All wagers, and all contracts and securities of which the whole or any part of the consideration is money or other valuable thing won, laid or bet, at any game, horse race, sport or pastime, and all contracts to repay any money knowingly lent at the time and place of such game, race, sport or pastime, to any person so gaming, betting or wagering, or to repay any money lent to any person who, at such time and place, so pays, bets or wagers, shall be void, provided nothing in this section shall (1) affect the validity of any negotiable instrument held by any person who acquired the same for value and in good faith without notice of illegality in the consideration, (2) apply to the sale of a raffle ticket pursuant to section
7-172, (3) apply to online casino gaming, online sports wagering, retail sports wagering and fantasy contests, as such terms are defined in section
12-850, and conducted pursuant to sections
12-852 to
12-865, inclusive, as applicable, (4) apply to the operation of keno through or the purchase of tickets for lottery draw games through the Internet web site, online service or mobile application of the Connecticut Lottery Corporation, pursuant to section
12-853, or (5) apply to any wager or contract otherwise authorized by law.
(1949 Rev., S. 6785; P.A. 03-60, S. 2; P.A. 10-36, S. 10; P.A. 21-23, S. 38.)
History: P.A. 03-60 made technical changes, designated existing proviso as Subdiv. (1) and added Subdiv. (2) providing that nothing in section shall apply to the sale of a raffle ticket pursuant to Sec. 7-172; P.A. 10-36 added Subdiv. (3) providing that nothing in section shall apply to any wager or contract otherwise authorized by law, effective July 1, 2010; P.A. 21-23 added new Subdiv. (3) re online casino gaming, online sports wagering, retail sports wagering and fantasy contests, added Subdiv. (4) re keno and purchase of lottery tickets through Internet web site, online service or mobile application and redesignated existing Subdiv. (3) as Subdiv. (5), effective July 1, 2021.
A wager is illegal at common law. 15 C. 30. All wagering contracts are void by statute and money deposited with stakeholder is recoverable. Id.; 40 C. 336; 49 C. 128; 70 C. 490. What constitutes gaming contract in margin transactions in stocks; distinguished from speculating contracts. 48 C. 127; 63 C. 198. Contract of insurance upon another's life may amount to mere wagering contract. 69 C. 511; 70 C. 647. Speculative stock transactions, where there is an option to demand delivery. 77 C. 508; Id., 518; 84 C. 694. Cited. 125 C. 120. Gambling on credit is the vice at which this statute and Sec. 52-554 are particularly directed. 189 C. 591. Parties' contract is not unenforceable under section because it would be contrary to the statutory scheme as a whole to conclude that agreement to share the spoils of legal wagering is illegal and unenforceable. 293 C. 17.
Section is not applicable to written agreement where parties agreed to share equally in any winnings they received from various forms of legalized gambling. 105 CA 663; judgment affirmed on alternate grounds, see 293 C. 17.
Where plaintiff sued to recover indebtedness from defendants, which claim arose from winnings from a bet made in violation of Sec. 53-298, held the court will not aid party to an illegal contract in enforcing his claim and, since all the parties were in pari delicto, judgment should be rendered for defendants. 26 CS 238. Cited. 33 CS 170; 35 CS 522.
Cited. 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 682.
Notes of Decisions
Sokaitis v. Bakaysa, 975 A.2d 51 (Conn. 2009).
· cites it 50× “The dispositive issue in this certified 1 appeal is whether General Statutes § 52-553 2 applies to, *19 and makes void, a contract entered into by the plaintiff, Theresa Sokaitis, and the defendant, Rose Bakaysa, to share equally the proceeds of their legal gambling activities.”
Sokaitis v. Bakaysa, 938 A.2d 1278 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
· cites it 38× “On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly held that General Statutes § 52-553 was applicable to the written agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant.”
Casanova Club v. Bisharat, 458 A.2d 1 (Conn. 1983).
· cites it 10× “The defendant replied with an answer and a special defense relying on General Statutes § 52-553. 1 Once the pleadings were closed, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.”
Hilton Int'l Co. v. Arace, 394 A.2d 739 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977).
· cites it 2× “This trend is one in which Connecticut is neither alone nor the first when viewed on a nationwide basis. Despite these recent legislative enactments in Connecticut, this court is of the view that there is still a strong policy against gambling, except where it is authorized…”
King Int'l Corp. v. Voloshin, 366 A.2d 1172 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1976).
· cites it 2× “The prohibition of gambling on credit has been a part of anti-gambling statutes in this state for about two hundred years.”
Connecticut Nat'l Bank of Hartford v. Kommit, 577 N.E.2d 639 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991).
· cites it 2× “Although the bank may have thought itself in compliance with the laws of New Jersey, and even though Richard may have known that his debt would be void under the law of Connecticut, we must also consider the facts that the bank expressly intended Connecticut law to control the…”
Sokaitis v. Bakaysa, 945 A.2d 976 (Conn. 2008).
· cites it 2× “663 (AC 28099), is granted, limited to the following issue: “Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the parties’ contract was not unenforceable under General Statutes § 52-553?” VERTEFEUILLE, J.”
Hilton of San Juan, Inc. v. Lateano, 305 A.2d 538 (Conn. App. Ct. 1972).
· cites it 2× “51 , in which our court held that we *682 will not enforce the laws of another jurisdiction or rights arising thereunder which contravene our public policy, and, therefore, it refused to uphold an agreement to share the proceeds of parimutuel horse bets legally made in Rhode…”
Connecticut Nat'l Bk. of Hartford v. Kommit, 577 N.E.2d 639 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991).
· cites it 2× “Although the bank may have thought itself in compliance with the laws of New Jersey, and even though Richard may have known that his debt would be void under the law of Connecticut, we must also consider the facts that the bank expressly intended Connecticut law to control the…”
In re Teagan K.-O. (Conn. 2020).
· cites it 2× “Bakaysa, supra, 23–24 (rejecting ‘‘literal reading’’ of General Statutes § 52-553 voiding ‘‘[a]ll .”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.