(a) Disposition after default. — After default, a secured party may sell, lease, license, or otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral in its present condition or following any commercially reasonable preparation or processing.
(b) Commercially reasonable disposition. — Every aspect of a disposition of collateral, including the method, manner, time, place, and other terms, must be commercially reasonable. If commercially reasonable, a secured party may dispose of collateral by public or private proceedings, by one or more contracts, as a unit or in parcels, and at any time and place and on any terms.
(c) Purchase by secured party. — A secured party may purchase collateral:
(1) at a public disposition; or
(2) at a private disposition only if the collateral is of a kind that is customarily sold on a recognized market or the subject of widely distributed standard price quotations.
(d) Warranties on disposition. — A contract for sale, lease, license, or other disposition includes the warranties relating to title, possession, quiet enjoyment, and the like which by operation of law accompany a voluntary disposition of property of the kind subject to the contract.
(e) Disclaimer of warranties. — A secured party may disclaim or modify warranties under subsection (d):
(1) in a manner that would be effective to disclaim or modify the warranties in a voluntary disposition of property of the kind subject to the contract of disposition; or
(2) by communicating to the purchaser a record evidencing the contract for disposition and including an express disclaimer or modification of the warranties.
(f) Record sufficient to disclaim warranties. — A record is sufficient to disclaim warranties under subsection (e) if it indicates “There is no warranty relating to title, possession, quiet enjoyment, or the like in this disposition” or uses words of similar import.
72 Del. Laws, c. 401,
§
1;
Notes of Decisions
Baldiga v. Moog, Inc. (In re Comprehensive Power, Inc.), 578 B.R. 14 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2017).
· cites it 3× “Under New York, Massachusetts, or Delaware law, 21 “[e]very aspect of a disposition of collateral, including the method, manner, time, place, and other terms, must be commercially reasonable.”
Reid v. Citadel Fin. Credit Union (In Re Reid), 423 B.R. 726 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2010).
“Under its terms, after repossession and sale of collateral by a secured creditor as permitted by 6 Del. C. § 9-610, a debtor may be liable for a deficiency or hold a right to a surplus.”
Autovest, L.L.C. v. Reshina Weatherly (Del. Ct. Com. Pl. 2019).
· cites it 2× “When a notice lacks any information under subsection (1), the sufficiency of the notice becomes a question of fact for the Court to determine.”
Pavel Menn v. Conmed Corp. (Del. Ch. 2022).
“2009) (interpreting the meaning of “commercially reasonable” under 6 Del. C. § 9-610(a)); see also Akorn, Inc.”
— 6 Del. C. § 9-610(a) — 2 cases
Autovest, L.L.C. v. Reshina Weatherly (Del. Ct. Com. Pl. 2019).
“When a notice lacks any information under subsection (1), the sufficiency of the notice becomes a question of fact for the Court to determine.”
Pavel Menn v. Conmed Corp. (Del. Ch. 2022).
“2009) (interpreting the meaning of “commercially reasonable” under 6 Del. C. § 9-610(a)); see also Akorn, Inc.”
— 6 Del. C. § 9-610(b) — 2 cases
Baldiga v. Moog, Inc. (In re Comprehensive Power, Inc.), 578 B.R. 14 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2017).
“Under New York, Massachusetts, or Delaware law, 21 “[e]very aspect of a disposition of collateral, including the method, manner, time, place, and other terms, must be commercially reasonable.”
Autovest, L.L.C. v. Reshina Weatherly (Del. Ct. Com. Pl. 2019).
“When a notice lacks any information under subsection (1), the sufficiency of the notice becomes a question of fact for the Court to determine.”
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