(a) A mortgage deed given to secure payment of a promissory note, which furnishes information from which there can be determined the date, principal amount and maximum term of the note, shall be deemed to give sufficient notice of the nature and amount of the obligation to constitute a valid lien securing payment of all sums owed under the terms of such note.
(b) With regard to a mortgage deed given to secure payment of a promissory note which contains a provision expressly providing that the interest rate set forth in the note may vary one or more times during the life of the note and that such changes in rate may cause the term of the note to change, the “maximum term” shall be adequately disclosed if the mortgage deed furnishes information from which can be determined: (1) A statement that the interest rate is subject to variation, (2) the conditions under which such rate may vary, (3) the manner, including changes in payment amounts, number of scheduled periodic payments, or change in the amount due at maturity, in which any increase and decrease in the rate may be effected, and (4) the date, if applicable, by which according to the terms of the note, remaining amounts of principal and interest, if any, shall be due and payable in full, regardless of changes in the interest rate. The mortgagee shall give written notice of any change in the interest rate to a second or subsequent encumbrancer, provided such encumbrancer has given written notice by registered mail, return receipt requested, of its encumbrance to the mortgagee. The provisions of this section shall not invalidate any mortgage which would be valid without this section.
(P.A. 76-357, S. 2, 3; P.A. 81-391, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 81-391 added Subsec. (b) concerning the information required in a mortgage deed to adequately disclose the maximum term of a note with a variable interest rate and requiring the mortgagee to give notice of any change in the interest rate to a second or subsequent encumbrancer.
Supplements but does not supplant relevant common law standards for validity of mortgages. 202 C. 566. Cited. 210 C. 221; 230 C. 828; 232 C. 294.
Notes of Decisions
Dart & Bogue Co. v. Slosberg, 522 A.2d 763 (Conn. 1987).
· cites it 30× “The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on its complaint alleging that the mortgages were unenforceable, under General Statutes § 49-31b (a), because they failed to “furnish information from which there can be determined the maximum term” of the note they purported to secure.”
Dart & Bogue Co. v. Slosberg (In Re Dart & Bogue Co.), 52 B.R. 594 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1985).
· cites it 12× “Conn.Gen.Stat. § 49-31b(a), originally enacted in 1976, reads as follows: A mortgage deed given to secure payment of a promissory note, which furnishes information from which there can be determined the date, principal amount and maximum term of a note, shall be deemed to give…”
Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Esposito, 554 A.2d 735 (Conn. 1989).
· cites it 4× “General Statutes § 49-31b (a) provides: “information in deed sufficient NOTICE AS TO NATURE AND AMOUNT OF OBLIGATION.”
Oller v. Oller-Chiang, 646 A.2d 822 (Conn. 1994).
· cites it 2× “See footnote 1, General Statutes §§ 45a-676 and 45a-677.”
Naugatuck Sav. Bank v. Fiorenzi, 654 A.2d 729 (Conn. 1995).
· cites it 6× “Although we contrasted the language of § 49-4b to that of General Statutes § 49-31b (a) in Dart & Bogue Co.”
Saunders v. KDFBS, LLC, 206 Conn. App. 92 (Conn. App. Ct. 2021).
· cites it 4× “2 Because the trial court made findings as to the priority of the Davis and Saunders mortgages, and the plaintiff does not contest the validity of the Davis mortgage on appeal, we limit our analysis to the issue of whether the Davis mortgage provided constructive notice to the…”
Pinkus v. Union Trust Co. (In re Schreier), 111 B.R. 25 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990).
· cites it 3× “UTC, on the other hand, argues that the mortgage complies with the common law requirement that the nature and amount of the debt be stated and, alternatively, that the mortgage meets the “safe harbor” requirements of Connecticut General Statutes § 49-31b(a). 2 As I conclude *27…”
Martino v. Scalzo, 966 A.2d 339 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
“4 The plaintiff cited “General Statutes § 49-31(b)” in her petition, but we conclude that she intended to refer to § 49-31b because of her allegation that the mortgage did not state the maximum term of the promissory note.”
Paul Fiano, Sr. (Bankr. D. Conn. 2019).
· cites it 8× “For the Manchester Mortgage to be enforceable under Connecticut law, it must satisfy certain minimum requirements as set forth in Conn.Gen.Stat. § 49-31b(a) and under Connecticut common law.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 49-31b(a) — 3 cases
Dart & Bogue Co. v. Slosberg (In Re Dart & Bogue Co.), 52 B.R. 594 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1985).
“Conn.Gen.Stat. § 49-31b(a), originally enacted in 1976, reads as follows: A mortgage deed given to secure payment of a promissory note, which furnishes information from which there can be determined the date, principal amount and maximum term of a note, shall be deemed to give…”
Pinkus v. Union Trust Co. (In re Schreier), 111 B.R. 25 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990).
“UTC, on the other hand, argues that the mortgage complies with the common law requirement that the nature and amount of the debt be stated and, alternatively, that the mortgage meets the “safe harbor” requirements of Connecticut General Statutes § 49-31b(a). 2 As I conclude *27…”
Paul Fiano, Sr. (Bankr. D. Conn. 2019).
“For the Manchester Mortgage to be enforceable under Connecticut law, it must satisfy certain minimum requirements as set forth in Conn.Gen.Stat. § 49-31b(a) and under Connecticut common law.”
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