Prior to the commencement of a summary process action, except in the case in which the landlord elects to proceed under sections
47a-23 to
47a-23b, inclusive, to evict based on nonpayment of rent, on conduct by the tenant which constitutes a serious nuisance or on a violation of subsection (h) of section
47a-11, if there is a material noncompliance with section
47a-11 which materially affects the health and safety of the other tenants or materially affects the physical condition of the premises, or if there is a material noncompliance by the tenant with the rental agreement or a material noncompliance with the rules and regulations adopted in accordance with section
47a-9, and the landlord chooses to evict based on such noncompliance, the landlord shall deliver a written notice to the tenant specifying the acts or omissions constituting the breach and that the rental agreement shall terminate upon a date not less than fifteen days after receipt of the notice. If such breach can be remedied by repair by the tenant or payment of damages by the tenant to the landlord, and such breach is not so remedied within such fifteen-day period, the rental agreement shall terminate except that (1) if the breach is remediable by repairs or the payment of damages and the tenant adequately remedies the breach within such fifteen-day period, the rental agreement shall not terminate; or (2) if substantially the same act or omission for which notice was given recurs within six months, the landlord may terminate the rental agreement in accordance with the provisions of sections
47a-23 to
47a-23b, inclusive. For the purposes of this section, “serious nuisance” means (A) inflicting bodily harm upon another tenant or the landlord or threatening to inflict such harm with the present ability to effect the harm and under circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to believe that such threat will be carried out, (B) substantial and wilful destruction of part of the dwelling unit or premises, (C) conduct which presents an immediate and serious danger to the safety of other tenants or the landlord, or (D) using the premises or allowing the premises to be used for prostitution or the illegal sale of drugs or, in the case of a housing authority, using any area within fifteen hundred feet of any housing authority property in which the tenant resides for the illegal sale of drugs. If the landlord elects to evict based upon an allegation, pursuant to subsection (g) of section
47a-11, that the tenant failed to require other persons on the premises with his consent to conduct themselves in a manner that will not constitute a serious nuisance, and the tenant claims to have had no knowledge of such conduct, then, if the landlord establishes that the premises or, in the case of a landlord that is a housing authority, the premises or any area within fifteen hundred feet of any housing authority property in which the tenant resides has been used for the illegal sale of drugs, the burden shall be on the tenant to show that he had no knowledge of the creation of the serious nuisance.
(P.A. 76-95, S. 16, 27; 76-435, S. 75, 82; P.A. 79-571, S. 35; P.A. 80-288; P.A. 86-267, S. 2; P.A. 89-254, S. 4; P.A. 95-247, S. 6; P.A. 97-231, S. 2.)
History: P.A. 76-435 revised effective date section of P.A. 76-95; P.A. 79-571 added references to Secs. 47a-23a and 47a-23b and deleted former Subsec. (b) re termination of rental agreement for nonpayment of rent; P.A. 80-288 added evictions based on illegal conduct of tenant; P.A. 86-267 replaced provision re eviction based on conduct which “is illegal” with conduct which “constitutes a serious nuisance” and defined “serious nuisance”; P.A. 89-254 made provisions of section applicable “Prior to the commencement of a summary process action”, added exception when landlord elects to evict based “on a violation of subsection (h) of section 47a-11”, made the delivery of the written notice by the landlord to the tenant mandatory rather than discretionary and applicable if “the landlord chooses to evict based on such noncompliance” and added provision re the tenant's evidentiary burden in an eviction action when the premises have been used for the illegal sale of drugs; P.A. 95-247 redefined “serious nuisance” to include “allowing the premises to be used” for prostitution or the illegal sale of drugs; P.A. 97-231 provided that the notice shall specify that the rental agreement will terminate upon a date not less than 15 days, rather than 30 days, after receipt of the notice, decreased from 21 to 15 days the time period for the tenant to remedy the breach, amended the definition of “serious nuisance” to include, in the case of a housing authority, using any area within 1,500 feet of any housing authority property in which the tenant resides for the illegal sale of drugs and added provision that if the landlord is a housing authority and is electing to evict in certain circumstances the burden shifts to the tenant if the landlord establishes that “the premises or any area within fifteen hundred feet of any housing authority property in which the tenant resides” has been used for the illegal sale of drugs.
Cited. 202 C. 128; 224 C. 903. Plaintiff required to give defendant notice before instituting summary process action. 225 C. 600. Cited. 235 C. 650.
Cited. 5 CA 101; 13 CA 150; 19 CA 564. Clear intent to treat differently those committing a serious nuisance and those failing to require others to desist from committing a serious nuisance. 28 CA 684. Cited. 32 CA 133. Subpara. (D): Defendant's appeal dismissed for mootness. 57 CA 731. Provisions are not restricted to actions of tenant and should take into account actions of tenant's guests. 79 CA 300. Does not require landlord in summary process action to allege in pleading tenant's failure to remedy violations specified in pretermination notice. 95 CA 802. Where notice to quit referred only to defendant's creation of “serious nuisance” by engaging in conduct which presents an immediate danger to other tenants or the landlord pursuant to Subpara. (C), and court's judgment in favor of plaintiff rested on conclusion that defendant threatened to inflict bodily harm pursuant to Subpara. (A), court had no subject matter jurisdiction to evict on a ground other than one charged in the notice to quit and discrepancy deprived defendant of notice of claims to be addressed by court. 123 CA 295. As defendant was not a tenant and had no right or privilege to occupy the premises, defendant was not entitled to a separate pretermination notice because defendant could not remedy the violation except by quitting the premises. 124 CA 728. Tenant cannot “repair” a breach of lease when the breach consists of drug related criminal activity. 129 CA 313. Court had subject matter jurisdiction over summary process action where plaintiff landlord did not deliver a pretermination notice to defendant tenant but alleged in notice to quit, which complied with Sec. 47a-23, that defendant tenant's conduct constituted a serious nuisance and court did not need to reach merits of whether defendant's conduct did, in fact, constitute a serious nuisance. 209 CA 569.
Use of “may” instead of “shall” in statute does not render requirement of notice directory rather than mandatory; “may” is to be construed as “shall” when necessary to effect manifest legislative intent. 35 CS 274. Cited. Id., 297; 37 CS 534; 38 CS 683. Plaintiff landlord was exempt under statute from serving pretermination notice to tenant evicted as a result of arrest off the premises for illegal sale of drugs; alleged acts by tenant arguably fall within definition of “serious nuisance” under statute. 50 CS 125.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
48
cases (
10 in the last 5 years), 1979–2026 · leading case:
Hous. Auth. v. Harris, 625 A.2d 816 (Conn. 1993).
Hous. Auth. v. Harris, 625 A.2d 816 (Conn. 1993).
· cites it 24× “General Statutes § 47a-15. The defendant remained in possession and the plaintiff instituted a summary process action seeking a judgment of possession against the defendant.”
Jefferson Garden Assocs. v. Greene, 520 A.2d 173 (Conn. 1987).
· cites it 14× “The applicable principles of Connecticut law are codified in General Statutes § 47a-23, and the procedures that are required for a valid eviction are set forth in General Statutes § 47a-15. In addition, a landlord who seeks to evict a tenant from the Michael Road apartment…”
Hous. Auth. v. Stevens, 209 Conn. App. 569 (Conn. App. Ct. 2022).
· cites it 30× “The defendant claims that the court (1) lacked subject mat- ter jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to deliver to the defendant a pretermination, or Kapa,1 notice prior to commencing its summary process action against him, (2) improperly found that his conduct constituted…”
Kapa Assocs. v. Flores, 408 A.2d 22 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979).
· cites it 13× “” General Statutes § 47a-15 (Rev. to 1979).”
Josephine Towers, L.P. v. Kelly, 199 Conn. App. 829 (Conn. App. Ct. 2020).
· cites it 18× “On October 12, 2017, pursuant to General Statutes § 47a-15, the plaintiffs served on the defendant a preter- mination, or Kapa,1 notice.”
Hous. Auth. of City of New Haven v. Deroche, 962 A.2d 904 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
· cites it 12× “” See General Statutes § 47a-15 (2) (C). On July *359 22,2005, the plaintiff served the defendant with a notice to quit possession of the apartment on or before August 4, 2005.”
Hous. Auth. of New Haven v. Martin, 898 A.2d 245 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
· cites it 11× “After the plaintiff filed its amended complaint, the defendant filed a motion to strike all of the plaintiffs claims because the plaintiff did not allege that the defendant had failed to remedy the alleged lease and statutory violations within the time provided by General…”
City of Bridgeport v. Barbour-Daniel Elec., Inc., 548 A.2d 744 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988).
· cites it 5× “The first notice, based on a material noncompliance by the tenant, was ineffective because of a failure to comply with the notice requirements of General Statutes § 47a-15. 3 The second notice, served two weeks later, was based on lapse of time because the parties’ written lease…”
Marrinan v. Hamer, 497 A.2d 67 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985).
· cites it 8× “The plaintiffs withdrew this count when they realized that they had failed to comply with the notice requirements of General Statutes § 47a-15. 1 The first count is based on a notice to quit that was served on July 13, 1983, demanding vacation of the premises by July 31, 1983.”
Suburban Greater Hartford Realty Mgmt. Corp. v. Edwards, 1 A.3d 1138 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010).
· cites it 30× “The defendant, Robyn Johnson Edwards, appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting possession of the premises in favor of the plaintiff, Suburban Greater Hartford Realty Management Corporation, in its summary process action alleging serious nuisance pursuant to General…”
Vidiaki, LLC v. Just Breakfast & Things!!! LLC, 33 A.3d 848 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012).
· cites it 9× “On the basis of our reading of Jefferson Garden Associates , we conclude that although the Supreme Court mentioned § 47a-23, the court’s rationale focused on the notice required under General Statutes § 47a-15. This reading is supported by the fact that “[§ 47a-15’s] notice…”
Ossen v. Kreutzer, 563 A.2d 741 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989).
· cites it 12× “The trial court interpreted that statute to require the plaintiff, as a prerequisite to the institution of a summary process action, to give the defendant an additional thirty days notice as required under General Statutes § 47a-15.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.