United States v. Robert B. Sutton & Sutton Investments, Inc., 786 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1986). · Go Syfert
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United States v. Robert B. Sutton & Sutton Investments, Inc., 786 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“section 105(a) simply authorizes a bankruptcy court to fashion such orders as are necessary to further the purposes of the substantive provisions of the bankruptcy code.”
225 citation events (114 in the last 25 years) across 79 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Wright v. Csabi (In re Wright) (txsb, 2017-12-01)
Treatment trajectory · 1986 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1986 2006 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Wright v. Csabi (In re Wright)
Bankr. S.D. Tex. · 2017 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
section 105(a) simply authorizes a bankruptcy court to fashion such orders as are necessary to further the purposes of the substantive provisions of the bankruptcy code.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) In Re Dow Corning Corp.
Bankr. E.D. Mich. · 1999 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
105, standing alone, cannot serve as a source of authority for granting a permanent injunction .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mark A Nordlicht
Bankr. S.D.N.Y. · 2025 · confidence medium
“Section 105(a) limits the bankruptcy court’s equitable powers, which ‘must and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code.’” New England Dairies, Inc. v. Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc. (In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc.), 351 F.3d 86, 92-93 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting FDIC v. Colonial Realty Co., 966 F.2d 57, 59 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988))). “[Section 105(a)] does not ‘authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law, or constit…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Field v. Honda Aircraft Company, LLC
Bankr. D. Haw. · 2025 · confidence medium
United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ditech Holding Corporation
Bankr. S.D.N.Y. · 2024 · confidence medium
In other words, section 105(a) “does not ‘authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law, or constitute a roving commission to do equity.’” In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc., 351 F.3d 86 at 92 (quoting United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Anytime Fitness v. Thornhill Brothers
5th Cir. · 2023 · confidence medium
But we have already decided that § 105 “does not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable.” United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Larry S. Jenkins and Jennifer W. Jenkins
Bankr. E.D. Tex. · 2022 · confidence medium
This does not mean that the Court can “create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law, or constitute a roving commission to do equity.” United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Anelia Tcherneva
Bankr. E.D.N.Y. · 2022 · confidence medium
S.D.N.Y. 1996) “Section 105(a) is not a license to judicially legislate perceived shortcomings in existing law,” Farrell, 241 B.R. at 349 , nor does it “constitute a roving commission to do equity,” New England Dairies, Inc. v. Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc. (In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc.), 351 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kenneth H. Roberson, Jr. and Vickie H. Roberson
Bankr. E.D.N.C. · 2020 · confidence medium
Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code gives the bankruptcy court authority to “issue any order . . . that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of” the Bankruptcy Code and “authorizes bankruptcy courts to issue injunctions and take other necessary steps in aid of their jurisdiction.” United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1307 (5th Cir. 1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lloyd Ward v. Robert Yaquinto
5th Cir. · 2020 · confidence medium
(In re Oxford Mgmt., Inc.), 4 F.3d 1329, 1334 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986)). 33 Anwiler v. Patchett (In re Anwiler), 958 F.2d 925, 929 (9th Cir. 1992), as amended on denial of reh’g (Apr. 8, 1992). 34 11 U.S.C. § 727 (a)(4)(A). 35 Frank v. Ward (In re Ward), No. 14-32939, 2017 WL 377947 , at *12-26 (Bankr.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Woodstream Falls Condominium v. United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado
10th Cir. BAP · 2020 · confidence medium
Considering the Debtor’s blatant disregard for the Bankruptcy Court’s prior orders, the imposition of the $500 sanction was an appropriate use of the Bankruptcy Court’s discretion. improper behavior in its own proceedings seems a necessary adjunct to any tribunal charged by law with the adjudication of disputes.”)). 73 Id. at 1265 (first citing In re Alderete, 412 F.3d 1200, 1207 (10th Cir. 2005), and then citing United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986)). 74 Law v. Siegel, 571 U.S. 415, 421 (2014) (quoting Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 375-76 (200…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Freddie Brown v. Mary Viegelahn
5th Cir. · 2020 · confidence medium
What we do know is that Section 105(a) speaks in quite broad terms of a bankruptcy court’s authority, but it “does not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law or constitute a roving commission to do equity.” United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986) (footnote omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts v. Adams
N.D. Tex. · 2020 · confidence medium
Comptroller’s Br. 13.2 The 1 Although the relief sought by the Debtors, and granted by the bankruptcy court, had the effect of modifying the remedies available to the Comptroller under the Plan or preventing it from exercising those remedies after Debtors defaulted, neither party nor the bankruptcy court addressed the Debtors’ motion in the context of a Plan modification, for example, under 11 U.S.C. § 1127 (a), applicable to individual debtors. 2 The Comptroller cites and quotes the following cases for support: [United States] v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986); see also, e.g…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Crockett v. NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC D/B/A MR. COOPER
Bankr. D.C. · 2020 · confidence medium
That provision “does not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law, or constitute a roving commission to do equity.” United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986) (footnote omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Senior Care Centers, LLC - Adversary Proceeding
Bankr. N.D. Tex. · 2019 · confidence medium
Congress has provided that: Upon timely motion of a party in a proceeding based upon a State law claim or State law cause of action, related to a case under title 11 but not arising under title 11 or arising in a case under title 11, with respect to which an action could not have been commenced in a court of the United States absent jurisdiction under this section, the district court shall abstain from hearing such proceeding if an action is commenced, and can be timely adjudicated, in a State forum of appropriate jurisdiction.39 The Fifth Circuit has articulated that mandatory abstention appl…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Yellow Poplar Lumber Company, Inc.
Bankr. W.D. Va. · 2019 · confidence medium
The ‘statute does not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law, or constitute a roving commission to do equity.’” (quoting United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986))); In re Lloyd Secs., 163 B.R. 242 (Bankr.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (In re Madoff)
Bankr. S.D.N.Y. · 2017 · confidence medium
Section 105(a) “does not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law, or constitute a roving commission to do equity,” Kalikow, 602 F.3d at 96 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); New England Dairies, Inc. v. Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc. (In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc.), 351 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir.1986)), and extends only to the exercise of equity “in carrying out the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, rather than to further…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Pioneer Health Services, Inc.
Bankr. S.D. Miss. · 2017 · confidence medium
United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986) ("the powers granted by [§ 105] may be exercised only in a manner consistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code” and does not “constitute a roving commission to do equity.”). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Colliau
Bankr. W.D. Tex. · 2016 · confidence medium
Law v. Siegel, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1188, 1194-95 , 188 L.Ed.2d 146 (2014) ("Section 105(a) confers authority to 'carry out’ the provisions of the Code, but it is quite impossible to do that by taking action that the Code prohibits.”); U.S. v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1307-08 (5th Cir.1986) ("Section 105(a) simply authorizes a bankruptcy court to fashion such orders as are necessary to further the purposes of the substantive provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.”). . 11 U.S.C. § 541 (a)(1); Law v. Siegel, — U.S.-, 134 S.Ct. 1188, 1192 , 188 L.Ed.2d 146 (2014). . 11 U.S.C. § 522 (1); Fed.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Spradlin v. Beads & Steeds Inns, LLC (In re Howland)
Bankr. E.D. Ky. · 2014 · confidence medium
United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir.1986); see also Pertuso v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 233 F.3d 417 , 423 n. 1 (6th Cir.2000) (same).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re MF Global Inc.
Bankr. S.D.N.Y. · 2014 · confidence medium
Bankruptcy Code section 105 “does not ‘authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law, or constitute a roving commission to do equity.’ ” Dairy Mart, 351 F.3d at 92 (quoting United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir.1986)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) In re Geneva Anhx IV LLC
Bankr. C.D. Ill. · 2013 · confidence medium
U.S. v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir.1986); Southern Ry.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Select Tree Farms, Inc.
Bankr. W.D.N.Y. · 2012 · confidence medium
Section 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides in relevant part that this court “may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.” This subdivision “does not ‘authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under the applicable law’ ” New England Dairies, Inc. v. Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc. (In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc.), 351 F.3d 86, 92 (2nd Cir.2003), quoting United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir.1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) FiberTower Network Services Corp. v. Federal Communications Commission ( In re FiberTower Network Services Corp.) (2×)
Bankr. N.D. Tex. · 2012 · confidence medium
As a result, granting the requested injunction would not impermissibly utilize Code section 105(a) to “create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law.” See United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir.1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables, XIV, LLC (In Re Rosenberg)
Bankr. S.D. Florida · 2012 · confidence medium
Co. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 758 F.2d 137 , 141 (3d Cir.1985), to serve as “a roving commission to do equity,” United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir.1986), or to add remedies to the remedies that are explicitly set forth in the Bankruptcy Code to address particular conduct, In re Joubert, 411 F.3d 452, 455 (3d Cir.2005) (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S.’ 275, 121 S.Ct. 1511 , 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re MF Global Holdings Ltd.
Bankr. S.D.N.Y. · 2012 · confidence medium
Section 105 does not “authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law, or constitute a roving commission to do equity.” Id. (citing United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir.1986)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re Butcher
Bankr.D. Colo. · 2011 · confidence medium
U.S. v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1307-1308 (5th Cir.1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Arsenault v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In Re Arsenault)
Bankr. S.D. Ga. · 2011 · confidence medium
However, “... in enacting the Bankruptcy Code, Congress sought to strike a balance among the competing interests of debtors, creditors and the government.” United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1306 (5th Cir.1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lenz v. Auto Acceptance (In Re Lenz)
Bankr. D. Or. · 2011 · confidence medium
That statute does not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law, or constitute a roving commission to do equity. *836 United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir.1986).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Chris Di Ferrante v. Donald Young
5th Cir. · 2011 · confidence medium
Id. (quoting United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986)). 19 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re Garcia
Bankr. D.N.M. · 2010 · confidence medium
United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir.1986) (citations omitted.) The Code anticipates dismissal if plan payments are not made.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Texas Comptroller of Public Accounts v. Zars (In Re Zars)
W.D. Tex. · 2010 · confidence medium
The bankruptcy court is not “a roving commission to do equity” and cannot violate the Code or its purposes by “elevating the status of the appellees above that of the other general unsecured creditors.” Oxford, 4 F.3d at 1334 (citing United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir.1986)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Davis v. Eagle Legacy Credit Union (In Re Davis)
Bankr.D. Colo. · 2010 · confidence medium
In the appropriate circumstance, this could include the Court’s disallowance of a creditor’s claim. 13 .See, e.g., In re Joubert, 411 F.3d 452, 454-455 (3d Cir.2005)(holding that section 105(a) does not afford a private cause of action and that Plaintiff’s lone remedy for a violation of the bankruptcy code is a contempt proceeding pursuant to section 105(a) and affirming dismissal of cause of action pled under 11 U.S.C. § 105 (a)); In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc., 351 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir.2003)(“ '[Section 105(a)] does not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive…
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re Synergy Hematology-Oncology Medical Associates, Inc.
Bankr. C.D. Cal. · 2010 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Browning v. Navarro, 887 F.2d 553 , 559 (5th Cir.1989); United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jones v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. (In Re Jones)
Bankr. E.D. La. · 2009 · confidence medium
U.S. v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir.1986). 32 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re Tidal Const. Co., Inc.
Bankr. S.D. Ga. · 2009 · confidence medium
In re Friedman’s, Inc., 336 B.R. 880, 882 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.2005) (quoting United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir.1986)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Harker v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA (In Re Krause)
Bankr. S.D. Ohio · 2009 · confidence medium
Thus, while § 105(a) vests bankruptcy courts with inherent power to sanction parties for improper conduct, it “does not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law.” Pertuso, 233 F.3d at 423, fn. 1 , quoting United Sates v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir.1986). 19 Bankruptcy courts have used their authority to impose contempt sanctions pursuant to § 105 in a variety of circumstances.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re General Motors Corp.
Bankr. S.D.N.Y. · 2009 · confidence medium
Group, Inc., 352 F.3d 671, 680 (2d Cir.2003) (Straub, X, concurring) {"Aquatic Development ”) ("[T]his Court has repeatedly cautioned that 105(a) 'does not "authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law, or constitute a roving commission to do equity.” ’ ”), quoting In re Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc., 351 F.3d 86 , 92 (2d Cir.2003) ("Dairy Mart"), in turn quoting U.S. v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986). 137 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) McVay v. Perez (In Re Perez)
D. Colo. · 2009 · confidence medium
Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 , 108 S.Ct. 963 , 99 L.Ed.2d 169 (1988); U.S. v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir.1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carter v. Flagler Hospital, Inc. (In Re Carter)
Bankr. M.D. Fla. · 2009 · confidence medium
Although courts recognize that § 105 vests bankruptcy courts with statutory contempt powers, it “does not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law....” United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir.1986)(citing Southern Ry.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Brown
Bankr. E.D. Tex. · 2009 · confidence medium
See also, e.g., Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 375 , 127 S.Ct. 1105 , 166 L.Ed.2d 956 (2007) (noting the “broad authority granted to bankruptcy judges to take any action that is necessary or appropriate to ‘prevent an abuse of process’”); U.S. v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1307 (5th Cir.1986) (noting that § 105(a) “authorizes a bankruptcy court to fashion such orders as are necessary to further the purposes of the substantive provisions of the Bankruptcy Code”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) French v. American General Financial Services (In Re French)
Bankr. E.D. Tenn. · 2009 · confidence medium
Undoubtedly included within the court’s § 105(a) powers is the authority to find a party in civil contempt for noncompliance with orders or violations of the Bankruptcy Code and/or Rules; however, it “does not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law[.]” Pertuso, 233 F.3d at 423 n. 1 (quoting United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir.1986)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rodriguez v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (In Re Rodriguez)
Bankr. S.D. Tex. · 2008 · confidence medium
In Marrama , the Supreme Court held that, under § 105, bankruptcy courts have “broad authority ... to take any action that is necessary or appropriate ‘to prevent the abuse of process.’ ” Marrama, 127 S.Ct. at 1111-1112 ; U.S. v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1307 (5th Cir.1986) (noting that § 105(a) “authorizes a bankruptcy court to fashion such orders as are necessary to further the purposes of the substantive provisions of the Bankruptcy Code”).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Jones
E.D. La. · 2008 · confidence medium
U.S. v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir.1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Barry v. Sommers (In Re Cochener)
S.D. Tex. · 2007 · confidence medium
Moreover, in assessing sanctions against Barry the Bankruptcy Court had to be mindful of the caveat stated by the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir.1986), that 11 U.S.C. § 105 “does not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law, or constitute a roving commission to do equity.” Appropriate factors for the Bankruptcy Court to have considered in determining the sanction to impose include: (1) the precise conduct being punished, (2) the precise expenses caused by the violation, (3) the …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Jacobsen
Bankr. E.D. Tex. · 2007 · confidence medium
The Court’s Authority under 11 U.S.C. § 105 (a) Moreover, § 105(a) of the Bankruptcy Code specifically “authorizes a bankruptcy court to fashion such orders as are necessary to further the purposes of the substantive provisions of the Bankruptcy Code,” United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1307 (5th Cir.1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Argose, Inc.
Bankr. D. Del. · 2007 · confidence medium
Co., 885 F.2d 98, 100 (3d Cir.1990)); see also In re Jamo, 283 F.3d 392, 403 (1st Cir.2002); United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir.1986); Lawrence P. King, Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 105.01[2], at [105 — 7]—[105—8] (15th ed. rev.2007).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Argose, Inc.
Bankr. D. Del. · 2007 · confidence medium
Co., 885 F.2d 98, 100 (3d Cir.1989)); see also In re Jamo, 283 F.3d 392, 403 (1st Cir.2002); United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir.1986); Lawrence P. King, Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 105.01[2] at [105-7]—[105—8] (15th ed. rev.2007).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Padilla v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. (In Re Padilla)
Bankr. S.D. Tex. · 2007 · confidence medium
Marrama, 127 S.Ct. at 1112 (noting the “broad authority granted to bankruptcy judges to take any action that is necessary or appropriate to ‘prevent an abuse of process’ ”); U.S. v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1307 (5th Cir.1986) (noting that § 105(a) “authorizes a bankruptcy court to fashion such orders as are necessary to further the purposes of the substantive provisions of the Bankruptcy Code”). ' A bankruptcy court’s authority under § 105(a) is not without limits.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sanchez v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co. (In Re Sanchez)
Bankr. S.D. Tex. · 2007 · confidence medium
Section 105(a) does not “authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights otherwise unavailable under applicable law, or constitute a roving commission to do equity.” Id. (quoting United States v. Sutton, 786 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir.1986)).
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Robert B. SUTTON and Sutton Investments, Inc., Defendants-Appellants
85-4843.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Apr 16, 1986.
786 F.2d 1305
William Hardy Patrick, III, Baton Rouge, La., for defendants-appellants., Glenn L. Archer, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Michael L. Paup, Chief, Appellate Sec., Roger M. Olsen, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., Wynette Hewett and John J. Boyle, Attys., Tax Div., U.S. Dept, of Justice, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff-appellee.
Rubin, Johnson, Jones.
Cited by 193 opinions  |  Published
ALVIN B. RUBIN, Circuit Judge:

The district court correctly held that a debtor in a Chapter 11 reorganization proceeding is not entitled to receive a monthly allowance for the support of his spouse. We, therefore, affirm its judgment.

I.

Robert B. Sutton had been wealthy. His holdings included a hotel, a residence in the Bahamas, a plastics factory in Denver, Colorado, a marine terminal and tank plant, and real estate in five states. His downfall came when he was charged with marketing oil at huge profits through miscertification, contrary to the regulations of the Department of Energy. After two separate criminal trials, Sutton was convicted of obstruction of justice, bribery, conspiracy and racketeering [1] and was incarcerated in the federal prison at Fort Worth, Texas, to serve sentences totalling nine years.

Sutton then filed a petition for reorganization pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bank[*1306] ruptcy Code [2] on April 25, 1984, as did his wholly owned corporation, Sutton Investments, Inc. The Department of Energy and the Internal Revenue Service both filed claims in the bankruptcy proceedings. The Department of Energy claim is based on a judgment against Sutton in an amount in excess of $400 million, plus interest at a daily rate of $132,000, and the IRS claim for delinquent federal taxes totals more than $475 million.

After the bankruptcy proceedings were instituted, the trustee paid certain living and travel expenses of Sutton’s spouse and two minor children apparently without seeking or obtaining authorization from the Bankruptcy Court. These distributions included sums in excess of $10,000 each month to maintain a plantation style home in which Sutton’s spouse and children resided. The trustee later determined that the home was burdensome to the estate and sold it. Without objection from the creditors, the trustee purchased a smaller home in which the debtor’s spouse and children then resided. The travel expenses paid by the trustee included those incurred by the debtor’s spouse in visiting the debtor at the prison and travel expenses to the criminal trial that was conducted after the petition was filed.

In April, 1985, the trustee sought direction from the Bankruptcy Court concerning “what expenses and payments, if any, should be made by the Trustee in Chapter 11 from the estate assets for the support of said wife and children.”

The bankruptcy court authorized monthly support payments from Sutton’s estate in the amount of $1,500 “for the support of [Sutton’s] wife and children,” citing 11 U.S.C. § 105 as authority for its asserted equitable power to make the award. [3] The court based its opinion on the thesis that the debtor had a continuing duty to support his spouse and children. The district court reversed, finding that neither the debtor nor any member of his family performed services of benefit to the bankruptcy estate that would justify distributions to them. It held that there was no provision in the Bankruptcy Code that authorized a family support allowance in a Chapter 11 reorganization proceeding.

II.

In enacting the Bankruptcy Code, Congress sought to strike a balance among the competing interests of debtors, creditors and the government. [4] Insofar as a debt- or’s obligation to support his family is concerned, Congress created a complete statutory scheme, striking the balance in favor of allowing claims for support against the assets of the bankruptcy estate only for “matured” amounts, that is, amounts due under a valid court order or decree that had accrued at the time the petition in bankruptcy was filed.

Under prior law, the Supreme Court had held that the marital or parental duty to support a spouse or children was not a “debt” and, thus, was not provable under the Bankruptcy Act [5] even if the obligation was evidenced by a decree or judgment. [6] In 1903, congress amended Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act [7] so as to except explicitly from discharge liabilities for alimony, maintenance, and support that were due or to become due. The Supreme Court treated this amendment as declaratory of case law and adhered to its position on the non-provability of such obligations. [8] A body of case law ultimately developed in the lower courts, however, that permitted a spouse to[*1307] prove a claim against a bankruptcy estate for such amounts as were the subject of a decree that was not subject to further modification and were past due at the time the petition was filed. [9]

Under the Act, the courts began to allow claims for support obligations that were matured, i.e., past due when the petition in bankruptcy was filed. [10] Collier on Bankruptcy states that this resolution of family support obligations struck a proper balance between other creditors and the debtor’s spouse. It recognized “to the largest possible extent the bankrupt’s legal duty to support his dependents.” On the other hand, this policy relieved creditors from the reduction of their distributive share for claims that would become due only in the future. [11]

When Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code, it struck a balance between these competing sets of policy considerations. Three provisions of the Code operate together to establish a scheme under which only matured obligations for support, maintenance, and alimony are allowable against the assets of the bankruptcy estate. Post-petition obligations for support are collectible directly from the debtor out of the property set aside to him as exempt or acquired by him after the petition is filed.

Section 523(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code renders obligations for alimony, maintenance, or support nondischargeable. In turn, Section 502(b)(5) [12] disallows claims against the bankruptcy estate for alimony, support and maintenance that are not matured on the date the petition for relief under the bankruptcy laws is filed. Thus, unmatured claims for alimony, support and maintenance that are non-dischargeable are not allowable against the assets of the bankruptcy estate. Such obligations, however, are collectible from the debtor personally, and Section 362 excepts from the automatic stay attempts to collect obligations of this type from property that is not property of the bankruptcy estate. [13] The legislative history of the relevant provisions confirms their plain meaning. [14]

Sutton’s spouse is not seeking to claim a distribution from the bankruptcy estate for amounts due under a decree ordering Sutton to pay her support. The balance struck by Congress among the competing interests of creditors, the debtor, disposes of Sutton’s argument that Section 105(a) authorizes distributions for post-petition support payments.

As the district court correctly recognized, Section 105(a) [15] simply authorizes a bankruptcy court to fashion such orders as are necessary to further the purposes of the substantive provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The section is described in the legislative history as being “similar in effect to the All Writs Statute.” [16] Thus, it authorizes bankruptcy courts to issue injunctions and take other necessary steps in aid of their jurisdiction. [17]

[*1308] While the bankruptcy courts have fashioned relief under Section 105(a) in a variety of situations, the powers granted by that statute may be exercised only in a manner consistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. [18] That statute does not authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise unavailable under applicable law, [19] or constitute a roving commission to do equity.

Sutton asserts that the payments can be regarded as compensation for “smoothing over the rough spots in their rocky relationship between the debtor and the trustee.” But the only testimony concerning any services of this type was to the effect that payments already made by the trustee to Sutton’s wife for her travel expenses were incurred for the purpose of obtaining information from Sutton. There was neither testimony that compensation was to be paid for these “services” nor evidence that she should be providing any services to the estate in the future.

The distributions were, therefore, not justifiable as compensation to Sutton’s spouse for services she rendered to the bankruptcy estate, hence administrative expenses. In any event, the bankruptcy court purported to make an award for the support of the debtor’s spouse not compensation for her services.

We have held that the Act gave bankruptcy courts no authority to grant compensation that was not expressly allowed by statutory provision. [20] The Code embodies the same policy. [21]

For these reasons, the judgment is AFFIRMED.

1

. See United States v. Sutton, 732 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir.1984), cert. denied, — U.S.-. 105 S.Ct. 903, 83 L.Ed.2d 919 (1984).

2

. ll U.S.C.

3

. 49 B.R. 891 (W.D.La.1985).

4

. H.R.Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 274 ([1978-5] U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5963, 6231.); S.Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. at 13-14 ([1978-5] U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 5787, 5799-5800).

5

. Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (11 U.S.C. § 103).

6

. Auaubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575, 21 S.Ct. 735, 45 L.Ed. 1009 (1901); Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 74 (1904).

8

. See generally 3A Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 6.13 at 1838-1840 (14th ed. 1976).

9

. See Heimberger v. Joseph, 55 F.2d 171 (6th Cir.1931); 3A Collier on Bankruptcy, supra, at 1839.

10

. 3A Collier on Bankruptcy, supra at 1839-1840.

11

. Id.

12

. Formerly Section 502(b)(6) prior to the amendments made by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, Sec. 445.

13

. See, e.g., In re Jackson, 48 B.R. 616 (Bankr.W.D.Ky.1985); In re Mack, 46 B.R. 652 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1985); In re Murray, 31 B.R. 499 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1983).

14

. See H.R.Rep. No. 95-595, supra at 364; S.Rep. No. 95-989, supra, at 79; 124 Cong.Rec. 32350, 32399.

15

. That section provides:

The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.
16

. 28 U.S.C. § 1651. H.R.Rep. No. 95-595, supra, at 316, ([1978-5] U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News p. 6273).

17

. See generally, 5 Collier on Bankruptcy, j[’s 105.02, 105.03 (15th ed. 1985).

18

. See Johnson v. First Bank of Montevideo, Minn., 719 F.2d 270, 273 (8th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1012, 104 S.Ct. 1015, 79 L.Ed.2d 245 (1984); In re Texas Consumer Finance Corp., 480 F.2d 1261, 1265 (5th Cir.1973).

19

. Southern Ry. Co. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 758 F.2d 137, 141 (3d Cir.1985).

20

. See In re First Bond & Mortgage Co., 74 F.2d 930, 932 (5th Cir.1935); Crutcher v. Logan, 102 F.2d 612 (5th Cir.1939). See also Lane v. Haytian Corporation of America, 117 F.2d 216, 219 (2d Cir.1941), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 580, 61 S.Ct. 1101, 85 L.Ed. 1537 (1941); Guerin v. Weil, 205 F.2d 302 (2d Cir.1953); In re Eureka Upholstering Co., 48 F.2d 95 (2d Cir.1931).

21

. In re Fox, 725 F.2d 661, 663 (11th Cir.1984); In re Howerton, 23 B.R. 58 (N.D.Tex.1982).