Connecticut General Statutes

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-41c (2026)

Information in application

✓ current as of May 2026
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Each application for an order authorizing the interception of a wire communication shall be made in writing upon oath or affirmation to a panel of judges. Each application shall include the following information: (1) The identity of the applicant and his authority to make such application; (2) the identity and qualifications of the investigative officers or agency for whom the authority to intercept a wire communication is sought; (3) the identity and qualifications of the investigative or law enforcement officers to whom disclosure of the contents of any intercepted wire communication or evidence derived therefrom might be made; (4) a statement of the use to which the contents of any intercepted wire communication or any evidence derived therefrom will be put; (5) a full and complete statement of the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant, to justify his reasonable belief that the wire communication of a particularly described person will constitute evidence of a crime enumerated in section 54-41b that has been or is being committed or that such communication will materially aid in the apprehension of the perpetrator of such crime and that an order should be issued, including (A) details as to the particular offense that has been or is being committed, (B) a particular description of the nature and location of the facilities from which or the place where the communication is to be intercepted, (C) a particular description of the type of communications sought to be intercepted, (D) the identity of the person, if known, who has committed or is committing the offense and whose communications are to be intercepted, (E) the time and date when the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant were first received by him or by the investigative or law enforcement officer conducting the investigation, whichever is earlier, (F) the way in which the intercepted wire communication will constitute material evidence of the particularly described offense or will materially aid in the apprehension of the perpetrator of such offense, (G) the hours of the day or night during which wire communication may be reasonably expected to occur; (6) a full and complete statement of facts showing that other normal investigative procedures with respect to the offense have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous to employ; (7) a statement of the period of time for which the interception is required to be maintained. No order authorizing or approving the interception of a wire communication shall be issued if the facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant were discovered more than twenty days next preceding the date of the application. If the nature of the investigation is such that the authorization for interception should not automatically terminate when the described type of communication has been first obtained, a particular description of facts establishing probable cause to believe that additional communications of the same type will occur thereafter; (8) a full and complete statement of the facts concerning all previous applications known to the individual making the application, made to any panel of judges, for authorization to intercept, or for approval of interceptions of, wire communications involving any of the same persons, facilities or places specified in the application, and the action taken by the panel on each such application; (9) a statement that the wire communications sought are material to a particularly described investigation or prosecution and that such communications are not legally privileged; (10) if it is reasonably necessary to make a secret entry upon a private place or premises in order to install an intercepting device to effectuate the interception, a statement to that effect and to the effect that no practicable alternative method of executing the order which will preserve the secrecy of its execution exists; (11) where the application is for the extension of an order, a statement setting forth the results thus far obtained from the interception, or a reasonable explanation of the failure to obtain such results; (12) where the application is for an order authorizing interception in excess of thirty-five orders previously issued by all panels in a calendar year, a statement setting forth the nature of the emergency situation which may result in imminent peril to the public health, safety or welfare, and the nature of that imminent peril, which requires the issuance of an additional interception order. The state's attorney shall inform the Governor and the joint standing committee of the General Assembly having cognizance of matters relating to criminal law and procedure of the nature of the emergency situation which may result in imminent peril to the public health, safety or welfare, and the nature of that imminent peril; (13) such additional testimony or documentary evidence in support of fact in the application as the panel of judges may require. Allegations of fact in the application may be based either upon the personal knowledge of the applicant or upon information and belief. If the applicant personally knows the facts alleged, it must be so stated. If the facts establishing such probable cause are derived in whole or part from the statements of persons other than the applicant, the sources of such information and belief shall be either disclosed or described, and the application shall contain facts establishing the existence and reliability of the informant, or the reliability of the information supplied by him. The application shall also state the basis of the informant's knowledge or belief. If the applicant's information and belief are derived from tangible evidence or recorded oral evidence, a copy or detailed description thereof shall be annexed to or included in the application. Affidavits of persons other than the applicant may be submitted in conjunction with the application if they tend to support any fact or conclusion alleged therein. Such accompanying affidavits may be based either on personal knowledge of the affiant, or information and belief with the source thereof and reason therefor specified.

(1971, P.A. 68, S. 3; P.A. 79-179, S. 3; P.A. 82-368, S. 3.)

History: P.A. 79-179 removed reference to law enforcement officers in Subdiv. (2); P.A. 82-368 changed the time limit on reliable information from 15 to 20 days and included the provision dealing with application for the thirty-sixth and subsequent emergency orders as new Subdiv. (12), renumbering accordingly.

Read with Sec. 54-41b, oath or affirmation required can only be that of the state's attorney applicant; acknowledgment is insufficient. 176 C. 17. Application defective for failure of state's attorney to make formal oath or affirmation; statute requires disclosure of prior applications to intercept the conversations of a particular person, not prior interceptions of conversations to which that person was a party. 180 C. 345. Cited. 191 C. 360; 194 C. 447; 199 C. 591; 224 C. 593; 238 C. 692.

Cited. 3 CA 477; 5 CA 207; 7 CA 660; 9 CA 182; 17 CA 587.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 13 cases, 1978–1996 · leading case: State v. Grant, 404 A.2d 873 (Conn. 1978).
State v. Grant, 404 A.2d 873 (Conn. 1978). · cites it 43× “The following provision, General Statutes § 54-41c, begins: "Each application for an order authorizing the interception of a wire communication shall be made in writing upon oath or affirmation to a panel of judges.”
State v. Ralston, 510 A.2d 1346 (Conn. App. Ct. 1986). · cites it 16× “The issues involve: (1) the sufficiency of the affidavits accompanying the applications to support the findings of probable cause for the issuance of the wiretap orders; (2) whether probable cause was required as to this defendant, whose telephone was not the subject of the…”
State v. Telesca, 508 A.2d 1367 (Conn. 1986). · cites it 11× “They level their attack on the sufficiency of Lawlor’s affidavit, claiming that the affidavit was inadequate because it did not indicate the unavailability of other less intrusive investigative techniques as required by General Statutes § 54-41c (6) and that it failed to…”
State v. Assuntino, 429 A.2d 900 (Conn. 1980). · cites it 7× “This case involves interpretation of the requirement of the wiretapping and electronic surveillance statute; General Statutes § 54-41c (8); 1 that applications for interception orders must contain statements of all previous wiretap applications involving the same subject.”
State v. Speers, 554 A.2d 769 (Conn. App. Ct. 1989). · cites it 10× “We note that, on the basis of the information provided by the affiants, the three judge wiretap panel unanimously decided to issue the wiretap order and concluded that the application met the requirements of General Statutes § 54-41c. 10 The trial court proceeded *598 from a…”
Washington v. Meachum, 680 A.2d 262 (Conn. 1996). · cites it 4× “General Statutes §§ 54-41c through 54-41o.”
State v. Ross, 481 A.2d 730 (Conn. 1984). · cites it 5× “As we have already pointed out, our wiretap statutes permit the issuance of a wiretap order only if it can be determined on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant that probable cause exists as to the nine separate criteria set forth in General Statutes § 54-41d. 12…”
State v. Kimbro, 496 A.2d 498 (Conn. 1985). · cites it 2× “See General Statutes § 54-41c; State v. Ross, 194 Conn.”
State v. McVeigh, 620 A.2d 133 (Conn. 1993). · cites it 2× “2d 900 (1980) (“authority to wiretap that is contained in General Statutes § 54-41c [8] requires strict compliance” with the statutory requirements); State v.”
United States v. D'Aquila, 719 F. Supp. 98 (D. Conn. 1989). · cites it 11× “Section 54-41c. Subsection 12 of this provision subjects those contents to the Aguilar-Spinelli test for probable cause.”
State v. Formica, 489 A.2d 1060 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985). · cites it 2× “) Third, the history of our wiretap act is replete with strong declarations of legislative intent that it be strictly construed, and that its carefully and narrowly drawn provisions reflect a delicate balancing of interests which placed great weight on safeguards to protect…”
State v. Levine, 497 A.2d 774 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985). · cites it 4× “Our wiretap statutes require, for the issuance of a wiretap order, probable cause as to nine separate criteria stated in General Statutes § 54-41d, based on an application and supporting affidavit containing the information stated in General Statutes § 54-41c.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-41c(13) — 1 case
United States v. D'Aquila, 719 F. Supp. 98 (D. Conn. 1989). “Section 54-41c. Subsection 12 of this provision subjects those contents to the Aguilar-Spinelli test for probable cause.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-41c(6) — 1 case
United States v. D'Aquila, 719 F. Supp. 98 (D. Conn. 1989). “Section 54-41c. Subsection 12 of this provision subjects those contents to the Aguilar-Spinelli test for probable cause.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-41c(7) — 1 case
United States v. D'Aquila, 719 F. Supp. 98 (D. Conn. 1989). “Section 54-41c. Subsection 12 of this provision subjects those contents to the Aguilar-Spinelli test for probable cause.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-41c(8) — 1 case
United States v. D'Aquila, 719 F. Supp. 98 (D. Conn. 1989). “Section 54-41c. Subsection 12 of this provision subjects those contents to the Aguilar-Spinelli test for probable cause.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 54-41c(9) — 1 case
United States v. D'Aquila, 719 F. Supp. 98 (D. Conn. 1989). “Section 54-41c. Subsection 12 of this provision subjects those contents to the Aguilar-Spinelli test for probable cause.”
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