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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 54 — Criminal ProcedureChapter 959a — Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-41c (2025)

Information in application

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1978–1996 13citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 13 opinions since 1978. The most litigated part is subsection (6) (1 case).

Each application for an order authorizing the interception of a wire communication shall be made in writing upon oath or affirmation to a panel of judges. Each application shall include the following information: (1) The identity of the applicant and his authority to make such application; (2) the identity and qualifications of the investigative officers or agency for whom the authority to intercept a wire communication is sought; (3) the identity and qualifications of the investigative or law enforcement officers to whom disclosure of the contents of any intercepted wire communication or evidence derived therefrom might be made; (4) a statement of the use to which the contents of any intercepted wire communication or any evidence derived therefrom will be put; (5) a full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant, to justify his reasonable belief that the wire communication of a particularly described person will constitute evidence of a crime enumerated in section 54-41b that has been or is being committed or that such communication will materially aid in the apprehension of the perpetrator of such crime and that an order should be issued, including (A) details as to the particular offense that has been or is being committed, (B) a particular description of the nature and location of the facilities from which or the place where the communication is to be intercepted, (C) a particular description of the type of communications sought to be intercepted, (D) the identity of the person, if known, who has committed or is committing the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted, (E) the time and date when the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant were first received by him or by the investigative or law enforcement officer conducting the investigation, whichever is earlier, (F) the way in which the intercepted wire communication will constitute material evidence of the particularly described offense or will materially aid in the apprehension of the perpetrator of such offense, (G) the hours of the day or night during which wire communication may be reasonably expected to occur; (6) a full and complete statement of facts showing that other normal investigative procedures with respect to the offense have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous to employ; (7) a statement of the period of time for which the interception is required to be maintained. No order authorizing or approving the interception of a wire communication shall be issued if the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant were discovered more than twenty days next preceding the date of the application. If the nature of the investigation is such that the authorization for interception should not automatically terminate when the described type of communication has been first obtained, a particular description of facts establishing probable cause to believe that additional communications of the same type will occur thereafter; (8) a full and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous applications known to the individual making the application, made to any panel of judges, for authorization to intercept, or for approval of interceptions of, wire communications involving any of the same persons, facilities or places specified in the application, and the action taken by the panel on each such application; (9) a statement that the wire communications sought are material to a particularly described investigation or prosecution and that such communications are not legally privileged; (10) if it is reasonably necessary to make a secret entry upon a private place or premises in order to install an intercepting device to effectuate the interception, a statement to that effect and to the effect that no practicable alternative method of executing the order which will preserve the secrecy of its execution exists; (11) where the application is for the extension of an order, a statement setting forth the results thus far obtained from the interception, or a reasonable explanation of the failure to obtain such results; (12) where the application is for an order authorizing interception in excess of thirty-five orders previously issued by all panels in a calendar year, a statement setting forth the nature of the emergency situation which may result in imminent peril to the public health, safety or welfare, and the nature of that imminent peril, which requires the issuance of an additional interception order. The state's attorney shall inform the Governor and the joint standing committee of the General Assembly having cognizance of matters relating to criminal law and procedure of the nature of the emergency situation which may result in imminent peril to the public health, safety or welfare, and the nature of that imminent peril; (13) such additional testimony or documentary evidence in support of fact in the application as the panel of judges may require. Allegations of fact in the application may be based either upon the personal knowledge of the applicant or upon information and belief. If the applicant personally knows the facts alleged, it must be so stated. If the facts establishing such probable cause are derived in whole or part from the statements of persons other than the applicant, the sources of such information and belief shall be either disclosed or described, and the application shall contain facts establishing the existence and reliability of the informant, or the reliability of the information supplied by him. The application shall also state the basis of the informant's knowledge or belief. If the applicant's information and belief are derived from tangible evidence or recorded oral evidence, a copy or detailed description thereof shall be annexed to or included in the application. Affidavits of persons other than the applicant may be submitted in conjunction with the application if they tend to support any fact or conclusion alleged therein. Such accompanying affidavits may be based either on personal knowledge of the affiant, or information and belief with the source thereof and reason therefor specified.

(1971, P.A. 68, S. 3; P.A. 79-179, S. 3; P.A. 82-368, S. 3.)

History: P.A. 79-179 removed reference to law enforcement officers in Subdiv. (2); P.A. 82-368 changed the time limit on reliable information from 15 to 20 days and included the provision dealing with application for the thirty-sixth and subsequent emergency orders as new Subdiv. (12), renumbering accordingly.

Read with Sec. 54-41b, oath or affirmation required can only be that of the state's attorney applicant; acknowledgment is insufficient. 176 C. 17. Application defective for failure of state's attorney to make formal oath or affirmation; statute requires disclosure of prior applications to intercept the conversations of a particular person, not prior interceptions of conversations to which that person was a party. 180 C. 345. Cited. 191 C. 360; 194 C. 447; 199 C. 591; 224 C. 593; 238 C. 692.

Cited. 3 CA 477; 5 CA 207; 7 CA 660; 9 CA 182; 17 CA 587.

The 13 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-41c most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. Grant, 404 A.2d 873 (Conn. 1978).
cites § 54-41c 43×cited by 72 cases
Where it cites § 54-41c
“The following provision, General Statutes § 54-41c, begins: "Each application for an order authorizing the interception of a wire communication shall be made in writing upon oath or affirmation to a panel of judges.”
The case’s holding
A wiretap application must be submitted under oath or affirmation to satisfy statutory requirements for intercepting communications.
Later courts cite it for
“insofar as it is possible, the entire enactment is to be harmonized, each part made operative.” · 4 citing courts
2
GREENState v. Ralston, 510 A.2d 1346 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986).
cites § 54-41c 16×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 54-41c
“The issues involve: (1) the sufficiency of the affidavits accompanying the applications to support the findings of probable cause for the issuance of the wiretap orders; (2) whether probable cause was required as to this defendant, whose telephone was not the subject of the…”
The case’s holding
The twenty-day statutory rule is not violated if the probable cause finding rests on facts discovered within the period in addition to older facts indicating a continuing course of criminal activity.
Later courts cite it for
“at least where the application and affidavit indicate a continuing course of criminal activity, as they do here, the twenty day statutory rule is not violated if the finding of probable cause rests on facts and circumstances discovered within the period in addition to facts and circumstances discovered beyond the period.” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENState v. Telesca, 508 A.2d 1367 (Conn. 1986).
cites § 54-41c 11×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 54-41c
“They level their attack on the sufficiency of Lawlor’s affidavit, claiming that the affidavit was inadequate because it did not indicate the unavailability of other less intrusive investigative techniques as required by General Statutes § 54-41c (6) and that it failed to…”
Later courts cite it for
“clearly the state has a strong public interest in protecting the identity of confidential informants in order to encourage the flow of information necessary in criminal prosecutions.” · 2 citing courts
4
GREENState v. Assuntino, 429 A.2d 900 (Conn. 1980).
cites § 54-41c 7×cited by 36 cases
Where it cites § 54-41c
“This case involves interpretation of the requirement of the wiretapping and electronic surveillance statute; General Statutes § 54-41c (8); 1 that applications for interception orders must contain statements of all previous wiretap applications involving the same subject.”
The case’s holding
A wiretap application is defective if the state attorney fails to submit the application under a formal oath or affirmation.
5
GREENState v. Speers, 554 A.2d 769 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989).
cites § 54-41c 10×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 54-41c
“We note that, on the basis of the information provided by the affiants, the three judge wiretap panel unanimously decided to issue the wiretap order and concluded that the application met the requirements of General Statutes § 54-41c. 10 The trial court proceeded *598 from a…”
6
GREENWashington v. Meachum, 680 A.2d 262 (Conn. 1996).
cites § 54-41c 4×cited by 52 cases
Where it cites § 54-41c
“General Statutes §§ 54-41c through 54-41o.”
The case’s holding
Monitoring of nonprivileged inmate mail and telephone calls is permissible to further substantial governmental interests in security, order, and rehabilitation.
Later courts cite it for
“it is now established beyond doubt that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts . . . and that such access must be adequate, effective and meaningful.” · 3 citing courts
7
GREENState v. Ross, 481 A.2d 730 (Conn. 1984).
cites § 54-41c 5×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 54-41c
“As we have already pointed out, our wiretap statutes permit the issuance of a wiretap order only if it can be determined on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant that probable cause exists as to the nine separate criteria set forth in General Statutes § 54-41d. 12…”
The case’s holding
A reviewing court must apply a more penetrating standard of review to wiretap applications than to search warrants to ensure the affidavit establishes probable cause.
Later courts cite it for
“examination of the plain language of general statutes 54-41a et seq. quickly makes it abundantly clear that the legislature sought to limit carefully such intrusions” · 2 citing courts
8
REDState v. Kimbro, 496 A.2d 498 (Conn. 1985).
cites § 54-41c 2×cited by 135 cases
Overruled by State v. Barton on other grounds: 1 citing opinion limits it to other grounds, 1 says in part, and 2 say overruled outright.
Where it cites § 54-41c
“See General Statutes § 54-41c; State v. Ross, 194 Conn.”
The case’s holding
The Connecticut Constitution requires the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test for probable cause in warrantless searches and arrests, providing greater protection than the federal totality-of-the-circumstances standard.
Later courts cite it for
“while the gates court reiterated the preference for search warrants, it seems fairly probable that the gates test may be applied in fourth amendment cases to warrant-less searches and seizures.” · 1 citing court
9
GREENState v. McVeigh, 620 A.2d 133 (Conn. 1993).
cites § 54-41c 2×cited by 30 cases
Where it cites § 54-41c
“2d 900 (1980) (“authority to wiretap that is contained in General Statutes § 54-41c [8] requires strict compliance” with the statutory requirements); State v.”
The case’s holding
Cordless telephone conversations are covered by Connecticut's wiretap statutes, so the radio-wave portion of such a conversation is a wire communication whose unauthorized interception requires suppression.
Later courts cite it for
“we do not believe that the legislative intent behind the wiretap act was to leave such unknowing third parties unprotected simply because the telephonic technology in such widespread use today was not available in 1971” · 1 citing court
10
GREENUnited States v. D'Aquila, 719 F. Supp. 98 (D. Conn. 1989).
cites § 54-41c 11×subsections: (7) 4× (6) 2× (13) 2× (8)cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 54-41c
“Section 54-41c. Subsection 12 of this provision subjects those contents to the Aguilar-Spinelli test for probable cause.”
11
GREENState v. Formica, 489 A.2d 1060 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985).
cites § 54-41c 2×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 54-41c
“) Third, the history of our wiretap act is replete with strong declarations of legislative intent that it be strictly construed, and that its carefully and narrowly drawn provisions reflect a delicate balancing of interests which placed great weight on safeguards to protect…”
12
NEUTRALState v. Levine, 497 A.2d 774 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985).
cites § 54-41c 4×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 54-41c
“Our wiretap statutes require, for the issuance of a wiretap order, probable cause as to nine separate criteria stated in General Statutes § 54-41d, based on an application and supporting affidavit containing the information stated in General Statutes § 54-41c.”
13
NO FLAGState v. Iovine, 517 A.2d 644 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986).
cites § 54-41c 2×cited by 0 cases
Where it cites § 54-41c
“The defendants attempt to offer alternate grounds for affirming the decision of the trial court, namely, that the affidavit supporting the issuance of the wiretap order was insufficient to establish probable cause as to other normal investigative procedures; see General Statutes…”

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197819871996

One bar per year. Tallest: 3 cases in 1985. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Conn.7Conn. App. Ct.5D. Conn.1
By subsection
(6)1 case
United States v. D'Aquila, 719 F. Supp. 98 (D. Conn. 1989).“Section 54-41c. Subsection 12 of this provision subjects those contents to the Aguilar-Spinelli test for probable cause.”
(7)1 case
United States v. D'Aquila, 719 F. Supp. 98 (D. Conn. 1989).
(8)1 case
United States v. D'Aquila, 719 F. Supp. 98 (D. Conn. 1989).
(9)1 case
United States v. D'Aquila, 719 F. Supp. 98 (D. Conn. 1989).
(13)1 case
United States v. D'Aquila, 719 F. Supp. 98 (D. Conn. 1989).
Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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