In Re Grand Jury Proceedings. United States of Am. v. Mark A. Gravel, 605 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1979). · Go Syfert
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In Re Grand Jury Proceedings. United States of Am. v. Mark A. Gravel, 605 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1979). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“where appropriate, we will enter an order extending the time within which the appeal must be decided.”
33 citation events (5 in the last 25 years) across 12 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. Energy Gathering, Inc. (ca5, 1993-09-15)
Treatment trajectory · 1979 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1979 2002 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 19 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. Energy Gathering, Inc.
5th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
where appropriate, we will enter an order extending the time within which the appeal must be decided.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Lamb (2×) also: Cited "see"
Kan. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 605 F.2d 750, 751 (5th Cir. 1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Budoo v. United States
D.C. · 1996 · confidence medium
In affirming his contempt conviction, the court stated: The witness may not frustrate the grand jury’s access to the information on the basis that he will be put in danger by giving it, and, at the same time, reject an offer to remove or minimize the danger, (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Gravel), 605 F.2d 750, 752-53 (5th Cir.1979)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Doe
1st Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings Empanelled May 1988 (Freligh I), 894 F.2d 881, 883-85 (7th Cir. 1989) (duress, demonstrated by reference to palpable, imminent danger, might constitute equitable defense to civil contempt); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Doe), 862 F.2d 430, 432 (2d Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (fear of reprisal is one factor to be considered in determining whether "confinement will produce the desired effect"); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Gravel), 605 F.2d 750, 752 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (fear of reprisal is "legitimate factor in mitigation").
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Doe
1st Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury ___ ____ ___________________ Proceedings Empanelled May 1988 (Freligh I), 894 F.2d 881 , _____________________________________________ 883-85 (7th Cir. 1989) (duress, demonstrated by reference to palpable, imminent danger, might constitute equitable defense to civil contempt); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Doe), 862 ___________________________________ F.2d 430, 432 (2d Cir. 1988) (per curiam) (fear of reprisal is one factor to be considered in determining whether "confinement will produce the desired effect"); In re Grand ____________ Jury Proceedings (Gravel), 605 …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Grand Jury Proceeding. United States v. John Doe
1st Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings Empanelled May 1988 (Freligh I), 894 F.2d 881, 883-85 (7th Cir.1989) (duress, demonstrated by reference to palpable, imminent danger, might constitute equitable defense to civil contempt); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Doe), 862 F.2d 430, 432 (2d Cir.1988) (per curiam) (fear of reprisal is one factor to be considered in determining whether “confinement will produce the desired effect”); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Gravel), 605 F.2d 750, 752 (5th Cir.1979) (per curiam) (fear of reprisal is “legitimate factor in mitigation”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Grand Jury Proceedings. United States of America v. John Doe
1st Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
“The witness may not frustrate the grand jury’s access to the information on the basis that he will be put in danger by giving it, and, at the same time, reject an offer to remove or minimize the danger.” In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Gravel), 605 F.2d 750, 752-53 (5th Cir.1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In the Matter of Grand Jury Proceedings Empanelled May 1988. Appeal of Dennis Freligh
7th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
No cases so hold, but In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 605 F.2d 750, 752-53 (5th Cir.1979) (per curiam), treats the proposition as arguable, and to us it seems implicit in the equitable character of civil contempt (of which more shortly); it is therefore unnecessary to decide whether it is strictly a defense.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Grand Jury Proceedings. United States of America v. James Owen Mallory
10th Cir. · 1986 · confidence medium
While a speculative fear of dan *908 ger or reprisals is not a defense to contempt, Martin-Trigona v. Gouletas, 634 F.2d 354, 360 (7th Cir.1980); In Re Grand Jury Proceedings (Gravel), 605 F.2d 750, 752-53 (5th Cir.1979), an actual showing that the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings has been impaired may constitute “just cause” for a refusal to testify and a defense to a contempt action.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ca7 1985
7th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
Other circuits have simply "extended" the 30-day period even though the contemnor is confined, and decided the appeal in the extended period, though not within the 30-day period, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Gravel, 605 F.2d 750, 751-52 (5th Cir.1979), while others simply ignore the period, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation: Appeal of Hartzell, 542 F.2d 166 (3d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1047 , 97 S.Ct. 755 , 50 L.Ed.2d 762 (1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Grand Jury Proceedings of August, 1984
7th Cir. · 1984 · confidence medium
Other circuits have simply "extended" the 30-day period even though the contemnor is confined, and decided the appeal in the extended period, though not within the 30-day period, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Gravel, 605 F.2d 750, 751-52 (5th Cir.1979), while others simply ignore the period, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation: Appeal of Hartzell, 542 F.2d 166 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1047 , 97 S.Ct. 755 , 50 L.Ed.2d 762 (1977).
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re Yoho
W. Va. · 1983 · confidence medium
In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 605 F.2d 750, 752 (5th Cir.1979); but since a civil contempt sanction is intended to coerce and not punish, mitigation is not an issue.
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS. Appeal of William T. BURNS
5th Cir. · 1981 · confidence medium
In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Gravel), 605 F.2d 750, 752-53 (5th Cir. 1979) (footnote omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, David Brummitt, in Re Grand Jury Proceedings, Jack Wayne Scarborough
5th Cir. · 1979 · confidence medium
Because the district court never allowed Brummitt to present his defenses, however, we remand his case along with that of Scarborough, see discussion infra, to give him an opportunity to raise any other matters, whether as defenses or in mitigation, see In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Gravel), 605 F.2d 750, 752-53 (5th Cir. 1979) (per curiam), he wishes to present.
discussed Cited "see" Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America, Natural Gas Pipeline Company of America v. Energy Gathering, Inc., John Fox, Movant-Appellant
5th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Gravel), 605 F.2d 750 , 752 n. 1 (5th Cir.1979) ("Where appropriate, we will enter an order extending the time within which the appeal must be decided.”) (citing cases). 18 .
cited Cited "see" Blaubergs v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia
5th Cir. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 605 F.2d 750 , 751-52 & n.l (5th Cir. 1979); In re Tierney, 465 F.2d 806, 809 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 914 , 93 S.Ct. 959 , 35 L.Ed.2d 276 (1973).
cited Cited "see" ca5 1980
5th Cir. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 605 F.2d 750 , 751-52 & n.1 (5th Cir. 1979); In re Tierney, 465 F.2d 806, 809 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 914 , 93 S.Ct. 959 , 35 L.Ed.2d 276 (1973).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Esposito
S.D.N.Y. · 1987 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See United States v. Bifield, 702 F.2d 342 , 346 & n. 2 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 931 , 103 S.Ct. 2095 , 77 L.Ed.2d 304 (1983); United States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381, 386-88 (7th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931 , 97 S.Ct. 1551 , 51 L.Ed.2d 775 (1977); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 605 F.2d 750, 752 (5th Cir.1979) (per curiam) (rejecting defense of duress in civil contempt when defendant declined government’s offer of protection).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In Re July 1979 Term Special Grand Jury. In the Matter of James J. Donohue. United States of America v. James J. Donohue
4th Cir. · 1981 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e. g., United States v. Gravel, 605 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1979); General Counsel v. United States, 599 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1979); Melickian v. United States, 547 F.2d 416 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 986 , 97 S.Ct. 1684 , 52 L.Ed.2d 381 (1977).
In Re GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS. UNITED STATES of America
v.
Mark A. GRAVEL
79-3001.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Oct 15, 1979.
605 F.2d 750
Camille F. Gravel, Jr., Alexandria, La., for appellant., Ronald A. Fonseca, Robert J. Boitman, Asst. U. S. Attys., New Orleans, La., for appellee/
Ainsworth, Godbold, Per Curiam, Vance.
Cited by 24 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 88%
Citer courts: Fifth Circuit (1)
PER CURIAM:

This is an appeal from an order, entered under 28 U.S.C. § 1826, adjudging Mark A. Gravel in civil contempt for his refusal to testify before a federal grand jury.

Gravel pleaded guilty on July 13, 1979, to federal charges of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and to possession of cocaine. On July 19 he was called before a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Louisiana, where he was granted use immunity and questioned regarding the source of the cocaine. He declined to reveal the identity of his source and gave the following explanation:

[Tjhere are many reasons such that there have been threats made on my life in regards to this matter, I have entered a guilty plea in two counts of the indictment; my attorney has told the United States District Attorney’s Office before I entered such a plea and before the plea bargain agreement, you know, that I would not be able to reveal my sources because of the threats, harassment by the press, leaks by Government sources to the press, conflicts between the Drug Enforcement Agency and myself on a statement that I voluntarily gave between amounts of money confiscated from me and amounts reported; misrepresentation by the press and them quoting informed sources and informed observers and things of that matter.

Gravel was called before the district judge who ordered him to respond to the questions asked by the grand jury. Gravel declined. He was cited for contempt and a show cause hearing was conducted on August 9. At the hearing Gravel reiterated his refusal to answer and was permitted to describe to the judge, in camera and without any representative of the government present, threats he claims to have received. The in camera testimony was sealed and sent forward to this court, and we have examined it. At the August 9 hearing the government stated that it had been and still was prepared to offer Gravel protection from any threats against him. The court found there was no just cause for Gravel’s refusal to answer and held him in contempt and ordered that he be confined until he is willing to testify, but not to exceed the term of the grand jury and in no event to exceed 18 months.

The criminal case had been transferred to the Western District of Louisiana. On August 17 Gravel was sentenced by that court to two concurrent ten-year terms of imprisonment to be followed by concurrent special parole terms of three years.

The order holding Gravel in contempt was entered August 9, 1979. Section 1826(b) provides that an appeal from an order of confinement under § 1826 shall be disposed of as soon a3 practicable but not later than 30 days from the filing of the appeal. In many § 1826 cases, it is not possible within the 30-day period for a record to be prepared and forwarded to this court, for the parties to write briefs, and[*752] for the court then to give full consideration to the appeal. Pursuant to the practice of this circuit we entered an order extending to October 16, 1979, the time in which this court should decide the appeal, and the parties have proceeded on an expedited briefing schedule. [1]

In this appeal Gravel attempts to invoke duress as a defense to the contempt charge, based primarily upon his testimony that he has been told he will be killed if he reveals the source of the cocaine he possessed. Some authority recognizes duress as a defense to a criminal prosecution. People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal.App.3d 823, 832, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110, 115 (1974), discussed in U. S. v. Bryan, 591 F.2d 1161 (CA5, 1979), a criminal prosecution for escape. Under the Lover-camp criteria there must be: (1) specific threat of death, forceable sexual attack or serious bodily injury in immediate future; (2) no time to complain to authorities or a history of futile complaints; (3) no opportunity to resort to court; (4) no force or violence used by defendants toward others; (5) prompt report by defendant to authorities once he is in a position of safety. In Bryan we did not adopt the Lovercamp indicia but held that, assuming they were applicable, the defendant did not comply with them because he escaped when he was in a place of safety and despite opportunity to complain to authorities he did not immediately complain.

In both civil and criminal contempt cases this circuit has held that fear for personal and family safety is not a defense to a charge arising from refusal of a witness to testify. In Re Grand Jury Proceedings, 509 F.2d 1349 (CA5, 1975); U. S. v. Gomez, 553 F.2d 958 (CA5, 1977). We have, however, held that such fear is a legitimate factor in mitigation. Gomez, supra. At least one other circuit has considered duress to be a defense to a contempt charge. U. S. v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381, 388 (CA7, 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931, 97 S.Ct. 1551, 51 L.Ed.2d 775 (1977) (criminal contempt).

It is not necessary that we decide whether duress can never be invoked in a contempt case, and if it can be invoked at all whether it can be raised in a civil contempt context, or whether, in view of our decisions these questions can be reached by only the court en banc. Assuming arguendo that Gravel can raise a duress defense, he has not brought himself within it. The government has made available to him an alternative course of conduct by offering him protection from the asserted threats. He has declined to accept this alternative on the ground that the protection would be ineffective. Gravel cannot have his cake and eat it too. Society has a powerful interest in a grand jury’s having available to it the testimony of a witness with knowledge of matter under investigation. Piemonte v. U. S., 367 U.S. 556, 559 n. 2, 81 S.Ct. 1720, 6 L.Ed.2d 1028, 1031 n. 2 (1961). The[*753] witness may not frustrate the grand jury’s access to the information on the basis that he will be put in danger by giving it, and, at the same time, reject an offer to remove or minimize the danger. This is not to say that the government would be required to offer perfect protection, if that is ever possible. The government’s offer to protect Gravel is at least a reasonable alternative available to him, and he has refused to avail himself of it. Thus, even if duress is otherwise available as a defense, Gravel has not brought himself within it. [2]

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

1

. Where appropriate, we will enter an order extending the time within which the appeal must be decided. E. g., In Re: Tierney, 465 F.2d 806, 809 (CA5, 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 914, 93 S.Ct. 959, 35 L.Ed.2d 276 (1973); Beverly v. U. S., 468 F.2d 732, 740-42 (CA5, 1972); In Re: Grand Jury Proceedings, 532 F.2d 404, 406 n. 3 (CA5), cert. denied sub nom. Field v. U. S., 429 U.S. 940, 97 S.Ct. 354, 50 L.Ed.2d 309 (1976). The First Circuit has decided an appeal beyond the 30-day limit apparently without entering an order extending the time. U. S. v. Doe, 460 F.2d 328, 332 n. 3 (CA1, 1972), cert. denied sub nom. Popkin v. U. S., 411 U.S. 909, 93 S.Ct. 1527, 36 L.Ed.2d 199 (1973). In the Eighth Circuit when the court cannot decide the case within the 30-day period the appellant has been released from custody pending decision. Melickian v. U. S., 547 F.2d 416 (CA8), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 986, 97 S.Ct. 1684, 52 L.Ed.2d 381 (1977). Cf. In Re January 1976 Grand Jury, 534 F.2d 719 (CA7, 1976), and Brown v. U. S., 465 F.2d 371 (CA9, 1972) (stay granted pending appeal and decision entered beyond 30 days). The Tenth Circuit has held that the 30-day period is mandatory and cannot be extended by waiver, stay or release on personal recognizance. Matter of Berry, 521 F.2d 179 (CA10), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 928, 96 S.Ct. 276, 46 L.Ed.2d 256 (1975). The difficulties of this position are demonstrated by Berry, in which the court put the burden on the appellant but found it impossible to examine the voluminous documents in the record and to do any more than hurriedly review the transcript and the complex briefs. Id. at 181. Several decisions have recognized that a serious constitutional problem would be created if a court did not decide an appeal within 30 days and the period were treated as jurisdictional.

2

. Gravel’s assertions of misrepresentations and harassment by the press, leaks to the press, and conflicts with government agents, would not trigger a duress defense, even if such a defense is applicable.

Gravel also refers to discussion during plea bargain negotiation in which he states he told government representatives that he would be unable to reveal his cocaine source. He does not claim that a bargain was made that he was not to be called to testify, but to the contrary acknowledges that the government told him that he might be called. Thus there is no assertion that a plea bargain was breached.