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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 53a — Penal CodeChapter 952 — Penal Code: Offenses

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-111 (2025)

Arson in the first degree: Class A felony

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1974–2025 55citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 55 opinions since 1974, 7 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a)(1) (3 cases).

(a) A person is guilty of arson in the first degree when, with intent to destroy or damage a building, as defined in section 53a-100, he starts a fire or causes an explosion, and (1) the building is inhabited or occupied or the person has reason to believe the building may be inhabited or occupied; or (2) any other person is injured, either directly or indirectly; or (3) such fire or explosion was caused for the purpose of collecting insurance proceeds for the resultant loss; or (4) at the scene of such fire or explosion a peace officer or firefighter is subjected to a substantial risk of bodily injury.

(b) Arson in the first degree is a class A felony.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 113; P.A. 79-570, S. 3; P.A. 80-229, S. 1; P.A. 82-290, S. 1.)

History: P.A. 79-570 restated Subsec. (a) in greater detail, replacing general language re actor's awareness that person is in or near building or his lack of knowledge or indifference as to whether another is in or near building; P.A. 80-229 clarified Subsec. (a), adding reference to “building” definition of Sec. 53a-100 and replacing reference to peace officer's or firefighter's closeness to building with reference to their being at the scene of a fire or explosion; P.A. 82-290 amended Subsec. (a) to include fire or explosion caused for the purpose of collecting insurance proceeds.

Cited. 172 C. 298; 174 C. 135; 178 C. 67; 194 C. 279; 197 C. 158; 198 C. 92; 200 C. 685; 204 C. 4; Id., 769; 210 C. 519; 216 C. 678; 219 C. 605; 220 C. 796; 222 C. 469; 227 C. 829; 235 C. 679; 236 C. 31; 237 C. 694; 238 C. 828.

Cited. 8 CA 581; 12 CA 32; 35 CA 527; Id., 714; 36 CA 454; 40 CA 789; 46 CA 350. Provisions applicable to firefighters on truck injured in accident en route to fire; injuries not required to be substantial or foreseeable. 59 CA 507.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 183 C. 1; 187 C. 109; Id., 513; 191 C. 412; Id., 636; 199 C. 1; 200 C. 30. Trial court's failure to consider a suspended sentence violated equal protection because it resulted in a harsher penalty for defendant who acted with less culpable intent and caused a less serious result than arson murder. Id., 268. Cited. 202 C. 93; 204 C. 377; 205 C. 201; 207 C. 118; 213 C. 161; 214 C. 161; Id., 752; 215 C. 1; 216 C. 585; 218 C. 747; 221 C. 713; 227 C. 1; 229 C. 10; 240 C. 708; 241 C. 57. Motive not an ultimate issue or element of Subdiv. (4), therefore state is not collaterally estopped from admitting evidence of insurance despite earlier acquittal of Subdiv. (3); evidence supported finding that firefighters were exposed to risk of substantial injury. 243 C. 282.

Cited. 10 CA 147; 12 CA 343; 28 CA 9; 30 CA 164; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 10; 34 CA 823; 36 CA 753; 37 CA 360; 39 CA 800. Defendant was not deprived of right to fair trial for violation of section because evidence was sufficient to establish that she possessed requisite intent; although prosecutor improperly asked defendant to comment on other witnesses' veracity, the questioning occurred just once and was not prejudicial; prosecutor's closing statements, even if found improper, were isolated and not prejudicial; jury instructions were proper. 75 CA 163. Definitive expert testimony that a fire was started intentionally is not required for a conviction. 127 CA 560.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-111 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Woodson, 629 A.2d 386 (Conn. 1993).
cites § 53a-111 21×subsections: (a)(3) 10× (a) 4× (a)(4) 3×cited by 95 cases
Where it cites § 53a-111
“If two *12 subparagraphs in the kidnapping statute can be regarded as separate crimes, it follows apodictically that subdivisions (3) and (4) of § 53a-111 (a) can likewise be regarded as separate crimes for double jeopardy purposes despite their enactment as subdivisions of the…”
The case’s holding
An element in a blockburger analysis means any fact that the legislature has deemed essential to the commission of the crime.
Later courts cite it for
“the term 'element' as used in the blockburger analysis . . . means any fact that the legislature has deemed essential to the commission of the crime.” · 3 citing courts
2
GREENConnecticut v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739 (Conn. 1997).
cites § 53a-111 13×cited by 268 cases
Where it cites § 53a-111
“Porter, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming his conviction for arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-111 (a) (4). The defendant claims that: (1) the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court properly denied his…”
The case’s holding
The Daubert standard governs the admissibility of scientific evidence, but polygraph results remain per se inadmissible in Connecticut courts where rules of evidence apply.
Later courts cite it for
“need only make a much more limited inquiry: whether sufficient indicia of legitimacy exist to support the conclusion that evidence derived from the principle may be profitably considered by a fact finder at trial.” · 4 citing courts
3
GREENState v. Pellegrino, 480 A.2d 537 (Conn. 1984).
cites § 53a-111 10×cited by 45 cases
Where it cites § 53a-111
“The New York statute upon which General Statutes § 53a-111 was modeled, N.”
The case’s holding
The intent of drafters is derived from the words used when the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous.
Later courts cite it for
“a cardinal rule of statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are plain and unambiguous the intent of the drafters in enacting the statute is to be derived from the words used.” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENState v. Ferguson, 796 A.2d 1118 (Conn. 2002).
cites § 53a-111 4×cited by 96 cases
Where it cites § 53a-111
“Ferguson, following a jury trial, was convicted of five counts of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a), 1 two counts of capital felony in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54b (8), 2 one count of arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §…”
The case’s holding
Statements made out of court by a party-opponent are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule if they are relevant and material to the issues in the case.
Later courts cite it for
“it is an elementary rule of evidence that an admission of a party may be entered into evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule. . . . statements made out of court by a party-opponent are universally deemed admissible when offered against him. . . so long as they are relevant and material to issues in the case. . . . the vast weight of authority, judicial, legislative, and scholarly, supports the admissibility without restriction of any statement of a party offered against that party at trial.” · 5 citing courts
5
GREENState v. Brown, 772 A.2d 1107 (Conn. 2001).
cites § 53a-111 4×cited by 51 cases
Where it cites § 53a-111
“Following a jury trial, the defendant, Judson Brown, was convicted of two counts of arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-111 1 and one count of conspiracy to commit arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-lll and 53a-48.”
The case’s holding
The defendant bears the burden of proving that prosecutorial statements were improper and prejudicial to a fair trial.
Later courts cite it for
“asserted the inviolability of the right of self-representation.” · 3 citing courts
6
GREENState v. Nardini, 447 A.2d 396 (Conn. 1982).
cites § 53a-111 4×cited by 114 cases
Where it cites § 53a-111
“The defendant was found guilty by a jury of conspiracy to commit arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-111 (a) and 53a-48 and also of the crime of arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-111 (a).”
The case’s holding
The court applies a three-part test established at common law prior to the adoption of the state code of evidence (State v. Nardini).
Later courts cite it for
“three factors have usually been identified as of primary importance in considering whether a former criminal conviction is to be admitted: (1) the extent of the prejudice likely to arise; (2) the significance of the commission of the particular crime in indicating untruthfulness; and (3) its remoteness in time.” · 5 citing courts
7
GREENState v. Joyce, 705 A.2d 181 (Conn. 1997).
cites § 53a-111 4×cited by 55 cases
Where it cites § 53a-111
“At the defendant’s first trial, when he was *299 charged with arson in violation of § 53a-111 (a) (3), the state had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed arson “for the purpose of collecting insurance proceeds for the resultant loss .”
The case’s holding
Evidence is admissible under the independent source doctrine if a search warrant is supported by probable cause derived from sources independent of prior illegal police conduct.
Later courts cite it for
“the measure of materiality is whether there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENState v. Francione, 46 A.3d 219 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012).
cites § 53a-111 7×cited by 8 cases
Where it cites § 53a-111
“, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-111 (a) (1). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court improperly denied his motions for a judgment of acquittal because…”
9
GREENState v. Richardson, 574 A.2d 182 (Conn. 1990).
cites § 53a-111 4×cited by 50 cases
Where it cites § 53a-111
“Richardson, was charged in an amended information with the crime of arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-111 (a) (1). 1 He was found guilty by a jury.”
The case’s holding
Statements from which a possible inference of inconsistency may be drawn are insufficient for the purpose of impeachment.
Later courts cite it for
“statements from which a possible inference of inconsistency may be drawn are insufficient for the purpose of impeachment” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENState v. Dubose, 815 A.2d 213 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
cites § 53a-111 5×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 53a-111
“Although the defendant’s brief cites General Statutes § 53a-111 (a) (3), the statutory language quoted and challenged throughout her brief regarding the court’s improper jury instruction on the element of a substantial risk of injury pertains to the language found in § 53a-111…”
11
GREENState v. McPhail, 567 A.2d 812 (Conn. 1989).
cites § 53a-111 4×cited by 43 cases
Where it cites § 53a-111
“After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-111 (a) (l) 1 and two counts of arson murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54d.”
The case’s holding
Impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence both fall within the definition of evidence favorable to an accused under Brady.
Later courts cite it for
“it is well established that impeachment evidence as well as exculpatory evidence falls within brady's definition of evidence favorable to an accused.” · 3 citing courts
12
GREENState v. Young, 469 A.2d 1189 (Conn. 1983).
cites § 53a-111 3×cited by 58 cases
Where it cites § 53a-111
“to 1979) § 53a-111 (a). No such mental element was necessary for second or third degree arson.”
The case’s holding
The phrase "in furtherance of" in a felony murder statute requires a logical nexus or causal relationship between the underlying felony and the homicide, rather than specific intent regarding the death.
13
GREENState v. Nardini, 445 A.2d 304 (Conn. 1982).
cites § 53a-111 2×cited by 160 cases
Where it cites § 53a-111
“General Statutes § 53a-111 (a) (1) and (2).”
The case’s holding
Legislative authorization for the judicial department to modify its own judgments does not violate the separation of powers or the judicial article of the state constitution.
Later courts cite it for
“justiciability requires (1) that there be an actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute ... (2) that the interests of the parties be adverse ... (3) that the matter in controversy be capable of being adjudicated by judicial power . . . and (4) that the determination of the controversy will result in practical relief to the complainant.” · 7 citing courts
14
GREENState v. Rios, 156 A.3d 18 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
cites § 53a-111 2×subsections: (a)(2) 2×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 53a-111
“2d 896 , was charged with and found guilty of the crimes of assault in the first degree in violation of § 53a-59(a)(3), arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-111(a)(2), and attempt to commit murder in violation of *15 General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and…”
15
GREENState v. Domian, 668 A.2d 1333 (Conn. 1996).
cites § 53a-111 3×cited by 48 cases
Where it cites § 53a-111
“General Statutes § 53a-111 provides in relevant part: “Arson in the first degree: Class A felony, (a) A person is guilty of arson in the first degree when, with intent to destroy or damage a building, as defined in section 53a-100, he starts a fire or causes an explosion, and…”
The case’s holding
A guilty plea is constitutionally valid if the defendant understands the actual sentencing possibilities despite a failure to explicitly advise of a mandatory minimum sentence.
Later courts cite it for
“defendant did not move to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing, electing instead to raise the issue of the defective plea canvass for the first time on appeal” · 1 citing court
16
GREENState v. King, 583 A.2d 896 (Conn. 1990).
cites § 53a-111 2×cited by 109 cases
Where it cites § 53a-111
“The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregarding it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.”
The case’s holding
Jury verdicts for offenses requiring mutually exclusive mental states regarding the same act and result are inconsistent and cannot stand.
Later courts cite it for
“the statutory definitions of 'intentionally' and 'recklessly' are mutually exclusive and inconsistent” · 1 citing court
17
GREENState v. Singh, 793 A.2d 226 (Conn. 2002).
cites § 53a-111 1×cited by 214 cases
Where it cites § 53a-111
“The jury returned guilty verdicts on two counts of arson in the first degree in violation of § 53a-111 (a) (1) and (4). 5 Thereafter, the trial court sentenced the defendant to a total effective term of twenty-five years *699 imprisonment, execution suspended after ten years,…”
The case’s holding
A prosecutor may invite reasonable inferences from evidence but may not invite sheer speculation or ask a witness to comment on the veracity of other witnesses.
Later courts cite it for
“whether the trial as a whole was fundamentally unfair and that the impropriety so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.” · 6 citing courts
18
GREENState v. Kendall, 2 A.3d 990 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010).
cites § 53a-111 2×subsections: (a)(1) 2×cited by 33 cases
Where it cites § 53a-111
“The defendant, Michael Kendall, appeals from the judgment of conviction, following a jury trial, of one count of capital felony in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54b(7), one count of capital felony in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54b(8), three counts of murder in…”
The case’s holding
A trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying a competency evaluation if the defendant demonstrates an understanding of the proceedings during colloquy.
Later courts cite it for
“our review of a trial court's exercise of the legal discretion vested in it is limited to the questions of whether the trial court correctly applied the law and could reasonably have reached the conclusion that it did.” · 2 citing courts
19
GREENState v. Griffin, 195 A.3d 723 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).
cites § 53a-111 3×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 53a-111
“General Statutes § 53a-111 (a) provides in relevant part: "A person is guilty of arson in the first degree when, with intent to destroy or damage a building, as defined insection 53a-100, 8 he starts a fire or causes an explosion, and .”
20
GREENState v. Durdek, 195 A.3d 388 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).
cites § 53a-111 2×subsections: (a)(1) 2×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 53a-111
“The defendant, Steven Robert Durdek, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a, felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c, burglary in the first degree in violation of General…”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197419992025

One bar per year. Tallest: 4 cases in 2017. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Conn.27Conn. App. Ct.26D. Conn.1Utah1
By subsection
(a)1 case
State v. Woodson, 629 A.2d 386 (Conn. 1993).“If two *12 subparagraphs in the kidnapping statute can be regarded as separate crimes, it follows apodictically that subdivisions (3) and (4) of § 53a-111 (a) can likewise be regarded as separate crimes for double jeopardy purposes despite their enactment as subdivisions of the…”
(a)(1)3 cases
State v. Kendall, 2 A.3d 990 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010).“The defendant, Michael Kendall, appeals from the judgment of conviction, following a jury trial, of one count of capital felony in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54b(7), one count of capital felony in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54b(8), three counts of murder in…”
State v. Durdek, 195 A.3d 388 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).“The defendant, Steven Robert Durdek, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a, felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c, burglary in the first degree in violation of General…”
Kendall, No. 3:24-cv-02028 (D. Conn. Oct. 15, 2025).
(a)(2)1 case
State v. Rios, 156 A.3d 18 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).“2d 896 , was charged with and found guilty of the crimes of assault in the first degree in violation of § 53a-59(a)(3), arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-111(a)(2), and attempt to commit murder in violation of *15 General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and…”
(a)(3)1 case
State v. Woodson, 629 A.2d 386 (Conn. 1993).
(a)(4)2 cases
State v. Woodson, 629 A.2d 386 (Conn. 1993).
State v. Durant, 674 P.2d 638 (Utah 1983).

Show all 55 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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