D. Lawrence Burdick v. Am. Express Co., 865 F.2d 527 (2d Cir. 1989). · Go Syfert
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D. Lawrence Burdick v. Am. Express Co., 865 F.2d 527 (2d Cir. 1989). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
104 citation events (17 in the last 25 years) across 19 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Akhmed Gadzhievich v. Herman Gref (nysd, 2022-09-13)
Treatment trajectory · 1989 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1989 2007 2026
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#3 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) cited 1× in this case · 36 total citations of statute
Top citers, strongest first. 44 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Akhmed Gadzhievich v. Herman Gref
S.D.N.Y. · 2022 · confidence medium
Co., 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir. 1989); see also Hollander, 173 F. App’x at 17 (stating that a RICO complaint fails when “the alleged injuries were proximately caused not by the alleged racketeering violations, but by the public exposure of those activities”).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Della Mura v. Thomas
S.D.N.Y. · 2021 · confidence medium
Co., 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir. 1989) (per curiam), a stockbroker alleged that the defendant committed RICO predicate acts of mail and securities fraud, which were perpetrated against its customers.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Cohen v. Cohen
S.D.N.Y. · 2014 · confidence medium
Express, 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir.1989)); Ray Larsen Assocs., Inc. v. Nikko Am., Inc., No. 89 Civ. 2809(BSJ), 1996 WL 442799 , at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Justin F. v. Maloney
D. Conn. · 2007 · confidence medium
Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir.1989) (quoting Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 , 105 S.Ct. 3275 , 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985)); Evans v. City of Chi, 434 F.3d 916, 925 (7th Cir.2006) (confirming that the injury requirement and the causation requirement must both be met to confer standing).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hollander v. Flash Dancers Topless Club
2d Cir. · 2006 · confidence medium
Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir.1989) (holding that a plaintiff fired by the defendant company after he complained about racketeering activities and refused to participate in them could not show proximate causation, even though their actions allegedly interfered with his “ability ... to earn a living for himself’ and deprived him of his job).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Cobbs v. Sheahan
N.D. Ill. · 2005 · confidence medium
(See, e.g., Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 528-29 (2d Cir.1989); Nodine v. Textron, Inc., 819 F.2d 347, 348-49 (1st Cir.1987); Morast v. Lance, 807 F.2d 926, 933 (11th Cir.1987)). 4 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Lerner v. Fleet Bank
2d Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 528 (2d Cir.1989) (per curiam).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A.
2d Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 528 (2d Cir.1989) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jones v. Enterprise Rent a Car Co. of Texas
S.D. Tex. · 2002 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Beck, 529 U.S. at 505 , 120 S.Ct. at 1616 (no standing under § 1964(c) for a violation of § 1962(d) for a president and CEO allegedly terminated for reporting misconduct of officers and directors to regulators); Hecht, 897 F.2d at 24 (no standing for employee claiming loss of employment for refusing to cooperate in employer’s mail and wire fraud scheme); Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir.1989) (per curiam) (no standing for stockbroker who was allegedly fired and lost chent base for complaining about employer’s acts of mail fraud and securities fraud); …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Donohue v. Teamsters Local 282 Welfare, Pension, Annuity, Job Training & Vacation & Sick Leave Trust Funds (2×) also: Cited "see"
E.D.N.Y · 1998 · confidence medium
Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir.1989).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Tsipouras v. W & M PROPERTIES, INC.
S.D.N.Y. · 1998 · confidence medium
Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir.1989); Rand v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., 794 F.2d 843, 849 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 987 , 107 S.Ct. 579 , 93 L.Ed.2d 582 (1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Skeete v. IVF America, Inc.
S.D.N.Y. · 1997 · confidence medium
See O'Malley v. O’Neill, 887 F.2d 1557, 1561 (11th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 926 , 110 S.Ct. 2620 , 110 L.Ed.2d 641 (1990) (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 497 , 105 S.Ct. 3275, 3285 , 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985)); Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir.1989).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Aramony v. United Way of America
S.D.N.Y. · 1997 · confidence medium
See First Nationwide Bank v. Gelt Funding Corp., 27 F.3d 763, 772 (2d Cir.1994); Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 528 (2d Cir.1989).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tarr v. Credit Suisse Asset Management, Inc. (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
E.D.N.Y · 1997 · confidence medium
See also Norman v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 873 F.2d 634, 636 (2d Cir.1989) (“The phrase ‘by reason of requires that there be a causal connection between the prohibited conduct and plaintiffs injury”); Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir.1989) (per curiam) (“in order to establish standing, [plaintiff] must show that the damage to his business or property resulted from the alleged mail and securities fraud”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Red Ball Interior Demolition Corp. v. Palmadessa (2×)
S.D.N.Y. · 1995 · confidence medium
Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 528 (2d Cir.1989).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lewis v. Robinson (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
2d Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
See Hecht, 897 F.2d 21, 23-24 ; Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir.1989); Sperber, 849 F.2d at 64-65 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re American Express Company Shareholder Litigation (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
2d Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
See Hecht, 897 F.2d 21, 23-24 ; Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir.1989); Sperber, 849 F.2d at 64-65 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Morin v. Trupin
S.D.N.Y. · 1993 · confidence medium
See Hecht, 897 F.2d at 23 ; Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir.1989); In re Gas Reclamation, Inc. Sec.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Morin v. Trupin
S.D.N.Y. · 1993 · confidence medium
To state a claim under RICO, a plaintiff must allege, in addition to the defendant’s violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962 , that there has been some injury to his business or property by reason of a defendant’s violation of § 1962, see 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (e); Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 , 105 S.Ct. 3275, 3285 , 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985); Hecht, 897 F.2d at 23 ; Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir.1989); In re Gas Reclamation, Inc. Secur.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Banctraining Video Systems v. First American Corp.
1st Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
Kramer v. Bacham Aerospace Corp., 912 F.2d 151 , 154-55 (6th Cir.1990) (plaintiff must be injured by conduct constituting RICO violation); Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir.1989) (same).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Casper v. Paine Webber Group, Inc.
D.N.J. · 1992 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 897 F.2d 21, 24-25 (2d Cir.1990) (“[T]he purpose of civil RICO liability does not extend to determining any illegal act such as retaliatory firings for which there are state and common law remedies.”); see also Kramer v. Bachan Aerospace Corp., 912 F.2d 151, 154-56 (6th Cir.1990); O’Malley v. O’Neill, 887 F.2d 1557, 1560-63 (11th Cir.1989); *1496 Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir.1989); Cullom v. Hibernia National Bank, 859 F.2d 1211, 1214-17 (5th Cir.1988); Nodine v. Textron, Inc., 819 F.2d 347, 349 (1st Cir.1…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Committee to Defend the United States Constitution v. Moon
D.D.C. · 1991 · confidence medium
In order to establish standing to bring a civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must show that it “was injured by reason of predicate acts which were directed at him, as opposed to others.” Burdick v. American Express, 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2nd Cir. 1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) COMMITTEE TO DEFEND US CONST. v. Moon
D.D.C. · 1991 · confidence medium
In order to establish standing to bring a civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must show that it "was injured by reason of predicate acts which were directed at him, as opposed to others." Burdick v. American Express, 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2nd Cir. 1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Clarissa Miranda A/K/A Clarissa Miranda Rodriguez v. Ponce Federal Bank, Etc.
1st Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
Hutton Group, Inc., 885 F.2d 1162, 1168 (3d Cir.1989); Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir.1989) (per curiam); Cullom v. Hibernia Nat’l Bank, 859 F.2d 1211, 1216 (5th Cir.1988).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bowman v. Western Auto Supply Co.
W.D. Mo. · 1991 · confidence medium
These courts have found the act of whistle-blowing, not the illegal RICO activity, to be the cause of the employee’s injury.' Reddy v. Litton Industries, Inc., 912 F.2d 291 (9th Cir.1990); O’Malley v. O’Neill, 887 F.2d 1557, 1562 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 2620 , 110 L.Ed.2d 641 (1990); Burdick v. *177 American Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir.1989); Cullom v. Hibernia National Bank, 859 F.2d 1211, 1215 (5th Cir.1988).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Morin v. Trupin
S.D.N.Y. · 1990 · confidence medium
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 , 105 S.Ct. 3275, 3285 , 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985); Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir.1989); In re Gas Reclamation, Inc. Secu *1067 rities Litigation, 659 F.Supp. 493, 518 (S.D.N.Y.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Miller v. Helmsley (2×)
S.D.N.Y. · 1990 · confidence medium
Memo.”), at 8 (quoting Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir.1989)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kramer v. Bachan Aerospace Corporation (2×)
6th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
Bank, 859 F.2d 1211 , 1215 n. 9 (5th Cir.1988); see also Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 897 F.2d 21, 24-25 (2d Cir.1990) (holding that standing may be founded only upon injury from overt acts that are also predicate acts under Sec. 1961, and not upon all overt acts in furtherance of a RICO conspiracy); Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir.1989) (holding that in order to establish standing, plaintiff must show that damage to his business or property resulted from predicate acts constituting the RICO violation); Pujol v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 829 F.2d 12…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kramer v. Bachan Aerospace Corp. (2×)
6th Cir. · 1990 · confidence medium
Bank, 859 F.2d 1211 , 1215 n. 9 (5th Cir.1988); see also Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 897 F.2d 21, 24-25 (2d Cir.1990) (holding that standing may be founded only upon injury from overt acts that are also predicate acts under § 1961, and not upon all overt acts in furtherance of a RICO conspiracy); Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir.1989) (holding that in order to establish standing, plaintiff must show that damage to his business or property resulted from predicate acts constituting the RICO violation); Pujol v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 829 F.2d 1201…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Flinders v. Datasec Corp.
E.D. Va. · 1990 · confidence medium
See Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 897 F.2d 21, 24 (2d Cir.1990); O’Malley, 887 F.2d at 1561 ; Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 529-30 (2d Cir.1989) (p er curiam); Cullom, 859 F.2d at 1216 ; Pujol v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 829 F.2d 1201, 1205 (1st Cir.1987); Kouvakas v. Inland Steel Co., 646 F.Supp. 474, 477 (N.D.Ind.1986); Diamond v. Reynolds, 1986 WL 15375 (D.Del.), aff'd in part and rev’d on other grounds, 853 F.2d 917 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 955 , 109 S.Ct. 392 , 102 L.Ed.2d 381 (1988); cf. Warren v. Manufacturers Nat’l Bank, 759 F.2d 542 (6t…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Beauford v. Helmsley
S.D.N.Y. · 1990 · confidence medium
See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496-97 , 105 S.Ct. 3275, 3285 , 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985) (plaintiff “can only recover to the extent that [ ] he has been injured in his business or property by the conduct constituting the violation.”); Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir.1989) (plaintiff must allege non-remote economic injury arising from predicate acts); O’Malley v. O’Neill, 887 F.2d 1557, 1561 (11th Cir.1989) (same). *213 iii.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Department of Economic Development v. Arthur Andersen & Co. (U.S.A.)
S.D.N.Y. · 1990 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir.1989) (to establish standing under RICO plaintiff must show damage to business or property resulted from the predicate acts constituting the RICO violation).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Minpeco, S.A. v. Hunt
S.D.N.Y. · 1989 · confidence medium
In the eases upon which defendants rely, the courts found the plaintiff’s injury not to have been caused by the predicate acts because the connection between the acts and the injury was only one of “cause-in-fact,” Brandenburg, 859 F.2d at 1189 , or simply “too remote” to support a claim under RICO, Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir.1989).
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re Crazy Eddie Securities Litigation
E.D.N.Y · 1989 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir. 1989).
cited Cited "see" Vitone v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
D.R.I. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir.1989) (injuries “simply too remotely related to the predicate acts of mail and securities fraud to support a claim under RICO.”).
discussed Cited "see" J.S. Service Center Corp. v. General Electric Technical Services Co.
S.D.N.Y. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Burdick, 865 F.2d at 529 (Any injury to defendant’s customers — who were the intended victims of defendant’s alleged mail and securities frauds— could not be used to satisfy the requirement that plaintiff “show that the damage to his business or property resulted from the ... fraud.”).
discussed Cited "see" Bennett v. Centerpoint Bank
D.N.H. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Burdick v. American Express *915 Co., 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir.1989) (plaintiff lacked standing when his allegations of securities and mail fraud injured defendant’s customers, not plaintiffs business or property).
discussed Cited "see" Jeffrey Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc., William Miller, Louis Ceccoli, and Stanley Stephens (2×)
2d Cir. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir.1989) (per curiam) (no standing for a stockbroker who alleged being fired and losing his client base for complaining about his employer's questionable practices); see also O’Malley, 887 F.2d at 1563 (no standing for vice president and dean of private university fired for refusing to participate in mail fraud scheme); Cullom v. Hibernia Nat’l Bank, 859 F.2d 1211, 1216 (5th Cir.1988) (no standing for employee constructively discharged for refusing to participate in fraudulent loan transactions); Pujol v. Shearson/American Express…
discussed Cited "see" Giuffre v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
S.D.N.Y. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Briscoe v. LaHue, 663 F.2d 713, 723 (7th Cir.1981) aff'd 460 U.S. 325 , 103 S.Ct. 1108 , 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (conclusory allegation of a conspiracy without any supporting facts insufficient to withstand motion to dismiss). 11 A similar situation arose in Burdick v. American Express Co., 677 F.Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y.1988), aff'd, 865 F.2d 527 (2d Cir.1989), where an employee claimed that he was fired in retaliation for his complaints about his employer’s alleged RICO violations and in order for his employer to acquire his valuable client base.
examined Cited "see" The Reverend Father John P. O'malley, O.S.A., Individually, and James A. Nesbitt, Individually v. The Reverend Father Patrick H. O'neill, O.S.A. (4×)
11th Cir. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir.1989); see also Nodine, 819 F.2d at 349 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Robert L. Moore and Jeannette S. Parry v. Painewebber, Inc. (2×)
2d Cir. · 1999 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 528 (2d Cir.1989) (per curiam).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." No. 89-55008
9th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir.1989) (per curiam) (employee terminated as a result of his complaints about employer's alleged fraudulent activities had no standing to sue under Sec. 1962(c)); Cullom v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 859 F.2d 1211 , 1215-16 (5th Cir.1988) (plaintiff employee's discharge for refusing to participate in a fraudulent bank loan scheme did not satisfy Sec. 1962(c) standing requirement); Nodine v. Textron, Inc., 819 F.2d 347, 349 (1st Cir.1987) (employee's termination after he reported violations of Canadian customs laws and Foreign Corrup…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Reddy v. Litton Industries, Inc.
9th Cir. · 1990 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2d Cir.1989) (per curiam) (employee terminated as a result of his complaints about employer's alleged fraudulent activities had no standing to sue under § 1962(c)); Cullom v. Hibernia Nat'l Bank, 859 F.2d 1211 , 1215-16 (5th Cir.1988) (plaintiff employee's discharge for refusing to participate in a fraudulent bank loan scheme did not satisfy § 1962(c) standing requirement); Nodine v. Textron, Inc., 819 F.2d 347, 349 (1st Cir.1987) (employee's termination after he reported violations of Canadian customs laws and Foreign Corrupt Pr…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Morin v. Trupin
S.D.N.Y. · 1989 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Burdick v. American Express Co., 865 F.2d 527, 529 (2nd Cir.1989); In re Gas Reclamation, Inc. Securities Litigation, 659 F.Supp. 493, 511 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (plaintiffs “must show that they were injured in their business or property by reason of the violations of section 1962(c).”).
D. Lawrence BURDICK, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
AMERICAN EXPRESS COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee
1227, Docket 88-7216.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
Jan 13, 1989.
865 F.2d 527
Andrew S. O’Connor, New York City (Liddle & O’Connor, Grais & Richards, New York City, of counsel), for plaintiff-appellant.1, Gerald Kerner, New York City (Brett F. Summers, Willkie Farr & Gallagher, New York City, of counsel), for defendant-appel-lee.
Van Graafeiland, Miner, Mahoney.
Cited by 54 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff-appellant D. Lawrence Burdick appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Charles L. Brieant, Chief Judge, dismissing his civil RICO complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, on the ground that Bur-dick lacked standing to sue under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). 677 F.Supp. 228. The district court concluded that plaintiff’s complaint did not allege a claim for damages suffered “by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter” within the meaning of section 1964(c). This appeal ensued. We affirm.

In reviewing the dismissal of this complaint, we assume its allegations to be true. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 10, 101 S.Ct. 173, 176, 66 L.Ed.2d 163 (1980) (citing Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 1081, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972)). According thereto, Burdick is a former vice president of Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc. (“Shearson”), a wholly owned subsidiary of defendant American Express Company (“American Express”). While employed at Shearson, plaintiff became aware of certain allegedly illegal practices engaged in by Shearson and its employees that constituted a pattern of racketeering activity. Specifically, Burdick claims that when Shear-son received payments of dividends and interest with respect to securities held in street name by Shearson for the benefit of its customers, it systematically failed to credit the dividend and interest payments to its customers’ accounts on the dates the payments were received. Rather, before crediting the funds to its customers’ accounts, Shearson used the funds for its own corporate purposes for approximately six to nine days, thereby earning millions of dollars in ill-gotten interest. Further, Shearson falsely represented the situation to its customers in monthly statements transmitted in the United States mails.

In addition, Burdick claims that Shearson encouraged its registered representatives to churn their customers’ accounts through “bait and switch” tactics in order to earn excessive commissions, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder. Burdick allegedly complained of these corrupt practices on numerous occasions to his supervisors and others, to no avail, and also refused to participate in such activities. As a result, he was fired on June 29, 1984.

Burdick then brought this action seeking treble damages pursuant to section 1964(c), claiming that he was discharged “as a result of” his complaints about Shearson’s illegal activities, and in order for Shearson to acquire his valuable client base. Bur-dick alleged that Shearson [2] violated 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982) through a pattern of mail fraud and securities fraud. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and 9(b). As noted earlier, the district court granted defendant’s motion, holding that plaintiff was not injured “by reason of” Shearson’s alleged mail and securities fraud within the meaning of the section 1964(c), and there[*529] fore had no standing to bring a civil RICO suit.

Plaintiff makes two claims on this appeal. First, he contends that the district court erred in concluding that a plaintiff in a civil RICO action must allege that he was injured by reason of predicate acts that were directed at him as opposed to others. Second, plaintiff argues that his discharge and loss of his client base were sufficiently related to the predicate acts to confer standing. These claims are without merit.

The statute here in issue, 18 U.S. C. § 1964(c) (1982), provides as follows:

Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.

Id.

In Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985), the Supreme Court concluded that a “plaintiff only has standing [under § 1964(c) ] if, and can only recover to the extent that, he has been injured in his business or property by the conduct constituting the violation.” Id. at 496, 105 S.Ct. at 3285. That is, “the compensable injury necessarily is the harm caused by predicate acts sufficiently related to constitute a pattern, for the essence of the violation is the commission of those acts in connection with the conduct of an enterprise.” Id. at 497, 105 S.Ct. at 3285. Accordingly, in order to establish standing, Burdick must show that the damage to his business or property resulted from the alleged mail and securities fraud, the predicate acts constituting the violation in this case. A careful review of Burdick’s complaint demonstrates that he cannot meet this requirement.

With respect to the failure promptly to credit dividends and interest and the related allegations of mail fraud, Burdick claims that Shearson breached its fiduciary duty to its customers by failing promptly to credit the interest and dividends to them, and instead using the funds for Shearson’s own gain. The securities fraud allegations are equally clear that any injury was inflicted upon Shearson’s customers, through the charging of excessive commissions by Shearson’s registered representatives. In sum, the complaint on its face is devoid of allegations that Burdick’s own business or property was injured as a result of Shear-son’s predicate acts.

Burdick contends, however, that these frauds not only damaged his customers, but also “interfere[d] with [his] ability to service his customers, keep them happy and earn a living for himself.” This, he claims, is injury to his business or property sufficient to confer standing. However, this type of harm is simply too remotely related to the predicate acts of mail and securities fraud to support a claim under RICO. See Sperber v. Boesky, 849 F.2d 60, 64-65 (2d Cir.1988); Rand v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., 794 F.2d 843, 849 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 987, 107 S.Ct. 579, 93 L.Ed.2d 582 (1986); Warren v. Manufacturers Nat’l Bank, 759 F.2d 542, 545 (6th Cir.1985).

Plaintiff’s second claim, that he was discharged “as a result of” his complaints concerning Shearson’s fraudulent activities, fares no better. In this regard, the First Circuit recently upheld the dismissal of a discharged employee’s RICO claims brought against his prior employer on standing grounds, stating: “None of these alleged offenses harmed Nodine in his business or property. His injury resulted from Textron’s decision to fire him after he reported the [illegal] scheme to his superiors. Firing Nodine under these circumstances was wrong, but it did not violate the RICO Act.” Nodine v. Textron, Inc., 819 F.2d 347, 349 (1st Cir.1987) (footnote omitted); see Pujol v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 829 F.2d 1201, 1204-06 (1st Cir.1987); Morast v. Lance, 807 F.2d 926, 932-33 (11th Cir.1987). We agree with these rulings. As to Burdick’s claim that he was discharged as an integral part of the illegal scheme, rather than in retaliation for reporting it, we are in agreement with the observation in Pujol that a differentiation between “preventive” and “retaliatory” dis[*530] missals in this context would serve no useful purpose. Pujol, 829 F.2d at 1205.

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

2

. In view of our disposition of this appeal, we do not reach the problems Burdick posed for himself by naming only American Express as a defendant, but alleging the commission of specific illegalities only by the subsidiary, Shear-son.