Conn. Gen. Stat. » Title 53a — PENAL CODE · Chapter 951 — Penal Code: Statutory Construction; Principles of Criminal Liability
Connecticut General Statutes

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-5 (2026)

Criminal liability; mental state required

✓ current as of May 2026
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When the commission of an offense defined in this title, or some element of an offense, requires a particular mental state, such mental state is ordinarily designated in the statute defining the offense by use of the terms “intentionally”, “knowingly”, “recklessly” or “criminal negligence”, or by use of terms, such as “with intent to defraud” and “knowing it to be false”, describing a specific kind of intent or knowledge. When one and only one of such terms appears in a statute defining an offense, it is presumed to apply to every element of the offense unless an intent to limit its application clearly appears.

(1969, P.A. 828, S. 5.)

Cited. 173 C. 35; 186 C. 45; 201 C. 505; 202 C. 520; 209 C. 75; 235 C. 477; 242 C. 211. When a statute requires state to prove that defendant intentionally engaged in the statutorily proscribed conduct, section does not require court to presume that the statute requires state to prove that defendant had knowledge of a circumstance described in the statute. 265 C. 35.

Cited. 9 CA 161; Id., 686; 17 CA 339; 19 CA 609; 40 CA 643.

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Notes of Decisions
Cited in 24 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1977–2022 · leading case: State v. Salamon, 949 A.2d 1092 (Conn. 2008).
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State v. Salamon, 949 A.2d 1092 (Conn. 2008). · cites it 28× “" Under General Statutes § 53a-5, however, when a statute defining a criminal offense uses a term such as "intentionally" to specify a requisite mental state, that term "is presumed to apply to every element of the offense unless an intent to limit its application clearly…”
State v. Higgins, 826 A.2d 1126 (Conn. 2003). · cites it 10× “The defendant points out, however, that, under General Statutes § 53a-5, “[w]hen one and only one of such terms appears in a statute defining an offense, it is presumed to apply to every element of the offense unless an intent to limit its application clearly appears.”
State v. Youngs, 904 A.2d 1240 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006). · cites it 12× “7 B The defendant relies on General Statutes § 53a-5 8 to support his claim that the court improperly instructed the jury on unlawful restraint in the first degree by failing to specify that specific intent applies to both elements of § 53a-95 (a), including the second element,…”
State v. Pond, 50 A.3d 950 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012). · cites it 5× “See General Statutes § 53a-5. 1 In State v. Crosswell, 223 Conn.”
State v. Wilchinski, 700 A.2d 1 (Conn. 1997). · cites it 4× “Indeed, General Statutes § 53a-5, which addresses the mental state *230 required for offenses in the penal code, implicitly permits the legislature to proscribe offenses that do not require a mens rea (“[w]hen the commission of an offense defined in this title, or some element…”
State v. Josephs, 176 A.3d 542 (Conn. 2018). · cites it 2× “2d 391 (1977) ; see also General Statutes § 53a-5 ("[w]hen the commission of an offense .”
Valeriano v. Bronson, 546 A.2d 1380 (Conn. 1988). · cites it 2× “, General Statutes §§ 53a-5 through 53a-23.”
State v. George J., 910 A.2d 931 (Conn. 2006). · cites it 2× “See General Statutes § 53a-5 (addressing mental state for criminal liability; “some element of an offense” and “every element of the offense”); General Statutes § 53a-7 (addressing effect of intoxication as defense; “an element of the crime charged”); General Statutes § 53a-49…”
State v. Denby, 668 A.2d 682 (Conn. 1995). · cites it 2× “” General Statutes § 53a-5. Section 21a-278a (b) specifically requires a mental state of “intent,” which must be applied to every element of that statute.”
State v. Hill, 773 A.2d 931 (Conn. 2001). · cites it 2× “” General Statutes § 53a-5; see also State v.”
State v. Roy, 376 A.2d 391 (Conn. 1977). · cites it 2× “It designates no special mental state or specific intent as set out in General Statutes § 53a-5. 3 “In determining which of these crimes requires proof of a general intent and which requires proof of a specific intent, the language chosen by the legislature in enacting a…”
State v. Foster, 522 A.2d 277 (Conn. 1987). · cites it 2× “” General Statutes § 53a-5. Accordingly, an accessory may be liable in aiding another if he acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence toward the result, depending on the mental state required by the substantive crime.”
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