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Conn. Gen. Stat.Title 09 — ElectionsChapter 141 — General Provisions

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-6 (2025)

Conferences of municipal clerks, registrars and Secretary

Edition and currency
laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1978–2022 29citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 29 opinions since 1978, 1 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (a) (6 cases).

Each registrar of voters or, in the absence of a registrar, the deputy registrar of voters, and each municipal clerk or, in the absence of a municipal clerk, one of the assistant municipal clerks shall be compensated by the municipality which the clerk represents, as provided for in this section, for attending two conferences a year for town clerks and registrars of voters which may be called by the Secretary of the State for the purpose of discussing the election laws, procedures or matters related thereto. Each such official shall be compensated by the municipality at the rate of thirty-five dollars per day for attending each such conference, plus mileage to and from such conference at a rate per mile determined by the municipality, but not less than twenty cents per mile, computed from the office of such official or, if he has no office, from his home to the place where such conference is being held.

(1957, P.A. 480; 1959, P.A. 51; 1961, P.A. 198; 1969, P.A. 97, S. 1; P.A. 79-384; P.A. 83-475, S. 3, 43; P.A. 95-171, S. 1, 14; P.A. 11-173, S. 27.)

History: 1959 act provided compensation for deputy registrar or assistant town clerk attending conference in the absence of a registrar or town clerk, and changed destination for computing mileage to the place where the conference is being held; 1961 act deleted requirement that conference be state-wide; 1969 act changed compensation from $10 to $25 per day; P.A. 79-384 changed compensation to $35 per day and changed mileage rate from $0.10 per mile to the same rate as that paid to state employees; P.A. 83-475 amended section by establishing minimum mileage rate of $0.20 per mile or such greater rate as determined by municipality; P.A. 95-171 added “two” re towns divided into voting districts, effective January 8, 1997; P.A. 11-173 deleted language re towns with 2 voting districts that elect registrars for each district and made technical changes, effective July 13, 2011.

The 20 cases that cite Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-6 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENState v. McCarver, 462 S.E.2d 25 (N.C. 1995).
cites § 9-6 4×subsections: (b) 4×cited by 94 cases
Where it cites § 9-6
“G.S. § 9-6(b) is essentially a pretrial screening process which is delegated to the district court, rather than a part of the capital trial.”
The case’s holding
Any jury issue ultimately dispositive of a recommendation for death or life imprisonment must be answered by a unanimous vote of the twelve jurors.
Later courts cite it for
“whether to grant a motion for mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial court and its ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is so clearly erroneous as to amount to a manifest abuse of discretion.” · 4 citing courts
2
GREENState v. Elliott, 628 S.E.2d 735 (N.C. 2006).
cites § 9-6 3×subsections: (a) 3×cited by 63 cases
Where it cites § 9-6
“C.G.S. § 9-6(a) (2001). This language gives trial courts considerable latitude to deal with the particular problems that appear with every trial, and we have recognized that the decision to excuse a prospective juror lies in the trial court’s discretion.”
The case’s holding
A trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying an evidentiary hearing when a defendant fails to make a threshold showing of juror misconduct or potential prejudice (State v. Elliott).
Later courts cite it for
“the supreme court of the united states is the final authority on federal constitutional questions.” · 4 citing courts
3
GREENState v. Rogers, 562 S.E.2d 859 (N.C. 2002).
cites § 9-6 2×subsections: (a) 2×cited by 58 cases
Where it cites § 9-6
“The General Assembly has declare[d] the public policy of this State to be that jury service is the solemn obligation of all qualified citizens, and that excuses from the discharge of this responsibility should be granted only *448 for reasons of compelling personal hardship or…”
The case’s holding
The cumulative effect of improper prosecutorial arguments attacking an expert witness's credibility during a capital sentencing hearing can prejudice a defendant and require a new sentencing proceeding.
Later courts cite it for
“a judge who observes the prospective juror's demeanor as he or she responds to questions and efforts at rehabilitation is best able to determine whether the juror should be excused for cause.” · 4 citing courts
4
GREENWebster Bank v. Zak, 792 A.2d 66 (Conn. 2002).
cites § 9-6 2×cited by 52 cases
Where it cites § 9-6
“Thereafter, MFR moved to be cited in as a party defendant, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-107 and Practice Book § 9-6, claiming that it was “the record titleholder of the property that is the subject of the foreclosure, and any judgment of foreclosure will necessarily affect…”
The case’s holding
A party establishes standing in a foreclosure action by alleging a direct interest in the property and providing corroborating documentation, particularly when the opposing party admits the interest.
5
GREENState v. Cole, 415 S.E.2d 716 (N.C. 1992).
cites § 9-6 4×subsections: (f) 3×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 9-6
“C.G.S. § 9-6 mandates a procedure to be promulgated by the chief district court judges to provide for the excusal of prospective jurors.”
The case’s holding
A defendant has an unwaivable right to be present at all stages of a trial, including bench conferences held after the trial has commenced.
Later courts cite it for
“defendant did not have the right to be present at the conferences.” · 1 citing court
6
GREENState v. Hyde, 530 S.E.2d 281 (N.C. 2000).
cites § 9-6 2×subsections: (a) 2×cited by 74 cases
Where it cites § 9-6
“C.G.S. § 9-6(a) (1999). He claims *51 that he was deprived of the right to reject prospective jurors in violation of his constitutional rights.”
The case’s holding
A defendant waives the right to challenge deviations from statutory jury selection procedures if they request or consent to such deviations without prejudice (admitting photographs corroborating a confession).
Later courts cite it for
“within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's ruling should not be overturned on appeal unless the ruling was 'manifestly unsupported by reason or was so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” · 18 citing courts
cites § 9-6 1×cited by 62 cases
Where it cites § 9-6
“, granted the motion of Anthony Troiano and Lillian Troiano, who own land acjjacent to the plaintiffs’ property, to intervene as party defendants in the administrative appeal, pursuant to General Statutes §§ 8-8 and 52-102 and Practice Book §§ 9-6 and 9-18. They have filed a…”
The case’s holding
The term occupational parking includes parking for private schools, and a commission's denial must be supported by substantial evidence rather than conclusory testimony.
Later courts cite it for
“to the broader statutory scheme to ensure the coherency of our construction” · 1 citing court
8
GREENWebster Bank v. Zak, 802 A.2d 916 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
cites § 9-6 2×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 9-6
“Thereafter, MFR moved to be cited in as a party defendant, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-107 and Practice Book § 9-6, claiming that it was ‘the record titleholder of the property that is the subject of the foreclosure, and any judgment of foreclosure will necessarily affect…”
9
GREENState v. Weeks, 367 S.E.2d 895 (N.C. 1988).
cites § 9-6 1×subsections: (a)cited by 111 cases
Where it cites § 9-6
“Furthermore, we find nothing in the trial judge’s statements that would induce any prospective juror to give less than candid responses.”
The case’s holding
The underlying felony merges with a first-degree murder conviction based solely on the felony murder rule and cannot be sentenced as a separate offense.
Later courts cite it for
“a trial court generally is not impermissibly expressing an opinion when it makes ordinary rulings during the course of the trial.” · 4 citing courts
10
GREENState v. Nobles, 515 S.E.2d 885 (N.C. 1999).
cites § 9-6 1×subsections: (a)cited by 80 cases
Where it cites § 9-6
“C.G.S. §§ 9-6(a), 9-6.1 (1986). Therefore, defendant’s absence from the trial court’s communication with Tanner was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
The case’s holding
A trial court instruction stating a weapon is inherently hazardous improperly relieves the state of its burden to prove the weapon is normally hazardous to multiple people.
Later courts cite it for
“the rule is that when defendant fails to object during trial, he has waived his right to complain further on appeal.” · 4 citing courts
11
GREENState v. Neal, 487 S.E.2d 734 (N.C. 1997).
cites § 9-6 2×subsections: (a) 2×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 9-6
“C.G.S. § 9-6(a) provides that citizens qualified for jury service may be excused for reasons “of compelling personal hardship.”
12
GREENNew England Estates, LLC v. Town of Branford, 988 A.2d 229 (Conn. 2010).
cites § 9-6 1×cited by 24 cases
Where it cites § 9-6
“See General Statutes §§ 52-102 and 52-108; Practice Book § 9-6. 5 The town also claims that New England Estates failed to present sufficient evidence of lost profits.”
The case’s holding
A government actor's bad faith exercise of the power of eminent domain violates the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment.
Later courts cite it for
“it is well established ... that a government actor's bad faith exercise of the power of eminent domain is a violation of the takings clause,” · 2 citing courts
13
GREENIn re Devon B., 825 A.2d 127 (Conn. 2003).
cites § 9-6 1×cited by 23 cases
Where it cites § 9-6
“02-7, § 29; by the addition of the following provision: “Upon the issuance of such [ex parte] order, or not later than sixty days after the issuance of such order, the court shall malee a determination whether the Department of Children and Families made reasonable efforts to…”
The case’s holding
A state agency is a necessary party when its involvement is required to provide services essential for a parent to meet reunification requirements and achieve complete justice.
Later courts cite it for
“the petitioner statutorily is obligated to effectuate the respondent's reunification with her child, and, in order to accomplish that obligation, the petitioner must address the respondent's ... needs in light of her mental disability” · 1 citing court
14
GREENState v. Geddie, 478 S.E.2d 146 (N.C. 1996).
cites § 9-6 1×cited by 59 cases
Where it cites § 9-6
“C.G.S. § 9-6, prospective jurors from the first two jury selection listings appeared before various district court judges and sought excusáis or deferrals on statutory grounds before the convening of the 12 September Criminal Session.”
The case’s holding
A defendant must make an offer of proof to prevail on a contention that evidence was improperly excluded unless the relevance and content of the answer are obvious.
Later courts cite it for
“evidence tending to show only that defendant drank some unknown quantity of alcohol over an indefinite period of time before the murder does not satisfy the defendant's burden of production.” · 4 citing courts
15
GREENSchenck v. Pelkey, 405 A.2d 665 (Conn. 1978).
cites § 9-6 1×cited by 57 cases
Where it cites § 9-6
“) See White & Summers, Handbook of the Law under the Uniform Commercial Code, §§ 9-6, 9-7 (1972). The warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, § 42a-2-315, by contrast, is narrower, more specific, and more precise.”
The case’s holding
Strict liability for selling unreasonably dangerous products is similar to the implied warranty of merchantability (noting similarities between strict liability for sale of unreasonably dangerous products and implied warranty of merchantability).
Later courts cite it for
“statements in pleadings that are inconsistent with claims advanced at trial are admissible as judicial admissions.” · 2 citing courts
16
GREENPond View, LLC v. Plan. & Zoning Comm'n, 953 A.2d 1 (Conn. 2008).
cites § 9-6 1×cited by 19 cases
Where it cites § 9-6
“” Thereafter, the intervenors filed their brief on the merits of the appeal, but did not file a motion to be made parties, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-102 (l) 8 and Practice Book § 9-6. Prior to the commencement of oral argument on the merits of the appeal, the plaintiff…”
Later courts cite it for
“an intervenor's standing pursuant to 22a-19 strictly is limited to challenging only environmental issues” · 1 citing court
17
GREENDay v. Seblatnigg, 199 A.3d 1103 (Conn. App. Ct. 2018).
cites § 9-6 1×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 9-6
“, Practice Book §§ 9-6 and 9-24 ; General Statutes §§ 8-8 (f) and 12-638n.”
18
GREENClifford v. Plan. & Zon. Com'n of Ansonia, 908 A.2d 1049 (Conn. 2006).
cites § 9-6 1×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 9-6
“At the commission’s June 25, 2001 meeting, a city resident, Bart Flaherty, spoke in opposition to the proposed explosives storage based on his concerns about the safety of the storage and transportation of explosives.”
The case’s holding
A trial court abuses its discretion by excluding evidence of prior commission conditions that could have affected the commission's consideration of a site plan application.
Later courts cite it for
“the evidence that clifford sought to introduce consisted of information that, viewed on its face, could well have affected the defendant's consideration of the company's site plan application if it had been brought to the defendant's attention, because the evidence revealed conditions that the defendant itself previously had imposed upon the company ....” · 1 citing court
19
GREENIzzo v. Quinn, 155 A.3d 315 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016).
cites § 9-6 1×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 9-6
“, Practice Book §§ 9-6 and 9-24 ; General Statutes §§ 8-8 (f) and 12-638n.”
20
GREENLoricco Towers Condo. Ass'n v. Pantani, 876 A.2d 1211 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005).
cites § 9-6 1×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 9-6
“See Practice Book §9-6. At this time, we issue no opinion on the effect that the failure to record a document purporting to transfer an interest in land would have in an action to quiet title between the plaintiff who prevails in a foreclosure action such as this, where the…”

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The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197820002022

One bar per year. Tallest: 3 cases in 1996. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
N.C.12Conn. App. Ct.9Conn.8
By subsection
(a)6 cases
State v. Elliott, 628 S.E.2d 735 (N.C. 2006).“C.G.S. § 9-6(a) (2001). This language gives trial courts considerable latitude to deal with the particular problems that appear with every trial, and we have recognized that the decision to excuse a prospective juror lies in the trial court’s discretion.”
State v. Rogers, 562 S.E.2d 859 (N.C. 2002).“The General Assembly has declare[d] the public policy of this State to be that jury service is the solemn obligation of all qualified citizens, and that excuses from the discharge of this responsibility should be granted only *448 for reasons of compelling personal hardship or…”
State v. Hyde, 530 S.E.2d 281 (N.C. 2000).“C.G.S. § 9-6(a) (1999). He claims *51 that he was deprived of the right to reject prospective jurors in violation of his constitutional rights.”
State v. Weeks, 367 S.E.2d 895 (N.C. 1988).“Furthermore, we find nothing in the trial judge’s statements that would induce any prospective juror to give less than candid responses.”
State v. Nobles, 515 S.E.2d 885 (N.C. 1999).“C.G.S. §§ 9-6(a), 9-6.1 (1986). Therefore, defendant’s absence from the trial court’s communication with Tanner was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
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(b)1 case
State v. McCarver, 462 S.E.2d 25 (N.C. 1995).“G.S. § 9-6(b) is essentially a pretrial screening process which is delegated to the district court, rather than a part of the capital trial.”
(f)1 case
State v. Cole, 415 S.E.2d 716 (N.C. 1992).“C.G.S. § 9-6 mandates a procedure to be promulgated by the chief district court judges to provide for the excusal of prospective jurors.”

Show all 29 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2024 session: the source has not yet published 2025 Public Acts (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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