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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 53a — Penal CodeChapter 952 — Penal Code: Offenses

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-72b (2025)

Sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm: Class C or B felony

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1983–2017 9citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 9 opinions since 1983. The most litigated part is subsection (a) (1 case).

(a) A person is guilty of sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm when such person commits sexual assault in the third degree as provided in section 53a-72a, and in the commission of such offense, such person uses or is armed with and threatens the use of or displays or represents by such person's words or conduct that such person possesses a pistol, revolver, machine gun, rifle, shotgun or other firearm. No person shall be convicted of sexual assault in the third degree and sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon the same information.

(b) Sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm is a class C felony or, if the victim of the offense is under sixteen years of age, a class B felony, and any person found guilty under this section shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of which two years of the sentence imposed may not be suspended or reduced by the court and a period of special parole pursuant to subsection (b) of section 53a-28 which together constitute a sentence of ten years.

(P.A. 75-619, S. 10; June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2, S. 51; P.A. 02-138, S. 9.)

History: June Sp. Sess. P.A. 99-2 amended Subsec. (b) to increase the penalty from a class D to a class C felony, increase from 1 year to 2 years the nonsuspendable portion of the sentence and add requirement that any person found guilty be sentenced to a term of imprisonment and a period of special parole pursuant to Sec. 53a-28(b) which together constitute a sentence of 10 years and made provisions of section gender neutral; P.A. 02-138 amended Subsec. (b) to classify the offense as a class B felony if the victim is under 16 years of age.

See chapter 968a re address confidentiality program.

See Sec. 53a-40c re sentence of psychological counseling for sexual assault of minor.

See Sec. 54-86f re admissibility of evidence of prior sexual conduct.

Cited. 175 C. 315; 192 C. 154; 207 C. 412; 216 C. 282; 240 C. 743.

Cited. 3 CA 374; 35 CA 173; 43 CA 715.

The 9 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-72b most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Blango, 927 A.2d 964 (Conn. App. Ct. 2007).
cites § 53a-72b 4×cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 53a-72b
“defendant, Emmanuel Blango, appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered after *103 a jury trial, of aggravated sexual assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-70a (a) (l), 1 kidnapping in the second degree with a firearm in violation of General…”
2
GREENState v. Kirsch, 820 A.2d 236 (Conn. 2003).
cites § 53a-72b 2×cited by 58 cases
Where it cites § 53a-72b
“he first degree and manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm upon the same transaction”); General Statutes § 53a-59a (b) (“[n]o person shall be found guilty of assault in the first degree and assault of an elderly, *419 blind, disabled, pregnant or mentally retarded…”
The case’s holding
The Blockburger test is a rule of statutory construction that is not controlling where there is a clear indication of contrary legislative intent.
Later courts cite it for
“the blockburger test is a rule of statutory construction, and because it serves as a means of discerning legislative purpose the rule should not be controlling where, for example, there is a clear indication of contrary legislative intent.” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENState v. Burgos, 155 A.3d 246 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).
cites § 53a-72b 2×subsections: (a) 2×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 53a-72b
“" General Statutes § 53a-72b(a) states in relevant part: "No person shall be convicted of sexual assault in the third degree and sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon…”
4
GREENState v. Tabone, 973 A.2d 74 (Conn. 2009).
cites § 53a-72b 2×cited by 34 cases
Where it cites § 53a-72b
“to 1999) § 53a-72b, which, at the time, carried a maximum period of incarceration of five years.”
The case’s holding
A trial court's power to resentence a defendant is limited by the original sentencing intent and the total effective sentence may not exceed the original sentence.
Later courts cite it for
“fthe determination of whether the defendant's new sentence exceeds his original sentence is a question of law over which . . . review is plenary.” · 2 citing courts
5
GREENState v. Vass, 469 A.2d 767 (Conn. 1983).
cites § 53a-72b 2×cited by 81 cases
Where it cites § 53a-72b
““If the Court charges the jury with regard to the crime of Sexual Assault in the First Degree, § 53a-70 of the General Statutes, the defendant further requests that the court charge the jury as to the crime of Sexual Assault in the Third Degree in accordance with General…”
The case’s holding
A defendant may be convicted of two offenses arising from the same criminal incident if each crime contains an element not found in the other.
Later courts cite it for
“a defendant may be convicted of two offenses arising out of the same criminal incident if each crime contains an element not found in the other.” · 5 citing courts
6
GREENState v. Perez, 828 A.2d 626 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003).
cites § 53a-72b 2×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 53a-72b
“d guilty of manslaughter in the first degree and manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm upon the same transaction’); General Statutes § 53a-59a (b) (‘[n]o person shall be found guilty of assault in the first degree and assault of an elderly, blind, disabled, pregnant or…”
The case’s holding
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only after adversary judicial proceedings initiate and prior invocations of silence are protected if police scrupulously honor them.
7
GREENState v. Matos, 694 A.2d 775 (Conn. 1997).
cites § 53a-72b 2×cited by 41 cases
Where it cites § 53a-72b
“youths charged with a class A felony or a violation of subdivision (2) of General Statutes § 53-21 (injury or risk of injury to, or impairing morals of, children), General Statutes § 53a-70 (sexual assault in first degree), General Statutes § 53a-70a (aggravated sexual assault…”
The case’s holding
The legislature may rationally exclude certain serious crimes from youthful offender eligibility without violating due process or equal protection rights.
Later courts cite it for
“in order to prevail on his due process claim, the defendant must prove that: (1) he has been deprived of a property or liberty interest cognizable under the due process clause; and (2) the deprivation of the property or liberty interest has occurred without due process.” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENPlourde v. Liburdi, 540 A.2d 1054 (Conn. 1988).
cites § 53a-72b 1×cited by 69 cases
Where it cites § 53a-72b
“…§ 53a-70a sexual assault in the first degree with a deadly weapon; § 53a-71 (b), sexual assault in the second degree; § 53a-72b (b), Sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm; § 53a-92a (b), kidnapping in the first degree with a firearm; § 53a-94a (b), kidnapping in…”
The case’s holding
The use of different words or the absence of repeatedly used words in the context of the same subject matter indicates a difference in legislative intention.
Later courts cite it for
“the use of different words or the absence of repeatedly used words in the context of the same subject matter must indicate a difference in legislative intention” · 7 citing courts
9
GREENState v. Victor O., 128 A.3d 940 (Conn. 2016).
cites § 53a-72b 1×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 53a-72b
“to 1999) § 53a-72b (b), as amended by Spec. Sess. P.”
The case’s holding
Statutory provisions must be read together to create a harmonious body of law and construed to avoid conflict between them.
Later courts cite it for
“it also is well established that, in cases in which more than one statutory provision is involved, we presume that the legislature intended those provisions to be read together to create a harmonious body of law ... and we construe the provisions, if possible, to avoid conflict between them.” · 2 citing courts

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
198320002017

One bar per year. Tallest: 2 cases in 2003. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Conn.6Conn. App. Ct.3
By subsection
(a)1 case
State v. Burgos, 155 A.3d 246 (Conn. App. Ct. 2017).“" General Statutes § 53a-72b(a) states in relevant part: "No person shall be convicted of sexual assault in the third degree and sexual assault in the third degree with a firearm upon the same transaction but such person may be charged and prosecuted for both such offenses upon…”
Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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