Each registrar of voters or, in the absence of a registrar, the deputy registrar of voters, and each municipal clerk or, in the absence of a municipal clerk, one of the assistant municipal clerks shall be compensated by the municipality which the clerk represents, as provided for in this section, for attending two conferences a year for town clerks and registrars of voters which may be called by the Secretary of the State for the purpose of discussing the election laws, procedures or matters related thereto. Each such official shall be compensated by the municipality at the rate of thirty-five dollars per day for attending each such conference, plus mileage to and from such conference at a rate per mile determined by the municipality, but not less than twenty cents per mile, computed from the office of such official or, if he has no office, from his home to the place where such conference is being held.
(1957, P.A. 480; 1959, P.A. 51; 1961, P.A. 198; 1969, P.A. 97, S. 1; P.A. 79-384; P.A. 83-475, S. 3, 43; P.A. 95-171, S. 1, 14; P.A. 11-173, S. 27.)
History: 1959 act provided compensation for deputy registrar or assistant town clerk attending conference in the absence of a registrar or town clerk, and changed destination for computing mileage to the place where the conference is being held; 1961 act deleted requirement that conference be state-wide; 1969 act changed compensation from $10 to $25 per day; P.A. 79-384 changed compensation to $35 per day and changed mileage rate from $0.10 per mile to the same rate as that paid to state employees; P.A. 83-475 amended section by establishing minimum mileage rate of $0.20 per mile or such greater rate as determined by municipality; P.A. 95-171 added “two” re towns divided into voting districts, effective January 8, 1997; P.A. 11-173 deleted language re towns with 2 voting districts that elect registrars for each district and made technical changes, effective July 13, 2011.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
29
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1978–2022 · leading case:
State v. McCarver, 462 S.E.2d 25 (N.C. 1995).
State v. McCarver, 462 S.E.2d 25 (N.C. 1995).
· cites it 4× “G.S. § 9-6(b) is essentially a pretrial screening process which is delegated to the district court, rather than a part of the capital trial.”
State v. Elliott, 628 S.E.2d 735 (N.C. 2006).
· cites it 3× “C.G.S. § 9-6(a) (2001). This language gives trial courts considerable latitude to deal with the particular problems that appear with every trial, and we have recognized that the decision to excuse a prospective juror lies in the trial court’s discretion.”
State v. Rogers, 562 S.E.2d 859 (N.C. 2002).
· cites it 2× “The General Assembly has declare[d] the public policy of this State to be that jury service is the solemn obligation of all qualified citizens, and that excuses from the discharge of this responsibility should be granted only *448 for reasons of compelling personal hardship or…”
Webster Bank v. Zak, 792 A.2d 66 (Conn. 2002).
· cites it 2× “Thereafter, MFR moved to be cited in as a party defendant, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-107 and Practice Book § 9-6, claiming that it was “the record titleholder of the property that is the subject of the foreclosure, and any judgment of foreclosure will necessarily affect…”
State v. Cole, 415 S.E.2d 716 (N.C. 1992).
· cites it 4× “C.G.S. § 9-6 mandates a procedure to be promulgated by the chief district court judges to provide for the excusal of prospective jurors.”
State v. Hyde, 530 S.E.2d 281 (N.C. 2000).
· cites it 2× “C.G.S. § 9-6(a) (1999). He claims *51 that he was deprived of the right to reject prospective jurors in violation of his constitutional rights.”
Webster Bank v. Zak, 802 A.2d 916 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002).
· cites it 2× “Thereafter, MFR moved to be cited in as a party defendant, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-107 and Practice Book § 9-6, claiming that it was ‘the record titleholder of the property that is the subject of the foreclosure, and any judgment of foreclosure will necessarily affect…”
State v. Weeks, 367 S.E.2d 895 (N.C. 1988).
“Furthermore, we find nothing in the trial judge’s statements that would induce any prospective juror to give less than candid responses.”
State v. Nobles, 515 S.E.2d 885 (N.C. 1999).
“C.G.S. §§ 9-6(a), 9-6.1 (1986). Therefore, defendant’s absence from the trial court’s communication with Tanner was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
State v. Neal, 487 S.E.2d 734 (N.C. 1997).
· cites it 2× “C.G.S. § 9-6(a) provides that citizens qualified for jury service may be excused for reasons “of compelling personal hardship.”
New England Estates, LLC v. Town of Branford, 988 A.2d 229 (Conn. 2010).
“See General Statutes §§ 52-102 and 52-108; Practice Book § 9-6. 5 The town also claims that New England Estates failed to present sufficient evidence of lost profits.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-6(a) — 6 cases
State v. Elliott, 628 S.E.2d 735 (N.C. 2006).
“C.G.S. § 9-6(a) (2001). This language gives trial courts considerable latitude to deal with the particular problems that appear with every trial, and we have recognized that the decision to excuse a prospective juror lies in the trial court’s discretion.”
State v. Rogers, 562 S.E.2d 859 (N.C. 2002).
“The General Assembly has declare[d] the public policy of this State to be that jury service is the solemn obligation of all qualified citizens, and that excuses from the discharge of this responsibility should be granted only *448 for reasons of compelling personal hardship or…”
State v. Hyde, 530 S.E.2d 281 (N.C. 2000).
“C.G.S. § 9-6(a) (1999). He claims *51 that he was deprived of the right to reject prospective jurors in violation of his constitutional rights.”
State v. Weeks, 367 S.E.2d 895 (N.C. 1988).
“Furthermore, we find nothing in the trial judge’s statements that would induce any prospective juror to give less than candid responses.”
State v. Nobles, 515 S.E.2d 885 (N.C. 1999).
“C.G.S. §§ 9-6(a), 9-6.1 (1986). Therefore, defendant’s absence from the trial court’s communication with Tanner was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-6(b) — 1 case
State v. McCarver, 462 S.E.2d 25 (N.C. 1995).
“G.S. § 9-6(b) is essentially a pretrial screening process which is delegated to the district court, rather than a part of the capital trial.”
— Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-6(f) — 1 case
State v. Cole, 415 S.E.2d 716 (N.C. 1992).
“C.G.S. § 9-6 mandates a procedure to be promulgated by the chief district court judges to provide for the excusal of prospective jurors.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
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treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.