State v. Fields, 505 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 1987). · Go Syfert
Search
State v. Fields, 505 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 1987). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“the word 'executed' . . . mean service upon the defendant.”
27 citation events (4 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: AMBER MARIE MORREALE v. STATE OF FLORIDA (fladistctapp, 2024-03-15)
Treatment trajectory · 1987 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1987 2006 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) AMBER MARIE MORREALE v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the word 'executed' . . . mean service upon the defendant.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Suarez
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
State v. Fields, 505 So.2d 1336, 1337 (Fla.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lucas v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
The Florida Supreme Court has established that commencing prosecution requires execution of the capias upon the defendant, and that "the word `executed' in section 775.15(5) can only mean service upon the defendant." State v. Fields, 505 So.2d 1336, 1337 (Fla.1987); Bragenzer .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Newman v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
State v. Fields, 505 So.2d 1336, 1337 (Fla.1987).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Shamy
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Fields, 505 So.2d 1336 (Fla.1987)(holding three and one-half year delay to serve capias was unreasonable *730 where the state knew where defendant was residing for previous five years but made no attempt to execute capias); Colvin v. State, 541 So.2d 724 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)(holding six-year delay in serving capias was unreasonable where the state knew of defendant's whereabouts).
discussed Cited "see" Brown v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fields, 505 So.2d 1336 (dismissal of charges affirmed when capias was served more than three and a half years after the information was filed because the state knew where the defendant had been residing for the preceding five years but made no attempt to execute capias); Bragenzer v. State, 582 So.2d 142 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (the trial court's ruling that one unsuccessful attempt to execute a capias was a reasonable and diligent search because the defendant could not be located due to his own "transient nature" was reversed because a single attempt to serve a defendant does not constitute a…
cited Cited "see" Bonel v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Fields, 505 So.2d at 1336 ; Colvin v. State, 541 So.2d 724 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Gunn v. State, 519 So.2d 1128 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988).
cited Cited "see" Brown v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
Sturdi-van v. State, 419 So.2d 300 (Fla.1982); see generally State v. Fields, 505 So.2d 1336 (Fla.1987).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Lett v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also State v. Fields, 505 So.2d 1336 (Fla. 1987); Colvin v. State, 541 So.2d 724 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).
cited Cited "see, e.g." State v. Watkins
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also State v. Fields, 505 So.2d 1336 (Fla. 1987).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
STATE of Florida, Petitioner,
v.
Willie FIELDS, Respondent.
69211.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Apr 23, 1987.
505 So. 2d 1336
Grimes.
Cited by 23 opinions  |  Published

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Amy Lynn Diem, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for petitioner.

Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, and Anthony Calvello, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for respondent.

GRIMES, Judge.

We review State v. Fields, 502 So.2d 5 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), because of asserted conflict with Sturdivan v. State, 419 So.2d 300 (Fla. 1982), and cases relying thereon; Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.

On January 20, 1982, Fields was charged by information with committing an aggravated assault on January 4, 1982. A warrant for his arrest was issued on that date but was not served until August 7, 1985. Fields moved to discharge the information on grounds that the three-year statute of limitations for aggravated assault had expired by reason of section 775.15(5), which reads:

(5) A prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay.

In discharging the information the trial judge found that Fields had resided at the same address for the preceding five years, that the state knew his address, and that no attempt had been made to execute the capias until the date Fields was served.[*1337] Acknowledging that its opinion could be in conflict with Sturdivan, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, nevertheless, affirmed.

In Sturdivan this Court said, "It is settled law in Florida that for the purposes of the statute of limitations, prosecution has commenced when a warrant has been issued and placed in the hands of the proper official for execution." 419 So.2d at 301. If this statement reflects current law, the prosecution of Fields was timely commenced and the delay in service was irrelevant. However, Sturdivan was referring to an arrest warrant issued and delivered to the police in 1971 — prior to enactment of section 775.15(5). The cases cited by Sturdivan in support of the foregoing quotation also interpreted earlier statutes which did not contain the present definition of commencement. Furthermore, the issue in Sturdivan was the effect of a late filed indictment rather than the timeliness of the execution of the arrest warrant. Hence, we hold that Sturdivan cannot be considered as having interpreted section 775.15(5). Accord State ex rel. Welch v. Circuit Court of Escambia County, 487 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 492 So.2d 1330 (Fla. 1986).

Likewise, we agree with the district court of appeal that the word "executed" in section 775.15(5) can only mean service upon the defendant. Since the record supports the trial judge's findings concerning unreasonable delay, the order of discharge was properly entered. We do not decide whether the same result would ensue if the information had been filed immediately before the expiration of limitations period or if Fields had been served before the statute of limitations ran.

We approve the opinion of the district court of appeal. We disapprove Warren v. Wainwright, 483 So.2d 820 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), and State v. Chacon, 479 So.2d 229 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), to the extent that they rely upon Sturdivan for an interpretation of section 775.15(5).

It is so ordered.

McDONALD, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH, SHAW, BARKETT and KOGAN, JJ., concur.