Conn. Gen. Stat. » Title 53a — PENAL CODE · Chapter 952 — Penal Code: Offenses
Connecticut General Statutes

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-181d (2026)

Stalking in the second degree: Class A misdemeanor

✓ current as of May 2026
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(a) For the purposes of this section:

(1) “Course of conduct” means two or more acts, including, but not limited to, acts in which a person directly, indirectly or through a third party, by any action, method, device or means, including, but not limited to, electronic or social media, (A) follows, lies in wait for, monitors, observes, surveils, threatens, harasses, communicates about or with or sends unwanted gifts to, a person, or (B) interferes with a person's property;

(2) “Emotional distress” means significant mental or psychological suffering or distress that may or may not require medical or other professional treatment or counseling; and

(3) “Personally identifying information” means:

(A) Any information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual's identity, such as name, prior legal name, alias, mother's maiden name, Social Security number, date or place of birth, address, telephone number or biometric data;

(B) Any information that is linked or linkable to an individual, such as medical, financial, education, consumer or employment information, data or records; or

(C) Any other sensitive private information that is linked or linkable to a specific identifiable individual, such as gender identity, sexual orientation or any sexually intimate visual depiction.

(b) A person is guilty of stalking in the second degree when:

(1) Such person knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at or concerning a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to (A) fear for such specific person's physical safety or the physical safety of a third person; (B) suffer emotional distress; or (C) fear injury to or the death of an animal owned by or in possession and control of such specific person;

(2) Such person with intent to harass, terrorize or alarm, and for no legitimate purpose, engages in a course of conduct directed at or concerning a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to fear that such person's employment, business or career is threatened, where (A) such conduct consists of the actor telephoning to, appearing at or initiating communication or contact to such other person's place of employment or business, including electronically, through video-teleconferencing or by digital media, provided the actor was previously and clearly informed to cease such conduct, and (B) such conduct does not consist of constitutionally protected activity; or

(3) Such person, for no legitimate purpose and with intent to harass, terrorize or alarm, by means of electronic communication, including, but not limited to, electronic or social media, discloses a specific person's personally identifiable information without consent of the person, knowing, that under the circumstances, such disclosure would cause a reasonable person to:

(A) Fear for such person's physical safety or the physical safety of a third person; or

(B) Suffer emotional distress.

(c) For the purposes of this section, a violation may be deemed to have been committed either at the place where the communication originated or at the place where it was received.

(d) Stalking in the second degree is a class A misdemeanor.

(P.A. 92-237, S. 2; P.A. 12-114, S. 12; P.A. 17-31, S. 1; P.A. 21-56, S. 2.)

History: P.A. 12-114 added new Subsec. (a) defining “course of conduct”, redesignated existing Subsecs. (a) and (b) as Subsecs. (b) and (c), and amended redesignated Subsec. (b) to replace former elements of crime with Subdiv. (1) re course of conduct that would cause reasonable person to fear for safety and Subdiv. (2) re course of conduct that would cause reasonable person to fear that person's employment, business or career is threatened; P.A. 17-31 amended Subsec. (a) to redefine “course of conduct” and to define “emotional distress”, and amended Subsec. (b)(1) to designate existing provision re fear for physical safety as Subpara. (A) and to add Subpara. (B) re emotional distress; P.A. 21-56 amended Subsec. (a) by designating existing definition of “course of conduct” as Subdiv. (1) and making technical changes and redsignating existing Subdivs. (1) and (2) as Subparas. (A) and (B) in same, designating existing definition of “emotional distress” as Subdiv. (2) and adding Subdiv. (3) defining “personally identifying information”, amended Subsec. (b) by adding “or concerning”, adding “specific” in Subpara. (A) and adding Subpara. (C) re fear injury to or death of an animal in Subdiv. (1), by replacing “intentionally” with “with intent to harass, terrorize or alarm”, adding “or concerning”, making a technical change and adding “including electronically, through video-teleconferencing or by digital media” in Subdiv. (2) and by adding Subdiv. (3) re use of electronic or social media to disclose personally identifiable information, added new Subsec. (c) re place where violation is committed and redesignated existing Subsec. (c) as Subsec. (d).

See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.

See Sec. 54-1k re issuance of protective order in stalking cases.

Cited. 44 CA 84. Held to be not unconstitutionally vague. 46 CA 661. Proof of verbal threats or harassing gestures not essential to prove violation of section; section can be violated without defendant's uttering a syllable, writing a word or making a gesture. 121 CA 520. Section requires that any “following” be “wilful” and “repeated”, and the following must have a predatory thrust to it; section does not encompass following that is aimless, unintentional, accidental or undertaken for a lawful purpose. 139 CA 553. Defendant not guilty under section because there was no evidence of a second act directed specifically against plaintiff to satisfy the “course of conduct” element. 166 CA 844.

Constitutionality of statute under attack for vagueness or overbreadth discussed. 43 CS 46.

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Notes of Decisions
Cited in 52 cases (16 in the last 5 years), 1993–2025 · leading case: State v. Culmo, 642 A.2d 90 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1993).
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State v. Culmo, 642 A.2d 90 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1993). · cites it 43× “In 1992, Connecticut’s legislature followed suit, enacting General Statutes §§ 53a-181d and 53a-181c.”
Stacy B. v. Robert S., 140 A.3d 1004 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016). · cites it 14× “The plaintiff filed an application for a protective order pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-16a 2 on April 4, 2015, alleging that he was being stalked pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-181d 3 by the defendant.”
Champagne v. Gintick, 871 F. Supp. 1527 (D. Conn. 1994). · cites it 24× “The plaintiff alleges that she was deprived of her First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and those guaranteed by Article IV, Section 2, of the Constitution as a result of her arrest pursuant to Conn.Gen.Stat. § 53a-181d. The plaintiff has also asserted a series of…”
State v. Douglas C., 345 Conn. 421 (Conn. 2022). · cites it 7× “, General Statutes § 53a-181d (b) (1) and (2); or that it must not be charged as a continuing offense; see, e.”
State v. Marsala, 688 A.2d 336 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997). · cites it 13× “The defendant appeals from the judgments of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of five counts of stalking in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181d. 1 On appeal, he claims that the trial court improperly (1) allowed the state to amend the *86…”
State v. Billings, 217 Conn. App. 1 (Conn. App. Ct. 2022). · cites it 10× “This court concluded that the applicable criminal statutes (§§ 53a-181d and 53a-183) for stalking in the second degree and harassment in the second degree, respectively, as applied to the defendant, violated his rights under the first amendment and, accordingly, reversed the…”
State v. Gibson, 969 A.2d 784 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009). · cites it 11× “" General Statutes § 53a-181c. General Statutes § 53a-181d (a) defines stalking in the second degree as occurring "when, with intent to cause another person to fear for his physical safety, [a person] wilfully and repeatedly follows or lies in wait for such other person and…”
State v. Cummings, 701 A.2d 663 (Conn. App. Ct. 1997). · cites it 8× “The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of stalking in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181c (a) (2), stalking in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181d, two counts of harassment in the…”
State v. Jackson, 742 A.2d 812 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000). · cites it 14× “General Statutes § 53a-181d (a) provides: “A person is guilty of stalking in the second degree when, with intent to cause another person to fear for his physical safety, he wilfully and repeatedly follows or lies in wait for such other person and causes such other person to…”
State v. Samms, 56 A.3d 755 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012). · cites it 9× “The defendant, Jeffrey Samms, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after a jury trial, of one count of risk of injury to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a) (l) 1 and two counts of stalking in the second degree in violation of General Statutes §…”
State v. Arthurs, 997 A.2d 568 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010). · cites it 6× “In order to obtain a conviction under General Statutes § 53a-181d, 5 the state must prove all of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that the perpetrator acted with intent to cause another person to fear for his or her physical safety, (2) that the perpetrator…”
State v. Boscarino, 861 A.2d 579 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004). · cites it 4× “” General Statutes § 53a-181d provides: “(a) A person is guilty of stalking in the second degree when, with intent to cause another person to fear for his physical safety, he wilfully and repeatedly follows or lies in wait for such other person and causes such other person to…”
Show all 52 citing cases →
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-181d(a) — 1 case
State v. Bryan, 910 P.2d 212 (Kan. 1996).
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-181d(b) — 1 case
Stacy B. v. Robert S., 140 A.3d 1004 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016). “The plaintiff filed an application for a protective order pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-16a 2 on April 4, 2015, alleging that he was being stalked pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-181d 3 by the defendant.”
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