Conn. Gen. Stat. » Title 48 — EMINENT DOMAIN · Chapter 835 — Eminent Domain
Connecticut General Statutes

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 48-23 (2026)

Obtaining possession of land acquired by eminent domain

✓ current as of May 2026
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When, under the provisions of any statute authorizing the condemnation of land in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, an appraisal of damages has been returned to the clerk of the Superior Court, as provided by law, and when the amount of appraisal has been paid or secured to be paid or deposited with the State Treasurer, as provided by law, any judge of the Superior Court may, upon application and proof of such payment or deposit, order such clerk to issue an execution commanding a state marshal to put the parties entitled thereto into peaceable possession of the land so condemned.

(1949 Rev., S. 7190; 1961, P.A. 517, S. 115; P.A. 00-99, S. 98, 154.)

History: 1961 act referred to amount of appraisal paid or deposited with state treasurer, rather than with county treasurer, county government having been abolished in 1959; P.A. 00-99 replaced reference to sheriff of the county with state marshal, effective December 1, 2000.

Cited. 139 C. 200. There is merit to contention of plaintiff town that defendant condemnee holding possession of condemned land after title had passed to highway commissioner condemnor had become a tenant by sufferance of commissioner and was a tenant within meaning of Sec. 52-549. 159 C. 64.

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Notes of Decisions
Cited in 6 cases, 1968–2004 · leading case: Krauss v. Wayne Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 493 S.E.2d 428 (N.C. 1997).
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Krauss v. Wayne Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 493 S.E.2d 428 (N.C. 1997). · cites it 4× “There, the biological father had consented to the adoption of his children by their stepfather. Id. at 621, 468 S.”
Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004). · cites it 2× “General Statutes § 48-23 provides in relevant part: “When, under the provisions of any statute authorizing the condemnation of land in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, an appraisal of damages has been returned to the clerk of the Superior Court .”
Town of Southington v. Francis, 266 A.2d 387 (Conn. 1970). · cites it 3× “We find no merit to the contention of the defendant that as used in § 52-549 the words “personal effects” were used in the statute in a sense other than their usual meaning of personal estate, goods, moveables and chattel property.”
Matter of Est. of Edwards, 343 S.E.2d 913 (N.C. 1986). · cites it 2× “C.G.S. § 48-23(2) clearly restates the principle that adopted children are legally severed from their biological parents, and vice versa: "The biological parents of the person adopted, if living, shall, from and after the entry of the final order of adoption, be relieved of all…”
Smalls v. Ives, 296 F. Supp. 448 (D. Conn. 1968). · cites it 13× “§ 48-23 because on its face it allows the state to be put into possession of condemned property (1) without requiring prior notice and a hearing for occupants on the land and (2) without requiring that the state first provide suitable relocation housing.”
Griffin v. Griffin, 456 S.E.2d 329 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995). “C.G.S. § 48-23(1) (1991), and an order of custody is always subject to modification upon a showing of changed circumstances.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 48-23(1) — 1 case
Griffin v. Griffin, 456 S.E.2d 329 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995). “C.G.S. § 48-23(1) (1991), and an order of custody is always subject to modification upon a showing of changed circumstances.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 48-23(2) — 2 cases
Krauss v. Wayne Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 493 S.E.2d 428 (N.C. 1997). “There, the biological father had consented to the adoption of his children by their stepfather. Id. at 621, 468 S.”
Matter of Est. of Edwards, 343 S.E.2d 913 (N.C. 1986). “C.G.S. § 48-23(2) clearly restates the principle that adopted children are legally severed from their biological parents, and vice versa: "The biological parents of the person adopted, if living, shall, from and after the entry of the final order of adoption, be relieved of all…”
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