Crystal Motor Car Co. of Hernando v. Bailey, 24 So. 3d 789 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009). · Go Syfert
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Crystal Motor Car Co. of Hernando v. Bailey, 24 So. 3d 789 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
4 citation events across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: CT Miami, LLC v. Samsung Electronics Latinoamerica Miami, Inc. (fladistctapp, 2015-09-09)
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) CT Miami, LLC v. Samsung Electronics Latinoamerica Miami, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Although the statute requires only that the trial court “summarily hear and determine the issue,” id., decisions from the other district courts of appeal have clarified that a trial Court should conduct an evidentiary -hearing when a' substantial issue regarding contract formation is raised, e.g., Crystal Motor Car Co. of Hernando, LLC v. Bailey, 24 So.3d 789, 791 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009); Rowe, 932 So.2d at 541-42; Tandem Health Care of St.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Spivey v. Teen Challenge of Florida, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Corp., 932 So.2d 537 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); see also FL-Carrollwood Care Ctr., LLC v. Jaramillo, 36 So.3d 180, 182-83 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010); Crystal Motor Car Co. of Hernando, LLC v. Bailey, 24 So.3d 789, 791 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009); Curcio v. Sovereign Healthcare of Boynton Beach L.L.C., 8 So.3d 449, 450 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009); Travelers Ins.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fi-Evergreen Woods, LLC v. Robinson
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
If the court shall find that a substantial issue is raised as to the making of the agreement or provision, it shall summarily hear and determine the issue and, according to its determination, shall grant or deny the application. § 682.03(1), Fla. Stat. (2012) (emphasis added). 4 We have previously indicated that “[t]he clear wording of [section 682.03(1) ] requires the trial court to conduct a hearing on a party’s motion to compel when there is a ‘substantial issue’ regarding the making of the arbitration agreement.” Crystal Motor Car Co. of Hernando, LLC v. Bailey, 24 So.3d 789, 79…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." FI-Evergreen Woods, LLC v. Estate of Vrastil
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
When there is no question “as to the making of the agreement or provision,” the motion should be granted, but if, as here, there is a “substantial issue,” then at least a summary hearing is needed. § 682.03(1), Fla. Stat. (2012); see, e.g., Crystal Motor Car Co. of Hernando, LLC v. Bailey, 24 So.3d 789, 791 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (reversing denial of motion to compel arbitration for failure to hold evidentiary hearing when nonmovant claimed agreement was never signed and signature on document was forgery).
CRYSTAL MOTOR CAR COMPANY OF HERNANDO, LLC, Appellant,
v.
Andrea BAILEY, Appellee
5D08-3729.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.
Dec 31, 2009.
24 So. 3d 789
Tracy Martinell Henry and Michael D. Siegel of Dalan, Katz & Siegel, P.L., Clearwater, for Appellant., Roger L. Fishell, Sarasota, for Appellee.
Monaco, Palmer, Sawaya.
Cited by 4 opinions  |  Published
PALMER, J.

Crystal Motor Car Company (Crystal Motor) appeals the non-final order entered by the trial court denying its motion to compel arbitration. [1] Determining that Crystal Motor was entitled to receive an evidentiary hearing on its motion, we reverse.

Andrea Bailey filed a complaint against Crystal Motor alleging sixteen separate claims of liability arising out of an agreement to purchase a motor vehicle from Crystal Motor. Bailey alleged that Crystal Motor breached the terms of the agreement by seeking additional consideration for the transaction, taking possession of the car from Bailey without notice, and maintaining possession of Bailey’s trade-in vehicle.

Crystal Motor filed a motion to compel arbitration alleging that the parties’ motor vehicle agreement contained an arbitration clause applicable to Bailey’s claims. Bailey filed a response to the motion with an affidavit contending that she did not sign any arbitration provision and that her signature on the document presented with Crystal Motor’s motion to compel arbitration was a forgery.

In denying the motion to compel arbitration, the trial court expressly found that a factual issue existed concerning the validity of Bailey’s signature. The court ruled:

The Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration is DENIED as Plaintiff has raised an issue regarding the validity of the signature of the Plaintiff on the arbitration agreement document, thereby casting doubt on the validity of the arbitration agreement.

Crystal Motor contends that the trial court committed reversible error when it ruled on its motion to compel arbitration without first holding an expedited eviden-tiary hearing since there were factual disputes as to whether Bailey executed a document containing an arbitration agreement. We agree.

Section 682.03 of the Florida Statutes governs proceedings to compel arbitration. The statute reads, in pertinent part:

682.03. Proceedings to compel and to stay arbitration
(1) A party to an agreement or provision for arbitration subject to this law claiming the neglect or refusal of another party thereto to comply therewith may make application to the court for an order directing the parties to proceed with arbitration in accordance with the[*791] terms thereof. If the court is satisfied that no substantial issue exists as to the making of the agreement or provision, it shall grant the application. If the court shall find that a substantial issue is raised as to the making of the agreement or provision, it shall summarily hear and determine the issue and, according to its determination, shall grant or deny the application.

§ 682.08(1), Fla. Stat. (2008). The clear wording of the statute requires the trial court to conduct a hearing on a party’s motion to compel when there is a “substantial issue” regarding the making of the arbitration agreement. As such, the trial court should have conducted an evi-dentiary hearing before entering an order denying Crystal Motor’s motion to compel arbitration. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for an evidentiary hearing.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

MONACO, C.J., and SAWAYA, J„ concur.
1

. Appellate jurisdiction is proper pursuant to rule 9.130(a)(3)(C)(iv) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure which authorizes appeals to the district courts of non-final orders that determine the entitlement of a party to seek arbitration.