(a) In any prosecution in which the criminal liability of the defendant is based upon the conduct of another person under section
53a-8, it shall be a defense that the defendant terminated his complicity prior to the commission of the offense under circumstances: (1) Wholly depriving it of effectiveness in the commission of the offense, and (2) manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose.
(b) For purposes of this section, renunciation of criminal purpose is not voluntary if it is motivated, in whole or in part, by circumstances, not present or apparent at the inception of the actor's course of conduct, which increase the probability of detection or apprehension or which make more difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose. Renunciation is not complete if it is motivated by a decision to postpone the criminal conduct until a more advantageous time or to transfer the criminal effort to another but similar objective or victim.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 10; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 3.)
History: 1971 act deleted word “affirmative” modifying “defense” in Subsec. (a).
Cited. 176 C. 451. Defendant is entitled, as matter of law, to a theory of defense instruction when evidence under section is before jury. 178 C. 704. Cited. 204 C. 240; 209 C. 75; 225 C. 270; 242 C. 409.
Cited. 22 CA 216; 40 CA 526.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
7
cases, 1979–1996 · leading case:
State v. Adams, 623 A.2d 42 (Conn. 1993).
State v. Adams, 623 A.2d 42 (Conn. 1993).
· cites it 25× “On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly: (1) denied his motion for judgment of acquittal as there was insufficient evidence to support *275 the jury’s guilty verdict; (2) violated his constitutional due process and statutory rights by denying his request…”
Valeriano v. Bronson, 546 A.2d 1380 (Conn. 1988).
· cites it 2× “, General Statutes §§ 53a-10, 53a-12, 53a-13, 53a-14, 53a-15, 53a-16.”
State v. Livingston, 577 A.2d 734 (Conn. App. Ct. 1990).
· cites it 6× “The defendant’s first claim is that the trial court should not have refused to instruct the jury on the defense of renunciation as provided by General Statutes § 53a-10. 3 The defendant originally was charged with two counts of robbery in the first degree in violation of General…”
State v. Rosado, 425 A.2d 108 (Conn. 1979).
“…criminal defendant, such as: ignorance or mistake; § 53a-6; intoxication; § 53a-7; renunciation of criminal purpose; § 53a-10; insanity; § 53a-13; duress; § 53a-14; entrapment; § 53a-15; justification; § 53a-16, as defined in §§ 53a-17 through 53a-23; use of firearms; §§…”
State v. Rouleau, 528 A.2d 343 (Conn. 1987).
“The trial court’s instructions included the following: “Now, we also have a statute that provides that in any prosecution for an offense, it shall be a defense that the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was coerced by the use of threatened imminent use of…”
State v. Messler, 562 A.2d 1138 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989).
“…in chapter 951 of the penal code, namely, General Statutes § 53a-6, ignorance or mistake; § 53a-7, intoxication; § 53a-10, renunciation of criminal purpose; § 53a-13, insanity; § 53a-14, duress; § 53a-15, entrapment; § 53a-16, justification, as defined in General Statutes…”
State v. Richardson, 671 A.2d 840 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996).
· cites it 5× “He claims that the trial court violated his constitutional due process rights by denying his request to instruct the jury on the defense of renunciation pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-10. 4 *528 We affirm the conviction on the charge of conspiracy to commit robbery but…”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.