United States of Am., Cross-Appellee v. Alvin Barker, 20 F.3d 365 (9th Cir. 1994). · Go Syfert
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United States of Am., Cross-Appellee v. Alvin Barker, 20 F.3d 365 (9th Cir. 1994). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
47 citation events (30 in the last 25 years) across 17 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Welsh v. Commissioner of Social Security (ohsd, 2020-12-17)
Treatment trajectory · 1995 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1995 2010 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 14 distinct citers.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Welsh v. Commissioner of Social Security
S.D. Ohio · 2020 · confidence medium
Sec., 710 20 F.3d 365, 375 (6th Cir. 2013).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Rigby v. State
Miss. · 2002 · confidence medium
United States v. Barker, 1 F.3d 957, 959 (9th Cir.1993), amended, 20 F.3d 365, 365-66 (9th Cir.1994) (emphasis added).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Carter v. State (4×) also: Cited "see"
Md. Ct. Spec. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Id. at 365-66 (footnote omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jeffrey A. Rigby v. State of Mississippi
Miss. · 2000 · confidence medium
United States v. Barker, 1 F.3d 957, 959 (9th Cir.1993), amended, 20 F.3d 365, 365-66 (9th Cir.1994) (emphasis added).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Robert Manning
9th Cir. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See 20 F.3d 365 (9th Cir. 1994).
cited Cited "see" Moll v. Telesector Resources Group, Inc.
2d Cir. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See Alfano v. Costello, 294 20 F.3d 365, 375 (2d Cir. 2002).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Charles Belk
2d Cir. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Barker, 1 F.3d 967, 959 (9th Cir.1993), reh’g denied and amended in part by 20 F.3d 365 (9th Cir.1994) (reversing, on mandamus, a district court’s attempt to bifurcate a felon-in-possession trial, and holding that bifurcation is never permissible); United States v. Collamore, 868 F.2d 24, 28 (1st Cir.1989) (same), overruled, in *311 part, on other grounds by United States v. Tavares, 21 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.1994) (en banc).
discussed Cited "see" ca10 1996
10th Cir. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Barker, 1 F.3d 957 , 959 n. 3 (9th Cir.1993) ("The underlying facts of the prior conviction are completely irrelevant under Sec. 922(g)(1) ..."), amended on denial of reh'g, 20 F.3d 365 (9th Cir.1994).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Wacker
10th Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Barker, 1 F.3d 957 , 959 n. 3 (9th Cir.1993) (“The underlying facts of the prior conviction are completely irrelevant under § 922(g)(1) ... ”), amended on denial of reh’g, 20 F.3d 365 (9th Cir.1994).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Terrence Henry Hale
9th Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Barker, 1 F.3d 957, 959 (9th Cir.1993) (citing United States v. Lloyd, 981 F.2d 1071, 1072 (9th Cir.1992)), as amended, 20 F.3d 365 (9th Cir.1994).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Gary Lee Roberson
9th Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See United State v. Barker, 1 F.3d 957 (1993), amended, 20 F.3d 365 , 366 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Higdon
3rd Cir. · 2011 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Id.; see also United States v. Barker, 1 F.3d 957, 959 (9th Cir.1993), amended, 20 F.3d 365, 366 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Birdsong, 982 F.2d 481, 482 (11th Cir.1993); United States v. Collamore, 868 F.2d 24, 27-29 (1st Cir.1989); United States v. Bruton, 647 F.2d 818, 825 (8th Cir.1981) (en banc); United States v. Brinklow, 560 F.2d 1003, 1006 (10th Cir.1977).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Charles Christopher Milton (2×)
4th Cir. · 1995 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Barker, 1 F.3d 957 (9th Cir.1993), amended, 20 F.3d 365, 366 (9th Cir.1994); United States v. Gilliam, 994 *81 F.2d 97, 101-02 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 335 , 126 L.Ed.2d 280 (1993); United States v. Birdsong, 982 F.2d 481, 482 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2984 , 125 L.Ed.2d 680 (1993); United States v. Collamore, 868 F.2d 24, 27-29 (1st Cir.1989); United States v. Brinklow, 560 F.2d 1003, 1006 (10th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1047 , 98 S.Ct. 893 , 54 L.Ed.2d 798 (1978).
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Stanley R. Bice
9th Cir. · 1995 · signal: see also · confidence low
See id. at 651-52 ; see also United States v. Barker, 1 F.3d 957, 959 (9th Cir.1994), as amended, 20 F.3d 365 (1994).
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee,
v.
Alvin BARKER, Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant
93-30121, 93-30128.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Mar 31, 1994.
20 F.3d 365
Joseph Douglas Wilson, U.S. Dept, of Justice, Washington, DC, Jack C. Wong, Asst. U.S. Atty., Portland, OR, for plaintiff-appellant, cross-appellee., Colleen B. Scissors, Asst. Federal Public Defender, Portland, OR, for defendant-appel-lee, cross-appellant.
Wright, Beezer, Hall.
Cited by 32 opinions  |  Published

ORDER AMENDING OPINION AND DENYING REHEARING

The opinion filed August 13, 1993, slip op. 8761, and appearing at 1 F.3d 957 (9th Cir.1993), is amended as follows:

Slip Opinion at 8767-68, 1 F.8d at 959-60:

Delete the text following the citation to United States v. Brinklow, 560 F.2d 1003, 1006 (10th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1047, 98 S.Ct. 893, 54 L.Ed.2d 798 (1978). Beginning, a new paragraph, insert the following:

Any other holding would lead to an impermissible result if a jury did not return a[*366] guilty verdict on the possession portion of the crime. The government would be precluded from proving an essential element of the charged offense, and the district court would breach its duty to instruct the jury on all the essential elements of the crime charged. [3] See United States v. Campbell, 774 F.2d 354, 356 (9th Cir.1985) (the government is “entitled to prove the[ ] elements of the charged offenses by introduction of probative evidence”); United States v. Combs, 762 F.2d 1343, 1346 (9th Cir.1985) (“When a person is prosecuted under a statute, the requirements of the statute should be explained to the jury so that they may determine whether or not the defendant’s conduct fits within the statute.”).

Additionally, the district court’s bifurcation order might unfairly confuse the jury, prompting it to exercise its power of nullification on the unwarranted belief that the defendant was charged for noncriminal conduct. As the First Circuit stated in Collamore:

when a jury is neither read the statute setting forth the crime nor told of all the elements of the crime, it may, justifiably, question whether what the accused did was a crime.... Possession of a firearm by most people is not a crime. A juror who owns or who has friends and relatives who own firearms may wonder why [the defendant’s] possession was illegal. Doubt as to the criminality of [the defendant’s] conduct may influence the jury when it considers the possession element.

868 F.2d at 28. Limiting the jury’s consideration of required elements of an indicted offense is contrary to the presumption against special verdicts in criminal cases. United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662, 690 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046, 111 S.Ct. 751, 112 L.Ed.2d 771 (1991). The bifurcation order removes an element of the crime charged from the jury’s consideration, prevents the government from having its case decided by the jury, and changes the very nature of the charged crime. See Gilliam, 994 F.2d at 102 (“There is a significant difference, however, between a rule formulated to limit the admissibility of potentially prejudicial evidence and a rule that eliminates an element of a crime legislated by Congress.”). We find the district court’s bifurcation order improper.

IV

We GRANT the government’s petition for mandamus. We ORDER the writ to issue REVERSING the district court’s bifurcation order. We REMAND the case to the district court for further proceedings.

With these amendments, the panel has voted unanimously to deny the petition for rehearing. Judges Beezer and Hall vote to reject the suggestion for rehearing en bane and Judge Wright recommends rejection.

The full court has been advised of the suggestion for rehearing en banc and no active judge has requested a vote on whether to rehear the matter en banc. Fed.R.App.P. 35.

The petition for rehearing is DENIED and the suggestion for rehearing en banc is REJECTED.

3

. Barker misunderstands the fundamental nature of “prejudicial evidence.” Evidence is prejudicial only when it has an additional adverse effect on a defendant beyond tending to prove the fact or issue that justifies its admission. A prior conviction is not prejudicial when it is an element of the charged crime. Proof of the felony conviction is essential to the proof of the offense — be it proof through stipulation or contested evidence. The underlying facts of the prior conviction are completely irrelevant under § 922(g)(1); the existence of the conviction itself is not.