Any person injured in person or property through the negligence of any state official or employee when operating a motor vehicle owned and insured by the state against personal injuries or property damage shall have a right of action against the state to recover damages for such injury.
(1949 Rev., S. 8297.)
Cited. 143 C. 653; 144 C. 282; 185 C. 616. Legislature did not intend statute to authorize an additional cause of action for state employees or their representatives who are eligible for workers' compensation. 189 C. 550. Cited. 239 C. 265. State's waiver of sovereign immunity pursuant to section does not exempt the state from a reallocation of damages under Sec. 52-572h(g). 247 C. 256. Reiterated previous holdings that operation of motor vehicle encompasses both parking incidental to travel and movement where essential element is location of motor vehicle in travel lane. 287 C. 421. Section inapplicable where state not made a party to negligence action; court does not have authority to treat an action against a state employee as one against state. 297 C. 317. “Damages” does not include postjudgment interest, and state did not waive sovereign immunity with regard to postjudgment interest under Sec. 37-3b. Id., 798. When the state, by statute, waives its immunity to suit, the right to a jury trial cannot be implied, but instead must be affirmatively expressed; section does not expressly provide for a right to a jury trial, therefore there is no right to a jury trial brought under section. 330 C. 138. The phrase “any person” signifies that waiver applies without restriction to persons who are injured under circumstances specified in section and therefore extends to state employees, but does not preclude state from asserting against such state employees a defense to liability based on workers' compensation exclusivity provision in Sec. 31-284(a). 336 C. 669.
Cited. 7 CA 196; 10 CA 22; 20 CA 619. To constitute cause of action under statute, injury must result from negligent operation of motor vehicle by state employee or official. 82 CA 459. As a matter of law, state employee was “operating a motor vehicle” within the meaning of section based on facts where he left a state-owned truck running alongside of the road so he could perform required maintenance. 84 CA 535. Allegation defendant was operating a state vehicle in course of employment is insufficient ground to invoke statute as defense to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction when state was not a named party and never formally notified by plaintiff of pending action. 92 CA 158. Section authorizes suit against the state on the basis of the negligence of its employee, but not against the employee in his or her individual capacity. 154 CA 448. Trial court failed to properly instruct jury that the state may be held liable only if the state vehicle alleged to have caused the accident was being operated at the time of the accident, that a motor vehicle ordinarily is still being operated if it is parked incident to travel in a convenient or ordinarily appropriate place to park, and that the state may not be sued or held liable if the state vehicle is positioned or parked in a particular location so as to warn drivers as to the danger ahead or to serve as a protective barrier. 155 CA 462.
Cited. 15 CS 251. Statute abolishes defense of governmental immunity. 18 CS 36. Defendant's motion to expunge portion of complaint alleging truck owned by state was insured denied as statute gives right of recovery only where there is such insurance. 22 CS 212.
Negligence of a state official or employee must be established by a fair preponderance of all the evidence to recover damages. 4 Conn. Cir. Ct. 116.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
64
cases (
10 in the last 5 years), 1960–2025 · leading case:
Feliciano v. State, 336 Conn. 669 (Conn. 2020).
Feliciano v. State, 336 Conn. 669 (Conn. 2020).
· cites it 68× “1 We must resolve whether the state’s waiver of sovereign immunity in General Statutes § 52-556 for claims arising from a state employee’s negligent operation of a state owned and insured motor vehicle extends to litigants who are state employees.”
Babes v. Bennett, 721 A.2d 511 (Conn. 1998).
· cites it 34× “General Statutes § 52-556 provides: “Any person injured in person or property through the negligence of any state official or employee when operating a motor vehicle owned and insured by the state against personal injuries or property damage shall have a right of action against…”
Hicks v. State, 1 A.3d 39 (Conn. 2010).
· cites it 31× “The sole question in this appeal is whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars a claim for postjudgment interest against the defendant state of Connecticut 1 in a motor vehicle negligence action brought pursuant to General Statutes § 52-556. 2 The state appeals 3 from the…”
Allison v. Manetta, 933 A.2d 1197 (Conn. 2007).
· cites it 27× “” General Statutes § 52-556. The Appellate Court, however, addressed this issue in Rivera v.”
Viera v. Cohen, 927 A.2d 843 (Conn. 2007).
· cites it 14× “The issue in Babes was whether the state, when it is sued for negligence upon its waiver of sovereign immunity under General Statutes § 52-556, [12] is immune from a reallocation of damages under § 52-572h (g) in the event that it is found liable for a proportionate share of the…”
Smith v. Rudolph, 191 A.3d 992 (Conn. 2018).
· cites it 32× “The named plaintiff, Anthony Smith, 2 commenced this action, pursuant to § 52-556, against the defendant Department of Transportation, 3 seeking damages stemming from an accident that occurred when a bus owned and operated by the state collided with a vehicle that the plaintiff…”
Egri v. Foisie, 848 A.2d 1266 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004).
· cites it 13× “The plaintiff filed an objection to that motion, asserting that the defendant had waived its immunity pursuant to General Statutes § 52-556. 6 In a memorandum of decision filed December 10, 2002, the court concluded that the complaint lacked “any common-law motor vehicular…”
Capers v. Lee, 684 A.2d 696 (Conn. 1996).
· cites it 15× “3 Thereafter, on December *268 16, 1994, the claims commissioner granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the claim, concluding that, because General Statutes § 52-556 4 authorized the plaintiff to bring a direct action in the Superior Court against the defendants, General…”
DePietro v. Dep't of Pub. Saf., 11 A.3d 1149 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011).
· cites it 18× “Before the trial court, the plaintiff insisted that General Statutes § 52-556 authorized his action against the defendant.”
Woodruff v. Hemingway, 2 A.3d 857 (Conn. 2010).
· cites it 8× “3 On *319 appeal, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because: (1) General Statutes § 27-70, 4 when read in conjunction with General Statutes § 4-142 (2), 5 permits actions against armed forces personnel; (2)…”
Hope v. Cavallo, 316 A.2d 407 (Conn. 1972).
· cites it 24× “The defendants then moved, pursuant to Practice Book § 306, that the court make a finding that the vehicle in question was not owned by the state as required by General Statutes § 52-556. The plaintiffs in response thereto thereupon filed an amendment to their complaint.”
Hicks v. State, 948 A.2d 982 (Conn. 2008).
· cites it 10× “The defendant state of Connecticut 1 appeals from the judgment of the trial court, rendered after a jury trial, in favor of the plaintiff, Herbert Hicks, for *425 damages pursuant to General Statutes § 52-556, 2 which provides a right of action against the state for persons…”
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