In computing the time limited in the period of limitation prescribed under any provision of chapter 925 or this chapter, the time during which the party, against whom there may be any such cause of action, is without this state shall be excluded from the computation, except that the time so excluded shall not exceed seven years.
(1949 Rev., S. 8330; 1959, P.A. 429; 1963, P.A. 642, S. 87; P.A. 85-548, S. 4.)
History: 1959 act clarified language, specifying section applies to periods prescribed under chapter 925 or this chapter and limited time excluded to seven years; 1963 act included periods prescribed in section 52-435a; P.A. 85-548 deleted reference to Sec. 46b-160.
This applies, although both parties are and always have been nonresidents. 24 C. 442. A temporary absence is not within statute. 16 C. 113, 116; 105 C. 569. Ownership of attachable property in Connecticut does not give nonresident debtor the right to invoke the aid of our statute of limitation. 55 C. 577. One who occupied apartment in New York with his wife a considerable portion of the time held to be still a resident here. 92 C. 55. Periods during which defendant is within the state may be added together to form statutory period; domicile in another state does not prevent one from having a usual place of abode here; defendant may have two or more usual places of abode in two or more states; time excluded while out of the state covers only absences which prevent service of process in actions in personam. 105 C. 571. Statute runs against nonresident when he acquires a usual place of abode here; against a resident when he returns here. Id., 568. Not applicable to actions against nonresidents begun under Sec. 52-62. 116 C. 643. Cited. 131 C. 675; 225 C. 238.
Cited. 31 CA 569.
When “usual place of abode” is acquired. 7 CS 145. Cited. 17 CS 222; Id., 408. Statute of limitations should be raised by special defense so that plaintiff may, in reply, plead section. 18 CS 143. Where defendant had room at Yale University and was absent therefrom only during summer vacation, his absence did not toll statute of limitations under section. 27 CS 394. Cited. 40 CS 6; 42 CS 187.
Notes of Decisions
Falls Church Grp., Ltd. v. Tyler, Cooper & Alcorn, LLP, 912 A.2d 1019 (Conn. 2007).
· cites it 4× “6 “The court then addressed whether it was reasonable for the law firm to believe that sufficient factual evidence existed to support a tolling of the statutes of limitation on the basis of the following tolling doctrines and related arguments: (1) fraudulent concealment, (2)…”
Cortes v. Cotton, 626 A.2d 1306 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993).
· cites it 6× “The defendant argues that General Statutes § 52-590 4 is not applicable and that during the period of his absence the plaintiffs could have had him served under the provisions of General Statutes §§ 52-59b and 52-57a.”
Doe v. Town of W. Hartford, 177 A.3d 1128 (Conn. 2018).
· cites it 2× “Regarding the applicable legislative scheme, the placement of § 52-593a among a number of provisions that extend or toll statutes of limitations under various circumstances; see General Statutes §§ 52-590 through 52-595 ; underscores its remedial purpose and counsels that it…”
Cadlerock Jt. Venture II, L.P. v. Milazzo, 949 A.2d 450 (Conn. 2008).
· cites it 5× “The plaintiff specifically contends that the six year statute of limitations was tolled, in accordance with General Statutes § 52-590, 17 when the defendant left the country because he was not amenable to service of process by certified *389 mail under § 52-59b.”
Gerena v. Korb, 617 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2010).
· cites it 2× “If the district court determines on remand that Connecticut law properly governs, we agree with its conclusion that the Gerenas’ claims are barred under Connecticut law by the three-year limitations period contained in Conn.”
Pagan v. Gonzalez, 965 A.2d 582 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
· cites it 4× “[6] The court also concluded that the running of the statute of limitations was not tolled pursuant to the defendant's absence from the state as provided for by General Statutes § 52-590. [7] On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the action is not time barred by § 52-577, stating…”
Moore v. McNamara, 513 A.2d 660 (Conn. 1986).
· cites it 2× “No such petition shall be brought after three years from the birth of such child, or after three years from cessation of contribution toward support of the child by the putative father, whichever is later, provided the provisions of section 52-590 shall be applicable to this…”
Falls Church Grp., Ltd. v. Tyler, Cooper & Alcorn, LLP, 874 A.2d 266 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005).
· cites it 4× “The court then addressed whether it was reasonable for the law firm to believe that sufficient factual evidence existed to support a tolling of the statutes of limitation on the basis of the following tolling doctrines and related arguments: (1) fraudulent concealment, (2)…”
Andrew Ansaldi Co. v. Plan. & Zoning Comm'n, 540 A.2d 59 (Conn. 1988).
· cites it 2× “ition against abatement of a writ or reversal of a judgment “for any kind of circumstantial errors, mistakes or defects, if the person and the cause may be rightly understood and intended by the court”; General Statutes § 52-123; our accidental failure of suit statute,…”
Robbins v. Van Gilder, 622 A.2d 555 (Conn. 1993).
· cites it 4× “affected his ability to understand completely the nature and extent of what had happened to him, and to understand whether he could have had a claim for damages against the defendants; (2) the statute of limitations, General Statutes § 52-584, 5 would be unconstitutional if…”
Hayes v. Smith, 480 A.2d 425 (Conn. 1984).
“No such petition shall be brought after three years from the birth of such child, or after three years from cessation of contribution toward support of the child by the putative father, whichever is later; provided the provisions of section 52-590 shall be applicable to this…”
Moore v. McNamara, 478 A.2d 634 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1984).
· cites it 3× “See General Statutes § 52-590. (The time excluded, however, must not exceed seven years.”
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