Morrow v. Topping, 437 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1971). · Go Syfert
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Morrow v. Topping, 437 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1971). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
39 citation events (27 in the last 25 years) across 14 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: In Re The Marriage Of Michelle Hope Doyle F/k/a Shea, App And Danielle Nicole Hashman, Resp (washctapp, 2024-08-19)
Treatment trajectory · 1971 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1971 1998 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 26 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re The Marriage Of Michelle Hope Doyle F/k/a Shea, App And Danielle Nicole Hashman, Resp
Wash. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
App. 722, 728 , 649 P.2d 181 (1982), current RAP 11.4(j), and Morrow v. Topping, 437 F.2d 1155, 1156 (9th Cir.1971)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re The Marriage Of Michelle Hope Doyle F/k/a Shea, App And Danielle Nicole Hashman, Resp
Wash. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
App. 722, 728 , 649 P.2d 181 (1982), current RAP 11.4(j), and Morrow v. Topping, 437 F.2d 1155, 1156 (9th Cir.1971)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gene Hazzard v. Libby Schaaf
9th Cir. · 2023 · confidence medium
R. 7-1(b) (stating that “a motion may be determined without oral argument”); Morrow v. Topping, 437 F.2d 1155, 1156 (9th Cir. 1971) (concluding that district courts may rule on motions without oral argument).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Cabardo v. Patacsil
Bankr. E.D. Cal. · 2023 · confidence medium
LBR 9014-1(h); Morrow v. 15 Topping, 437 F.2d 1155, 1156 (9th Cir. 1971). 16 II.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Cabardo v. Patacsil
Bankr. E.D. Cal. · 2023 · confidence medium
LBR 9014-1(h); Morrow v. 26 Topping, 437 F.2d 1155, 1156 (9th Cir. 1971). 27 III.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mirch Law Firm, LLP v. Elias Nakhleh
9th Cir. · 2022 · confidence medium
Cal. Local R. 7-15; Morrow v. Topping, 437 F.2d 1155, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (holding that a district court’s failure to hold oral argument on a motion to dismiss was not an abuse of discretion or a denial of due process).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kenneth Gardner v. Kilolo Kijakazi
9th Cir. · 2022 · confidence medium
P. 78(b) (“By rule or order, the court may provide for submitting and determining motions on briefs, without oral hearings.”); Morrow v. Topping, 437 F.2d 1155, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (finding no due process violation where the district court dismissed the plaintiff’s action without oral argument).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Nestor Geoffrey D. Quilates and Maria Ermelinda A. Quilates
Bankr. E.D. Cal. · 2021 · confidence medium
LBR 9014-1(h); Morrow v. Topping, 437 F.2d 1155, 1156 (9th 5 Cir. 1971).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Christopher Hadsell v. Barry Baskin
9th Cir. · 2020 · confidence medium
P. 78(b); Morrow v. Topping, 437 F.2d 1155, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1971) (district court’s failure to hold oral argument on a motion to dismiss was not an abuse of discretion or a denial of due process).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Genetta James v. County of Los Angeles
9th Cir. · 2019 · confidence medium
Cal. R. 7-15; Morrow v. Topping, 437 F.2d 1155, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1971) (district court’s failure to hold oral argument on a motion to dismiss was not an abuse of discretion or a denial of due process).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bosley v. Special Devices
9th Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
P. 78; Morrow v. Topping, 437 F.2d 1155, 1156 (9th Cir.1971) (finding that failure to hold oral argument on a motion to dismiss was neither an abuse of discretion or a denial of due process).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Carpinteria Valley Farms, Ltd. v. County of Santa Barbara
9th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
Co., 926 F.2d 865, 869 (9th Cir.1991); Biotics Research Corp. v. Heckler, 710 F.2d 1375, 1379 (9th Cir.1983); Morrow v. Topping, 437 F.2d 1155, 1156-57 (9th Cir.1971).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Carpinteria Valley Farms, Ltd. v. The County Of Santa Barbara
9th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
Co., 926 F.2d 865, 869 (9th Cir.1991); Biotics Research Corp. v. Heckler, 710 F.2d 1375, 1379 (9th Cir.1983); Morrow v. Topping, 437 F.2d 1155, 1156-57 (9th Cir.1971).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Carpinteria Valley Farms, Ltd. v. County of Santa Barbara
9th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
Co., 926 F.2d 865, 869 (9th Cir.1991); Biotics Research Corp. v. Heckler, 710 F.2d 1375, 1379 (9th Cir.1983); Morrow v. Topping, 437 F.2d 1155, 1156-57 (9th Cir.1971).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Carpinteria Valley Farms, Ltd. v. County of Santa Barbara
9th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
Co., 926 F.2d 865, 869 (9th Cir.1991); Biotics Research Corp. v. Heckler, 710 F.2d 1375, 1379 (9th Cir.1983); Morrow v. Topping, 437 F.2d 1155, 1156-57 (9th Cir.1971).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jacobs v. Lanterman Developmental Center
9th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
See Fed.R.Civ.P. 78; Morrow v. Topping, 437 F.2d 1155, 1156 (9th Cir.1971) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lewis, Lewis & Van Etten Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.
E.D.N.Y · 1991 · confidence medium
The courts have repeatedly held that there is no constitutional right to present oral argument on motions (see, e.g., Wilkins v. Rogers, 581 F.2d 399, 405 [4th Cir. 1978] [the practice of deciding motions on papers alone “is unquestionably constitutional”]; Morrow v. Topping, 437 F.2d 1155, 1156-57 [9th Cir.1971] [no due process violation to deny request for oral argument on motion to dismiss]; see also Borden, Inc. v. Meiji Milk Prods.
discussed Cited "see" Goldup v. Valley View Casino and Hotel
S.D. Cal. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See 8 Morrow v. Topping, 437 F.2d 1155 , 1156–57 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that a district court 9 that acted on a motion to dismiss without oral argument “did [not] deny plaintiff due 10 process of law” (citing Fed.
discussed Cited "see" Tanya Nemcik v. Jill Fannin
9th Cir. · 2020 · signal: see · confidence high
See Morrow v. Topping, 437 F.2d 1155, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1971) (setting forth standard of review; district court’s failure to hold oral argument on a motion to dismiss was not an abuse of discretion or a denial of due process).
cited Cited "see" Bach v. Teton County
9th Cir. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See Morrow v. Topping, 437 F.2d 1155, 1156 (9th Cir.1971).
cited Cited "see" Olson v. Salomon Smith Barney, Inc.
9th Cir. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See Morrow v. Topping, 437 F.2d 1155, 1156 (9th Cir.1971).
cited Cited "see" Guerrera v. Tempe Union High School
9th Cir. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Morrow v. Topping, 437 F.2d 1155, 1156 (9th Cir.1971) (per curiam).
cited Cited "see" Albert Zucker v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., Walter Kaufmann, Class Member, Objector And
9th Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Morrow v. Topping, 437 F.2d 1155, 1156 (9th Cir.1971) (rejecting due process claim).
cited Cited "see" Cowan v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe
D.S.D. · 1975 · signal: see · confidence high
See, Morrow v. Topping, 437 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1971).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Nancy Stachewicz v. Certegy Payment Solutions, LLC
C.D. Ill. · 2025 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Rose Barge Line, Inc. v. Hicks, 421 F.2d 163, 164 (8th Cir. 1970); see also Morrow v. Topping, 437 F.2d 1155, 1156 (9th Cir. 1971) (holding that failure to set hearing on motion to dismiss did not violate Rule 6(c)(1) and was “in full accordance with established procedure”); Ameriway Corp. v. Chen, No. 1:19-cv-9407, 2024 WL 1526175 , at *2 n.3 (S.D.N.Y.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Bandura
Wash. Ct. App. · 1997 · signal: see also · confidence medium
App. 722, 728 , 649 P.2d 181 , review denied, 98 Wn.2d 1011 (1982); see also Morrow v. Topping, 437 F.2d 1155, 1156 (9th Cir. 1971) (due process not violated by court rule requiring that motions be presented without oral argument); RAP 11.6 (appellate court may decide appeal without oral argument). 10 118 Wn.2d 876, 885-86 , 828 P.2d 1086 , cert. denied, 506 U.S. 958 (1992). 11 Cf. RCW 10.73.090(2) (equating personal restraint petition with motion for new trial or arrest of judgment). 12 U.S. Const. amend.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Donald Morrow
v.
Norman Topping, President, University of Southern California Evelle Younger, Los Angeles District Attorney, Tom Reddin, Chief, Los Angeles Police Department, the United States of America, and the County of Lancaster, State of Nebraska
24284_1.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Jan 27, 1971.
437 F.2d 1155
Cited by 21 opinions  |  Published

437 F.2d 1155

Donald MORROW, Appellant,
v.
Norman TOPPING, President, University of Southern California; Evelle Younger, Los Angeles District Attorney, Tom Reddin, Chief, Los Angeles Police Department, the United States of America, and the County of Lancaster, State of Nebraska, Appellees.

No. 24284.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

January 5, 1971.

Rehearing Denied January 27, 1971.

Donald Morrow, in pro per.

Larry L. Dier, Asst. U. S. Atty., John D. Maharg, County Counsel, Michael Douherty, Deputy County Counsel, Roger Arnebergh, City Atty., John A. Daly, George J. Franscell, Asst. City Attys., Lowell M. Ramseyer, Deputy City Atty., Cleve R. Ferguson of Musick, Peeler & Garret, Donnelly, Clark, Chase & Haakh, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellees.

Before CHAMBERS, HAMLEY and KILKENNY, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

[*~1155]1

Donald Morrow appeals from the dismissal of his action against the President of the University of Southern California, the Chief of the Los Angeles Police Department, the Los Angeles State District Attorney, the United States and Lancaster County, Nebraska. Appellant sought tort damages and redress for the alleged deprivation of various constitutional rights in connection with appellant's commitment to, and the events following his release from, a mental hospital in Nebraska.

2

Plaintiff argues that the district court erred in the following respects: (1) denial of due process by acting upon defendants' motions to dismiss without oral argument; (2) denial of appellant's motion for reconsideration; and (3) denial of a fair hearing because: (a) the district judge's attitude toward plaintiff's case "may have been prejudiced" since one of the defendants is President of the University of Southern California, where the judge obtained his undergraduate degree, (b) the district judge was a member of the staff of the United States District Attorney at the time when that office "may have been involved" in this matter, and (c) one of the defendants is the United States, which employs the district judge.

3

Under Rule 3(d) of the Rules of the District Court for the Central District of California, motions, in general, are to be submitted and determined on the basis of motion papers, and without oral argument. Such a local rule is contemplated by Rule 78, F.R.Civ.P. See Rose Barge Line, Inc. v. Hicks, 421 F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1970); Proceedings of the Seminar on Procedures for Effective Judicial Administration, 29 F.R.D. 191, 301. Failure to have oral argument before acting upon the motions to dismiss was therefore in full accordance with established procedure.

4

Promulgation of the local rule, and adherence thereto in this case, does not manifest an abuse of discretion. See Hazen v. Southern Hills National Bank of Tulsa, 414 F.2d 778, 780 (10th Cir. 1969). Nor, under the circumstances of this case, did it deny plaintiff due process of law. See Federal Communications Commission v. WJR, The Goodwill Station, Inc., 337 U.S. 265, 272-285, 69 S.Ct. 1097, 93 L.Ed. 1353; Sarelas v. Porikos, 320 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1963).

5

Plaintiff's purported motion to reconsider was not accompanied by the affidavit required by Rule 3(k) of the district court, nor did appellant present any evidence of the sort required by Rule 60, F.R.Civ.P., for such relief. There was no error in the denial of the motion.

6

Finally, appellant's vague allegations of bias in the district judge, leaving their insubstantiality aside, are untimely and can avail him nothing here. See 28 U.S.C. § 144.

[*~1156]7

Affirmed.