A person in possession or control of premises, or a person who is licensed or privileged to be in or upon such premises, is justified in using reasonable physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate the commission or attempted commission of a criminal trespass by such other person in or upon such premises; but he may use deadly physical force under such circumstances only (1) in defense of a person as prescribed in section
53a-19, or (2) when he reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent an attempt by the trespasser to commit arson or any crime of violence, or (3) to the extent that he reasonably believes such to be necessary to prevent or terminate an unlawful entry by force into his dwelling as defined in section
53a-100, or place of work, and for the sole purpose of such prevention or termination.
(1969, P.A. 828, S. 20; 1971, P.A. 871, S. 6; P.A. 73-639, S. 2; P.A. 92-260, S. 5.)
History: 1971 act specified use of “reasonable” physical force; P.A. 73-639 allowed use of deadly physical force when necessary to prevent crime of violence and deleted language allowing use of deadly physical force “not earlier in time” than necessary to prevent or terminate unlawful entry in dwelling or workplace by force; P.A. 92-260 made technical changes by replacing “believes it is necessary” and “believes it necessary” with “believes such to be necessary”.
Defendant is entitled to a theory of defense instruction as a matter of law when evidence under section is before jury. 178 C. 704. Cited. 199 C. 383; 203 C. 466; 204 C. 240; 209 C. 75; 242 C. 211. Defendant's due process right to fair trial was violated when trial court failed to explicitly instruct jury that state bore burden of disproving defendant's defense of premises theory. 294 C. 399. The term “crime of violence” includes only those offenses that fall within the traditional common law definition of the term, such as arson and burglary, and do not necessarily involve the use of deadly force or infliction of great bodily harm. 314 C. 618.
Cited. 2 CA 617; 8 CA 667; 23 CA 615; 24 CA 195; 45 CA 390.
Common-law right referred to; unnecessary to decide whether Sec. 53a-23 creates an exception. 34 CS 531. Cited. 43 CS 46.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
27
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1976–2024 · leading case:
State v. Ebron, 975 A.2d 17 (Conn. 2009).
State v. Ebron, 975 A.2d 17 (Conn. 2009).
· cites it 6× “*691 B Finally, we address the defendant’s claim that the trial court improperly failed to instruct the jury on defense of premises pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-20. 29 Although the defendant failed to request this charge at trial, he raises this claim pursuant to State v.”
State v. Parnoff, 186 A.3d 640 (Conn. 2018).
· cites it 2× “] ); see also **440 General Statutes § 53a-20 (defense of premises).”
State v. Brunette, 886 A.2d 427 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005).
· cites it 8× “The defendant relies on General Statutes § 53a-20, which permits the use of reasonable force by a person who is privileged to be on the premises and who “reasonably believes [such force] to be necessary to prevent or terminate the commission .”
State v. Amado, 756 A.2d 274 (Conn. 2000).
· cites it 9× “On remand, the Appellate Court reversed the intentional murder and capital felony convictions, concluding that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the victims’ right to use reasonable force in defense of premises pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-20, 6 and the…”
State v. Erickson, 997 A.2d 480 (Conn. 2010).
· cites it 8× “On July 26, 2007, the defendant filed a request to charge that included the affirmative defenses of (1) selfdefense, [8] (2) the common-law right to resist unlawful entry, [9] (3) defense of premises under General Statutes § 53a-20, [10] and (4) Orr's failure to serve the…”
State v. Terwilliger, 984 A.2d 721 (Conn. 2009).
· cites it 5× “2 At trial, the defendant requested a jury instruction on defense of premises pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-20. 3 The defendant specifically requested that the trial court *404 charge the jury that the state bore the burden of disproving the defendant’s defense of premises…”
State v. Garrison, 525 A.2d 498 (Conn. 1987).
· cites it 6× “1 When this case was first appealed one year ago, we remanded for further articulation by the trial court of its reasons for rejecting the two defenses on which the defendant had relied, self-defense under General Statutes § 53a-19 2 and defense of premises *468 under General…”
State v. Amado, 719 A.2d 45 (Conn. App. Ct. 1998).
· cites it 9× “” General Statutes § 53a-20 provides: “Use of physical force in defense of premises.”
State v. Terwilliger, 937 A.2d 735 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008).
· cites it 5× “General Statutes § 53a-20 provides: “A person in possession or control of premises, or a person who is licensed or privileged to be in or upon such premises, is justified in using reasonable physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes…”
State v. Johnson, 801 A.2d 890 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
· cites it 3× “" General Statutes § 53a-20 provides: “A person in possession or control of premises, or a person who is licensed or privileged to be in or upon such premises, is justified in using reasonable physical force upon another person when and to the extent that he reasonably believes…”
State v. Garrison, 507 A.2d 467 (Conn. 1986).
· cites it 6× “1 In his trial, the defendant relied on the defenses of self-defense under General Statutes § 53a-19 2 and defense-of-premises under General Statutes § 53a-20. 3 The trial *385 court rejected these defenses and found the defendant guilty as charged.”
State v. Wilchinski, 700 A.2d 1 (Conn. 1997).
· cites it 2× “) General Statutes § 53a-20 provides: “Use of physical force in defense of premises.”
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