Conn. Gen. Stat. » Title 53a — PENAL CODE · Chapter 952 — Penal Code: Offenses
Connecticut General Statutes

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-118 (2026)

Definitions generally

✓ current as of May 2026
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section CT-CGAcga.ct.gov (official) JustiaTitle on Justia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar
(a) The following definitions are applicable to this part: (1) “Property” means any money, personal property, real property, thing in action, evidence of debt or contract, or article of value of any kind. Commodities of a public utility nature such as gas, electricity, steam and water constitute property, but the supplying of such a commodity to premises from an outside source by means of wires, pipes, conduits or other equipment shall be deemed a rendition of a service rather than a sale or delivery of property. (2) “Obtain” includes, but is not limited to, the bringing about of a transfer or purported transfer of property or of a legal interest therein, whether to the obtainer or another. (3) To “deprive” another of property means (A) to withhold it or cause it to be withheld from him permanently or for so extended a period or under such circumstances that the major portion of its economic value or benefit is lost to him, or (B) to dispose of the property in such manner or under such circumstances as to render it unlikely that an owner will recover such property. (4) To “appropriate” property of another to oneself or a third person means (A) to exercise control over it, or to aid a third person to exercise control over it, permanently or for so extended a period or under such circumstances as to acquire the major portion of its economic value or benefit, or (B) to dispose of the property for the benefit of oneself or a third person. (5) An “owner” means any person who has a right to possession superior to that of a taker, obtainer or withholder. (6) To “receive” means to acquire possession, control or title, or to lend on the security of the property. (7) “Service” includes, but is not limited to, labor, professional service, public utility and transportation service, the supplying of hotel accommodations, restaurant services, entertainment, and the supplying of equipment for use, but does not include school accommodations provided by a school district to (A) a child or an emancipated minor, or (B) a pupil eighteen years of age or older who was a homeless person, as defined in subdivision (3) of section 8-355, at the time of the offense. (8) “Check” means any check, draft or similar sight order for the payment of money which is not postdated with respect to the time of issuance. (9) “Drawer” of a check means a person whose name appears thereon as the primary obligor, whether the actual signature be that of himself or of a person purportedly authorized to draw the check in his behalf. (10) “Representative drawer” means a person who signs a check as drawer in a representative capacity or as agent of the person whose name appears thereon as the principal drawer or obligor. (11) A person “issues” a check when, as a drawer or representative drawer thereof, he delivers it or causes it to be delivered to a person who thereby acquires a right against the drawer with respect to such check. One who draws a check with intent that it be so delivered is deemed to have issued it if the delivery occurs. (12) A person “passes” a check when, being a payee, holder or bearer of a check which previously has been or purports to have been drawn and issued by another, he delivers it, for a purpose other than collection, to a third person who thereby acquires a right with respect thereto. (13) “Funds” means money or credit. (14) A drawer has “insufficient funds” with a drawee to cover a check when he has no funds or account whatever, or funds in an amount less than that of the check; and a check dishonored for “no account” shall also be deemed to have been dishonored for “insufficient funds”. (15) “Credit” means an arrangement or understanding with a bank or depository for the payment of a check, draft or order in full on presentation.

(b) A person who has obtained possession of property by theft or other illegal means shall be deemed to have a right of possession superior to that of a person who takes, obtains or withholds it from him by larcenous means.

(c) A joint or common owner of property shall not be deemed to have a right of possession thereto superior to that of any other joint or common owner thereof.

(d) In the absence of a specific agreement to the contrary, a person in lawful possession of property shall be deemed to have a right of possession superior to that of a person having only a security interest therein, even if legal title lies with the holder of the security interest pursuant to a conditional sale contract or other security agreement.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 120; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 23; P.A. 13-211, S. 1.)

History: 1971 act added Subdivs. (6) to (15) in Subsec. (a) defining “receive”, “service”, “check”, “drawer”, “representative drawer”, “issues”, “passes”, “funds”, “insufficient funds” and “credit”; P.A. 13-211 redefined “service” in Subsec. (a)(7) to exclude school accommodations.

Cited. 201 C. 489; 233 C. 552.

Cited. 19 CA 695; 43 CA 801; 45 CA 369; 47 CA 1.

Cited. 32 CS 650.

Subsec. (a):

Cited. 186 C. 555; 196 C. 225; 212 C. 31; 223 C. 243; 242 C. 666. Word “appropriate” as defined in Subdiv. (4) is not used in its ordinary sense. 255 C. 746.

Cited. 1 CA 642; 11 CA 684; 14 CA 272; 21 CA 386; 22 CA 449; 34 CA 751; judgment reversed, see 233 C. 211; 35 CA 566; 43 CA 801; 45 CA 6; 46 CA 269. Subdiv. (5): In circumstance where owner of motor vehicle took such vehicle from bailee, the bailee had a right of possession superior to that of owner and thus, for purposes of larceny statutes, bailee was the “owner” and owner of motor vehicle was the “taker”. 59 CA 135.

Cited. 35 CS 536. Subdiv. (1): Applicability of a penal code definition to the products liability statute may be inapposite. 40 CS 120.

(Return to Chapter
Table of Contents)		 (Return to
List of Chapters)		 (Return to
List of Titles)

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 71 cases (4 in the last 5 years), 1976–2025 · leading case: State v. Spillane, 770 A.2d 898 (Conn. 2001).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
State v. Spillane, 770 A.2d 898 (Conn. 2001). · cites it 16× “1 The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming “that the trial court improperly (1) denied his motion for acquittal at the end of the state’s case-in-chief, (2) denied his motion for acquittal at the conclusion of all of the evidence, (3) omitted from its final jury…”
State v. Spillane, 737 A.2d 479 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999). · cites it 33× “On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly (1) denied his motion for acquittal at the end of the state’s case-in-chief, (2) denied his motion for acquittal at the conclusion of all of the evidence, (3) omitted from its final jury instructions the definition…”
State v. Smith, 86 A.3d 498 (Conn. App. Ct. 2014). · cites it 30× “) General Statutes § 53a-118 (a) (5) defines ‘‘an owner’’ as used in § 53a- 119: ‘‘An ‘owner’ means any person who has a right to possession superior to that of a taker, obtainer or withholder.”
State v. Ingram, 687 A.2d 1279 (Conn. App. Ct. 1996). · cites it 12× “When a violation of § 53a-119 is committed under the aggravating circumstances set out in § 53a-135 (incorporating § 53a-133), § 53a-135 clearly evinces a legislative intent that robbery is a person and victim oriented crime and, thus, is of a higher order than a crime against…”
State v. Wieler, 645 A.2d 1032 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994). · cites it 18× “On March 2,1992, during the trial, the state abandoned its claim of larceny by embezzlement under General Statutes § 53a-119 (1) against the defendant as defined in General Statutes § 53a-118 (a) (4) (A) and proceeded against the defendant for larceny by embezzlement under…”
Almeida v. Holder, 588 F.3d 778 (2d Cir. 2009). · cites it 6× “We decline Almeida’s invitation to retreat from Abimbola’s conclusion that Connecticut’s statutory definition of larceny “is not divisible because it is no broader than ‘theft offense’ as defined by § 1101(a)(43)(G).”
State v. Kurvin, 442 A.2d 1327 (Conn. 1982). · cites it 4× “General Statutes § 53a-118 (a) (3) defines "deprive" to mean "(A) to withhold it or cause it to be withheld from him permanently or for so extended a period or under such circumstances that the major portion of its economic value or benefit is lost to him, or (B) to dispose of…”
State v. Morant, 701 A.2d 1 (Conn. 1997). · cites it 6× “) General Statutes § 53a-119. “An ‘owner’ means any person who has a right to possession superior to that of a taker, obtainer or withholder.”
State v. Lewis, 717 A.2d 1140 (Conn. 1998). · cites it 5× “) General Statutes § 53a-119. Our Penal Code defines “owner” for purposes of larceny as “any person who has a right to possession superior to that of a taker, obtainer or withholder.”
State v. Fauntleroy, 921 A.2d 622 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007). · cites it 5× “It is not necessary to prove that the coats were spun from silk or fashioned from the finest cloth to satisfy the statutory requirement of value set forth in § 53a-125b.”
State v. Radzvilowicz, 703 A.2d 767 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997). · cites it 6× “” General Statutes § 53a-118 (a) (1). Our definitional provision in part IX of chapter 952 of the General Statutes, *21 which covers “Larceny, Robbery and Related Offenses,” does not, however, contain any definition of “property of another.”
State v. Calonico, 770 A.2d 454 (Conn. 2001). · cites it 4× “” General Statutes § 53a-119. “An ‘owner’ [is] any person who has a right to possession superior to that of a taker, obtainer or withholder.”
Show all 71 citing cases →
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-118(3) — 1 case
Almeida v. Holder, 588 F.3d 778 (2d Cir. 2009). “We decline Almeida’s invitation to retreat from Abimbola’s conclusion that Connecticut’s statutory definition of larceny “is not divisible because it is no broader than ‘theft offense’ as defined by § 1101(a)(43)(G).”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-118(4) — 2 cases
Almeida v. Holder, 588 F.3d 778 (2d Cir. 2009). “We decline Almeida’s invitation to retreat from Abimbola’s conclusion that Connecticut’s statutory definition of larceny “is not divisible because it is no broader than ‘theft offense’ as defined by § 1101(a)(43)(G).”
Almeida v. Holder (2d Cir. 2009).
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-118(a) — 2 cases
Almeida v. Holder, 588 F.3d 778 (2d Cir. 2009). “We decline Almeida’s invitation to retreat from Abimbola’s conclusion that Connecticut’s statutory definition of larceny “is not divisible because it is no broader than ‘theft offense’ as defined by § 1101(a)(43)(G).”
Almeida v. Holder (2d Cir. 2009).
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-118(a)(2) — 1 case
One Barberry Real Est. Holding, LLC v. Maturo (D. Conn. 2021).
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-118(a)(3) — 5 cases
Diaz-lizarraga, 26 I. & N. Dec. 847 (BIA 2016).
Obeya, 26 I. & N. Dec. 856 (BIA 2016).
United States v. Cruz Santiago, 12 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1993).
Reyes, 28 I. & N. Dec. 52 (BIA 2020).
One Barberry Real Est. Holding, LLC v. Maturo (D. Conn. 2021).
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-118(a)(4) — 1 case
One Barberry Real Est. Holding, LLC v. Maturo (D. Conn. 2021).
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-118(a)(4)(A) — 1 case
Patel v. Holder, 707 F.3d 77 (1st Cir. 2013).
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-118(b) — 1 case
Crocco v. Advance Stores Co. Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 485 (D. Conn. 2006).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.