In any action for summary process under this chapter or section
21-80 it shall be an affirmative defense that the plaintiff brought such action solely because the defendant attempted to remedy, by lawful means, including contacting officials of the state or of any town, city, borough or public agency or filing a complaint with a fair rent commission, any condition constituting a violation of any of the provisions of chapter 368o, or of chapter 412, or of any other state statute or regulation or of the housing or health ordinances of the municipality wherein the premises which are the subject of the complaint lie. The obligation on the part of the defendant to pay rent or the reasonable value of the use and occupancy of the premises which are the subject of any such action shall not be abrogated or diminished by any provision of this section.
(1969, P.A. 315; 1972, P.A. 160, S. 4; 186, S. 14; P.A. 74-333, S. 6, 12; P.A. 78-303, S. 118, 136; P.A. 79-560, S. 20, 39.)
History: 1972 acts specified as affirmative defense that plaintiff brought action because defendant sought remedy by filing complaint with fair rent commission and added reference to statutes and regulations other than provisions of Ch. 352 and later added reference to Ch. 412; P.A. 74-333 added reference to Sec. 21-80; Sec. 52-540a transferred to Sec. 47a-33 in 1977; P.A. 78-303 deleted reference to Sec. 21-80; P.A. 79-560 restored reference to Sec. 21-80.
See Sec. 47a-20 prohibiting retaliatory action by landlord.
See Sec. 47a-21 re actions deemed not to be retaliatory.
Annotations to former section 52-540a:
Cited. 33 CS 15. Defense of retaliatory eviction not available in summary process action for nonpayment of rent. 34 CS 594.
Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 207, 208.
Annotations to present section:
Cited. 178 C. 586; 217 C. 313.
Cited. 1 CA 439; 16 CA 444.
Cited. 35 CS 233. Section establishes retaliatory action as affirmative defense; no presumptions permitted under section and tenant, by affirmative proof, must establish landlord's primary motive in seeking eviction was in retaliation for tenant's exercise of his statutory right to report housing code violations; burden of persuasion for affirmative defense rests upon tenant who asserts it. Id., 261. Cited. 36 CS 47; 38 CS 70; Id., 370.
Notes of Decisions
Fairchild Heights, Inc. v. Dickal, 45 A.3d 627 (Conn. 2012).
· cites it 10× “he following special defenses: (1) that the plaintiff did not apply the park rules and regulations fairly and evenly in violation of General Statutes § 21-70(d)(3); (2) that the remedy of summary process was unavailable to the plaintiff because the defendants had engaged in…”
Wilson v. Jefferson, 908 A.2d 13 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
· cites it 5× “Finally, in counts fourteen through seventeen, the plaintiff set forth causes of action for retaliatory eviction on the basis of General Statutes § 47a-33. 6 A jury trial was commenced whereupon both sides presented their case to the jury.”
Alteri v. Layton, 408 A.2d 18 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979).
· cites it 6× “Although the defendant asserts only the defense of retaliatory eviction under $47a-20, supra, the *263 court feels compelled to review for anticipated litigation the relationship of a second retaliatory action statute, § 47a-33 of the General Statutes. 2 Section 47a-20, supra,…”
Southland Corp. v. Vernon, 473 A.2d 318 (Conn. App. Ct. 1983).
· cites it 2× “Summary process, formerly limited by statute to a few simple matters, now includes actions for possession by cooperative housing corporations against their members or shareholders, based on the breach of a lease by the members or shareholders; General Statutes § 47a-24; it may…”
Connecticut Mobile Home Assn., Inc. v. Jensen's, Inc., 424 A.2d 285 (Conn. 1979).
· cites it 2× “General Statutes § 47a-33. For the *593 purpose of deciding the narrow issue before us, however, we are limited to the well-pleaded facts of the complaint which we assume to be true.”
Ossen v. Wanat, 585 A.2d 685 (Conn. 1991).
· cites it 4× “” General Statutes § 47a-33 provides in relevant part: “In any action for summary process .”
Visco v. Cody, 547 A.2d 935 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988).
· cites it 2× “As for § 47a-33, before the tenant may raise retaliation as an affirmative defense, he must establish that an attempt was made to remedy “by lawful means” any condition which was a violation of the state statutes or of a municipal code, including lodging a complaint with a…”
Groton Townhouse Apts. v. Covington, 448 A.2d 221 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1982).
· cites it 2× “Moreover, after weighing conflicting testimony, the trial court concluded that the plaintiff did not possess the sole motivation, as required by § 47a-33, of bringing suit to retaliate against the defendants’ lawful efforts to remedy building conditions.”
Kosel Equity, LLC v. MacGregor (Conn. 2026).
· cites it 14× “Finally, General Statutes § 47a-33 enumerates cir- cumstances under which a tenant may raise retaliation as a special defense to a summary process action, even when the operation of § 47a-20a defeats the presump- tion that would otherwise apply under § 47a-20.”
TOV Realty, LLC v. Suarez (Conn. 2026).
· cites it 8× “Among the special defenses were retaliatory evic- tion under § 47a-20 and General Statutes § 47a-33, and an equitable defense seeking dismissal of the action in light of the Hartford commission’s cease and desist order.”
Dorsey v. Vernon Vill., Inc., 934 A.2d 882 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007).
· cites it 4× “General Statutes § 47a-33. 10 Thus, the court will not grant injunctive relief.”
Black Rock Gardens, LLC v. Berry, 224 Conn. App. 379 (Conn. App. Ct. 2024).
· cites it 2× “General Statutes § 47a-33 provides: ‘‘In any action for summary process under this chapter or [General Statutes §] 21-80 it shall be an affirmative defense that the plaintiff brought such action solely because the defendant attempted to remedy, by lawful means, including…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.