Connecticut General Statutes

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-107 (2026)

Criminal trespass in the first degree: Class A misdemeanor

✓ current as of May 2026
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(a) A person is guilty of criminal trespass in the first degree when: (1) Knowing that such person is not licensed or privileged to do so, such person enters or remains in a building or any other premises after an order to leave or not to enter personally communicated to such person by the owner of the premises or other authorized person; or (2) such person enters or remains in a building or any other premises in violation of a restraining order issued pursuant to section 46b-15 or a protective order issued pursuant to section 46b-16a, 46b-38c, 54-1k or 54-82r by the Superior Court; or (3) such person enters or remains in a building or any other premises in violation of a foreign order of protection, as defined in section 46b-15a, that has been issued against such person in a case involving the use, attempted use or threatened use of physical force against another person; or (4) knowing that such person is not licensed or privileged to do so, such person enters or remains on public land after an order to leave or not to enter personally communicated to such person by an authorized official of the state or a municipality, as the case may be.

(b) Criminal trespass in the first degree is a class A misdemeanor.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 109; P.A. 80-58; P.A. 91-381, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 43; P.A. 95-214, S. 4; P.A. 99-240, S. 5; P.A. 03-98, S. 3; P.A. 05-147, S. 3; 05-234, S. 1; P.A. 14-217, S. 188.)

History: P.A. 80-58 added Subsec. (a)(2) specifying that entering or remaining in building or other premises in violation of a restraining order is criminal trespass in the first degree; P.A. 91-381 amended Subsec. (a) by adding “pursuant to section 46b-15 or a protective order issued pursuant to section 46b-38c” after “issued”; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes in Subsec. (a) by replacing references to “such person” with “he” or “him” as appropriate; P.A. 95-214 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to include a protective order issued pursuant to Sec. 54-1k; P.A. 99-240 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to include a protective order issued pursuant to Sec. 54-82r and to make provisions gender neutral; P.A. 03-98 added Subsec. (a)(3) re entry or remaining in a building or other premises in violation of a foreign order of protection; P.A. 05-147 amended Subsec. (a)(3) to delete the requirement that the foreign order of protection has been issued “after notice and an opportunity to be heard has been provided to such person”; P.A. 05-234 added Subsec. (a)(4) re entry or remaining on public land, effective January 1, 2006; P.A. 14-217 amended Subsec. (a)(2) to add reference to Sec. 46b-16a, effective January 1, 2015.

See Sec. 53a-44a re surcharge on fine for trespass on public land.

Cited. 203 C. 466; Id., 624; 204 C. 441.

Cited. 12 CA 172; 18 CA 303; 19 CA 245; 20 CA 599; 24 CA 195; 35 CA 714; 43 CA 1. Conviction reversed; evidence was insufficient to convict defendant under section. 55 CA 475.

Word “owner” must be given broad meaning so statute serves its legislative purpose to protect any possessor of land from unwanted intrusions; proof of title not essential element. 35 CS 555. Cited. 37 CS 853.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 216 C. 647; 236 C. 342. A spouse's right or privilege to enter property is not determined solely by the spouse's ownership interest in the property, or by whether the structure can be characterized as the marital home, but rather by whether the spouse had any possessory or occupancy interest in the premises at the time of entry; In general, when the marital relationship is intact and both spouses have a possessory or occupancy interest in a premises, an isolated request to leave the premises during a heated marital argument will not suffice to revoke one spouse's possessory or occupancy interest in the premises vis-à-vis the other. 334 C. 100.

Cited. 11 CA 24; 12 CA 258; 30 CA 45; 35 CA 262; 36 CA 448; judgment reversed, see 236 C. 342. Subdiv. (2): Conviction under this section and Sec. 53a-223(a) did not violate constitutional protection against double jeopardy because legislature intended multiple punishments for offense of trespassing in violation of a protective order. 97 CA 72.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 88 cases (7 in the last 5 years), 1974–2026 · leading case: State v. Quint, 904 A.2d 216 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006).
State v. Quint, 904 A.2d 216 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006). · cites it 22× “Quint, appeals from the judgments of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of three counts of criminal violation of a protective order, pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-223 (a), and three counts of criminal trespass in the first degree, in violation of General Statutes §…”
Koennicke v. Maiorano, 682 A.2d 1046 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996). · cites it 15× “They are that, on diverse dates, the plaintiff or his agents personally communicated to the defendant orders not to enter the plaintiff s property or to leave that property and that the defendant’s conduct constituted criminal trespass in violation of General Statutes § 53a-107.…”
State v. Delgado, 562 A.2d 539 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989). · cites it 17× “The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, after a jury trial, of assault in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (2), burglary in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-101 (a) (2), and criminal trespass in the first…”
State v. Fernando a., 981 A.2d 427 (Conn. 2009). · cites it 6× “Additionally, in accordance with section 53a-107 of the Connecticut general statutes, entering or remaining in a building or any other premises in violation of this order constitutes criminal trespass in the first degree which is punishable by a term of imprisonment of not more…”
State v. D'Antonio, 877 A.2d 696 (Conn. 2005). · cites it 4× “2d 1187 (2003) (D’Antonio I); and (2) convicted the defendant after a jury trial of criminal trespass in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-107 (a) (1), and two counts of interfering with an officer in violation of General Statutes § 53a-167a (a).”
State v. Robinson, 937 A.2d 717 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008). · cites it 8× “Thus, in order to be found guilty of criminal trespass in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-107, [1] criminal trespass in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-108, [2] criminal trespass in the third degree in violation of § 53a-109 [3]…”
State v. Jordan, 186 A.3d 1 (Conn. 2018). · cites it 4× “In connection with that 2012 incident, the victim was convicted of misdemeanor assault in the third degree in violation of **285 General Statutes § 53a-61 (a) (1), 8 unlawful restraint in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-96, 9 and criminal trespass in the…”
State v. Jennings, 583 A.2d 915 (Conn. 1990). · cites it 4× “In another case, the defendant was charged by substitute information with criminal attempt to commit assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 3 and 53a-59 (a) (1) and criminal trespass in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-107…”
State v. Brunette, 886 A.2d 427 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005). · cites it 6× “” 10 In order for that section to apply in this case, the victims, Rivera and DoCarmo, would need to have been criminal trespassers pursuant to General Statutes §§ 53a-107, 53a-108 and 53a-109.”
State v. Kinchen, 707 A.2d 1255 (Conn. 1998). · cites it 6× “On October 26, 1995, the defendant was charged by misdemeanor summons and complaint with criminal trespass in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-107. 2 According to the police report on which the complaint was based, the defendant, a former employee of Trudy…”
State v. Marsala, 337 Conn. 55 (Conn. 2020). · cites it 13× “’’ General Statutes § 53a-107 (a) (1). As proof that such an order had been communicated to the defendant prior to his entry onto mall property on November 28, 2015, the state relied on Salati’s testimony that, on November 27, 2015, she told the defendant that ‘‘he had to leave .”
State v. Bell, 739 A.2d 714 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999). · cites it 10× “The defendant, Frank Bell, appeals from the judgments of conviction, rendered after a trial to the court, of harassment in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-183 (a) (3), criminal trespass in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-107 and…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-107(a) — 3 cases
State v. Robinson, 937 A.2d 717 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008). “Thus, in order to be found guilty of criminal trespass in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-107, [1] criminal trespass in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-108, [2] criminal trespass in the third degree in violation of § 53a-109 [3]…”
Almonte v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of New York, Inc., 959 F. Supp. 569 (D. Conn. 1997).
State v. Marsala, 198 A.3d 669 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-107(a)(1) — 1 case
State v. Marsala, 198 A.3d 669 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).
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