Connecticut General Statutes

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47-33b (2026)

Marketable record title. Definitions

✓ current as of May 2026
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As used in sections 47-33b to 47-33l, inclusive:

(a) “Marketable record title” means a title of record which operates to extinguish such interests and claims, existing prior to the effective date of the root of title, as are stated in section 47-33e;

(b) “Records” means the land records of the town where the particular land is located;

(c) “Recorded” means recorded as provided by section 47-10 or section 49-5, as the case may be;

(d) “Person dealing with land” includes a purchaser of any estate or interest therein, a mortgagee, an attaching or judgment creditor, a land contract vendee, or any other person seeking to acquire an estate or interest therein, or impose a lien thereon;

(e) “Root of title” means that conveyance or other title transaction in the chain of title of a person, purporting to create or containing language sufficient to transfer the interest claimed by such person, upon which he relies as a basis for the marketability of his title, and which was the most recent to be recorded as of a date forty years prior to the time when marketability is being determined. The effective date of the root of title is the date on which it is recorded;

(f) “Title transaction” means any transaction affecting title to any interest in land, including, but not limited to, title by will or descent, by public sale, by trustee's, referee's, guardian's, executor's, administrator's, conservator's or committee deed, by warranty or quitclaim deed, by mortgage or by decree of any court.

(1967, P.A. 553, S. 1; 1969, P.A. 509, S. 1; P.A. 78-105, S. 1, 4.)

History: 1969 act redefined “root of title” to change marker date for most recent conveyance or other title transaction from 60 to 40 years before time when marketability is being determined; P.A. 78-105 redefined “root of title” to include conveyances or title transactions “containing language sufficient to transfer” interest claimed.

Cited. 183 C. 59; 219 C. 81; 239 C. 199. Reaffirmed previous holdings that Marketable Title Act extinguishes only those property interests that once existed and cannot be used to create an easement where grantor had no legal right to make the grant. 254 C. 502. Trial court properly determined that Marketable Title Act was not a special defense that had to be pleaded affirmatively by defendants, and it properly placed on plaintiff the burden of proving validity of easement under the act. 270 C. 487.

Cited. 3 CA 550; 44 CA 683; 46 CA 525. Marketable Title Act applies and renders void an equitable claim to a constructive trust in farm. 130 CA 100.

Cited. 34 CS 31. Vague and general reference to “right of way” in chain of title is insufficient notice of existence of an easement and therefore null and void under Marketable Title Act; the reason that a general reference to pre-root of title interests is not sufficient to preserve or prevent extinguishment of those interests is to avoid necessity to search record back to the root of title, as well as to eliminate uncertainties caused by such general references. 51 CS 399.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 37 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1974–2024 · leading case: McBurney v. Cirillo, 889 A.2d 759 (Conn. 2006).
McBurney v. Cirillo, 889 A.2d 759 (Conn. 2006). · cites it 8× “e relevant records in the chain of title to the plaintiffs’ property trace back to a 1950 conveyance in fee, of lot 4, along with a ten foot strip of the lawn area south of lot 4 (first lawn parcel), from John Moran to Margaret Walker, which conveyance the parties agree…”
Il Giardino, LLC v. Belle Haven Land Co., 757 A.2d 1103 (Conn. 2000). · cites it 8× “General Statutes § 47-33b et seq. The plaintiff further alleged that the defendants and Clephane “have wilfully denied the Plaintiff the use and enjoyment of the aforementioned express and/or implied Right-of-Way and Grant-of-Use to the ways and avenues of [the Belle Haven Land…”
Coughlin v. Anderson, 853 A.2d 460 (Conn. 2004). · cites it 6× “The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly: (1) (a) granted the defendants’ motions for a directed verdict on the basis of the Connecticut Marketable Title Act (act); General Statutes § 47-33b et seq.; despite the defendants not having pleaded the act as a special…”
Schulz v. Syvertsen, 591 A.2d 804 (Conn. 1991). · cites it 8× “The issues presented on appeal are: (1) whether the trial court committed harmful error in considering the applicability of the Marketable Title Act, General Statutes § 47-33b et seq.; (2) whether the prescriptive use of the accessway was adverse under a claim of right; (3)…”
Vill. Apts., LLC v. Ward, 152 A.3d 76 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016). · cites it 6× “1 The court determined that the Marketable Title Act (act), General Statutes §§ 47-33b et seq., extinguished the right-of-way because it was not preserved in the roots of title of the parties as required by the act and did not meet the apparent easement exceptions in General…”
Dowling v. Heirs of Bond, 345 Conn. 119 (Conn. 2022). · cites it 4× “with a draft memoran- dum indicating that there was a ‘‘risk’’ that the defen- dant would rely on the Marketable Title Act (MTA), General Statutes § 47-33b et seq.,10 to invalidate the plaintiff’s claim of adverse possession and recommend- ing that, pursuant to General Statutes…”
Irving v. Firehouse Assocs., LLC, 898 A.2d 270 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006). · cites it 6× “The defendant claims that the court (1) lacked personal jurisdiction over the parties pursuant to General Statutes § 51-183b, *716 (2) improperly concluded that the claimed right-of-way was not extinguished by the provisions of the Marketable Title Act, General Statutes § 47-33b…”
Smith v. Plan. & Zoning Bd., 490 A.2d 539 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985). · cites it 4× “General Statutes § 47-33e states that “any person dealing with the land” may take marketable record title.”
Simonds v. Shaw, 691 A.2d 1102 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997). · cites it 5× “y prescriptive use by the plaintiffs and their predecessors in title, (3) found that a right-of-way is appurtenant to the plaintiffs’ property, (4) determined that the plaintiffs had met their burden of proving that a right-of-way exists, (5) found that there had not been an…”
Mizla v. Depalo, 438 A.2d 820 (Conn. 1981). · cites it 4× “This is an action involving the Connecticut Marketable Record Title Act, General Statutes §§ 47-33b through 47-331.”
Branch v. Occhionero, 681 A.2d 306 (Conn. 1996). · cites it 2× “4 The trial court also concluded that even if the right-of-way was not precluded by the unity of title doctrine, it was extinguished by operation of the Marketable Title Act (act), *203 General Statutes §§ 47-33b through 47-33l.”
Mannweiler v. LaFlamme, 700 A.2d 57 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997). · cites it 4× “” The trial court found it unnecessary to rule on the defendant’s special defense that they were entitled to judgment in this case pursuant to the provisions of the Marketable Title Act 3 due to the failure of the plaintiffs to preserve their claim, as required by General…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47-33b(a) — 1 case
Vill. Apts., LLC v. Ward, 152 A.3d 76 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016). “1 The court determined that the Marketable Title Act (act), General Statutes §§ 47-33b et seq., extinguished the right-of-way because it was not preserved in the roots of title of the parties as required by the act and did not meet the apparent easement exceptions in General…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 47-33b(e) — 1 case
Vill. Apts., LLC v. Ward, 152 A.3d 76 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016). “1 The court determined that the Marketable Title Act (act), General Statutes §§ 47-33b et seq., extinguished the right-of-way because it was not preserved in the roots of title of the parties as required by the act and did not meet the apparent easement exceptions in General…”
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