(a) A person is guilty of arson in the first degree when, with intent to destroy or damage a building, as defined in section
53a-100, he starts a fire or causes an explosion, and (1) the building is inhabited or occupied or the person has reason to believe the building may be inhabited or occupied; or (2) any other person is injured, either directly or indirectly; or (3) such fire or explosion was caused for the purpose of collecting insurance proceeds for the resultant loss; or (4) at the scene of such fire or explosion a peace officer or firefighter is subjected to a substantial risk of bodily injury.
(b) Arson in the first degree is a class A felony.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 113; P.A. 79-570, S. 3; P.A. 80-229, S. 1; P.A. 82-290, S. 1.)
History: P.A. 79-570 restated Subsec. (a) in greater detail, replacing general language re actor's awareness that person is in or near building or his lack of knowledge or indifference as to whether another is in or near building; P.A. 80-229 clarified Subsec. (a), adding reference to “building” definition of Sec. 53a-100 and replacing reference to peace officer's or firefighter's closeness to building with reference to their being at the scene of a fire or explosion; P.A. 82-290 amended Subsec. (a) to include fire or explosion caused for the purpose of collecting insurance proceeds.
Cited. 172 C. 298; 174 C. 135; 178 C. 67; 194 C. 279; 197 C. 158; 198 C. 92; 200 C. 685; 204 C. 4; Id., 769; 210 C. 519; 216 C. 678; 219 C. 605; 220 C. 796; 222 C. 469; 227 C. 829; 235 C. 679; 236 C. 31; 237 C. 694; 238 C. 828.
Cited. 8 CA 581; 12 CA 32; 35 CA 527; Id., 714; 36 CA 454; 40 CA 789; 46 CA 350. Provisions applicable to firefighters on truck injured in accident en route to fire; injuries not required to be substantial or foreseeable. 59 CA 507.
Subsec. (a):
Cited. 183 C. 1; 187 C. 109; Id., 513; 191 C. 412; Id., 636; 199 C. 1; 200 C. 30. Trial court's failure to consider a suspended sentence violated equal protection because it resulted in a harsher penalty for defendant who acted with less culpable intent and caused a less serious result than arson murder. Id., 268. Cited. 202 C. 93; 204 C. 377; 205 C. 201; 207 C. 118; 213 C. 161; 214 C. 161; Id., 752; 215 C. 1; 216 C. 585; 218 C. 747; 221 C. 713; 227 C. 1; 229 C. 10; 240 C. 708; 241 C. 57. Motive not an ultimate issue or element of Subdiv. (4), therefore state is not collaterally estopped from admitting evidence of insurance despite earlier acquittal of Subdiv. (3); evidence supported finding that firefighters were exposed to risk of substantial injury. 243 C. 282.
Cited. 10 CA 147; 12 CA 343; 28 CA 9; 30 CA 164; judgment reversed, see 229 C. 10; 34 CA 823; 36 CA 753; 37 CA 360; 39 CA 800. Defendant was not deprived of right to fair trial for violation of section because evidence was sufficient to establish that she possessed requisite intent; although prosecutor improperly asked defendant to comment on other witnesses' veracity, the questioning occurred just once and was not prejudicial; prosecutor's closing statements, even if found improper, were isolated and not prejudicial; jury instructions were proper. 75 CA 163. Definitive expert testimony that a fire was started intentionally is not required for a conviction. 127 CA 560.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
55
cases (
7 in the last 5 years), 1974–2025 · leading case:
State v. Woodson, 629 A.2d 386 (Conn. 1993).
State v. Woodson, 629 A.2d 386 (Conn. 1993).
· cites it 21× “If two *12 subparagraphs in the kidnapping statute can be regarded as separate crimes, it follows apodictically that subdivisions (3) and (4) of § 53a-111 (a) can likewise be regarded as separate crimes for double jeopardy purposes despite their enactment as subdivisions of the…”
Connecticut v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739 (Conn. 1997).
· cites it 13× “Porter, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming his conviction for arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-111 (a) (4). The defendant claims that: (1) the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court properly denied his…”
State v. Pellegrino, 480 A.2d 537 (Conn. 1984).
· cites it 10× “The New York statute upon which General Statutes § 53a-111 was modeled, N.”
State v. Ferguson, 796 A.2d 1118 (Conn. 2002).
· cites it 4× “Ferguson, following a jury trial, was convicted of five counts of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a), 1 two counts of capital felony in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54b (8), 2 one count of arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §…”
State v. Brown, 772 A.2d 1107 (Conn. 2001).
· cites it 4× “Following a jury trial, the defendant, Judson Brown, was convicted of two counts of arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-111 1 and one count of conspiracy to commit arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-lll and 53a-48.”
State v. Nardini, 447 A.2d 396 (Conn. 1982).
· cites it 4× “The defendant was found guilty by a jury of conspiracy to commit arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-111 (a) and 53a-48 and also of the crime of arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-111 (a).”
State v. Joyce, 705 A.2d 181 (Conn. 1997).
· cites it 4× “At the defendant’s first trial, when he was *299 charged with arson in violation of § 53a-111 (a) (3), the state had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed arson “for the purpose of collecting insurance proceeds for the resultant loss .”
State v. Francione, 46 A.3d 219 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012).
· cites it 7× “, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-111 (a) (1). On appeal, the defendant claims that (1) the trial court improperly denied his motions for a judgment of acquittal because…”
State v. Richardson, 574 A.2d 182 (Conn. 1990).
· cites it 4× “Richardson, was charged in an amended information with the crime of arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-111 (a) (1). 1 He was found guilty by a jury.”
State v. Dubose, 815 A.2d 213 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
· cites it 5× “Although the defendant’s brief cites General Statutes § 53a-111 (a) (3), the statutory language quoted and challenged throughout her brief regarding the court’s improper jury instruction on the element of a substantial risk of injury pertains to the language found in § 53a-111…”
State v. McPhail, 567 A.2d 812 (Conn. 1989).
· cites it 4× “After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of arson in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-111 (a) (l) 1 and two counts of arson murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54d.”
State v. Young, 469 A.2d 1189 (Conn. 1983).
· cites it 3× “to 1979) § 53a-111 (a). No such mental element was necessary for second or third degree arson.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-111(a) — 1 case
State v. Woodson, 629 A.2d 386 (Conn. 1993).
“If two *12 subparagraphs in the kidnapping statute can be regarded as separate crimes, it follows apodictically that subdivisions (3) and (4) of § 53a-111 (a) can likewise be regarded as separate crimes for double jeopardy purposes despite their enactment as subdivisions of the…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-111(a)(1) — 3 cases
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-111(a)(2) — 1 case
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-111(a)(3) — 1 case
State v. Woodson, 629 A.2d 386 (Conn. 1993).
“If two *12 subparagraphs in the kidnapping statute can be regarded as separate crimes, it follows apodictically that subdivisions (3) and (4) of § 53a-111 (a) can likewise be regarded as separate crimes for double jeopardy purposes despite their enactment as subdivisions of the…”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-111(a)(4) — 2 cases
State v. Woodson, 629 A.2d 386 (Conn. 1993).
“If two *12 subparagraphs in the kidnapping statute can be regarded as separate crimes, it follows apodictically that subdivisions (3) and (4) of § 53a-111 (a) can likewise be regarded as separate crimes for double jeopardy purposes despite their enactment as subdivisions of the…”
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treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.