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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 51 — CourtsChapter 882 — Superior Court

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-183c (2025)

(Formerly Sec. 51-41). Same judge not to preside at new trial

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1982–2025 45citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 45 opinions since 1982, 7 of them in the last five years.

No judge of any court who tried a case without a jury in which a new trial is granted, or in which the judgment is reversed by the Supreme Court, may again try the case. No judge of any court who presided over any jury trial, either in a civil or criminal case, in which a new trial is granted, may again preside at the trial of the case.

(1949 Rev., S. 7697; P.A. 74-183, S. 282, 291; P.A. 76-436, S. 60, 681; P.A. 82-248, S. 92.)

History: P.A. 74-183 prohibited judge who tried case in which judgment was reversed in appellate session of superior court from trying case again, effective December 31, 1974; P.A. 76-436 deleted provision added by P.A. 74-183, effective July 1, 1978; Sec. 51-41 transferred to Sec. 51-183c in the 1977 Court Reorganization Supplement; P.A. 82-248 rephrased section but made no substantive change.

Annotations to former section 51-41:

Applies though offenses not in all respects the same. 75 C. 109. Does not create a jurisdictional infirmity which the parties are powerless to remedy by waiver or consent. 147 C. 296. Where judge who tried defendant had been a member of the sentence review division which had heard defendant's application for a review of his sentence on a previous conviction, there was not even a technical infraction of section since the powers of the sentence review division are limited to a review of the sentence imposed and have nothing to do with the ascertainment of guilt or innocence. 152 C. 629.

Section does not prevent original presiding judge from discontinuing case at regular annual call of docket. 3 CS 420.

Annotations to present section:

Cited. 186 C. 426; 188 C. 354; 216 C. 813; 227 C. 784; 242 C. 617. Sentencing hearing does not constitute a trial within meaning of section and defendant's motion that case be assigned to a new judge for resentencing is without merit. 260 C. 93. Section applies when a judgment is reversed in part and fewer than all of the issues in the case must be retried, and includes when a judgment is reversed only as to damages and remanded for a new trial only on the issue of damages. 334 C. 279.

Cited. 10 CA 103. Term “trial” not intended to include pretrial or short calendar proceedings. 27 CA 15. Section does not apply to pretrial or short calendar proceedings, and accordingly, court unwilling to unilaterally extend its legislative policy to arbitration process. 66 CA 202. Section is clear and unambiguous, and explicitly prohibits a judge who tries a case that is thereafter reversed from trying the case on remand, there being no reasonable manner in which the language can be interpreted to yield a different result. 133 CA 431; judgment reversed, see 311 C. 649. Section not restricted to cases in which issues to be considered on remand are identical to those that already had been decided by the trial judge, and it is of no consequence to proper application of section that a remand order require consideration of an issue in the case that the trial judge had yet to resolve on its merits or that the prior judgment had not been reversed with respect to the trial judge's resolution of that unresolved issue of fact. 166 CA 408. Policy underpinning of section does not apply to workers' compensation proceedings. 212 CA 1.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 51-183c most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENBarlow v. Comm'r of Corr., 142 A.3d 290 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016).
cites § 51-183c 24×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 51-183c
“He also contends that General Statutes § 51-183c would necessitate that a different habeas judge preside over the new evidentiary hearing.”
2
GREENBarlow v. Comm'r of Corr., 182 A.3d 78 (Conn. 2018).
cites § 51-183c 15×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 51-183c
“On appeal, the commissioner contends that the Appellate Court improperly concluded in Barlow II that (1) **612 General Statutes § 51-183c 2 required that a different habeas judge preside over the proceedings directed by Barlow I to determine whether deficient performance by the…”
3
GREENChase Home Fin., LLC v. Scroggin, 222 A.3d 1025 (Conn. App. Ct. 2019).
cites § 51-183c 28×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 51-183c
“Scroggin also known as Daniel Scroggin, appeals from the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered by the trial court, for the second time, in favor of the substitute plaintiff, AJX Mortgage Trust I, a Delaware Trust, Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, Trustee.”
4
GREENState v. Miranda, 794 A.2d 506 (Conn. 2002).
cites § 51-183c 9×cited by 94 cases
Where it cites § 51-183c
“*131 B The defendant also claims that General Statutes § 51-183c 15 requires that this case be assigned to another trial judge for resentencing.”
The case’s holding
A judicial interpretation of a statute does not violate due process if it is neither unexpected nor indefensible based on the law existing at the time of the conduct.
Later courts cite it for
“merely as component parts or building blocks of a larger total punishment for the aggregate convictions.” · 1 citing court
5
GREENState v. Riley, 209 A.3d 646 (Conn. App. Ct. 2019).
cites § 51-183c 21×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 51-183c
“The defendant argued, for various reasons, that Practice Book § 1-22, General Statutes § 51-183c, rule 2.11 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment required recusal.”
6
GREENLyme Land Conservation Trust, Inc. v. Platner, 221 A.3d 788 (Conn. 2019).
cites § 51-183c 25×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 51-183c
“Pritchard, pro hac vice, with whom were Tracy M.”
7
GREENGagne v. Vaccaro, 35 A.3d 380 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012).
cites § 51-183c 20×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 51-183c
“” General Statutes § 51-183c. The language of § 51-183c is clear and unambiguous.”
8
GREENBd. of Educ. of East Haven V. East Haven Educ. Ass'n, 784 A.2d 958 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
cites § 51-183c 12×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 51-183c
“Second, the board claims that the designation of an arbitrator on remand is governed by General Statutes § 51-183c. 12 Third, the board maintains that even if the statute vests discretion in the trial court to direct a remand either to the original arbitrator or a new…”
9
GREENLafayette Bank & Trust Co. v. Szentkuti, 603 A.2d 1215 (Conn. App. Ct. 1992).
cites § 51-183c 14×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 51-183c
“The defendants also claim, relying on General Statutes § 51-183c, 4 that the judge who presided over the first valuation hearing should have disqualified himself from the second hearing on the same matter.”
Later courts cite it for
“nothing in our law is more elementary than that the trier of fact is the final judge of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight to be accorded their testimony.” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENState v. Rizzo, 31 A.3d 1094 (Conn. 2011).
cites § 51-183c 4×cited by 63 cases
Where it cites § 51-183c
“, General Statutes § 51-183c (requiring different judge, in case of court trial, after new trial is granted or judgment is reversed on appeal and, in case of jury trial, after new trial is granted); General Statutes § 51-183h (disallowing judge from hearing motion attacking…”
The case’s holding
A defendant's waiver of the right to a sentencing jury is valid if the totality of the circumstances demonstrates the choice was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.
Later courts cite it for
“opinions that judges may form as a result of what they learn in earlier proceedings in the same case 'rarely' constitute the type of bias, or appearance of bias, that requires recusal.” · 2 citing courts
11
GREENConnecticut Nat'l Bank v. Giacomi, 699 A.2d 101 (Conn. 1997).
cites § 51-183c 3×cited by 138 cases
Where it cites § 51-183c
“Judge Blue first held a hearing to determine whether he was presumptively disqualified from continuing with the case pursuant to General Statutes § 51-183c, which provides in relevant part: “No judge of any court who tried a case without a jury in which anew trial is granted, or…”
The case’s holding
A bank is precluded from enforcing promissory notes if its statutory violations are inextricably intertwined with the execution of those notes.
Later courts cite it for
“we are not required to review issues that have been improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief.” · 10 citing courts
12
GREENState v. McCoy, 206 A.3d 725 (Conn. 2019).
cites § 51-183c 2×cited by 28 cases
Where it cites § 51-183c
“See General Statutes § 51-183c. Moreover, if the remand to the trial court is to serve any more than a perfunctory purpose, it would seem necessary to not only reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court, but to vacate the decision of the Appellate Court that considered, and…”
The case’s holding
A trial court loses jurisdiction over a criminal case once the sentence is executed unless a statute or the constitution expressly authorizes the court to act.
13
GREENState v. Canales, 916 A.2d 767 (Conn. 2007).
cites § 51-183c 2×cited by 81 cases
Where it cites § 51-183c
“, General Statutes § 54-33f (judge issuing search warrant may not hear motion to suppress); Practice Book § 41-17 (same); General Statutes § 51-183h (judge issuing arrest warrant may not preside at hearing attacking validity or sufficiency of warrant); General Statutes § 51-183c…”
The case’s holding
A defendant waives the right to challenge the legality of an arrest during a suppression hearing if they fail to raise the lack of probable cause at that time (State v. Canales).
Later courts cite it for
“consideration of . . . evidence for the first time on appeal, without the benefit of effective state rebuttal or trial court determinations of credibility and fact, would usurp the trial court's role as the finder of fact” · 1 citing court
14
GREENState v. Phillips, 927 A.2d 931 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007).
cites § 51-183c 4×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 51-183c
“…to be made, it is necessary that the determination required on remand be made by the same trial judge. But see General Statutes § 51-183c.”
15
GREENFantasia v. Milford Fastening Sys., 860 A.2d 779 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004).
cites § 51-183c 2×cited by 29 cases
Where it cites § 51-183c
“Such an unstated limitation would be difficult to reconcile with the provisions of General Statutes § 51-183c, which provides that ‘[n]o judge of any court who tried a case without a jury in which a new trial is granted, or in which the judgment is reversed by the Supreme Court,…”
The case’s holding
An articulation is not an opportunity for a trial court to substitute a new decision nor to change the reasoning or basis of a prior decision.
Later courts cite it for
“an articulation is not an opportunity for a trial court to substitute a new decision nor to change the reasoning or basis of a prior decision. ... a trial court may not alter its initial findings by way of a further articulation . . . .” · 3 citing courts
16
GREENState v. Ortiz, 848 A.2d 1246 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004).
cites § 51-183c 2×cited by 25 cases
Where it cites § 51-183c
“General Statutes § 51-183c prohibits a judge who presided over a court trial from retrying a case where a new trial is granted or the judgment is reversed.”
The case’s holding
A judge need not recuse sua sponte based on a defendant's undisputed pretrial admissions, and a defendant who consents to a bench trial waives disqualification objections.
17
GREENHiggins v. Karp, 706 A.2d 1 (Conn. 1998).
cites § 51-183c 2×cited by 54 cases
Where it cites § 51-183c
“In accordance with General Statutes § 51-183c, we ordered that the matter be assigned to ajudge other than the judge who originally had decided the motions.”
The case’s holding
A trial court must consider all relevant evidence, including evidence of diligence and lack of prejudice, when determining whether good cause exists to set aside a default.
Later courts cite it for
“a motion to set aside a default where no judgment has been rendered may be granted by the judicial authority for good cause shown upon such terms as it may impose....” · 3 citing courts
18
GREENState v. Gonzales, 441 A.2d 852 (Conn. 1982).
cites § 51-183c 2×cited by 49 cases
Where it cites § 51-183c
“General Statutes § 51-183c ordinarily requires that, upon a retrial, a different judge shall preside, that statute is inapplicable here, where the purpose of the remand is not to correct error but to determine whether error has occurred.”
The case’s holding
A trial court must conduct a mandatory in camera inspection of a disputed witness statement to determine its relevance to the subject matter of the testimony.
Later courts cite it for
“although ... 51-183c ordinarily requires that, upon a retrial, a different judge shall preside, that statute is inapplicable ... where the purpose of the remand is not to correct error but to determine whether error has occurred” · 1 citing court
19
GREENState v. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 1565, 732 A.2d 762 (Conn. 1999).
cites § 51-183c 3×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 51-183c
“The state also argues that the legislative policy embodied in General Statutes § 51-183c, which prohibits a judge who tries or presides over a case in which a new trial is granted from retrying the case or presiding over the retrial, should apply to arbitration proceedings.”
20
GREENIn re Zoarski, 632 A.2d 1114 (Conn. 1993).
cites § 51-183c 2×cited by 35 cases
Where it cites § 51-183c
“Such proceedings are therefore distinguishable from the legislative proscription contained in General Statutes § 51-183h, which prohibits a judge from presiding “at the hearing of any motion attacking the validity or sufficiency of any bench warrant of arrest which he has signed.”
The case’s holding
Statements made by a respondent during a probable cause hearing qualify as admissions under the hearsay exception because the hearing is sufficiently adversarial.
Later courts cite it for
“in civil as well as in criminal cases, the words and acts of a party-opponent are generally admissible against him under the admission exception to the hearsay rule.” · 3 citing courts

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Citing cases by year
198220032025

One bar per year. Tallest: 7 cases in 2019. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

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Conn. App. Ct.23Conn.22
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Courts have not cited this section by subsection, so its cases are not split up here. The Leading cases tab lists the cases that cite it most heavily.

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