(a) No action may be brought in accordance with section
46a-100 unless the complainant has received a release from the commission in accordance with the provisions of this section.
(b) The complainant and the respondent, by themselves or their attorneys, may jointly request that the complainant receive a release from the commission at any time from the date of filing the complaint. The complainant or the complainant's attorney may request a release from the commission if the complaint is still pending after the expiration of one hundred eighty days from the date of its filing or after a case assessment review in accordance with subsection (c) of section 46a-83, whichever is earlier. The executive director or the executive director's designee shall conduct an expedited case assessment review in accordance with subsection (c) of section 46a-83 if the commission receives a request for a release of jurisdiction from the complainant prior to one hundred eighty days from the date a complaint is filed.
(c) The executive director of the commission shall grant a release, allowing the complainant to bring a civil action, not later than ten business days after the date of receipt of the request for the release, except that if a case is scheduled for public hearing, the executive director may decline to issue a release. The commission may defer acting on a request for a release for thirty days if the executive director of the commission, or the executive director's designee, certifies that there is reason to believe that the complaint may be resolved within that period.
(d) Upon granting a release, the commission shall dismiss or otherwise administratively dispose of the discriminatory practice complaint pending with the commission without cost or penalty assessed to any party.
(e) Any action brought by the complainant in accordance with section 46a-100 shall be brought not later than ninety days after the date of the receipt of the release from the commission.
(P.A. 91-331, S. 2; P.A. 98-245, S. 7, 14; P.A. 11-237, S. 14; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 15-5, S. 85.)
History: P.A. 98-245 amended Subsec. (b) by adding provision that complainant and respondent may jointly request that the complainant receive a release at any time from date of filing the complaint until 210 days from the date of filing the complaint, effective July 1, 1998, and applicable to all cases pending with the commission or in the courts and cases filed on or after said date; P.A. 11-237 amended Subsec. (b) by making technical changes, deleting provision re expiration of 210 days from filing complaint, replacing provisions re requesting release of pending complaint after expiration of 210 days with provisions allowing such request by earlier of 180 days of its filing or after merit assessment review, and adding provision re expedited merit assessment review; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 15-5 amended Subsec. (b) by substituting “case assessment” for “merit assessment”, replacing reference to Sec. 46a-83(b) with reference to Sec. 46a-83(c) and deleting reference to “the complainant's attorney”, and amended Subsecs. (c) and (e) by making technical changes (Revisor's note: In Subsec. (b), an additional reference to Sec. 46a-83(b) was replaced editorially by the Revisors with reference to Sec. 46a-83(c) for accuracy, in accordance with Sec. 2-56f).
Cited. 231 C. 328; 236 C. 681.
Cited. 44 CA 446.
Subsec. (e):
Ninety-day time limitation for commencing action in Superior Court is mandatory, subject to waiver and equitable tolling, and not subject matter jurisdictional. 213 CA 128.
Notes of Decisions
Anderson v. Derby Bd. of Educ., 718 F. Supp. 2d 258 (D. Conn. 2010).
· cites it 15× “Because the CHRO never released jurisdiction over the claim against Derby, in accordance with Conn. Gen.Stat. § 46a-101, Plaintiff cannot pursue a CFEPA claim against Derby in district court.”
Lyon v. Jones, 968 A.2d 416 (Conn. 2009).
· cites it 10× “First, if the complaint is still pending, General Statutes § 46a-101 (b) provides two methods for obtaining a release of jurisdiction from the commission: “The complainant and the respondent, by themselves or their attorneys, may jointly request that the complainant receive a…”
Sokolovsky v. Mulholland, 213 Conn. App. 128 (Conn. App. Ct. 2022).
· cites it 38× “Although the plaintiff’s claims on appeal are not a model of clarity, he appears to argue that the court erred by concluding that (1) the ninety day time limitation set forth in General Statutes § 46a-101 (e)1 for commencing an action in Superior Court pursuant to General…”
Sempey v. Stamford Hosp., 184 A.3d 761 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).
· cites it 8× “" 3 General Statutes § 46a-101 (e) provides, in relevant part: "Any action brought by the complainant .”
Malasky v. Metal Prods. Corp., 689 A.2d 1145 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997).
· cites it 5× “On June 8, 1994, the plaintiff received a release of jurisdiction from the CHRO pursuant to General Statutes § 46a-101, 4 permitting her to bring a civil action *449 against Metal and Birken in Superior Court pursuant to General Statutes § 46a-100.”
Mosby v. Bd. of Educ. of Norwalk, 203 A.3d 694 (Conn. App. Ct. 2019).
· cites it 8× “On July 8, 2016, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the plaintiff had failed to commence his action within ninety days of receiving the release of jurisdiction from the commission as required by General Statutes § 46a-101 (e). 1 By order dated…”
Brittell v. Dep't of Corr., 717 A.2d 1254 (Conn. 1998).
· cites it 3× “” General Statutes § 46a-101 (a) provides: “No action may be brought in accordance with section 46a-100 unless the complainant has received a release from the commission in accordance with the provisions of this section.”
Westry v. Litchfield Visitation Ctr., 216 Conn. App. 869 (Conn. App. Ct. 2022).
· cites it 11× “On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court erred in (1) setting aside a default that had been entered against the defendant and (2) granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to commence the action within the ninety day time limitation set…”
White v. Martin, 23 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D. Conn. 1998).
· cites it 6× “This Court has held that subject matter jurisdiction does not exist where a plaintiff has not obtained a release from the CHRO and has, therefore, failed to comply with the clear and unambiguous statutory prerequisite embodied in C.”
Angelsea Prods., Inc. v. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 727 A.2d 1268 (Conn. 1999).
· cites it 8× “We concluded that our determination that the commission’s failure to comply with the deadlines set forth in §§ 46a-83 (b) and 46a-84 (b) had divested it of jurisdiction to proceed with a public hearing did not deprive Hyde of her constitutional due process rights because Hyde…”
Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities v. City of Torrington, 901 A.2d 46 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
· cites it 5× “With respect to counts one and two, the defendant claimed that Blin-koff could not pursue the state law discrimination *316 claims because she failed to obtain a release pursuant to General Statutes § 46a-101. 2 The district court, Underhill, J.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-101(a) — 15 cases
Anderson v. Derby Bd. of Educ., 718 F. Supp. 2d 258 (D. Conn. 2010).
“Because the CHRO never released jurisdiction over the claim against Derby, in accordance with Conn. Gen.Stat. § 46a-101, Plaintiff cannot pursue a CFEPA claim against Derby in district court.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-101(b) — 6 cases
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-101(d) — 5 cases
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-101(e) — 9 cases
Mosby v. Bd. of Educ. of Norwalk, 203 A.3d 694 (Conn. App. Ct. 2019).
“On July 8, 2016, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the plaintiff had failed to commence his action within ninety days of receiving the release of jurisdiction from the commission as required by General Statutes § 46a-101 (e). 1 By order dated…”
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