11 Del. C. § 4214

Habitual criminal; life sentence

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(a) Any person who has been 2 times convicted of a Title 11 violent felony, or attempt to commit such a violent felony, as defined in § 4201(c) of this title under the laws of this State, and/or any comparable violent felony as defined by another state, United States or any territory of the United States, and who shall thereafter be convicted of a subsequent Title 11 violent felony, or attempt to commit such a violent felony, as defined in § 4201(c) of this title, or any person who has been 3 times convicted of any felony under the laws of this State, and/or any other state, United States or any territory of the United States, and who shall thereafter be convicted of a subsequent felony is declared to be an habitual criminal. The court, upon the State’s petition, shall impose the applicable minimum sentence pursuant to subsection (b), (c) or (d) of this section and may, in its discretion, impose a sentence of up to life imprisonment, unless the felony conviction allows and results in the imposition of capital punishment. Under no circumstances may the sentence imposed pursuant to this section be less than the minimum sentence provided for by the felony prompting the person’s designation as a habitual offender.

(b) Any person who has been 3 times convicted of a felony under the laws of this State, and/or any other state, United States or any territory of the United States, and who shall thereafter be convicted of a subsequent felony, which is the person’s first Title 11 violent felony, or attempt to commit such a violent felony, as defined in § 4201(c) of this title, shall receive a minimum sentence of ½ of the statutory maximum penalty provided elsewhere in this title, unless the maximum statutory penalty is life in which case the minimum sentence shall be 30 years, for the subsequent felony which forms the basis of the States petition to have the person declared to be an habitual criminal, up to life imprisonment, unless the felony conviction allows and results in the imposition of capital punishment.

(c) Any person who has been 2 times convicted of a felony under the laws of this State, and/or any other state, United States or any territory of the United States, and 1 time convicted of a Title 11 violent felony, or attempt to commit such a violent felony, as defined in § 4201(c) of this title under the laws of this State, and/or any comparable violent felony as defined by another state, United States or any territory of the United States, and who shall thereafter be convicted of a subsequent Title 11 violent felony, or attempt to commit such a violent felony, as defined by § 4201(c) of this title, shall receive a minimum sentence of the statutory maximum penalty provided elsewhere in this title for the fourth or subsequent felony which forms the basis of the State’s petition to have the person declared to be an habitual criminal, up to life imprisonment, unless the felony conviction allows and results in the imposition of capital punishment.

(d) Any person who has been 2 times convicted of a Title 11 violent felony, or attempt to commit such a violent felony, as defined in § 4201(c) of this title under the laws of this State, and/or any comparable violent felony as defined by another state, United States or any territory of the United States, and who shall thereafter be convicted of a third or subsequent felony which is a Title 11 violent felony, or an attempt to commit such a violent felony, as defined in § 4201(c), shall receive a minimum sentence of the statutory maximum statutory penalty provided elsewhere in this title for the third or subsequent Title 11 violent felony which forms the basis of the State’s petition to have the person declared to be an habitual criminal, up to life imprisonment, unless the felony conviction allows and results in the imposition of capital punishment.

(e) Notwithstanding any provision of this title to the contrary, any minimum sentence required to be imposed pursuant to subsection (b), (c), or (d) of this section shall not be subject to suspension by the court, and shall be served in its entirety at full custodial Level V institutional setting without the benefit of probation or parole, except that any such sentence shall be subject to the provisions of §§ 4205(h), 4381 and 4382 of this title. For purposes of the computation of good time under § 4381 of this title, a life sentence imposed pursuant only to this section shall equate to a sentence of 45 years.

(f) Notwithstanding any statute, court rule or regulation to the contrary, beginning January 1, 2017, any person sentenced as an habitual criminal to a minimum sentence of not less than the statutory maximum penalty for a violent felony pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, or a life sentence pursuant to subsection (b) of this section prior to July 19, 2016, shall be eligible to petition the Superior Court for sentence modification after the person has served a sentence of incarceration equal to any applicable mandatory sentence otherwise required by this section or the statutes describing said offense or offenses, whichever is greater. Absent extraordinary circumstances, the petitioner may only file 1 application for sentence modification under this section. A Superior Court Judge upon consideration of a petition filed pursuant to this subsection may modify, reduce or suspend such petitioner’s sentence, excepting any minimum or mandatory sentence required by this section or the statutes describing said offense or offenses. If a Superior Court Judge modifies such petitioner’s sentence, the Judge may impose a suspended sentence that includes a probationary term. Nothing in this section, however, shall require the Court to grant such a petitioner a sentence modification pursuant to this section. For the purposes of this subsection, the “applicable mandatory sentence’' shall be calculated by reference to the penalties prescribed for the relevant offense or offenses by this Code as of July 19, 2016, unless said offense has been repealed, in which case the penalties prescribed by this Code at the time of the act repealing said offense shall be controlling. The Superior Court shall establish rules to implement this subsection which are consistent with the statute, and those rules shall also provide that all petitions filed pursuant to this subsection where the felony establishing an inmate as a habitual offender was a Title 16 offense are heard first, followed by all petitions filed pursuant to this subsection where the felony establishing an inmate as a habitual offender was a crime against property, followed by all other petitions. Nothing in the rules or this subsection shall prohibit the Superior Court from hearing any petition without regard to this preferred sequence when the Department of Justice, through the personal authorization of the Attorney General, Chief Deputy Attorney General, State Prosecutor, or the Chief Prosecutor of a particular county, in response to a request authorized by the Chief Defender, Chief Deputy Defender, or Chief Conflicts Counsel, or private counsel if a petitioner is not represented by the Office of Defense Services, consents to the hearing of that petition and the Superior Court determines it is in the interest of justice to do so. The rules shall also provide for an initial review, including review of a formal response by the Department of Justice after consulting with the victim or victims, of sentence modification petitions involving crimes against persons or property, for the purpose of ensuring that victims are not inconvenienced by petitions that should be denied based upon the documents submitted; in cases not denied in this manner, all victims shall be given an opportunity to be heard. The Superior Court’s review of any petitions filed pursuant to this subsection shall include a review of the applicant’s prior criminal history, including arrests and convictions, a review of the applicant’s conduct while incarcerated, and available evidence as to the likelihood that the applicant will reoffend if released, including a formal, recent risk assessment. The Superior Court shall articulate on the record the results of its review and its rationale for granting or denying a petition. In all cases where sentence modifications are granted, modified sentences should provide for step-down provisions to ensure successful reintegration of persons into the community. By January 1, 2017, the Department of Correction shall notify any criminal defendant whose Level V sentence was imposed under a statutory sentencing regimen which was subsequently changed in a manner that reduced the sentence applicable to the defendant’s convictions, including any criminal defendant who received a minimum mandatory sentence that no longer exists by virtue of the enactment of 80 Del. Laws, c. 28. The Department of Correction shall similarly notify the attorney of record, and if the attorney of record is unavailable to receive notice, the Office of Defense Services.

11 Del. C. 1953, §  4213;  58 Del. Laws, c. 497, §  259 Del. Laws, c. 547, §§  19-2165 Del. Laws, c. 159, §  166 Del. Laws, c. 269, §  767 Del. Laws, c. 350, §  3770 Del. Laws, c. 186, §  170 Del. Laws, c. 477, §  271 Del. Laws, c. 285, §§  15, 1672 Del. Laws, c. 34, §  472 Del. Laws, c. 43, §  772 Del. Laws, c. 197, §  874 Del. Laws, c. 346, §  177 Del. Laws, c. 318, §  1578 Del. Laws, c. 13, §§  11, 1278 Del. Laws, c. 252, §  1178 Del. Laws, c. 406, §  379 Del. Laws, c. 89, §  180 Del. Laws, c. 321, § 181 Del. Laws, c. 6, §§ 1-381 Del. Laws, c. 313, §  1
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 395 cases (167 in the last 5 years), 1977–2026 · leading case: Charbonneau v. State
Charbonneau v. State (2006) del · cites it 2× “Brown, as a prior violent felon, faced a designation as a habitual criminal pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4214(b) and a mandatory life sentence if convicted of either murder.”
Ortiz v. State (2005) del “His convictions in this case make him an *309 habitual criminal under 11 Del. C. § 4214. This is a substantial aggravating factor.”
White v. State (2006) del · cites it 2× “A Superior Court judge sentenced Jan, under 11 Del. C. § 4214, as follows: one year at Level V, suspended for 18 months at Level III for Criminal Impersonation, ten years at Level V with credit for 144 days already served for Trafficking in Cocaine Over 100 grams, three years at…”
Bunting v. Phelps (2009) ded · cites it 2× “July 23, 2008) *446 Petitioner’s pending § 2254 application, dated November 3, 2008, asserts the following four claims: (1) the habitual offender statute, 11 Del. C. § 4214(b), is facially unconstitutional because the statute creates a conclusive presumption of incorrigibility…”
Stigars v. State (1996) del “The record also shows that Stigars recognized the potential dangers inherent in proceeding in the absence of counsel and understood the seriousness of the charges against him.”
Anderson v. Redman (1977) ded “§ 4209 (1974) — held to constitute life sentence without parole for persons convicted of first degree murder; 11 Del.C. § 4214 (1974) — habitual criminal statute provides in most instances for a life sentence without probation or parole; 16 Del.”
Morales v. State (1997) del “11 Del.C. § 4214(b) states: Habitual criminal; life sentence.”
Holland v. Donnelly (2002) nysd “1 (setting base offense level of life imprisonment for first-degree murder); 11 Del.Code Ann. § 4214 (authorizing life imprisonment without parole for certain repeat offenders convicted of specified felonies); Ga.”
McLaughlin v. Carroll (2003) ded · cites it 2× “On February 27, 1997, the State used these two convictions (burglary in the second degree and assault in the second degree), a 1992 North Carolina felony conviction for the delivery of cocaine, and a 1993 North Carolina felony conviction for breaking and entering a motor vehicle…”
Saunders v. State (1979) del “” ** 11 Del.C. § 4214 provides in pertinent part: “(a) Any person who has been 3 times convicted of a felony, other than those which are specifically mentioned in subsection (b) hereunder, under the laws of this State, and/or any other state, United States or any territory of…”
Johnson v. Carroll (2003) ded “Pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4214(a), Petitioner was sentenced as a habitual offender to 18 years imprisonment for the weapons conviction and 30 days imprisonment for the menacing charge.”
State v. Harris (2022) delsuperct · cites it 13× “at *3-4 (“inmate meets the time-served eligibility requirement when he ‘has served a sentence of incarceration equal to any applicable mandatory sentence otherwise required by [the new provisions of 11 Del. C. § 4214] or the statutes describing said offense or offenses [for…”
— 11 Del. C. § 4214(0) — 1 case
State v. Dwyer (2019) delsuperct
— 11 Del. C. § 4214(1) — 2 cases
State v. Williams (2018) delsuperct
State v. Hester (2018) delsuperct
— 11 Del. C. § 4214(a) — 220 cases
Stigars v. State (1996) del “The record also shows that Stigars recognized the potential dangers inherent in proceeding in the absence of counsel and understood the seriousness of the charges against him.”
Johnson v. Carroll (2003) ded “Pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4214(a), Petitioner was sentenced as a habitual offender to 18 years imprisonment for the weapons conviction and 30 days imprisonment for the menacing charge.”
State v. Ruffin (2023) delsuperct
State v. Yarborough (2020) delsuperct
State v. Saunders (2022) delsuperct
— 11 Del. C. § 4214(b) — 58 cases
Charbonneau v. State (2006) del “Brown, as a prior violent felon, faced a designation as a habitual criminal pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4214(b) and a mandatory life sentence if convicted of either murder.”
Bunting v. Phelps (2009) ded “July 23, 2008) *446 Petitioner’s pending § 2254 application, dated November 3, 2008, asserts the following four claims: (1) the habitual offender statute, 11 Del. C. § 4214(b), is facially unconstitutional because the statute creates a conclusive presumption of incorrigibility…”
Morales v. State (1997) del “11 Del.C. § 4214(b) states: Habitual criminal; life sentence.”
McLaughlin v. Carroll (2003) ded “On February 27, 1997, the State used these two convictions (burglary in the second degree and assault in the second degree), a 1992 North Carolina felony conviction for the delivery of cocaine, and a 1993 North Carolina felony conviction for breaking and entering a motor vehicle…”
State v. Vickers (2025) delsuperct
— 11 Del. C. § 4214(c) — 36 cases
State v. Moore (2025) delsuperct
State v. Anderson (2024) delsuperct
Wright v. State (2022) del
Downs v. State (2023) del
Garnett v. State (2022) del
— 11 Del. C. § 4214(d) — 36 cases
State v. Woods (2020) delsuperct
State v. Ransome (2022) delsuperct
State v. Lindsey (2023) delsuperct
State v. Goodman (2021) delsuperct
Downs v. State (2023) del
— 11 Del. C. § 4214(e) — 2 cases
State v. Ransome (2022) delsuperct
Herbert v. State (2023) del
— 11 Del. C. § 4214(e)(2)(c) — 1 case
Campbell v. State (2022) del
— 11 Del. C. § 4214(f) — 48 cases
State v. Harris (2022) delsuperct “at *3-4 (“inmate meets the time-served eligibility requirement when he ‘has served a sentence of incarceration equal to any applicable mandatory sentence otherwise required by [the new provisions of 11 Del. C. § 4214] or the statutes describing said offense or offenses [for…”
State v. Harris (2018) delsuperct
State v. Wright (2019) delsuperct
State v. Heath (2022) delsuperct
State v. Heath (2022) delsuperct
— 11 Del. C. § 4214(t) — 1 case
State v. Douglas (2018) delsuperct
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