No judge of any court who tried a case without a jury in which a new trial is granted, or in which the judgment is reversed by the Supreme Court, may again try the case. No judge of any court who presided over any jury trial, either in a civil or criminal case, in which a new trial is granted, may again preside at the trial of the case.
(1949 Rev., S. 7697; P.A. 74-183, S. 282, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 60, 681; P.A. 82-248, S. 92.)
History: P.A. 74-183 prohibited judge who tried case in which judgment was reversed in appellate session of superior court from trying case again, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-436 deleted provision added by P.A. 74-183, effective July 1, 1978; Sec. 51-41 transferred to Sec. 51-183c in the 1977 Court Reorganization Supplement; P.A. 82-248 rephrased section but made no substantive change.
Annotations to former section 51-41:
Applies though offenses not in all respects the same. 75 C. 109. Does not create a jurisdictional infirmity which the parties are powerless to remedy by waiver or consent. 147 C. 296. Where judge who tried defendant had been a member of the sentence review division which had heard defendant's application for a review of his sentence on a previous conviction, there was not even a technical infraction of section since the powers of the sentence review division are limited to a review of the sentence imposed and have nothing to do with the ascertainment of guilt or innocence. 152 C. 629.
Section does not prevent original presiding judge from discontinuing case at regular annual call of docket. 3 CS 420.
Annotations to present section:
Cited. 186 C. 426; 188 C. 354; 216 C. 813; 227 C. 784; 242 C. 617. Sentencing hearing does not constitute a trial within meaning of section and defendant's motion that case be assigned to a new judge for resentencing is without merit. 260 C. 93. Section applies when a judgment is reversed in part and fewer than all of the issues in the case must be retried, and includes when a judgment is reversed only as to damages and remanded for a new trial only on the issue of damages. 334 C. 279.
Cited. 10 CA 103. Term “trial” not intended to include pretrial or short calendar proceedings. 27 CA 15. Section does not apply to pretrial or short calendar proceedings, and accordingly, court unwilling to unilaterally extend its legislative policy to arbitration process. 66 CA 202. Section is clear and unambiguous, and explicitly prohibits a judge who tries a case that is thereafter reversed from trying the case on remand, there being no reasonable manner in which the language can be interpreted to yield a different result. 133 CA 431; judgment reversed, see 311 C. 649. Section not restricted to cases in which issues to be considered on remand are identical to those that already had been decided by the trial judge, and it is of no consequence to proper application of section that a remand order require consideration of an issue in the case that the trial judge had yet to resolve on its merits or that the prior judgment had not been reversed with respect to the trial judge's resolution of that unresolved issue of fact. 166 CA 408. Policy underpinning of section does not apply to workers' compensation proceedings. 212 CA 1.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
45
cases (
7 in the last 5 years), 1982–2025 · leading case:
Barlow v. Comm'r of Corr., 142 A.3d 290 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016).
Barlow v. Comm'r of Corr., 142 A.3d 290 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016).
· cites it 24× “He also contends that General Statutes § 51-183c would necessitate that a different habeas judge preside over the new evidentiary hearing.”
Barlow v. Comm'r of Corr., 182 A.3d 78 (Conn. 2018).
· cites it 15× “On appeal, the commissioner contends that the Appellate Court improperly concluded in Barlow II that (1) **612 General Statutes § 51-183c 2 required that a different habeas judge preside over the proceedings directed by Barlow I to determine whether deficient performance by the…”
Chase Home Fin., LLC v. Scroggin, 194 Conn. App. 843 (Conn. App. Ct. 2019).
· cites it 28× “Scroggin also known as Daniel Scroggin, appeals from the judgment of strict foreclo- sure rendered by the trial court, for the second time, in favor of the substitute plaintiff, AJX Mortgage Trust I, a Delaware Trust, Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, Trustee.”
State v. Miranda, 794 A.2d 506 (Conn. 2002).
· cites it 9× “*131 B The defendant also claims that General Statutes § 51-183c 15 requires that this case be assigned to another trial judge for resentencing.”
State v. Riley, 209 A.3d 646 (Conn. App. Ct. 2019).
· cites it 21× “The defendant argued, for various reasons, that Practice Book § 1-22, General Statutes § 51-183c, rule 2.11 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment required recusal.”
Gagne v. Vaccaro, 35 A.3d 380 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012).
· cites it 20× “” General Statutes § 51-183c. The language of § 51-183c is clear and unambiguous.”
Bd. of Educ. of East Haven V. East Haven Educ. Ass'n, 784 A.2d 958 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
· cites it 12× “Second, the board claims that the designation of an arbitrator on remand is governed by General Statutes § 51-183c. 12 Third, the board maintains that even if the statute vests discretion in the trial court to direct a remand either to the original arbitrator or a new…”
Lafayette Bank & Trust Co. v. Szentkuti, 603 A.2d 1215 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992).
· cites it 14× “The defendants also claim, relying on General Statutes § 51-183c, 4 that the judge who presided over the first valuation hearing should have disqualified himself from the second hearing on the same matter.”
State v. Rizzo, 31 A.3d 1094 (Conn. 2011).
· cites it 4× “, General Statutes § 51-183c (requiring different judge, in case of court trial, after new trial is granted or judgment is reversed on appeal and, in case of jury trial, after new trial is granted); General Statutes § 51-183h (disallowing judge from hearing motion attacking…”
Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Giacomi, 699 A.2d 101 (Conn. 1997).
· cites it 3× “Judge Blue first held a hearing to determine whether he was presumptively disqualified from continuing with the case pursuant to General Statutes § 51-183c, which provides in relevant part: “No judge of any court who tried a case without a jury in which anew trial is granted, or…”
State v. McCoy, 206 A.3d 725 (Conn. 2019).
· cites it 2× “See General Statutes § 51-183c. Moreover, if the remand to the trial court is to serve any more than a perfunctory purpose, it would seem necessary to not only reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court, but to vacate the decision of the Appellate Court that considered, and…”
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