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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 46a — Human RightsChapter 814c — Human Rights and Opportunities

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-95 (2025)

(Formerly Sec. 31-128). Enforcement by Superior Court of order of presiding officer

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1982–2007 14citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 14 opinions since 1982. The most litigated part is subsection (j) (1 case).

(a) The commission, through the Attorney General or a commission legal counsel, or the complainant may petition the superior court for the judicial district of Hartford, the judicial district where any discriminatory practice occurred or the judicial district in which any person charged with a discriminatory practice resides or transacts business for the enforcement of any order issued by a presiding officer under this chapter and for appropriate temporary relief of a restraining order.

(b) The commission shall certify and file in the court the order of the presiding officer as part of the commission's petition or upon order of the court.

(c) Within five days after filing a petition in court, the commission or the complainant shall (1) serve the petition by registered or certified mail to all parties identified in the order issued by the presiding officer or the representatives of such parties, and (2) file with the court an affidavit stating the date and manner in which each party was served.

(d) The court shall: (1) Grant such relief by injunction or otherwise, including temporary relief, as it deems just and suitable, and (2) enter a decree enforcing any order of the presiding officer. The court may remand, in whole or in part, any order of the presiding officer, provided any such remand shall be limited to clarifying any ambiguity in the relief ordered. The court shall retain jurisdiction over the order while the presiding officer complies with the remand. Unless the relief ordered by the presiding officer is ambiguous, the court shall order the party in noncompliance to comply immediately with the presiding officer's order. The court shall award the costs of enforcement, including reasonable attorney's fees, to the commission or the complainant.

(e) No objection or defense that has not been urged before the presiding officer or that was raised or could have been raised on appeal under section 46a-94a may be considered by the court. Petitions pursuant to this section shall be limited to resolving whether the relief ordered by the presiding officer is sufficiently clear to enforce and shall not be deemed an appeal of or collateral attack on the order of the presiding officer.

(f) The jurisdiction of the court shall be exclusive and, except for a remand ordered pursuant to subsection (d) of this section, its judgment and decree shall be final. A final decree may be appealed to the Appellate Court in accordance with subsection (e) of section 51-197b.

(g) Petitions filed under this section shall be heard expeditiously.

(1949 Rev., S. 7407; 1963, P.A. 472; 1967, P.A. 715, S. 4; 1971, P.A. 870, S. 89; P.A. 76-436, S. 619, 681; P.A. 77-603, S. 124, 125; P.A. 78-280, S. 1, 127; P.A. 80-422, S. 43; 80-483, S. 92, 186; P.A. 83-496; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29, S. 35, 82; P.A. 88-241, S. 2; 88-317, S. 105, 107; P.A. 93-362, S. 5; June 30 Sp. Sess. P.A. 03-6, S. 195; P.A. 11-237, S. 12.)

History: 1963 act authorized complainants to obtain review of order in superior court in Subsec. (d); 1967 act authorized commission counsel to petition court when respondent is a state agency or officer in Subsec. (a); 1971 act replaced superior court with court of common pleas in Subsec. (d), effective September 1, 1971, except that courts with cases pending retain jurisdiction unless pending matters deemed transferable; P.A. 76-436 added references to judicial districts in Subsecs. (a) and (d), added reference to Sec. 52-7 in Subsec. (c) and replaced court of common pleas with superior court in Subsec. (d), effective July 1, 1978; P.A. 77-603 replaced provisions re review of orders by court with provision requiring that appeals be made in accordance with Sec. 4-183, retaining venue as before and jurisdictional powers; P.A. 78-280 deleted references to counties; P.A. 80-422 restated and reorganized provisions, creating new Subsecs. (b) to (h) from provisions formerly included in Subsec. (a), redesignating former Subsecs. (c) to (f) accordingly, and deleting provision granting hearings precedence over all other matters before court; P.A. 80-483 made technical correction in Subsec. (d); Sec. 31-128 transferred to Sec. 46a-95 in 1981; P.A. 83-496 amended Subsec. (j) to authorize the commission to appeal a final order of a hearing officer; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 83-29 substituted appellate court for supreme court in Subsec. (i); P.A. 88-241 amended Subsec. (d) to replace court authority to set aside any order with court authority to remand any order to the commission or hearing officer, amended Subsec. (e) to prohibit the court considering a defense that was not urged before the hearing officer or an objection or defense that was raised or could have been raised on appeal under Sec. 46a-94a, deleted Subsec. (j) re the appeal of a final order of a hearing officer to the superior court and Subsec. (k) re an automatic stay of enforcement of any order upon commencement of review proceedings, and relettered the remaining Subsec. accordingly; P.A. 88-317 substituted “presiding officer” for “hearing officer”, effective July 1, 1989, and applicable to all agency proceedings commencing on or after that date; P.A. 93-362 amended Subsec. (a) by deleting “or, where the respondent is an agency or officer of the state” and adding “or the complainant may” before “petition”; June 30 Sp. Sess. P.A. 03-6 amended Subsec. (a) to replace “the commission counsel” with “a commission legal counsel”, effective August 20, 2003; P.A. 11-237 amended Subsec. (a) by adding judicial district of Hartford, amended Subsec. (b) by replacing provision re transcript of entire record with “the order” and adding “as part of the commission's petition or upon order of the court”, amended Subsec. (c) by adding complainant as party who shall serve petition or file affidavit and adding provision re filing affidavit with the court, amended Subsec. (d) by deleting former Subdivs. (1) and (3), redesignating existing Subdiv. (2) as Subdiv. (1), adding new Subdiv. (2) re entering a decree, and adding provisions re remand by court, court retaining jurisdiction, court orders to comply, and awarding costs of enforcement, amended Subsec. (e) by deleting provision re failure to urge objection and adding provision re limit of petitions, deleted former Subsecs. (f) to (h), redesignated existing Subsec. (i) as Subsec. (f) and amended same by adding exception re remand ordered pursuant to Subsec. (d), deleting provision re review on appeal, and adding provision re appeal of final decree, redesignated existing Subsec. (j) as Subsec. (g) and amended same by deleting provision re determination upon transcript filed, and made technical changes.

Annotations to former section 31-128:

Substantial and competent evidence requires that evidence be such as would, in a jury trial, justify a refusal to direct a verdict. 140 C. 537. Cited. 153 C. 171. Substantial evidence means something more than a mere scintilla and must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established. Id., 652, 661. Substantial and competent evidence discussed. 163 C. 309, 327. Cited. 165 C. 318; 168 C. 26; 176 C. 88; Id., 291; Id., 533; 188 C. 44.

Employee applicant not a necessary party on appeal; he can just set the statutory machinery in motion. 17 CS 96. “Substantial and competent evidence” discussed. Id., 99; 18 CS 129; 20 CS 172. Superior Court has jurisdiction to hear appeal from order dismissing complainant's complaint of discrimination against her. 28 CS 341.

Annotations to present section:

Cited. 195 C. 543; 196 C. 208; 207 C. 547; 211 C. 464.

Cited. 3 CA 464; Id., 484; 4 CA 423; 5 CA 643; 15 CA 569.

The 14 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a-95 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
cites § 46a-95 4×cited by 50 cases
Where it cites § 46a-95
“within the exclusive jurisdiction of the domiciliary receivership court"); General Statutes § 46a-95 (i) ("jurisdiction of the court shall be exclusive"); General Statutes § 46b-42 ("Superior Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all complaints seeking a decree of…”
The case’s holding
A remand issued pursuant to General Statutes section 4-183(j) constitutes a final judgment for purposes of appeal regardless of the nature of the remand or subsequent proceedings.
Later courts cite it for
“where the court issues a remand pursuant to 4-183 (j), the remand is a final judgment for purposes of appeal, irrespective of both the nature of the remand and the administrative proceedings that are expected to follow it” · 2 citing courts
2
GREENHaylett v. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 541 A.2d 494 (Conn. 1988).
cites § 46a-95 6×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 46a-95
“The only issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erred in determining that General Statutes *548 § 52-49 1 required the plaintiff, Claris Haylett, to designate a return date in her appeal to the Superior Court, which had been taken as authorized by General Statutes §§…”
3
GREENWroblewski v. Lexington Gardens, Inc., 448 A.2d 801 (Conn. 1982).
cites § 46a-95 4×cited by 37 cases
Where it cites § 46a-95
“General Statutes § 31-128 (b) (now General Statutes § 46a-95 [g]). Under the unusual circumstances of this case, however, consideration of the refusal to hire was inseparable from the examiner's incorrect conclusion, affirmed by the trial court, that the plaintiff was…”
The case’s holding
An employer violates sex discrimination statutes by requiring female applicants to answer gender-specific medical questions unless the employer proves the requirement is a bona fide occupational qualification.
4
GREENAtkins v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 501 A.2d 1223 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985).
cites § 46a-95 2×cited by 117 cases
Where it cites § 46a-95
“” If these informal procedures are unsuccessful, the CHRO must certify the complaint, hold a hearing and order appropriate relief. General Statutes §§ 46a-84, 46a-86.”
The case’s holding
A common law cause of action for wrongful discharge exists only when the employee is otherwise without a remedy for the violation of public policy.
Later courts cite it for
“permitting the discharge to go unredressed would leave a valuable social policy to go unvindicated.” · 5 citing courts
5
GREENSullivan v. Bd. of Police Commissioners, 491 A.2d 1096 (Conn. 1985).
cites § 46a-95 2×cited by 115 cases
Where it cites § 46a-95
“General Statutes § 46a-95 (j). Read in its entirety, the CFEPA not only defines important rights designed to rid the workplace of discrimination, but also vests first-order administrative oversight and enforcement of these rights in the CHRO.”
The case’s holding
A plaintiff lacks statutory authority to pursue a discrimination claim if they fail to follow the administrative route prescribed by the legislature.
Later courts cite it for
“forecloses his access to judicial relief, because it deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to hear his complaint” · 9 citing courts
6
GREENRogers v. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 489 A.2d 368 (Conn. 1985).
cites § 46a-95 2×cited by 65 cases
Where it cites § 46a-95
“The right to judicial review of CHRO’s action is created by General Statutes § 46a-95 (j), which provides that “any complainant aggrieved by the dismissal of his complaint by [CHRO] may appeal therefrom in accordance with section 4-183.”
The case’s holding
The right to appeal an administrative decision is triggered by the mailing of notice and requires strict compliance with statutory time limits to maintain jurisdiction.
Later courts cite it for
“the failure to file an appeal from an administrative decision within the time set by statute renders the appeal invalid and deprives the court of jurisdiction to hear it.” · 13 citing courts
7
GREENIerardi v. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 546 A.2d 870 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988).
cites § 46a-95 2×cited by 63 cases
Where it cites § 46a-95
“to 1981) § 4-183 (b), which governed the *575 plaintiffs administrative appeal under the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA), provides, in pertinent part, that “[proceedings for such [an] appeal shall be instituted by filing a petition in superior court .”
The case’s holding
A request for reconsideration filed with an agency within the statutory appeal period tolls the time for filing an administrative appeal, even if the request is untimely under the agency's internal regulations.
8
GREENState v. Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities, 559 A.2d 1120 (Conn. 1989).
cites § 46a-95 1×cited by 102 cases
Where it cites § 46a-95
“to 1987) § 46a-95 (j); General Statutes § 4-183. They argued that Kirkland’s complaint was untimely under General Statutes (Rev.”
The case’s holding
Each payment of a discriminatory pension benefit constitutes a new act of discrimination, making a timely complaint possible and allowing for future benefit equalization as a remedy.
Later courts cite it for
“under certain circumstances, federal law defines the beginning and not the end of our approach to the subject.” · 7 citing courts
cites § 46a-95 1×cited by 33 cases
The case’s holding
Statutory venue provisions are procedural rather than jurisdictional, and improper venue does not defeat subject matter jurisdiction but requires transfer of the case.
10
GREENCatholic Fam. & Cmty. Servs. v. Comm'n on Human Rights, 489 A.2d 408 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985).
cites § 46a-95 2×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 46a-95
“77-603, § 124, amended what is now General Statutes § 46a-95 (j) to provide for an appeal pursuant to General Statutes *466 § 4-183.”
Later courts cite it for
“is a body in which the legislature has reposed general powers of administration of a particular state program in connection with which it has been given statutory authority to act for the state in the implementation of that program.” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENNapoleon v. Xerox Corp., 656 F. Supp. 1120 (D. Conn. 1987).
cites § 46a-95 2×subsections: (j) 2×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 46a-95
“…§§ 46a-84, 46a-86. Thereafter, any party aggrieved by a final order of the CHRO may appeal to the Superior Court. Conn.Gen. Stat. § 46a-95(j).”
12
GREENOsborn v. Rocklen Auto. Parts & Serv., Inc., 494 A.2d 622 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985).
cites § 46a-95 2×cited by 10 cases
Where it cites § 46a-95
“” If these informal procedures are unsuccessful, the CHRO must certify the complaint, hold a hearing and order appropriate relief.”
13
GREENSprague v. Comm'n on Human Rights, 489 A.2d 1064 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985).
cites § 46a-95 1×cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 46a-95
“It is undisputed that the plaintiff is a resident of Madison and alleges that the discriminatory practice occurred in Wallingford, where the employer is located.”
Later courts cite it for
“no cause shall fail on the ground that it has been made returnable to an improper location.” · 6 citing courts
14
GREENCooper v. Gorski (In re Gorski), 272 B.R. 59 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2002).
cites § 46a-95 1×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 46a-95
“Section 46a-95 further provides: The commission through the Attorney General, the commission counsel, or the complainant may petition the court within the judicial district wherein any discriminatory practice occurred or in which any person charged with a discriminatory practice…”

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198219942007

One bar per year. Tallest: 6 cases in 1985. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Conn.7Conn. App. Ct.5Bankr. D. Conn.1D. Conn.1
By subsection
(j)1 case
Napoleon v. Xerox Corp., 656 F. Supp. 1120 (D. Conn. 1987).“…§§ 46a-84, 46a-86. Thereafter, any party aggrieved by a final order of the CHRO may appeal to the Superior Court. Conn.Gen. Stat. § 46a-95(j).”
Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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