Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...upon which we express no opinion, the statute of limitations for Holmberg’s alleged violation is now long past. See Fla. Stat. § 843.02 (2006) (defining the offense of resisting an officer without violence as a first-degree misdemeanor); Fla. Stat. § 775.15(2)(c) (providing for a two-year statute of limitations for first-degree misdemeanors). 44 remand....

...This, too, is a defensive matter that must be raised at trial. Had it been raised, the state could have shown that, even though Sochor was indicted for kidnapping beyond the applicable four-year limitation period, his undisputed, continuous absence from the state tolled the running of the statute. See § 775.15(6), Fla. Stat. (1989). Thus, the trial court did not commit fundamental error by failing to instruct the jury in this regard. In addition, capital crimes are not subject to a statute of limitation. Section 775.15(1), Fla....

...sion... ." [1] Respondent's brief at p. 7. [2] The statute of limitations has historically required that prosecutions for second degree murder and manslaughter be initiated within a certain period of time. § 932.465(2), Fla. Stat. (1973) (2 years); § 775.15, Fla....

...Thus, assuming the statute of limitations was not extended or tolled, it would have expired in August 1995, because at the time of the incident, the limitation for a prosecution for a first-degree felony (such as the burglary charged here) was four years from the offense date. See § 775.15, Fla....

...State, 545 So.2d 1357, 1358 (Fla.1989) ("[T]he limitations period in effect at the time of the incident giving rise to the criminal charges controls the time within which prosecution must be begun."). Here, the charging document was not filed until December 1996. See § 775.15(4)(a), Fla....

...The State contends that even if Overton's counsel had challenged the burglary charge based upon the statute of limitations, the State could have amended that charge to an armed burglary, which is a life felony, for which a prosecution could be "commenced at any time." § 775.15, Fla....

...see generally Annot., 47 A.L.R.2d 887 (1956). [7] The usual context in which the problem arises is in a prosecution for a capital or life felony which may be commenced at any time, whereas the lesser offenses must be commenced within four years. See § 775.15, Fla....

...orth a legislative policy that limitations are not waivable. See Note, The Statute of Limitations in a Criminal Case: Can It Be Waived?, 18 William and Mary L.Rev. 823 (1977). Certainly, no such legislative policy can be gleaned from the language of Section 775.15, Florida Statutes (1974) ("[a] prosecution for ......

...This, too, is a defensive matter that must be raised at trial. Had it been raised, the state could have shown that, even though Sochor was indicted for kidnapping beyond the applicable four-year limitation period, his undisputed, continuous absence from the state tolled the running of the statute. See § 775.15(6), Fla. Stat. (1989). Thus, the trial court did not commit fundamental error by failing to instruct the jury in this regard. In addition, capital crimes are not subject to a statute of limitation. § 775.15(1), Fla....

...is dismissed or set aside. (3) Offenses by state, county, or municipal officials committed during their terms of office and connected with the duties of their office shall be commenced within two years after the officer retires from the office. [2] Section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1975), effective October 1, 1975, provides: A prosecution for any other felony must be commenced within 3 years after it is committed.

...hin a specified number of years. [1] A prosecution is commenced when *740 "either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay." § 775.15(5), Fla.Stat....

...The capias must also be executed without unreasonable delay. State v. Miller, 581 So.2d 641 (Fla. 2d DCA), review dismissed, 584 So.2d 999 (Fla.1991). The word "executed" means completion of service on the defendant. State v. Fields, 505 So.2d 1336 (Fla.1987). Section 775.15(5) further provides that "[i]n determining what is reasonable, inability to locate the defendant after diligent search or the defendant's absence from the state shall be considered." In this case, each information was filed and each capias was issued well within the limitation periods....

...Statutes of limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of the accused. Reino v. State, 352 So.2d 853, 860 (Fla.1977). Generally, the running of a statute of limitations is tolled only for reasons specified in the statute. 1 Wharton's Criminal Law § 184. Section 775.15 contains no provision that tolls the period of limitation when a defendant is in the custody of another sovereign, [2] and we find no language in the statute that will authorize a court-made exception....

...ring a forgery, in violation of section 831.02, Florida Statutes (1981). He was also charged with one count of forgery, in violation of section 831.01, Florida Statutes (1981). The applicable periods of limitation range from one to five years. See §§ 775.15(2)(b) and (d), and 812.035, Fla.Stat. (1981). [2] Section 775.15(6) allows the period of limitation to be tolled for a period not to exceed three years when a defendant is continuously absent from the state or has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state....

...NOTES [1] § 782.04, Fla. Stat. (1981). [2] § 782.07, Fla. Stat. (1981). [3] Manslaughter is a second degree felony. § 782.07. "A prosecution for any other felony (other than a first degree felony) must be commenced within 3 years after it is committed." § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1981). [4] First degree murder is a capital felony. § 782.04. "A prosecution for a capital ... felony may be commenced at any time." § 775.15(1), Fla....

...anuary 4, 1982. A warrant for his arrest was issued on that date but was not served until August 7, 1985. Fields moved to discharge the information on grounds that the three-year statute of limitations for aggravated assault had expired by reason of section 775.15(5), which reads: (5) A prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay....

...If this statement reflects current law, the prosecution of Fields was timely commenced and the delay in service was irrelevant. However, Sturdivan was referring to an arrest warrant issued and delivered to the police in 1971 — prior to enactment of section 775.15(5)....

...ent definition of commencement. Furthermore, the issue in Sturdivan was the effect of a late filed indictment rather than the timeliness of the execution of the arrest warrant. Hence, we hold that Sturdivan cannot be considered as having interpreted section 775.15(5). Accord State ex rel. Welch v. Circuit Court of Escambia County, 487 So.2d 65 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 492 So.2d 1330 (Fla. 1986). Likewise, we agree with the district court of appeal that the word "executed" in section 775.15(5) can only mean service upon the defendant....

...We approve the opinion of the district court of appeal. We disapprove Warren v. Wainwright, 483 So.2d 820 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), and State v. Chacon, 479 So.2d 229 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985), to the extent that they rely upon Sturdivan for an interpretation of section 775.15(5)....

...4th DCA 1992), review denied, 618 So.2d 210 (1993). The state had three years from the commitment of the crimes to commence prosecution on two of the third degree felonies, which involved insurance fraud, and five years to commence prosecution for the charge of grand theft. Sections 775.15(2)(b) and 812.05(1), Florida Statutes (1981). Section 775.15(5), Florida Statutes (1981) provided in pertinent part: A prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay....

...4 We conclude that this hybrid case does not give rise to habeas relief at this post-sentencing juncture. The district court’s denial of Rembert’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus is AFFIRMED. 1 . In Florida, robbery has a four year statute of limitations. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 775.15(2)(a) (West 1976). First degree murder has no statute of limitations. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 775.15(1) (West 1976)....

...d *1147 by the statute of limitations. State v. King, 282 So.2d 162 (Fla. 1973); Akers v. State, 370 So.2d 81 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). A prosecution for escape, which is a second degree felony, must be commenced within three years after it is committed. Section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981). To determine when a prosecution commences, we look to section 775.15(5) which states in pertinent part: A prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay....

...Counts I and II charged Jackson as a principal, respectively, in the killings of the manager and the death of his accomplice, Count III with the kidnapping of two persons, and Count IV with the commission of attempted armed robbery, a second degree felony. The trial court, on the authority of section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1985), dismissed Count IV on the ground that attempted armed robbery, a second degree felony, was time barred....

...1956) (statutes of limitation ordinarily apply to the remedy and not the substantive claim); see also Henry v. Halifax Hospital District, 368 So.2d 432, 433 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Martz v. Riskamm, 144 So.2d 83, 87-88 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962). Consistent with that principle, section 775.15(2)(b) does not obliterate Jackson's crime of attempted armed robbery but simply forecloses penalizing its commission. In spite of the fact that the doctrine we follow stems from civil actions, we find no reason to reject its application in a criminal prosecution. In short, the sophistry urged upon us by Jackson falls short of overcoming the narrow effect of section 775.15(2)(b)....

...se issues for the purposes of assisting the trial court. The eleven charges dismissed against Geiger consist of nine third-degree felonies and two first-degree misdemeanors which have limitation periods of three years and two years respectively. See § 775.15(2)(b), (c), Fla....

...State, 541 So.2d 724 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). A prosecution is commenced for these purposes "when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay." § 775.15(5), Fla....

...An unexcused delay in serving the appropriate process until after the statute of limitations has run bars prosecution for the offenses charged. See generally Brown v. State, 674 So.2d 738 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); State v. Miller, 581 So.2d 641 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Under section 775.15(6), Florida Statutes (1989), "[t]he period of limitation does not run during any time when the defendant is continuously absent from the state or has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state," but in no case...

...Picklesimer, 606 So.2d 473, 475 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). Here, the most serious charge against Neal, leaving the scene of an accident with personal injury, is a third-degree felony, prosecution for which must be commenced within three years after it is committed. § 775.15(2)(b)....

...s actually fell within the period. King, 687 So.2d at 919. The State's other alternative was to prove that its service of process beyond the limitations period was not unreasonable because it had been unable to locate Neal despite a diligent search. § 775.15(5); Picklesimer, 606 So.2d at 475-76....

...3) Neal was known to have eight aliases. 4) Neal had no vehicle registered in her name, no property interests, no insurance, no license to drive, no professional licenses, and no voter registration. The traverse asserted that "pursuant to section (6) of Fla. Stat. 775.15, the period of limitation should be tolled accordingly." At the hearing, the assistant state attorney added that when Neal was arrested she advised the Duval County Sheriff's Office that she was a self-employed housekeeper....

...The state labeled the new information with the notation "refile case number 78-3887 CF." Shortly after filing the second information the state dismissed case number 78-3887 CF. Appellee pled not guilty to the second information and filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the statute of limitations, Section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1983), barred prosecution for the crime charged....

...the first petition since both alleged the same offense. The statute, however, gives the trial court no discretion to deny motions to dismiss under § 39.05(7) when it is clear a petition is not filed within the designated 30 days. The statute, like § 775.15(5), describing the time within which criminal prosecutions must be commenced, gives a juvenile, upon an appropriate showing in a motion to dismiss, a substantive right to have the charges against him dismissed....

...nse. [2] "An indictment ... for a felony . . shall be found ... within five years after its commission." A.R.S. § 13-106(B) (1972). "Found" means "duly returned and presented by the grand jury in open court." A.R.S. § 13-106(D) (1972). [3] Compare § 775.15(5), Fla....

...(1977), which states that a prosecution is commenced with the filing of an indictment or an information, but provides that indictments or informations dismissed or set aside because of formal defects toll the statute for three months. We extensively considered the effect of § 775.15(5) in State ex rel....

...— (1) A prosecution for an offense punishable by death may be commenced at any time. (2) Prosecution for offenses not punishable by death must be commenced within two years after commission... . (Emphasis added.) Subsequently, the statute was renumbered to section 775.15. In 1975, section 775.15 provided: 775.15 Time limitations....

...(2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, prosecutions for other offenses are subject to the following periods of limitation: (a) A prosecution for a life felony or a felony of the first degree must be commenced within 4 years after it is committed. ... . (Emphasis added.) In 1976, the legislature again amended section 775.15, providing: 775.15 Time limitations....

...NOTES [1] Section 932.465, Florida Statutes (1973), provided: (1) A prosecution for an offense punishable by death may be commenced at any time. (2) Prosecution for offenses not punishable by death must be commenced within two years after commission... . Effective July 1, 1975, the statute of limitations was designated as section 775.15, Florida Statutes (1975), and provided: (1) A prosecution for a capital felony may be commenced at any time....

...of limitations period. The state argued that, pursuant to Florida Statutes, the trial court was required to determine whether the state was diligent in its efforts to serve the arrest warrant. The applicable 1981 [1] statute of limitations provides: 775.15 Time limitations....

...*475 We agree with the state. In applying the three-year extension period referred to in subsection (6) of the Statutes to the provisions relating to execution of process in subsection (5), the trial court was mixing apples and oranges. Although both sections 775.15(5) and 775.15(6) provide similar justifications for the state's failure to serve the defendant, the two sections nonetheless are independent. Section 775.15(5) allows the state to "relate back" the date of service to the date the information was filed....

...5th DCA 1991) (Peterson, J., concurring) ("In light of ... Walker and Wells, we conclude that the state's single attempt to serve defendant in 1984 does not constitute a diligent search, and therefore the six-year delay in the execution of the capias is unreasonable."). Section 775.15(6), on the other hand, is a provision which allows the statute of limitations for commencing prosecution ( i.e., filing an information or an indictment) to be tolled for the period when the "defendant is continuously absent from the st...

...attempt at service. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the trial court for a ruling as to whether the evidence heretofore presented by the state established that the delay in execution upon Picklesimer was reasonable pursuant to the provisions of section 775.15(5), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...Petitioner alleges that both the three-year statute of limitations in effect at the time for lewd and lascivious acts upon a child and the four-year statute of limitations for the alleged sexual battery had run when the information was filed. Furthermore, petitioner claims that the application of the 1985 amendment to section 775.15(7) constitutes an unconstitutional ex post facto law since it deprives him of a vested right; i.e., the onset of the limitation period....

...It is an appropriate procedural device to test the validity of a trial judge's pretrial ruling that prosecution of criminal charges by the state is not barred by the statute of limitations. Reino v. State, 352 So.2d 853 (Fla. 1977). The legislature amended section 775.15(7) effective January 1, 1985, extending the statute of limitations for violations of sections 800.04 and 794.011, if the victim is under sixteen years of age, so that the limitations period does not run until the victim reaches the age...

...While these cases do not address the specific issue of whether the statute of limitations alters the onset time for prosecution, we believe petitioner's argument relies on distinctions without real differences. In the case at bar, the 1985 amendment to section 775.15(7) reflects a clear legislative intent to extend prosecutions for violations of sections 794.011 and 800.04 to those offenses not time barred on or before December 31, 1984....

...une under the old law have been similarly rejected. State v. Creekpaum, 753 P.2d 1139 (Alaska 1988). Accordingly, petitioner's argument must be rejected. In the alternative, petitioner argues that if prosecution is proper under the 1985 amendment to section 775.15(7), counts I and III are still untimely since the June 1989 amendment of the information was not identical to the original January 1989 information....

...That is so because the three-year statute of limitations cited by the defendant is subject to being extended for an additional three years "when the defendant is continuously absent from the state or has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state." § 775.15(6), Fla....

...Construing the speedy trial rule as requiring a discharge with prejudice in all cases converts the procedural rule into a trumping of the statute of limitations. This immunity extends to serious crimes like murder, effectively reducing the statute of limitations for murder from a limitless period down to only 175 days. § 775.15(1)(a), Fla....

...The trial court denied defendant's motion. Once the jurisdiction of the court has been challenged by raising the statute of limitations as a defense, the state has the burden of establishing that the prosecution is not barred by such limitation. State v. King, 282 So.2d 162 (Fla. 1973). Section 775.15, Florida Statutes (1975) [1] provides that a prosecution for the offense of delivering heroin must be commenced within three years after the offense is committed: 775.15 Time limitations....

...State, 538 So.2d 148 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989); Gunn v. State, 519 So.2d 1128 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). See also Colvin v. State, 541 So.2d 724 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Fleming v. State, 524 So.2d 1146 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). We note further that the tolling period of section 775.15(6), which extends the three year limitation period under section 775.15(2)(b) up to three years for a maximum limitation period of six years fails to cure the untimeliness of this prosecution....

...Breffnay Cunnell seeks a writ prohibiting the circuit court from proceeding with a criminal prosecution against her. Ms. *811 Cunnell argues that the State failed to commence the prosecution within the time periods established in the applicable statutes of limitations. § 775.15, Fla....

...Based on these findings, the circuit court denied the motion to dismiss. Ms. Cunnell's petition for the writ of prohibition followed. DISCUSSION We begin our discussion by noting the applicable periods of the pertinent statutes of limitations. Under section 775.15(2)(b), a prosecution for a third-degree felony must commence within three years of the commission of the offense. The statute of limitations for a first-degree misdemeanor is two years. § 775.15(2)(c)....

...Our next step is to determine when the prosecution may be said to have "commenced" for purposes of the statutes of limitations. Prior to the filing of the information, Ms. Cunnell had not been arrested or served with a summons in connection with the charges at issue. Therefore, section 775.15(5)(a) is not controlling. Instead, section 775.15(5)(b) applies....

...asonable delay. An unexcused delay in executing service bars prosecution for the offense charged. See Norris v. State, 784 So.2d 1188, 1189 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (citing Neal v. State, 697 So.2d 903, 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)). However, in accordance with section 775.15(6), [3] a statute of limitations is tolled if a "defendant is continuously absent from the state or has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state." When a criminal defendant challenges his or her prosecution a...

...In this case, the State failed to carry its burden of proof. In assessing whether service of the capias on Ms. Cunnell was executed without unreasonable delay, the circuit court was obligated to consider whether the State made a diligent search to locate her or if she had been absent from the state. § 775.15(5)(b)....

...2d DCA 2001), superseded by statute on other grounds, State v. Parks, 866 So.2d 172, 173 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Lucas v. State, 718 So.2d 905, 907 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). The circuit court also erred in finding that the statutes of limitations were tolled under section 775.15(6). This subsection provides for tolling the term of a statute if a defendant "has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state." Counsel have not directed us to any cases construing this portion of section 775.15, and our independent research has not disclosed any either....

...NOTES [1] The 2000 version of the Florida Statutes controls this case. See Brown v. State, 674 So.2d 738, 739 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (noting that applicable statutes of limitation are the ones in effect at the time of the acts giving rise to the criminal charges). [2] Subsection (5) of section 775.15 was renumbered as subsection (4) effective July 1, 2005. See ch.2005-110, §§ 1, 3, Laws of Fla. [3] Subsection (6) of section 775.15 has also been renumbered....

...s after the alleged offense. Wells moved to dismiss the charge because the applicable statute of limitation required that prosecution "commence" within three years of the date the offense was committed. The trial court denied her motion. We reverse. Section 775.15(5), Florida Statutes (1985) defines the term "commence" as follows: (5) A prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed provided the capias, summons or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay....

...The problem for MacFarland was that he could not compel Wright to incriminate himself. However, the lower court noted that the statute of limitations on those crimes barred the State from prosecuting Wright after four years from the date of the crimes. § 775.15(2)(a), Fla....

...In this case, the parties concede that there are no material facts in dispute. In his motion to dismiss, Perez relied on State v. Mack, 637 So.2d 18 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). The decision in Mack was based on that court's interpretation of the 1981 version of section 775.15, Florida Statutes, which provided: (2)(b) A prosecution [for felonies other than first degree] must be commenced within 3 years after it is committed....

...State, 674 So.2d 738, 740 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). The date of Perez's charged offense is May 27, 1998, therefore, the 1997 version of the statute, which became effective on July 1, 1997, applies. Ch. 97-90, § 7 at 521, Laws of Fla. Although the 1997 version of section 775.15(2)(b) still provides that prosecution must be commenced within three years of the commission of the crime, section 775.15(5)(b) significantly changes the application of that limitation: A prosecution on a charge on which the defendant has not previously been arrested or served with a summons is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed,...

...fendants absence from the state shall be considered. The failure to execute process on or extradite a defendant in another state who has been charged by information or indictment with a crime in this state shall not constitute an unreasonable delay. § 775.15(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1997). (Emphasis on language added in 1997). Section 775.15(6) was also significantly changed: The period of limitation does not run during any time when the defendant is continuously absent from the state or has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state....

...the prosecution of a defendant who has been timely charged by indictment or information or other charging document and who has not been arrested due to his or her absence from this state or has not been extradited for prosecution from another state. § 775.15(6), Fla....

...998. Although Perez was not arrested until September 29, 2005, he admits that, but for about three months, he was continuously out of the State of Florida for the entire period in question. As a result, under the circumstances of this case, sections 775.15(5)(b) and (6) tolled the statute of limitation for as long as Perez remained absent from Florida and relieved the State from any obligation to attempt to extradite Perez from New Jersey....

...based on an application of an incorrect version of the statute and must be reversed. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions to reinstate the information. ALTENBERND and KELLY, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] Perez argues that the 1997 version of section 775.15 does not relieve the State from having to conduct a diligent search....

...The crimes were allegedly committed on March 15, 1984. A capias for the appellee's arrest was issued on January *642 25, 1985, but the appellee was not arrested until September 21, 1989. The appellee filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him on the basis of section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1983), which requires the state to commence a prosecution for a third degree felony within three years of the offense....

...Although the state filed an information against the appellee within three years of the alleged offenses, the mere filing of an information does not commence a prosecution. A prosecution is not commenced by filing an information unless a capias is issued and executed without unreasonable delay. § 775.15(5)....

...In this case, the trial court properly determined that there was an unreasonable delay in executing the capias. In determining what is reasonable, the inability to locate a defendant after diligent search or the defendant's absence from the state shall be considered. § 775.15(5)....

...On January 5, 1984 defendant was charged with uttering a worthless check on May 25, 1983, in violation of section 832.05(4)(a) of the Florida Statutes (1983), a third degree felony. A prosecution for a third degree felony must be "commenced" within three years after it is committed. § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1983). This three-year limitation was also subject to a maximum three-year extension pursuant to section 775.15(6), which provides: (6) The period of limitation does not run during any time when the defendant is continuously absent from the state or has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state, but in no case shall this provision extend the period of limitation otherwise applicable by more than 3 years. Section 775.15(5) defines the term "commence" as follows: (5) A prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay....

...dividuals that might come under prosecution in the future — the definition urged by Hampton on appeal. The process of “prosecution” under Florida law is distinct from the process of being arrested or charged by an arresting officer. See, e.g., § 775.15(4)(a), Fla....

...R.Crim. P. 3.140(a)(2) (emphasis added). And, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.125 defines a “notice to appear” as a written order requiring the accused to appear in a designated court “at • a specified time.” See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.125(a). Section 775.15(1)-(16), Florida Statutes (2009) (Time limitations; general time limitations; exceptions), sets forth the relevant statutes of limitations for the “prosecution” of various crimes in the State of Florida. And specifically, as noted earlier, section 775.15(4)(a) — the statute of limitations applicable to Juror D’s misdemeanor charge — provides that “[pjrosecution on a charge on which the defendant has previously been arrested or served with a summons is commenced by the filing of...

...The state filed a timely notice of appeal from the order discharging the appellee on the charges. [1] We affirm the dismissal of the possession of a short-barreled shotgun and aggravated assault charges because the statute of limitations expired before the state commenced prosecution of these offenses. Section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), requires that prosecution of aggravated assault and possession of short-barreled shotgun offenses, both third degree felonies, be commenced within three years of the date of the offenses. Section 775.15(5) provides that prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, if the capias, summons, or other process is executed without unreasonable delay. The statute provides further that in determining what is reasonable, the inability to locate a defendant after a diligent search, or the defendant's absence from the state must be considered. § 775.15....

...e issuance and execution of an arrest warrant commenced prosecution. See Sturdivan v. State, 419 So.2d 300 (Fla.1982); State ex rel. Florida Petroleum Marketers Ass'n, Inc. v. McClure, 330 So.2d 239 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). However, the present statute, section 775.15, provides an express and unambiguous definition of this term and it does not include the act of arresting a person and notifying him of the charges that the state may or may not file against him at a later date....

...If the record contained proof that a notice to appear for arraignment had been mailed to Mr. Watkins at the address he provided when he was released on bail, I would rule that this prosecution was not barred by the statute of limitations. The legislature should amend section 775.15(5), and the Criminal Procedure Rules Committee needs to examine several rules of procedure to avoid this result in the future....

...Because his bond was estreated, it is fair to assume that Mr. Watkins' surety also tried to bring this oversight to his attention, relying on the address he provided when he was released. For four years, Mr. Watkins never checked with law enforcement about the status of his arrest. Section 775.15(5) provides: "A prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay." (Emphasis supp...

...On October 25, 1984, the defendant was arrested in Dade County on the outstanding arrest warrant. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the information on the ground that it was time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations for second degree felonies [grand theft is a second degree felony] as provided by Section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981). The trial court granted the motion and this appeal follows. First, the applicable statute of limitations for grand theft is not the three-year statute under Section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), but, as the Fifth District has recently held, the five-year statute under Section 812.035(10), Florida Statutes (1981), which is made specifically applicable to all theft prosecutions notwithstanding any other contrary statute....

...s DNA. On March 11, 2009, Appellant was arrested for attempted armed robbery, based on the DNA match and other evidence. Before trial, Appellant filed a motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations, arguing that prosecution was precluded by section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...gent in the collection of the materials and in the ascertaining of who was alleged to have been ... involved in the shooting." The trial court then denied Appellant's motion to dismiss, finding that prosecution was permitted by the plain language of section 775.15(16)(a), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...Analysis The standard of review in this case is de novo, because we must interpret the *854 applicable statutes of limitations. McBride v. Pratt & Whitney, 909 So.2d 386, 387 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). Ordinarily, prosecution for attempted armed robbery must commence within three years of the crime. § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. However, section 775.15(16)(a) states that for certain crimes, including attempted armed robbery, prosecution ......

...n of the evidence collected at the time of the original investigation and tested for DNA is preserved and available for testing by the accused. (Emphasis added.) Appellant argues that prosecution was barred by the three-year limitation imposed under section 775.15(2)(b). Appellant further argues that section 775.15(16)(a) does not apply here because the State had the necessary DNA evidence to arrest and prosecute him as early as September 1, 2006. Appellant contends that section 775.15(16)(a) is intended for situations where the State has DNA evidence from a crime, but no way to link that evidence to a particular person, unlike this case....

...To determine that intent, a statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning. Id. If statutory language is clear, unambiguous, and conveys a definite meaning, there is no reason to resort to the rules of statutory interpretation. Id. The plain language of section 775.15(16)(a) states that prosecution for attempted armed robbery "may be commenced at any time after the date on which the identity of the accused is established, or should have been established by the exercise of due diligence, through the...

...statute provides that Appellant could have been prosecuted at any time after September 1, 2006, when FDLE established a close link between Appellant's DNA and that of the blood sample taken from the crime scene. Appellant further argues that even if section 775.15(16)(a) were to apply on its face, it cannot apply here because the law went into effect on July 1, 2006, after the commission of the attempted robbery in 2005....

...State, 392 So.2d 270, 271 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); see U.S. v. Richardson, 512 F.2d 105, 106 (3d Cir.1975); see also Scharfschwerdt v. Kanarek, 553 So.2d 218 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989). The crime in this case occurred in April 2005. In 2006, the Legislature added section 775.15(16)(a), which extended the statute of limitations applicable to Appellant's crime....

...State, 352 So.2d *855 853, 861 (Fla.1977) (holding that legislature could have retroactively extended statute of limitations applicable to murder offenses without violating ex post facto prohibition, but failed to act while previous statute allowed prosecution). Section 775.15(16)(a) came into effect in July 2006, less than three years after Appellant's crime, when prosecution was not barred by section 775.15(2)(b). Additionally, section 775.15(16)(b) clearly indicates it "applies to any offense that is not otherwise barred from prosecution on or after July, 1, 2006." Appellant correctly asserts that the trial court erred in its reference to the defendant's purported requirement to show prejudice, which does not apply here....

...King, 282 So.2d 162 (Fla. 1973); Fleming v. State, 524 So.2d 1146 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). In this case, the state failed to carry its burden. A prosecution for robbery with a firearm must begin within four years after the date of the alleged offense, section 775.15(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), and prosecution for aggravated battery within three years. § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1979). Section 775.15(5) provides: A prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay....

...A state witness was also aware of Colvin's residence, but was never asked. She testified in deposition that Colvin lived with her for four and one-half years of the six years the capias was outstanding. In State v. Fields, 505 So.2d 1336 (Fla. 1987), the supreme court found that the word "executed" as used in section 775.15(5) means service upon the defendant....

...The statute of limitations for the crime of conspiracy to commit murder was two years. Chapter 74-383 was approved by the governor and filed with the Secretary of State on July 3, 1974. Section 67 thereof specified an effective date of July 1, 1975. Section 10 directed the renumbering of Section 932.465 as Section 775.15 and amended it extensively....

...Our reading of the statutes does not comport with that conclusion. First degree murder is a capital felony. Section 782.04(1)(a), Fla. Stat. Conspiracy to commit a capital felony is a first degree felony. Section 777.04(4)(a), Fla. Stat. The statute of limitations on a first degree felony is four years. Section 775.15(2)(a), Fla....

...of limitations had run on the offense. The trial court denied the motion after finding that the statute of limitations was tolled during his absence from the state. [1] The statute of limitations for first-degree scheming to defraud is four years. §§ 775.15(2)(a), 817.034(4), Fla....

...The State established that Mr. Netherly was absent from the state between October 1992 and September 1995. However, merely demonstrating his absence was not enough to toll the statute. In order to avail themselves of the three-year tolling provision of section 775.15, the State must have shown that his absence prevented or delayed his prosecution for this offense. This court has repeatedly held that the *437 statute of limitations will not be tolled pursuant to section 775.15(6) in cases where the State is unable to demonstrate that prosecution was delayed due to the defendant's absence from the state....

...On *440 remand for resentencing based on the failure of proof as to count 2, the court shall correct the illegal sentences imposed for the remaining counts. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing. CASANUEVA, A.C.J., and SALCINES, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 775.15(6), Florida Statutes (1991) provides: The period of limitation does not run during any time when the defendant is continuously absent from the state or has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state, but in no...

...The defendants were variously convicted on twelve counts of grand theft, seven counts of larceny by fraud, and three counts of common law cheat. They have presented nine issues for our consideration, one of which we find to have merit. We agree that the seven charges of larceny are barred by the time limitations set forth in section 775.15, Florida Statutes (1983). Section 775.15(2)(b) applies to the larceny charges and requires that prosecution be commenced within three years after the offense is committed....

...The charging document shows on its face that the larceny charges in this case were not filed against these defendants until after the expiration of three years from the dates alleged in the various larceny counts. Therefore, the state must rely on subsection (3) of section 775.15, which provides as follows: (3) If the period prescribed in subsection (2) has expired, a prosecution may nevertheless be commenced for: (a) Any offense a material element of which is either fraud or a breach of fiduciary obligation, w...

...e charges were brought, that the defendants were engaging in the activities which the state later claimed to constitute larceny. But it is not the defendants' burden to establish that the state could not rely on the three-year extension set forth in 775.15(3)(a); rather, the burden is on the state to establish the date of the discovery of the offense by the aggrieved party, in this case Collier County....

...In its brief, the state advises us that the question of who was the aggrieved party, or when with specificity that party knew, never was resolved or even addressed to the trial court. We take *440 that to be an admission by the state that it failed to establish the crucial date required for the extended limitations period of section 775.15(3)(a)....

...the five-year limitations period. However, by statute the prosecution was commenced when the indictment was filed, "provided that the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay." § 775.15(5), Fla.Stat....

...itted the offense of issuing corporate obligations beyond the authorized amount "on or about October 14, 1983 through and including July 18, 1984." The statute of limitations for such an offense is three years from the date of commission of the act, section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1987). Section 775.15(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1987), reads: (3) If the period prescribed in subsection (2) has expired, a prosecution may nevertheless be commenced for: (a) Any offense, a material element of which is either fraud or a breach of fiduciary o...

...The statute of limitations for the offenses is five years from the date of commission of the crime as to the racketeering charge, section 895.05(10), Florida Statutes (1987), and four years as to the offense of committing an organized scheme to defraud, section 775.15(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...On November 10, 1989, more than three years later, a capias was issued pursuant to a court order dated November 3, 1989. Ivory was arrested on November 30, 1989, and thereafter filed a motion for discharge relying on the criminal statute of limitations, section 775.15, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...n this court seeking review of that circuit court order. *1008 Petitioners' argument is straightforward. Since the charges involved are both second degree misdemeanors, prosecution must be commenced within one year after the offenses were committed. § 775.15(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (1989). According to section 775.15(5), "a prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay." Petitioners allege that...

...Petitioners concede that a traffic ticket can be a valid "charging document", but assert that a traffic citation does not become such a valid charging document until after it is filed, the government "pursues" the charge and executes process. Petitioners rely on the fact that the predecessor to section 775.15, section 932.465, Florida Statutes (1973) contained a tolling provision that references an indictment, information or affidavit, reasoning that the absence of that term in the 1974 amendment reflects a legislative intent to eliminate a...

...otice of the criminal charges against him so any facts that might support a defense to the charge are not lost or obscured by the passage of time. State v. King, 282 So.2d 162 (Fla. 1973). Finally, the state asserts that petitioners' construction of section 775.15(5) would require issuance of an additional charging document to commence traffic prosecutions for purposes of the statute of limitations....

...Petitioners object that they do not claim an additional charging document must issue but rather that the state must take prosecutorial steps, including, at a minimum, serving some undefined "official process" on the defendant in order for the ticket to become a charging *1009 document that will meet the requirements of section 775.15....

...nstitute the charging document. When issued and served, a uniform traffic citation is the equivalent of an executed information, as suggested by the supreme court in Hurley. See Art. I, § 16(a), Fla. Const. It would be incongruous that, in drafting section 775.15(5), Florida Statutes, the legislature intended to create a requirement for an otherwise unnecessary document or procedure whose sole purpose is to satisfy the "commencement of prosecution" requirement of section 775.15(5), Florida Statutes....

...He argues here—as he did in his unsuccessful motion to dismiss below— that the statute of limitations should have precluded his further prosecution. Unpersuaded, we affirm. He does not argue [1] —and has no basis for any argument-that the information was not filed in timely fashion. See § 775.15(2)(a), Fla....

...other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay. In determining what is reasonable, inability to locate the defendant after diligent search or the defendant's absence from the state shall be considered. § 775.15(5), Fla....

...[3] The only argument he makes on appeal is that the motion should have been granted because "the state failed to conduct a diligent search to locate" him. Initial Brief, p. 11. At issue is whether the arrest warrant or capias was served on Mr. Goings "without unreasonable delay." § 775.15(5), Fla....

...Goings had received traffic tickets in Maryland in May of 1996 and June of 2006, and that somebody had filed a civil action against him in Maryland in 2000. The investigator testified that he was not aware, at the time, that Mr. Goings had been arrested in 1996 and in 2002. [4] *978 Under section 775.15(5), the state had the burden to show an "inability to locate the defendant after diligent search or the defendant's absence from the state." § 775.15(5), Fla....

...the computer searches performed in 2002 and thereafter. But the state showed it searched diligently until after Mr. Goings left the state, and the parties agree that he was continuously absent from the state from 1996 until he was arrested in 2009. Section 775.15(5) does not require any other showing....

...til long after the fact. The state's showing that Mr. Goings left the state soon after the arrest warrant or capias issued and remained continuously absent from the state until his arrest proved the reasonableness of the delay, within the meaning of section 775.15(5). Since the jailhouse encounter, the Legislature has amended section 775.15(6), Florida Statutes (1993), to add: "This provision shall not extend the period of limitation otherwise applicable by more than 3 years, *979 but shall not be construed to limit the prosecution of a defendant who has been timely charg...

...State, 964 So.2d 178, 179 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); Lett v. State, 837 So.2d 614, 615 n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); State v. Shamy, 759 So.2d 728, 730 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (the statute of limitations applicable is the one in effect when the crime was committed). It can be argued that section 775.15(6), Florida Statutes (1993), has no application in the present case because, as the parties agree, the information was filed before even the primary four-year limitations period had run....

...1st DCA 2004) (ruling prosecution timely where information was filed a year after the primary limitations period because "the appellant was continuously absent from the state and his absence resulted in the tolling of the statute of limitations"). Section 775.15(6) provides: The period of limitation does not run during any time when the defendant is continuously absent from the state or has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state, but in no case shall this provision extend the period of limitation otherwise applicable by more than 3 years. § 775.15(6), Fla....

...Subsection (6) "is not an absolute limitation upon prosecution after a specified time period," but "merely allows for a delay of commencement of that prosecution for specified reasons." Id. See also King v. State, 687 So.2d 917, 919 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (agreeing with Picklesimer that "subsections 775.15(5) and (6) are independent provisions")....

...rom the state, but deciding the case on the basis that the twenty-year delay in serving capias was not reasonable); Robinson v. State, 773 So.2d 1266, 1266-67 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (finding that the state failed to show that delay was reasonable under section 775.15(5), but noting that "in any event, section 775.15(6) ....

...1st DCA 2006), we ruled that appellant had stated a legally sufficient claim for relief in his postconviction motion when he alleged counsel was ineffective for failing to inform him of a viable defense based on the statute of limitations. We said that, even if the statute of limitations was extended under section 775.15(6), it could have been extended for only three years, and that the capias was executed outside the extended time period....

...State, 515 So.2d 346, 348 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Morgan v. State, 486 So.2d 1356, 1357 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). [4] Mr. Goings also testified that between March and August of 1996, he was arrested and placed on probation in Virginia for two years. [5] In 1997, the legislature amended section 775.15(5), Florida Statutes, to add: "The failure to execute process on or extradite a defendant in another state who has been charged by information or indictment with a crime in this state shall not constitute an unreasonable delay." Ch....

...Thus, the court found, Miller's absence from the state had not prevented the state from commencing prosecution. Id. We adopted the Miller holding in Pearson v. State, 867 So.2d 517, 519 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004): "The second district's holding in Miller appears to be proper because the dispositive issue under section 775.15(5) is whether the state's delay in prosecution is reasonable....

...Michael E. Dutko of Bogenschutz & Dutko, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee. POLEN, J. The state appeals from an order which dismissed its information against Shamy based upon the prosecution being beyond the statute of limitations. It argues that, under section 775.15(5), Florida Statutes (1997), no unreasonable delay occurred....

...reasonable. The statute of limitations for the charged offense has expired." The statute of limitation that applies to the charge filed against Shamy provides that prosecution must be "commenced" within five years. § 812.035(10), Fla. Stat. (1989). Section 775.15(5), Florida Statutes (1989), provides that a prosecution is commenced when "either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay." § 775.15(5), Fla....

...The question in this case is whether the capias was "executed without unreasonable delay." In determining what is reasonable, courts should consider the state's inability to locate the defendant after diligent search or the defendant's absence from the state. § 775.15(5), Fla....

...Overall, courts must determine on a case-by-case basis whether the state was diligent in its efforts to execute a capias in order to bring a defendant before the court within the statutory limit. Id. In this case, our review of the record shows that the court considered the factors set forth in section 775.15(5) before dismissing the information....

...o attempt to execute capias); Colvin v. State, 541 So.2d 724 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)(holding six-year delay in serving capias was unreasonable where the state knew of defendant's whereabouts). The state, however, contends that the 1997 amended version of section 775.15(5) applies here retroactively. [1] The 1997 amendment to section 775.15(5), in addition to the above-quoted language requiring execution "without unreasonable delay," added that "failure to execute process on or extradite a defendant in another state who has been charged by information or indictment with a crime in the state shall not constitute an unreasonable delay." § 775.15(5), Fla....

...t of the statute of limitations). Statutes which affect substantive rights are presumed to operate prospectively absent clear legislative intent to the contrary. State v. Lavazzoli, 434 So.2d 321, 323 (Fla.1983). Here, under sections 812.035(10) and 775.15(5), Florida Statutes (1989), [2] Shamy's right to be protected from prosecution vested before the amendment became effective....

...Appellant's new public defender subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the information as barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitation. The substance of his argument was that the prosecution had not been timely commenced as required by section 775.15, Florida Statutes (1989), because the delay in executing the capias issued on July 3, 1991, was unreasonable....

...to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. This appeal follows. The offense with which appellant was charged (burglary of a dwelling) is a second-degree felony. § 810.02(3), Fla. Stat. (1989). Therefore, the applicable statute of limitation is section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), which requires that "[a] prosecution for any other felony [i.e., other than a capital, life or first-degree felony] must be commenced within 3 years after it is committed." Section 775.15(5) states that "[a] prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay." Appellant...

...However, the limitation period ran on June 12, 1993, three years after the date on which the offense allegedly occurred. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss should have been granted. The state responds that the capias issued on July 3, 1991, is not the type of process contemplated by section 775.15(5) because it was not issued to procure appellant's arrest on the charge made in the information but, rather, was issued because of appellant's failure to appear in court, which constitutes an indirect criminal contempt of court....

...rmal arraignment and plea of not guilty on appellant's behalf). Therefore, according to the state, the prosecution was timely commenced, and the trial court correctly denied the motion to dismiss. We agree with the state. It is relatively clear that section 775.15(5) is intended to define commencement of a prosecution for purposes of the limitations set out in section 775.15 by reference to the date on which the indictment or information is filed....

...e is stale and defense witnesses have died, disappeared or otherwise become unavailable." State v. Garofalo, 453 So.2d 905, 906 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (citing State v. Hickman, 189 So.2d 254 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)). Therefore, consistent with that purpose, section 775.15(5) also contains a proviso-in order for the prosecution to be treated as having commenced *1252 on the date the indictment or information was filed, the "process issued on such indictment or information [must be] executed without unrea...

...The information was filed on August 22, 1990. The trial court progress docket reflects that, on the following day, an arraignment was set for September 4 and a notice to appear was issued. A compelling argument might be made that the notice constituted the "process" contemplated by section 775.15(5)....

...tifying him or her [sic] of the filing of the information and the date and time of arraignment, I would regard that as sufficient `other process'"). However, we need not rely on that notice because we conclude that, under any common-sense reading of section 775.15, appellant's prosecution had "commenced" no later than August 31, 1990, when his attorney filed a written waiver of formal arraignment and plea of not guilty on his behalf....

...withdraw our previously issued opinion dated May 20, 2015, and replace it with the following: Appellant Wilgy Therlonge was convicted of lewd and lascivious battery of a person under sixteen years of age. His appeal challenges the trial court’s construction of section 775.15(16)(a)4., Florida Statutes (2007), which extends the statute of limitations for lewd and lascivious offenses. As no DNA evidence pertinent to the crime was collected and preserved for later testing during the “original investigation�...

...over three years had passed since the crime was reported to law enforcement—Appellant was charged with lewd and lascivious battery of a person under sixteen years of age. Despite the time lapse, the State argued that it was permitted to continue the prosecution under section 775.15(16)(a), which provides an extension to the statute of limitations period in certain circumstances: In addition to the time periods prescribed in this section, a prosecution for [a lewd or lascivious offense] may be...

...gh the analysis of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence, if a sufficient portion of the evidence collected at the time of the original investigation and tested for DNA is preserved and available for testing by the accused[.] § 775.15(16)(a)4., Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis added).1 Appellant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that section 775.15(16)(a) could not be applied to his case because the child’s DNA was not obtained during the “original investigation” within the meaning of the statute....

...3d 1263, 1265-66 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (quoting Brook v. State, 999 So. 2d 1093, 1097 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009)). We reject the trial court’s conclusion that there was an “original, ongoing investigation” (emphasis added) sufficient to trigger the extension period of section 775.15(16)(a)4....

...Nonetheless, our decision is dictated by the plain language of the statute and the fact that no DNA evidence of the crime was collected during the “original investigation” to preserve for comparison against an accused and thus trigger the application of the extension period under section 775.15(16)(a)4....

...t been declared “inactive.” Conclusion We reverse and vacate Appellant’s conviction and sentence, including his designation as a sexual offender, as the extension of the statute of limitations period under section 775.15(16)(a) is inapplicable in the instant case....

...Gen., Daytona Beach, for appellee. SHARP, Chief Judge. Sherley appeals from the trial court's order denying his motion to dismiss the state's information charging him with aggravated battery. He claims that the three year statute of limitations under section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1987) had expired prior to the state's commencement of prosecution....

...The aggravated battery charge was discovered and Sherley was extradited to Florida. After the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss, he pled nolo contendere to the charge, expressly reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion. The trial court accepted his plea and placed Sherley on probation. Section 775.15(2)(b) provides that prosecution for the second degree felony of aggravated battery must be commenced within three years after it was committed....

...(6) The period of limitation does not run during any time when the defendant is continuously absent from the state or has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state, but in no case shall this provision extend the period of limitation otherwise applicable by more than 3 years. § 775.15(5) and (6), Fla....

...1st DCA 1988) (prosecution for escape commenced more than three years after it was committed, was barred by statute of limitations, absent evidence to explain state's four-year delay in executing capias or evidence that it had made a diligent search to locate defendant). Furthermore, the tolling period of section 775.15(6), caused by Sherley's absence from the state, was insufficient to make his prosecution timely....

...Giambalvo, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellee. NORTHCUTT, Acting Chief Judge. The circuit court dismissed charges of criminal mischief and battery against Vincent White on the basis that the State did not commence his prosecution within the statutory limitations period. § 775.15(5), Fla....

...State had not commenced his prosecution within the applicable statutes of limitations. The State must begin a prosecution for criminal mischief within three years from the date the crime was committed, and a prosecution for battery within two years. § 775.15(2)(b), (c), Fla. Stat. (1989). "A prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay." § 775.15(5), Fla....

...Martinez, 790 So.2d 520 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); see also Young v. State, 784 So.2d 1249 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). As we explained in Martinez, where the defendant is represented, files a plea and is arraigned, "other process" sufficient to commence prosecution under section 775.15(5) has occurred. Cf. Watkins, 685 So.2d at 1324-25 (Altenbernd, J. concurring) (positing "if a defendant were formally notified of his or her arraignment date at first appearance" that would be sufficient "other process" to commence prosecution under section 775.15, if an information had been filed)....

...On May 1, 2007, the State filed an amended information which added the new charge of fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer at high speed, in violation of subsection 316.1935(3), Florida Statutes (2003). [1] Both sides agree that the applicable statute of limitations is three years. § 775.15(2)(b), Fla....

...ason for trial counsel to fail to raise the defense of the statute of limitations. The State requested an opportunity to determine whether it had a good faith basis to assert that any exception to the statute of limitations applies in this case. See § 775.15(5)-(7), Fla....

...Klawikofsky, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee. *1241 THREADGILL, Acting Chief Judge. The appellant challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss an information on the ground that the State failed to commence prosecution within the limitations periods set forth in section 775.15(2)(b) and (c), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...c defender. The trial court also found it was unrebutted that the deputy was told the appellant had gone to Georgia. The appellant pleaded nolo contendere to the charges, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his dispositive motion to dismiss. Section 775.15(2)(b) and (c) provides that a prosecution for a second-degree felony must be commenced within three years after it is committed, and a prosecution for a first-degree misdemeanor must be commenced within two years after it is committed. "A prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay." § 775.15(5)....

...Further, statutory time limitations upon criminal prosecutions must be liberally construed in favor of the accused. State v. Watkins, 685 So.2d 1322 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). In Watkins, this court held that the term "commencement *1242 of prosecution," as defined in section 775.15(5), does not include the act of arresting a person and notifying him of charges the State may file against him at a later date....

...Again, the burden was on the State to prove that the delay was not unreasonable. See Brown, 674 So.2d at 740. In determining what is reasonable, an inability to locate a defendant after a diligent search or the defendant's absence from the state shall be considered. § 775.15(5). A single visit to a defendant's residence is not a diligent search within the meaning of section 775.15(5)....

...State, 765 So.2d 163 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). The State failed to demonstrate a diligent search in this case. Finally, we do not believe the sister's statement to the deputy that the appellant was in Georgia was sufficient to support a tolling of the statute pursuant to section 775.15(6), which provides that "[t]he period of limitation does not run during any time when the defendant is continuously absent from the state or has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state...." The deputy testif...

...onses. However, as the respondents point out, criminal prosecution would likely be barred by the statute of limitations, due to the lapse of time (approximately six years) between the mother's drug usage while pregnant and the deposition. See, e.g., § 775.15(2)(a), Fla....

...rohibit the State from proceeding with the prosecution of three charges against him, a first-degree felony, a second-degree felony, and a first-degree misdemeanor. Lewis claims that the prosecution is barred by the statutes of limitations set out in section 775.15, Florida Statutes (1995), which is four years for the first-degree felony, three years for the second-degree felony, and two years for the first-degree misdemeanor. Because the capiases for these offenses were executed after the expiration of the applicable statutes of limitations, we grant the petition for writ of prohibition. Section 775.15(5) provides that a prosecution is commenced when an information is filed, "provided the capias ......

...uch with his probation officer and that the state's execution of the capias was not untimely. We reverse. We agree with appellant that the state's execution of the capias three years and three months after his commission of the perjury was untimely. Section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1991) provides for a three-year statute of limitations for prosecutions of felonies other than those previously designated, including third degree felonies. Section 775.15(5) also provides in part: (5) A prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay....

...In determining what is reasonable, inability to locate the defendant after diligent search or the defendant's absence from the state shall be considered. A single visit and a single letter to appellant's residence is not a diligent search within the meaning of section 775.15(5)....

...Giambalvo, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellee. NORTHCUTT, Judge. The circuit court dismissed charges of burglary and theft against Richard Martinez on the ground that the State did not commence prosecution within the statutory limitations periods. § 775.15, Fla....

...he factual issues. The court granted the motion and dismissed the charges, relying on State v. Watkins, 685 So.2d 1322 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). The State must commence a prosecution for burglary within three years, and a prosecution for theft within two. § 775.15(2)(b),(c), Fla. Stat. (1989). "A prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay." § 775.15(5), Fla....

...1. Young; cf. Watkins, 685 So.2d at 1324-25 (Altenbernd, J., concurring) (positing that "if a defendant were formally notified of his or her arraignment date at first appearance" this would be sufficient "other process" to commence prosecution under section 775.15 if an information had been filed)....

...He moved to dismiss the charges based on the statute of limitations. Without ordering a response from the state the trial court denied the motion explaining that Kidd was never arrested on the warrant. The trial court's reasoning does not support denial of the motion. Section 775.15, Florida Statutes, sets out the statutes of limitations for different degrees of criminal offenses. Unless otherwise provided, the prosecution for second and third degree felonies must be commenced within three years after commission of the offense. § 775.15(2)(b), Fla....

...Forgery is an offense under section 831.01 and dealing in stolen property is an offense under section 812.019. The three-year statute of limitations applies to the forgery charge, but the state has five years to prosecute the charge for dealing in stolen property. § 812.035(10), Fla. Stat. Section 775.15(4), Florida Statutes, provides in part: (a) Prosecution on a charge on which the defendant has previously been arrested or served with a summons is commenced by the filing of an indictment, information, or other charging document....

...v. State, 837 So.2d 614, 615 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) ("The filing of a detainer, which merely advises prison officials that a prisoner has other charges and requests notice of the prisoner's release, is not the equivalent of the process contemplated by section 775.15(5).")....

...Wittenberg, 398 So.2d 1002 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Appellant next argues that since under Section 468.138, any violation of Chapter 468, part II, is a misdemeanor of the second degree, the one year statute of limitations for prosecutions of misdemeanor charges under Section 775.15(2)(d) applies, and would bar the Department's reliance upon any alleged infractions of the licensure law committed by appellant more than one year prior to the filing of the administrative complaint....

...as sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, King argues that his state armed robbery conviction must be vacated because the State did not serve him with the capias within the four year statute of limitation applicable to first degree felonies. See § 775.15(2)(a), Fla.Stat....

...(1995) (prosecution for first degree felony must be commenced within four years of the commission of the crime). Because he was not served with the capias until some eight months after the expiration of the four year period, King contends that the prosecution was commenced untimely and he is therefore entitled to release. Subsection 775.15(5) defines the commencement of a prosecution: (5) A prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed[ [2] ] without unreasonable delay....

...mmencing prosecution shall be extended 3 months from the time the indictment or information is dismissed or set aside. (Footnote added). The period of limitation may be extended for a period not to exceed three years pursuant to the provisions of subsection 775.15(6): The period of limitation does not run during any time when the defendant is continuously absent from the state or has no reasonable ascertainable place of abode or work within the state, but in no case shall this provision extend the period of limitation otherwise applicable by more than 3 years....

...King asserts that the legislature did not intend that subsection (6) apply to federal prisoners incarcerated outside of Florida, and because there was no evidence that the State had diligently attempted to serve him as required by subsection (5), the prosecution was barred. The relationship between subsections 775.15(5) and (6) was discussed in State v....

...There, Judge Cobb wrote: In applying the three-year extension period referred to in subsection (6) of the Statutes to the provisions relating to execution of process in subsection (5), the trial court was mixing apples and oranges. Although both [sub]sections 775.15(5) and 775.15(6) provide similar justifications for the state's failure to serve the defendant, the two [sub]sections nonetheless are independent. S[ubs]ection 775.15(5) allows the state to "relate back" the date of service to the date the information was filed....

...5th DCA 1991) (Peterson, J., concurring) ("In light of ... Walker and Wells, we conclude that the state's single attempt to serve defendant in 1984 does not constitute a diligent search, and therefore the six-year delay in the execution of the capias is unreasonable."). S[ubs]ection 775.15(6), on the other hand, is a provision which allows the statute of limitations for commencing prosecution (i.e., filing an information or an indictment) to be tolled for the period when the "defendant is continuously absent from the state or ha...

...the state." Subsection (6) is not an absolute limitation upon prosecution after a specified time period. It merely allows for a delay of commencement of that prosecution for specified reasons. We agree with Picklesimer's conclusion that subsections 775.15(5) and (6) are independent provisions. Provided that both the information and capias are served within the applicable period of limitations, whether or not that period is extended by the application of subsection 775.15(6), the prosecution must be deemed timely commenced....

...After the information was filed and warrant issued in 1980, Florida had the Maryland Department of Corrections place a detainer on petitioner, but did not seek extradition. The warrant was not served on petitioner until his release in 2002. The applicable statute of limitations, section 775.15, Florida Statutes (1979), required prosecution to be commenced within three years of the commission of this second degree felony. § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1979). That period could have been extended a maximum of three years if the defendant was continuously absent from the state. § 775.15(6), Fla....

...[1] A prosecution is commenced, for purposes of the statute of limitations, "when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay." § 775.15(5), Fla....

...1987); Colvin v. State, 541 So.2d 724 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). The filing of a detainer, which merely advises prison officials that a prisoner has other charges and requests notice of the prisoner's release, is not the equivalent of the process contemplated by section 775.15(5)....

...(1993); 18 U.S.C.App. 2, § 1 et seq. Id. at 741-42 (footnotes omitted). We therefore grant the writ. POLEN, C.J., and SHAHOOD, J., concur. NOTES [1] In 1997 the statute was amended to excuse the failure to execute process on or extradite a defendant in another state. § 775.15(5), Fla....

...At issue is whether prosecution was commenced before the statute of limitations had run. The crime allegedly occurred between February and April, 1981. The information was filed two years and nine months after the offense charged, but within the three-year statute of limitations provided by section *1129 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1985) for prosecution of third degree felonies....

...The appellant resided in the town of Apopka, Florida throughout the periods involved here and had the same address for several years. There was no evidence in the record that the State had made any efforts to locate or serve Gunn prior to the actual date of service. Section 775.15(5), Florida Statutes (1985) provides: "A prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay....

...In determining what is reasonable, inability to locate the defendant after diligent search or the defendant's absence from the state shall be considered." The Florida Supreme Court recently considered this section in State v. Fields, 505 So.2d 1336 (Fla. 1987) and held that "the word `executed' in section 775.15(5) can only mean service on the defendant." From the record in this case, we conclude that the capias was executed after an unreasonable delay, and after the statute of limitations had run....

...contract with Thomas and Janet Burch. Subsequently, Bare moved to dismiss the information, stating that the statute of limitations had expired. The lower court granted this motion. The state appeals the dismissal as to count one of the information. Section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes, imposes a three-year period for commencement of prosecution after the commission *800 of any felony other than a capital felony, life felony or felony of the first degree....

...and for two years following its termination. (Emphasis added). The state argues that since this section applies to both civil and criminal proceedings, and clearly states that it will apply "notwithstanding any other provision of law," it supersedes section 775.15(2)(b)....

...Clements claims that from November 1990 to the end of 1993, the statute of limitations for the offense of sexual activity with a child by a person in familial or custodial authority was four years from when the offense was committed. [1] See § 794.041, Fla. Stat. (1989-1992) (proscribing the offense, a first-degree felony); § 775.15(2)(a), Fla....

...(Supp.1990-1992) (providing the time limitations for prosecution of first-degree felony). Effective October 1, 1993, section 794.041 was repealed and reenacted as subsection (8) of section 794.011. See ch. 93-156, §§ 3, 4, at 911, § 27 at 933, Laws of Fla. Section 775.15(7), Florida Statutes (1993-1997), tolls the statute of limitations for a violation of section 794.011....

...n to the state attorney for the judicial circuit in which the alleged violation occurred. This subsection applies to any such offense except an offense the prosecution of which would have been barred by subsection (2) on or before December 31, 1984. § 775.15(7), Fla....

...ation of section 794.041 and was therefore untimely. It is correct that the statute of limitations for a violation of section 794.041 between 1990 and September 30, 1993, began to run after the offense was committed and that the tolling provision in section 775.15(7), Florida Statutes (1993-1997), would not apply. In Hemphill v. State, 820 So.2d 405, 406 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002), this court held that the tolling provision in "section 775.15(7) does not and has never included section 794.041 as a statute to which its tolling provisions apply." Although in 1993 section 794.041 became a part of 794.011 — "a statute to which the tolling provisions of section 775.15(7) apply" — "[t]he tolling provisions of section 775.15(7) are not applicable to violations of *259 section 794.041 committed before October 1, 1993." Hemphill, 820 So.2d at 406-07....

...If the offense was committed before or on September 30, 1993, it would have constituted a violation of section 794.041 subject to the four-year statute of limitations. If the offense was committed on or after October 1, 1993, it would have constituted a violation of section 794.011(8) and the tolling provision of section 775.15(7), Florida Statutes (1993-1997), would toll the statute of limitations until the victim turned sixteen or when the violation was reported to a government agency, whichever was earlier....

...of the offense because the information was not timely filed in 1997. The State claims that Clements' alleged conduct was a continuing offense and that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until the conduct terminated. The State relies on section 775.15(4), Florida Statutes (1989-1997), which provides that "[a]n offense is committed either when every element has occurred or, if a legislative purpose to prohibit a continuing course of conduct plainly appears, at the time when the cours...

...CANADY, J., Concurs specially with opinion. CANADY, Judge, Concurring specially. I concur in the court's disposition of this case. I write separately to explain that I disagree with the holding in Hemphill and would conclude that the tolling provision of section 775.15(7), Florida Statutes (1997), was applicable to the offense charged against Clements. However, even if the tolling provision applied, the prosecution was still untimely. The final sentence of section 775.15(7) unequivocally provides that the tolling provision applies to any of the offenses codified in section 794.011, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...Among those offenses is the crime of sexual activity with a child by a person in familial or custodial authority. In 1993, this crime, which had previously been codified in section 794.041, was transferred to section 794.011(8). When the crime became a part of section 794.011, it became subject to the tolling provisions of section 775.15(7). By transferring the crime of sexual activity with a child by a person in familial or custodial authority to section 794.011, the legislature evinced a clear intent to make "any such offense" subject to the tolling provision of section 775.15(7)—unless the prosecution of the offense had been barred prior to being made subject to the tolling provision....

...barred by the old statute, and (b) clearly indicates that the new statute is to apply to cases pending when it becomes effective."); Scharfschwerdt v. Kanarek, 553 So.2d 218, 220 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (applying the principle articulated in Andrews to section 775.15(7))....

...The statutory section in which the crime was codified at the time of the offense is irrelevant to the operation of the tolling provision. I thus disagree with the view adopted in Hemphill. In my view, Hemphill is based on a hyperformalistic reading of section 775.15(7)—a reading which is inconsistent with the manifest legislative purpose....

...The problem for MacFarland was that he could not compel Wright to incriminate himself. However, the lower court noted that the statute of limitations on those crimes barred the State from prosecuting Wright after four years from the date of the crimes. § 775.15(2)(a), Fla....

...Whyte. The State charged appellant with violation of section 817.034(4)(a)1, Florida Statutes (1997), the Florida Communications Fraud Act (FCFA). Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the information, arguing that the violations are time-barred under section 775.15(2)(a), Florida Statutes....

...the statute of limitations. Appellant pled no contest to the charge and reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. Appellant contends that the statute of limitations bars his prosecution for all eight victims. He asserts that section 775.15(2)(a), Florida Statutes, requires commencement of prosecution for a first-degree felony within four years after its completion....

...[2] He argues that because the *1238 first four violations are time-barred, the remaining violations are also time-barred because their prosecution would have had to commence within three years because they total less than fifty thousand dollars. See § 775.15(2)(b), Fla....

..., 1997; and against Clover Whyte in October, 1997. Thus, for these last four victims, the information filed on February 6, 1998, was well within the statutory period. We do not reach the question of whether the statute of limitations was extended by section 775.15(3)(a), Florida Statutes....

...e number 98-2932 CF 10A. Other than a brief statement of the underlying charges, appellant has failed to assert any error in the convictions and sentences rendered in case numbers 95-5353 and 97-25406. Therefore, we deem those appeals abandoned. [2] Section 775.15(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1997), provides, If the period prescribed in subsection (2) has expired, a prosecution may nevertheless be commenced for: (a) Any offense, a material element of which is either fraud or a breach of fiduciary ob...

...outside the record.’” Whigham v. State, 97 So. 3d 274, 275 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (quoting Jackson v. State, 89 So. 3d 1011, 1018 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012)). However, where the arguments arose in 3 There is no statute of limitations for capital sexual battery. See § 775.15(1), Fla....

...keteering, securities violations and grand theft. The trial court dismissed one of the grand theft charges because the information was filed after the expiration of the statute of limitations. We affirm the dismissal because the tolling provision in section 775.15(6), Florida Statutes (1983), does not apply to the five-year statute of limitations for theft....

...The information was filed on December 20, 1988, five years and eight months after the alleged offense. The state admits that this offense is governed by the five-year statute of limitations established in section 812.035(10), Florida Statutes (1983), rather than by the three-year period established in section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...State, 505 So.2d 1118 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); State v. Bare, 473 So.2d 799 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985). The state seeks to extend the five-year period by proving that the defendants were continuously absent from the state during a portion of the five-year period. Section 775.15(6) provides: The period of limitation does not run during any time when the defendant is continuously absent from the state or has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state, but in no case shall this provision extend the period of limitation otherwise applicable by more than 3 years. The state argues that this tolling provision applies not only to the general periods of limitation provided in section 775.15, but also to the more specific period provided in section 812.035(10)....

...We cannot accept this argument. Section 812.035(10) provides a five-year period for both criminal and civil theft actions "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law." The statute contains its own tolling provisions and does not expressly adopt the tolling provision in section 775.15(6). Section 812.035 does not require a strict construction but is to be construed in light of its remedial goal. § 812.037, Fla. Stat. (1983). On the other hand, section 775.15 must be strictly construed....

...Typically, a statute of limitations for a criminal offense must be liberally construed in favor of the defendant. State v. King, 275 So.2d 274 (Fla. 3d DCA), aff'd, 282 So.2d 162 (Fla. 1973). Accordingly, we do not believe the legislature has authorized the state to apply section 775.15(6) to the special statute of limitations for theft....

...LaROSE, Judge. The State appeals a trial court order dismissing, on statute of limitations grounds, the grand theft charge against Margarita Perez. We have jurisdiction. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.140(c)(1)(A). The State argues that "[t]he plain language of [section 775.15, Florida Statutes (1999),] indicates that [Ms....

...State v. Telesz, 873 So.2d 1236, 1237-38 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (reiterating that the specific provisions of section 812.035(10) control for grand theft charges instead of the general five-year statute of limitations for third-degree felonies outlined in section 775.15); see also Brown v....

...Section 812.035(10) provides a five-year limitations period. That period can be extended for no more than one year should a defendant be continuously absent from the state. § 812.035(10). Here, the limitations period began to run on September 1, 2000. See § 775.15(4); Brown, 674 So.2d at 741 (holding that the period of limitations begins to run on the day after the offense is committed and runs until the prosecution is commenced). The information was filed within the limitations period. The capias must be executed without unreasonable delay. § 775.15(5)(b), (6), Fla....

...Perez conceded that the State was entitled to a six-year limitations period allowed by section 812.035(10) due to her absence from Florida. Thus, the limitations *308 period would have expired at the end of August 2006. The State urges us to bootstrap the general provisions of section 775.15(5)(b) and (6) [1] onto the specific provisions of section 812.035(10) to toll the limitations period automatically and indefinitely due to Ms. Perez's out-of-state status. Section 775.15(5)(b), effective July 1, 1997, provides, among other things, that process must be executed without unreasonable delay: In determining what is reasonable, inability to locate the defendant after diligent search or the defendant's absence from the state shall be considered. The failure to execute process on or extradite a defendant in another state who has been charged by information or indictment with a crime in this state shall not constitute an unreasonable delay. Section 775.15(6) provides: The period of limitation does not run during any time when the defendant is continuously absent from the state or has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state....

...ution of a defendant who has been timely charged by indictment or information or other charging document and who has not been arrested due to his or her absence from the state or has not been extradited for prosecution from another state. Nothing in section 775.15 suggests that it supersedes or adds to the specific limitation provisions for grand theft provided in section 812.035(10). We have recognized that a more specific statute controls over a more general statute. Telesz, 873 So.2d at 1237-38 (holding that section 812.035(10) takes precedent over section 775.15 in theft cases and citing collection of authorities); State v. Guthrie, 567 So.2d 544, 545 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (rejecting argument that section 775.15 tolling provision applies to the more specific provision in section 812.035(10) and noting that the latter statute specified that its statute of limitations controls "notwithstanding any other provision of law"); see also Schuster v....

...State, 21 So.3d 117, 118 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (reversing denial of motion to dismiss grand theft charge on statute of limitations grounds; specific statute of limitations for theft controlled over more general limitation provisions for prosecution of crimes). Thus, sections 775.15(5) and (6) yield to section 812.035(10), and the State was limited to a maximum limitations period of six years....

...The trial court found that the State had not attempted to ascertain Ms. Perez's whereabouts at all during the *309 applicable limitations period. The record supports that finding. Affirmed. DAVIS and CRENSHAW, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] Presently numbered section 775.15(4)(b) and (5)....

...to establish that it noticed him or Gold that the information had been filed in May 1993. Starling, therefore, argues that the motion to dismiss should have been granted because the State did not demonstrate that the prosecution was, in accord with section 775.15(5), Florida Statutes, "commenced" prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations period. The State was required to commence prosecution on Starling's resisting charge, which is a third degree felony, see section 843.01, Florida Statutes (1993), within three years from the date the offense was committed. § 775.15(2)(b), Fla....

...[1] The applicable statute of limitations provides that "[a] prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay." § 775.15(5), Fla....

...the state from interfering with the defendant's ability to prepare his defense by delaying the proceedings to the point where evidence becomes stale or witnesses become unavailable. See Young v. State, 784 So.2d 1249 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). Therefore, section 775.15(5) provides that prosecution is deemed to have commenced on the date the indictment or information was filed provided the "`process issued on such indictment or information [is] executed without unreasonable delay.'" Young, 784 So.2d at 1252 (quoting section 775.15(5), Florida Statutes)....

...The trial court granted his motion and dismissed the charges. On appeal, the Second District reversed the trial court's decision, concluding that [a]s ... explained in Martinez, where the defendant is represented, files a plea and is arraigned, "other process" sufficient to commence prosecution under section 775.15(5) has occurred. Cf. Watkins, 685 So.2d at 1324-25 (Altenbernd, J. concurring) (positing "if a defendant were formally notified of his or her arraignment date at first appearance" that would be sufficient "other process" to commence prosecution under section 775.15, if an information had been filed)....

...the client did not receive notice, the attorney's knowledge was imputed to the client)). We hold, therefore, that notification to Starling through his attorney of the trial and pre-trial conference dates constitutes sufficient "other process" under section 775.15(5) to commence prosecution within the applicable limitations period....

...State, 390 So.2d 322 (Fla.1980)). [2] This subsection has been substantially amended since 1993 and the current version provides that if the defendant had previously been arrested on the charge, prosecution commences when the information or indictment is filed. § 775.15(5)(a), Fla. Stat. (2001). The "other process" inquiry only applies if the defendant had not previously been arrested on the charge. § 775.15(5)(b), Fla....

...Statutes of limitation in criminal cases are to be liberally construed in favor of the accused. Reino v. State, 352 So.2d 853 (Fla. 1977); State v. Mack, 637 So.2d 18 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). A prosecution for burglary of a dwelling, which is a second degree felony, must be commenced within three years after it is committed. § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1991). A prosecution is commenced, under section 775.15(5), Florida Statutes (1991), "when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay." The word "executed" has been construed as meaning the completion of service on the defendant....

...The crime for which Calderon was charged occurred in February 1992. He was indicted in 2000. The statute in effect in 1992, at the time the crime was committed, provided for a four-year statute of limitations on the conspiracy charge, a first degree felony. ß 775.15(2)(a), Fla....

...The statute also granted the state an additional three years to bring charges against a defendant who was "continuously absent from the state or has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state" during the original limitations period. ß 775.15(6), Fla....

...hree-year extension applied. The trial court stated that it would, at a later time, conduct a hearing on the applicability of the three-year extension of time. This should be done on remand. Effective October 1, 1996, the Florida Legislature amended section 775.15 and provided that a prosecution for "a felony that resulted in a death" may be commenced at any time....

...itual offender. [5] The State had filed a motion to depart from the sentencing guidelines, relying on Baker and Moreira v. State, 500 So.2d 343 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). (R. 24). [6] Brown involves the interpretation of a different statute of limitations, section 775.15, Florida Statutes, not the statute at issue in this case. The Brown court took the position that for purposes of initiating a prosecution, the only reasons for tolling the section 775.15 statute of limitations are the reasons expressed in the statute itself....

...The statute of limitations for the offenses is five years from the date of commission of the crime as to the racketeering charge, section 895.05(10), Florida Statutes (1987), and four years as to the offense of committing an organized scheme to defraud, section 775.15(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...Thus, without the reclassification from a first degree felony to a life felony, the defendant’s conviction must be vacated due to the expiration of the four-year statute of limitations for first degree felonies pursuant to the law that was in effect in 1982. 1 § 775.15(2)(a), Fla....

...defendant’s use of a firearm during the commission of the offense; and (4) there was no evidence that the defendant carried a firearm during the commission of the murder. 1 Presently, a prosecution for “a felony that resulted in a death may be commenced at any time.” § 775.15(1), Fla....

...Second degree murder is a necessary lesser included offense of first degree premeditated murder, see State v. Montgomery, 39 So. 3d 252, 259 n.4 (Fla. 2010) (citing Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.2), and second degree murder with a firearm is not barred by the statute of limitations because it is a life felony. § 775.15(1), Fla....

...State argued that a literal reading of section 775.087(1) required only that the defendant possess “any” weapon or firearm. Thus, the State proposed, if during the commission of the crime the defendant carried “any weapon or firearm,” that 8 See § 775.15(2) (a), Fla....

...It was undisputed that co-defendant Martorano used his own gun to shoot Callahan, and that Connolly never carried, displayed, used, or threatened to use the murder weapon. In 1982, when the murder occurred, the statute of limitation for a first-degree felony was four years. § 775.15(2) (a), Fla....

...The issue of reclassification is dispositive because, without reclassification, the defendant’s conviction as a principal to second-degree murder is a first-degree felony. At the time of this offense (1982), the statute of limitations for a first-degree felony was four years. See § 775.15(2)(a) Fla. Stat. (1982). The statute was subsequently amended and now provides that prosecution of a capital felony, a life felony or a “felony that resulted in death may be commenced at any time.” See § 775.15(1), Fla....

...For these reasons, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. SUAREZ, C.J., and SHEPHERD and LAGOA, JJ., join in the dissent only and concur that we must reverse with directions to vacate the judgment and sentence and enter a judgment of acquittal. 52 See § 775.15(2)(a), Fla....

...gate and advise him of the defense of statute of limitations for four of the felony charges. At an evidentiary hearing on this claim, it was undisputed that the statute of limitations would have barred Mr. Cordes' convictions for counts 4 and 6. See § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1989) (requiring prosecution for second— and third-degree felonies to commence within three years). As to counts 3 and 5, there was dispute as to whether the statute of limitations may have been extended by section 775.15(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), which allows the statute of limitations to be extended to as much as six years when fraud is a material element of the offense. However, section 775.15(3)(a) only permits the limitations period to extend to one year after the discovery of the offense by the "aggrieved party," and it was unclear when these offenses were "discovered." In addition, during this hearing the State discovere...

...A capias was issued on April 29, 1998, when Parks failed to appear for a scheduled hearing. He was not apprehended until September 14, 2002. On Parks's motion, the circuit court dismissed the charge on the ground that the State failed to prosecute within the three-year statute of limitations. See § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1997). The circuit court dismissed the case because it found the State had made no effort to locate Parks between March 1998 and September 2002. In doing so, the court relied on a number of decisions interpreting the pre-1997 version of section 775.15(5), which required the State to show that the capias, summons, or other process issued on the information had been executed without unreasonable delay. See, e.g., Sutton v. State, 784 So.2d 1239 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (interpreting 1995 version of section 775.15(5)); Lewis v....

...State, 765 So.2d 163 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (same). But the statute was amended effective July 1, 1997. Ch. 97-90, § 7, at 521, Laws of Fla. Parks allegedly committed his crime in 1998; therefore the amended 1997 version applies. [1] The applicable version of section 775.15(5) provides: (a) Prosecution on a charge on which the defendant has previously been arrested or served with a summons is commenced by the filing of an indictment, information, or other charging document....

...(b) A prosecution on a charge on which the defendant has not previously been arrested or served with a summons is commenced when either an indictment *174 or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay.... § 775.15(5). The 1997 amendment added subsection (a) to section 775.15(5) and changed the way prosecution is commenced for defendants who have been arrested or served with a summons on the charged offense before an information is filed....

...apella v. City of Gainesville, 377 So.2d 658 (Fla. 1979)); Dep't of Commerce, Div. of Employment Sec. v. Hart, 372 So.2d 174, 176 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). Parks was arrested for discharging a firearm in February 1998. Therefore, under the 1997 version of section 775.15(5), prosecution on this charge commenced when the information was filed two months later, well within the statutory limitations period. The circuit court's analysis of whether the State served the capias without unreasonable delay simply was not pertinent to these facts. See § 775.15(5)(a); see also Starling v. State, 799 So.2d 425, 427 n. 2 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (noting that if the 1997 version of section 775.15(5) had been applicable, the defendant's prosecution would have commenced upon the filing of the information because he had been first arrested on the charge)....

...We reverse the dismissal of the charge and the discharge of Parks, and we remand with directions to reinstate the prosecution. STRINGER and DAVIS, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] On appeal, Parks's counsel claims that the State did not raise the applicability of the 1997 version of section 775.15(5) at the hearing on the motion to dismiss....

...delivered and installed at Crandon Gardens and at adjacent medians in Crandon Park.... to MIAMI-DADE COUNTY.... for payment and GUILLERMO ANTONIO CUTIE approving said invoices *468 for payment, in violation of s. 812.014(1)(2)(a) and s. 812.035 and s. 775.15(4) and s....

...RELEVANT STATUTES Florida Statute § 812.035(10) provides: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a criminal .... proceeding under ss. 812.037-812.037 .... may be commenced at any time within 5 years after the cause of action accrues. Florida Statute § 775.15(4) provides: An offense is committed either when every element has occurred or, if a legislative purpose to prohibit a continuing course of conduct plainly appears, at the time when the course of conduct or the defendant's complicity therein is terminated....

...committed pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct, whether the thefts are from the same person or several persons, may be aggregated in determining the grade of the offense. . . . . The State contends that Florida Statute §§ 812.012(9)(c) and 775.15(4) permit this prosecution of crimes which occurred beyond the five year statute of limitations period. The State submits *469 that it is allowed to aggregate separate takings to establish the value necessary to determine the grade of the offense under § 812.012(9)(c). As noted, under § 775.15(4) a crime is committed when all the elements of the crime have occurred or "if a legislative purpose to prohibit a continuing course of conduct plainly appears, at the time when the course of conduct or the defendant's complicity therein i...

...es, "An offense is committed either when every element has occurred or, if a legislative purpose to prohibit a continuing course of conduct plainly appears, at the time when the course of conduct or the defendant's complicity therein is terminated." § 775.15(4), Fla....

...he grade of the offense, where the thefts have been committed pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct. To my way of thinking, this is a situation in which "a legislative purpose to prohibit a continuing course of conduct plainly appears...." Id. § 775.15(4)....

...me is complete—and committed—upon the taking. 282 So.2d at 167 (emphasis added). In 1974—the year after King —the legislature responded to the court's invitation and rewrote the statute of limitations. Ch. 74-383 § 10, Laws of Fla. (codified as § 775.15, Fla....

...It is the 1974 enactment which provides that an offense is committed "if a legislative purpose to prohibit a continuing course of conduct plainly appears, at the time when the course of conduct or the defendant's complicity therein is terminated." § 775.15(4), Fla....

...The King decision thus has no bearing on the question now before us, because here we deal with statutes enacted after King was announced. In King itself, the court recognized that the legislature could change the statute of limitations if it chose to do so. The inquiry under subsection 775.15(4) is whether, in examining the theft statute, "a legislative purpose to prohibit a continuous course of conduct plainly appears...." The theft statute uses the words "scheme or course of conduct." Id....

...Where a scheme or course of conduct is shown, the amounts may be aggregated, even though they would otherwise be entirely separate crimes. See id. Under the theft statute, the legislative purpose to prohibit a continuing course of conduct "plainly appears," as required by subsection 775.15(4)....

...to imagine a case in which it would apply. III. In granting the motion to dismiss, the trial court also relied on O'Malley v. Mounts, 590 So.2d 437 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). That decision does not address the statute-of-limitations extender created by subsection 775.15(4)....

...*471 The court upheld the dismissal of several counts, however, because under the facts of the case, there was no scheme to defraud: the crimes were "separated in time and unrelated to one another." Id. at 1239. The Rosen case involved a different statute, not subsection 775.15(4) and not the theft statute....

...Jaynes, 75 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1996), and United States v. Yashar, 2 F.Supp.2d 1009 (N.D.Ill.1998), vacated, 166 F.3d 873 (7th Cir.1999). Those cases construed federal criminal statutes. The federal statutes do not have a statute-of-limitations extender like that created by subsection 775.15(4)....

...The defendant below, Paul Hampton, obtained a dismissal of a grand theft charge against him on the basis that the information was filed more than three years after the offense. The dismissal was based on this court's opinion in Wells v. State, 571 So.2d 563 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) and section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes. [1] The state, on the other hand, contends that Wells is clearly erroneous and that section 775.15(2)(b), a general statute, does not apply....

...cution is deemed to have been "commenced" and the reasonableness of the delay in prosecuting that case. The parties in Wells, and the panel, apparently accepted as a given that the applicable statute of limitations was three years in accordance with section 775.15....

...ias. The state argued that Lucas got a copy of the information on November 16, 1994, putting him on notice of the charges against him, and tolling the statute. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Lucas petitioned for a writ of prohibition. Section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1993), requires that prosecutions for third degree felonies commence within three years of commission of the offense. Pursuant to section 775.15(5), Florida Statutes (1993), "the mere filing of an information does not commence a prosecution....

...State, 582 So.2d 142 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). To determine whether a delay in serving the defendant has been unreasonable the court must consider whether a diligent search was made to locate the defendant or whether the defendant was absent from the state. § 775.15(5), Fla....

...on Lucas; hence, Lucas was on notice of the charges against him. This argument is unavailing. The Florida Supreme Court has established that commencing prosecution requires execution of the capias upon the defendant, and that "the word `executed' in section 775.15(5) can only mean service upon the defendant." State v....

..."One of the fundamental tenets of statutory construction requires that we give statutory language its plain and ordinary meaning...." Spicer v. Overby, 613 So.2d 548, 549 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993). The plain meaning of the statute does not provide for "notice" to defendant. "[S]ection 775.15, provides an express and unambiguous definition of [commencement of prosecution] and it does not include the act of arresting a person and notifying him of the charges that the state may or may not file against him at a later date." State v. Watkins, 685 So.2d 1322, 1323 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)(emphasis added). As the state concedes in its supplemental response, there is no authority for the service of an information that has not been filed with the court. See Spicer, 613 So.2d at 549 (§ 775.15(5) does not *908 authorize issuance of capias before an information is filed)....

...See Genden v. Fuller, 648 So.2d 1183 (Fla.1994) (Wells, J., dissenting). Thus, an expansion of the reach of the speedy trial rule in respect to misdemeanors consolidated with felonies by not applying rule 3.191(f) as written is further in conflict with section 775.15(2)(c) and (d), Florida Statutes, and article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution....

...an seven years later, on October 28, 2008. The crime charged is subject to a five-year statute of limitations. See § 812.035(10), Fla. Stat. (2001). This specific statute of limitations controls over the more general limitations provisions found in section 775.15, Florida Statutes....

...The cause of action accrued when the crime was committed, no later than June 20, 2001. A prosecution is commenced, for statute of limitations purposes, when the information is filed, unless there is an "unreasonable delay" in execution of the capias. § 775.15(5), Fla....

...tion 784.048(2), Florida Statutes (2000), for events occurring between December 1, 1995, and September 26, 2000. He moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that pursuant to the two-year statute of limitations for first-degree misdemeanors set forth in section 775.15(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2000), he could not be charged with any of the incidents alleged to have occurred before September *1061 27, 1998....

...red by statute of limitations). The circuit court denied the writ. The circuit court concluded that stalking was a continuing course of conduct crime for which the statute of limitations begins to run only when the course of conduct stops. We agree. Section 775.15(4), Florida Statutes (2000), provides in relevant part that "[a]n offense is committed either when every element has occurred or, if a legislative purpose to prohibit a continuing course of conduct plainly appears, at the time when the...

...Section 893.13(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1979), provides, inter alia, that any person who possesses in excess of ten grams of certain controlled substances described in Section 893.03(1)(a) or (b) is guilty of a first-degree felony for *341 which the statute of limitations is four years. See § 775.15(2)(a), Fla....

...Prosecution for grand theft, a third degree felony, must be commenced within five years. § 812.035(10), Fla. Stat. (1998). A prosecution is commenced when an indictment or information is filed, assuming the capias is executed without unreasonable delay. § 775.15(5)(b), Fla....

...In May 1990, an information was filed charging grand theft and trespassing which offenses were alleged to have occurred in November 1989. Although timely issued, the capias was not executed until March 1993, long after the applicable two-year limitations period had expired. Section 775.15(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1989), requires that the state commence prosecution for a first degree misdemeanor (e.g., trespassing) within 2 years of the offense....

...A prosecution is deemed commenced, however, at the time the information is filed, provided the capias issued on the information is executed without "unreasonable delay." An inability to locate the defendant despite a diligent search shall be considered in determining whether a delay is reasonable. § 775.15(5), Fla....

...t Venice High School. The Motions to Dismiss Before LaMorte entered into the plea agreements, he filed motions to dismiss the charges in both cases. He argued in pertinent part that the prosecutions were barred by the statute of limitations and that section 775.15(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1981-1983, Supp....

...When LaMorte entered into the plea agreements, he reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motions to dismiss. LaMorte was convicted of the first-degree and second-degree felonies in accordance with his plea. Statute of Limitations Prosecution for a first-degree felony must be commenced within a four-year period. § 775.15(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1981-1983). Prosecution for a second-degree felony must be commenced within three years. § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1990-1991). However, an extension of these statutes of limitations is found in section 775.15(3)(b) which states: (b) Any offense based upon misconduct in office by a public officer or employee at any time when the defendant is in public office or employment, within 2 years from the time he or she leaves public office or employment, or during any time permitted by any other part of this section, whichever time is greater. LaMorte argues that the legislature did not intend for the statutory extension of the limitations period supplied by section 775.15(3)(b) to apply to his actions while he was employed as a public school teacher....

...fficer or employee. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) LaMorte argues that the statute only applies to persons who hold public office. The trial court rejected LaMorte's argument. We also find LaMorte's argument not to be persuasive. *551 Statutory History Section 775.15(b)(3) was the product of a revision in the laws in 1974. Ch. 74-383, § 10, Laws of Fla. In formulating the statute, the legislature substantially rewrote section 932.465, Florida Statutes (1973), and renumbered it to become section 775.15....

...The legislature specifically included the word "employee" and referenced that employee's "employment." LaMorte's argument that the statute only applies to public officer holders is without merit. Statutory Construction This is a case of first impression in Florida with regard to the use of section 775.15(3)(b) to extend the statute of limitations for prosecution of a public school teacher....

...[4] Accordingly, we affirm the convictions and sentences imposed. Affirmed. VILLANTI, J., Concurs specially. ALTENBERND, J., Dissents with opinion. VILLANTI, Judge, Specially concurring. I concur in the majority opinion in this case because I believe that it is the result required by the plain language of section 775.15(3)(b), which clearly and unambiguously makes its provisions applicable to public employees....

...Further, while I share Judge Altenbernd's concerns about the ramifications of this statute, I believe that these concerns must be addressed by the legislature rather than this court. In State v. Bruno, 107 So.2d 9, 13 (Fla.1958), the defendant challenged the constitutionality of the predecessor statute to section 775.15(3)(b), arguing that its plain meaning was unreasonable because it "could mean that one who held public office for forty years could be charged almost forty two years later for an offense committed in the first year of his tenure." In r...

...I am troubled by the disparity created by the majority's holding between the treatment of state employees and the treatment of private employees. For example, a private school teacher who steals a $500 piece of equipment is subject to a three-year statute of limitations, see § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2007), while a public school teacher, or perhaps even a janitor, who commits the same act is subject to a statute of limitations that may not expire for thirty years. See § 775.15(12)(b)....

...NOTES [1] LaMorte also had been charged in case 05-CF-10351 with lewd, lascivious, or indecent act upon or in the presence of D.P., a child under fourteen years of age in violation of section 800.04, Florida Statutes (1979-1983). However, the State later dismissed this charge. [2] In 1981 through 1983 and 1990 through 1991, section 775.15(3)(b) was the applicable subsection for extending the statute of limitations for misconduct in office by a public employee. The subsection is now located at section 775.15(12)(b)....

...In criminal cases, the applicable statute of limitations is that which is in effect at the time of the offense giving rise to the criminal charges. State v. Perez, 952 So.2d 611 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); see Rubin v. State, 390 So.2d 322, 323-24 (Fla. 1980). LaMorte cites to section 775.15(12)(b) throughout his argument. In this opinion, citations to the statute shall be to the subsection in effect at the time the offenses were committed, section 775.15(3)(b)....

...Corey, Assistant Public Defender, Clearwater, for Respondent. WHATLEY, Judge. The State of Florida filed this petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of an order of the circuit court sitting in its appellate capacity. The order determined that the two-year statute of limitations period defined in section 775.15, Florida Statutes (1997), applied to the crime of petit theft, and therefore, the State's information *1237 filed against Brenda Telesz was properly dismissed because the case did not commence within the two-year period....

...4, Florida Statutes (1997). Telesz was not arrested until July 2002, after having failed to appear on a summons issued on December 22, 1998. The county court dismissed the information based on the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations in section 775.15, and the circuit court affirmed the dismissal. Section 775.15(2)(c) provides that prosecution for a misdemeanor of the first degree must be commenced within two years after it is committed....

...J.M., 824 So.2d 105, 112 (Fla.2002) (noting the "long-recognized principle" of statutory construction that a more specific statute will control over a more general statute). Although Telesz notes that there are no district court decisions involving this issue, several districts have held that section 812.035(10), instead of section 775.15, applies to the offense of grand theft....

...2d DCA 1987), this court determined that the offense of grand theft is controlled by section 812.035(10), "which provides a five-year statute of limitations in cases of theft instead of the general three-year statute of limitations for third degree felonies" outlined in section 775.15....

...f limitations controls "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law" and held as follows: Section 812.035 does not require a strict construction but is to be construed in light of its remedial goal. § 812.037, Fla. Stat. (1983). On the other hand, section 775.15 must be strictly construed. § 775.021(1), Fla. Stat. (1983).... Accordingly, we do not believe the legislature has authorized the state to apply section 775.15(6) to the special statute of limitations for theft. See also Williams v. State, 707 So.2d 897 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). Several other district courts have held that section 812.035 takes precedent over section 775.15 in grand theft cases. State v. Hampton, 692 So.2d 278, 279 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997) (holding that the more specific five-year statute of limitations period in section 812.035 applied to grand theft rather than the more general statute, section 775.15); O'Malley v....

...hstanding any other contrary statute"), reversed on other grounds, State v. Fields, 505 So.2d 1336 (Fla.1987); State v. Bare, 473 So.2d 799, 800 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (concluding that the statute of limitations period in section 812.035(10) supersedes section 775.15(2)(b)). We note that there is no language in section 812.035(10) or section 775.15 which would suggest that the limitations provision should apply differently to petit theft than it does to grand theft....

...d theft. That section provides that "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, a criminal or civil action or proceeding under ss. 812.012-812.037 or s. 812.081 may be commenced at any time within 5 years after the cause of action accrues. . . ." Section 775.15(5) states that "[a] prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay." (Emphasis...

...f the date of the offense. See Young v. State, 784 So.2d 1249 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (after filing of information, notice to appear at arraignment and defense filing of waiver of formal arraignment and entry of plea was sufficient "other process" under section 775.15(5) to commence prosecution): see also Starling v....

...y has been convicted in a reprosecution of the case"). We find the reasoning in these cases construing similar statutes to be persuasive, and therefore, find that a prosecution commences by either the filing of the indictment or the information. See § 775.15(4)(a), (b), Fla....

...ense. The appellant alleges that he escaped from county jail on May 26, 1996, and the capias against him was not executed until December 18, 2002. Because escape is a second-degree felony, prosecution was required to be commenced within three years. § 775.15(2)(b), Fla....

...The execution of the capias was clearly outside of the three-year time limit. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record showing that the state conducted a reasonable search in an attempt to locate the appellant so it is unclear whether the time period could have been extended by three years. See § 775.15(6), Fla....

...d not allege any error for direct appeal. The sole defect now being complained of has to do with the state's failing to establish and allege in the charging document that the offenses were not time barred by reason of the statute of limitations. See § 775.15(5), Fla....

...r jurisdiction of the Circuit Court regarding this matter. [3] Grosser contends that the ninety day time period began to run on the date when the Florida Uniform Traffic Citations were issued (July 14, 2007). [4] The State argued at the hearing that § 775.15(4)(b), Florida Statutes, provided the basis for utilizing the date of filing an Information as the date when the speedy trial clock begins to run in cases where the defendant had not been previously arrested or served with a summons/Notice to Appear. Section 775.15, however, is the statute of limitations for the prosecution of criminal charges; it has no bearing whatsoever upon the speedy trial timeframes which are provided for in Rule 3.191....

...Defendants theorize that because no information or indictment were ever issued against Plaintiff Sharp for the offense of official misconduct or for any other charge, and because Sharp was never arrested and never required to appear in court, no judicial proceeding was actually initiated. Defendants point out that Fla. Stat. § 775.15(4)(b) provides that "prosecution on a charge on which the defendant has not previously been arrested or served with a summons is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed ....

...The charge of organized scheme to defraud, a third-degree felony, was filed against Labrador on December 22, 2003. The alleged incidents giving rise to the charge occurred between February 16, 2000, and August 21, 2000. The statute of limitations for a third-degree felony is three years. See § 775.15(2)(b), Fla....

...Rehearing Denied May 2, 1986. Nicholas J. Capuano, Miami, for petitioner. Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Norma J. Mungenast, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent. PER CURIAM. Petitioner seeks to prohibit his trial on charges of armed robbery alleging that the statute of limitations, section 775.15, Florida Statutes (1977), has expired. *66 Section 775.15 which was in effect at the time of the charged offense provides in pertinent part: 775.15 Time limitations....

...ced by the issuance of a warrant. However, due to the express and unambiguous definition of the term "commencement" in the current statute, the rationale of Sturdivan is not applicable to prosecutions for crimes committed after the effective date of section 775.15....

...Because the time to file a postconviction motion under rule 3.850 is extended by an appeal and, thus, can be longer than the time limitations period for prosecution of a third-degree felony, Ms. Kassis probably can no longer be prosecuted for this offense (unless the false statement is actually in the affidavit). See § 775.15, Fla....

...increased the risk of death as a penalty, we find that Eaddy was denied due process. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial. It is so ordered. BARKETT, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, SHAW, GRIMES, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 775.15(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1977), provides that "[a] prosecution for a felony of the first degree must be commenced within 4 years after it is committed." [2] The sentencing order found that the murder was committed while the defendant w...

barred by the statute of limitations under section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2006). As will be

...The 1993 statute in effect at the time of Norris's offenses controls. Brown v. State, 674 So.2d 738, 739 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). Accordingly, the prosecution for Norris's misdemeanor and third-degree felony must have commenced within two years and three years, respectively, after he committed them. § 775.15(2), Fla. Stat. (1993). A prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons or other process is executed without unreasonable delay. § 775.15(5)....

...as not unreasonable. Brown, 674 So.2d at 740-741. An unexcused delay in serving appropriate process until after the statute of limitations has run bars prosecution for the offenses charged. Neal v. State, 697 So.2d 903, 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). Under section 775.15(6), Florida Statutes (1993), the limitation period does not run during any time when the defendant is continuously absent from the state or has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state, but in no case does that provision extend the applicable limitation period by more than three years....

the date the crime was committed. See § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004). However, the limitations

...Norton was arrested in St. Lucie County on July 30, 2014. Ms. Norton filed a motion to dismiss the information on the ground that the State failed to timely commence prosecution within the three-year statute of limitations for a third-degree felony. See § 775.15(2)(c), Fla....

...Norton and execute the capias so as to excuse its delay in commencing prosecution. At the time it filed the information, the State had neither arrested Ms. Norton nor served her with a summons, so it was required to timely commence prosecution pursuant to section 775.15(4)(b), which provides: A prosecution on a charge on which the defendant has not previously been arrested or served with a summons is commenced when either an indictment or information...

...cy to deal in stolen property, a third degree felony. The defendant moved to dismiss the Information, asserting that based on the allegations in the Information, the prosecution was commenced beyond the three-year statute of limitations set forth in section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2004). In response, the State argued that the five-year statute of limitations set forth in section 812.035(10) was applicable because it was more specific than the general three-year statute of limitations in section 775.15(2)(b)....

...Rather, as the parties acknowledge, the conspiracy and solicitation charges are violations of section 777.04, which pertains to "Attempts, solicitation, and conspiracy." Therefore, as the Information was filed beyond the applicable three-year limitations period set forth in section 775.15(2)(b), we reverse the defendant's conviction and sentence....

...Netherly to the extent they hold that the State must prove a defendant’s absence from the state hindered the prosecution or that the State conducted a diligent search for the defendant while he was continuously absent in order to toll the statute of limitations set forth in section 775.15, Florida Statutes (2008). BACKGROUND AND FACTS On July 20, 2012, Brian Michael Robinson was charged in an information in Count 1, a second-degree felony, with promoting sexual conduct by a child in v...

...After Robinson was arrested on a longstanding warrant for possession of child pornography, he filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the statute of limitations applicable to second- and third- degree felonies barred his prosecution. He contended that under section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2008), the prosecution of any felony other than a capital or first-degree felony must be commenced within three years after commission of the alleged criminal act, and that after the arrest warrant was issue...

...2. The State countered that Robinson was outside of the state from May 2008 until June 2012 and, thus, the statute of limitations had not run because it was tolled during the -2- entire time. Pursuant to section 775.15(5), Florida Statutes, (2008), the State argued, it need only prove that the defendant had been continuously absent from the state during the time in question in order to toll the statute of limitations. Robinson disagreed and...

...Robinson was outside Florida for most of the time during the limitations period, the State failed to make any diligent search for him, and that Robinson’s absence from the state was not his fault and did not prevent the State from prosecuting him. The State countered that section 775.15(5), which provides a tolling of the statute of limitations when a defendant is continuously out of state, did not require any type of search be made or that the absence hindered the prosecution....

...The State further contended that during the time that Robinson was out of state and deployed to Afghanistan, there was no practical way he could have been brought back. The trial court denied Robinson’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that “[s]ection 775.15(5), Florida Statutes (2008), provides that ‘[t]he period of 2....

...That same April 2011, Watkins learned that Robinson had been deployed to Afghanistan. -5- limitation does not run during any time when the defendant is continuously absent from the state,’ ” and because the decisions of three district courts of appeal had previously held that section 775.15 tolls the statute of limitations when the defendant is continuously absent from the state.3 Based on the evidence presented and stipulations and agreement of counsel, the trial court found that “Defendant was continuously absent f...

...the denial of his motion to dismiss as dispositive, to which the prosecutor agreed. The trial court allowed the reservation and Robinson appealed to the First District Court of Appeal. On appeal, the First District affirmed the case. Robinson, 153 So. 3d 313. In construing section 775.15(5), Florida Statutes (2008), the First District held that the “limitations period may be tolled, however, for the time during which the 3....

...4th DCA 1992). -6- defendant is continuously absent from the state.” Id. at 314. The district court further held, as it did in Pearson, that “where the defendant is continuously absent from the state, the express language of section 775.15(5) does not require that the State undertake a diligent search or show that the defendant’s absence hindered the prosecution for the statute of limitations to be tolled.” Id....

...at 314 (citing Pearson, 867 So. 2d at 519). In reaching this conclusion, the First District found that the State proved Robinson was continuously absent from the state between May 2008 and May 2012. Id. The First District explained that its reading of section 775.15(5) in this case, as in Pearson in 2004, conflicts with the Second District’s interpretation of earlier versions of the statute in Netherly and Perez....

...See Robinson, 153 So. 3d at 314. Based on that statement, Robinson sought discretionary review, which this Court granted. Before we discuss the court decisions cited for conflict, it is instructive to review the pertinent provisions of section 775.15, Florida Statutes (2008), which state: 775.15....

...prosecution of a defendant who has been timely charged by indictment or information or other charging document and who has not been arrested due to his or her absence from this state or has not been extradited for prosecution from another state. -8- § 775.15(1)-(5), Fla....

...The Second District’s decision in Netherly expressly construed an earlier version of the statute at issue here, stating merely demonstrating his absence was not enough to toll the statute. In order to avail themselves of the three-year tolling provision of section 775.15, the State must have shown that his absence prevented or delayed his prosecution for this offense. This court has repeatedly held that the statute of limitations will not be tolled pursuant to section 775.15(6) in cases where the State is unable to demonstrate that prosecution was delayed due to the defendant’s absence from the state. Netherly, 804 So....

...defendant’s absence from the state did not toll the five-year grand theft statute of -9- limitations under section 812.035(10), Florida Statutes (2000).4 In so holding, the Second District refused to “bootstrap the general provisions of section 775.15(5)(b) and (6) onto the specific provisions of section 812.035(10) to toll the limitations period automatically and indefinitely due to Ms. Perez’s out-of-state status.” Perez, 72 So. 3d at 308. The Second District reasoned in Perez that “[n]othing in section 775.15 suggests that it supersedes or adds to the specific limitation provisions for grand theft provided in section 812.035(10),” and that the specific statute controls over the general....

...2d at 437). This latter comment, although it deals with executing a capias and not with the statute of limitations time period, as well as the Second District’s citation to Netherly, suggest the court concluded that even if the tolling provisions of section 775.15 could be bootstrapped onto section 812.035(10), the tolling would not apply because the State did not act diligently in 4....

...In this case, we agree with the district court and the circuit court below that the State established Robinson was continually absent from the state between May 2008 and May 2012, and nothing was presented to the contrary. See Robinson, 153 So. 3d at 314. We also agree with the district court’s holding that section 775.15(5) does not require the State to conduct a diligent search or prove that the defendant’s absence hindered the prosecution in order for Robinson’s continuous absence from the state to toll the running of the limitations period....

...Florida from May 2008 through May 2012, and the statute states in pertinent part, “The period of limitation does not run during any time when the defendant is continuously absent from the state or has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state.” § 775.15(5), Fla....

...away from one’s usual - 12 - place of residence.” Black’s Law Dictionary 8 (10th ed. 2014). Accordingly, under the plain and ordinary meaning of the words “absent” and “absence,” as used in section 775.15, Robinson was “continuously absent” from the state even though he had an address of record in Florida. Robinson also asks this Court to adopt the construction placed on the statute by the Second District, which held in Netherly that the statute of limitations in section 775.15 will not be tolled in cases where the State is unable to demonstrate that the prosecution was delayed due to the defendant’s absence from the state. However, this language does not expressly appear in the text of section 775.15, and in stating that requirement, the Second District in Netherly does not identify any portion of the statute that indicates the existence of, or intent for, the requirement. Nowhere in section 775.15 does the statute require the State to prove that the continuous absence hindered the prosecution or that the State made a diligent search for a defendant who is continuously absent in order to toll the limitations period....

...should be required, but no such burden is imposed by the plain and ordinary language of the statute. Whether proof of a diligent search should be required for purposes of the tolling provision - 13 - in section 775.15(5) is a policy matter best considered by the Legislature and not a requirement to be engrafted onto the statute by the courts....

...of the best policy.” Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp. v. Perdido Sun Condo. Ass’n, Inc., 164 So. 3d 663, 668 (Fla. 2015) (citing Rollins, 761 So. 2d at 299, and State v. Ashley, 701 So. 2d 338, 343 (Fla. 1997)). Accordingly, we will not engraft onto section 775.15(5) any requirements that the State must prove it conducted a diligent search or that the defendant’s absence hindered the prosecution when the State has established that the defendant was continuously absent from the state during the limitations period. Because the State demonstrated that Robinson was continually absent from the state, the statute of limitations period was tolled under section 775.15(5) and the prosecution which occurred after he returned to Florida was not barred. CONCLUSION For the reasons explained above, we approve the decision of the First District in Robinson v. State, 153 So. 3d 313 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014). We disapprove the decisions of the Second District in Netherly v. State, 804 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), and State v. Perez, 72 So. 3d 306 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), to the extent they hold that under section 775.15, Florida Statutes, the State must prove that the defendant’s absence from the state hindered the prosecution or that the State - 14 - conducted a diligent search for the defendant while he...

...Given the admitted facts regarding the conduct at issue in count six, reversal is required under Hallberg. Crews also challenges the denial of his motions to dismiss counts two through five and seven through ten. His basis for seeking dismissal of these counts was the claim the statute of limitations, as stated in section 775.15(2), Florida Statutes, had expired and that the State improperly utilized section 775.15(12)(b), to extend the period of permissible prosecution....

...Like appellant in the instant case, the defendant in LaMorte argued that the charges against him were barred by the applicable statute of limitations; the State argued that the time for prosecution was extended by virtue of the “misconduct in public office,” section 775.15(3)(b). The trial court agreed as did a majority of the reviewing court. Like the majority in La-Morte, we hold that section 775.15(3)(b) may apply to the type of offenses committed by Crews while he was indisputably a public school teacher....

not timely commenced, due to the language of section 775.15(5), Florida Statutes (1981). (“A prosecution

...1st DCA 1979) (an amended information changed the substance of the crime which had been charged in the original information where the amendment expanded the time period during which the crime was alleged to have been committed and increased the severity of the penalty to which defendant was exposed). The state, citing section 775.15(1), Florida Statutes (1979), argues that the battery statute of limitations did not run because of defendant’s continuous absence from the state. But even if section 775.15(1) could on that basis have interrupted the running of the statute of limitations for a period long enough to prevent the statute from having run in this case (which we need not address), there was no showing that defendant was so absent....

...We conduct a de novo review of orders on motions to dismiss when they concern a question of law. See generally Crocker v. Marks, 856 So.2d 1123 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). The prosecution of a third degree felony must be commenced “within 3 years after it is committed.” See § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1998). An action is commenced “when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay.” See § 775.15(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1998) (emphasis added). “The period of *239 limitation does not run- during any time when the defendant is continuously absent from the state or has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state.” See § 775.15(6), Fla....

...1 We must decide whether the State’s failure to serve the defendant for nearly five years constituted “unreasonable delay.” This requires our consideration of the State’s inability to locate the defendant after a diligent search and the defendant’s absence, if any, from the state. § 775.15(5)(b), Fla....

...2 HAZOURI, J., and BLANC, PETER, Associate Judge, concur. . Canadian authorities contacted the State in 2001 to advise of the defendant’s detention at the border. The State chose not to extradite the defendant. This fact has no bearing on the outcome due to a 1997 amendment to section 775.15, Florida Statutes. “The failure to execute process on or extradite a defendant in another state who has been charged by information or indictment with a crime in this state shall not constitute an unreasonable delay.” See § 775.15(5)(b), Fla....

...Section 932.465, Florida Statutes (1973), provided: (1) A prosecution for an offense punishable by death may be commenced at any time. (2) Prosecution for offenses not punishable by death must be commenced within two years after commission.... Effective July 1, 1975, the statute of limitations was designated as section 775.15, Florida Statutes (1975), and provided: (1) A prosecution for a capital felony may be commenced at any time....

...n sexual activity with a child by a person in a position of familial authority. Absent any tolling provision, the statute of limitations would have expired long before the prosecution commenced in January 1999 upon the filing of the information. See § 775.15(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1993) (providing a four-year statute of limitation for first-degree felonies). The trial court found that the statute of limitations had been tolled pursuant to section 775.15(7), Florida Statutes (1993), which provides: If the victim of a violation of s....

...826.04 is under the age of 16, the applicable period of limitation, if any, does not begin to run until the victim has reached the age of 16 or the violation is reported to a law enforcement agency or other governmental agency, whichever occurs earlier. (Emphasis added.) The problem with this analysis is that section 775.15(7) does not and has never included section 794.041 as a statute to which its tolling provisions apply. However, by chapter 93-156, sections 3 and 4, at 909-911, Laws of Florida, effective October 1, 1993, section 794.041 was repealed and reenacted as part of section 794.011, which is a statute to which the tolling provisions of section 775.15(7) apply....

...Therefore, if Hemphill's offense occurred on or after October 1, 1993, he could have been properly charged under *407 section 794.011, and the statute of limitations would not have run. The 1998 criminal affidavit initiating this case reflects that the offense occurred months before October 1, 1993. The tolling provisions of section 775.15(7) are not applicable to violations of section 794.041 committed before October 1, 1993....

...her from service on Appellant’s jury. If so, Appellant contends that he is entitled to a new trial even without a showing that he was prejudiced. Although section 40.013(1) does not define the phrase “under prosecution,” Appellant argues that section 775.15, Florida Statutes (2007), which denotes when a “prosecution” is “commenced” for purposes of the statute of limitations, also marks the beginning of prosecution for purposes of the jury qualification statute....

...se, that the commencement of prosecution for purposes of the statute of limitations establishes the beginning of “prosecution” for purposes of the jury qualification statute, this event does not occur until the citation is both served and filed. § 775.15(4)(a), Fla....

...after establishing permanent or temporary residence in this state. Failure to report is a third degree felony. § 943.0435(9)(a), Fla. Stat. (2005). A prosecution for a third degree felony must be commenced within three years after it is committed. § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2005). Section 775.15(3) defines when a crime is committed, as follows: An offense is committed either when every element has occurred or, if a legislative purpose to prohibit a continuing course of conduct plainly appears, at the time when the course of conduct or the defendant's complicity therein is terminated....

...began on January 13, 2002, and ended January 13, 2005, before the prosecution commenced. If the crime was continuing in nature, the limitations period arguably began when police learned of the violation in April 2005. Pursuant to the requirement in section 775.15(3) that a legislative purpose to prohibit a continuing course of conduct "plainly appear" in order to construe this crime as continuing in nature, the trial court found that the legislative purposes and comprehensive provisions of sect...

...The applicable statute of limitations is that which was in effect at the time of the incident giving rise to the criminal charges. State v. Mack, 637 So.2d 18, 19 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994). The 1996 statute of limitations requires the State to commence a prosecution for any felony within three years after it was committed. § 775.15(2)(b), Fla....

...other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay. In determining what is reasonable, inability to locate the defendant after diligent search or the defendant's absence from the state shall be considered. § 775.15(5), Fla....

...The statute further provides that where "unreasonable delay" has been alleged, a court must consider the State's attempts to locate the defendant, as well as the defendant's absence from the state. [1] Id. We note that the legislature subsequently amended section 775.15(5), so that a "[p]rosecution on a charge on which the defendant has previously been arrested or served with a summons is commenced by the filing of an indictment, information, or other charging document." See Ch....

...as, the record is devoid of any evidence in that regard. Therefore, because the State offered no evidence at the hearing in support of its claim that attempts were made to locate Soto and execute the capias, it failed to meet its burden under former section 775.15(5)....

...elay under subsection (6) of the statute, which states, "[t]he period of limitation does not run during any time when the defendant is continuously absent from the state or has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state...." § 775.15(6), Fla....

...Deny your request." McLaughlin entered a no contest plea, reserving for appeal the dispositive issue of her motion to dismiss. The State is generally required to commence prosecution for third-degree felonies within three years after the crimes were committed. See § 775.15(2)(b), Fla....

...t any time within 5 years after the cause of action accrues." Thus, the statute of limitations is five years on the grand theft charge and three years on the battery of a law enforcement officer charge. With respect to when prosecution is commenced, section 775.15(5) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (5) A prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay. In determining what is reasonable, inability to locate the defendant after diligent search or the defendant's absence from the state shall be considered. (Emphasis added.) With respect to the defendant's absence from the state, section 775.15(6) provides as follows: (6) The period of limitation does not run during any time when the defendant is continuously absent from the state or has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state, but in no case shall...

...imitation otherwise applicable by more than 3 years. Section 812.035(10) provides that, for the grand theft charge, the defendant's absence from the state shall not "extend the period of limitation otherwise applicable by more than 1 year." In 1997, section 775.15 was amended to excuse the State for not extraditing or actively pursuing suspects who had been timely charged by indictment or information and been continuously absent from the State. See § 775.15(6), Fla....

...ases such as White, 794 So.2d 682, and State v. Martinez, 790 So.2d 520 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). In White, this court stated that "where the defendant is represented, files a plea and is arraigned, `other process' sufficient to commence prosecution under section 775.15(5) has occurred." 794 So.2d at 683....

...VILLANTI and WALLACE, JJ., Concur. NOTES [1] The 1997 amendment also provides, "Prosecution on a charge on which the defendant has previously been arrested or served with a summons is commenced by the filing of an indictment, information, or other charging document." § 775.15(5)(a), Fla....

...See Steinhorst v. State, 412 So.2d 332, 338 (Fla.1982). The dismissal of this ten year old indictment is without prejudice. See State v. Gellis, 375 So.2d 885 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979). Because there is no statute of limitations for first degree murder, see § 775.15(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2002), if or when the state obtains additional evidence, it may refile the charges against appellant....

...The trial resulted, again, in a verdict of manslaughter, after which Fridovich moved for a judgment of acquittal because the information on which he was tried was filed four and one-half years after the alleged offense and was barred by the Statute of Limitations, section 775.15, Florida Statutes....

...In count two, the State charged Mr. Lawson with lewd or lascivious battery upon an elderly person under section 825.1025(2). The applicable statute of limitations for prosecution of that crime is three years, and the limitations period ran on January 25, 2006. See § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2002). Because the information in this case was not filed until November 20, 2008, the State did not commence prosecution for the offense until after the limitations period had run. See § 775.15(5)(b) (providing that commencement of prosecution depends, in part, on the filing of an information). In addition, we agree with Mr. Lawson’s argument that the limitations period applicable to the lewd or lascivious battery charge was not extended under section 775.15(15)(a)(2), Florida Statutes (2008), based upon the commencement of the prosecution within one year of Mr. Lawson’s identification through DNA analysis. Section 775.15(15)(a)(2) does not apply to offenses that were barred from prosecution between July 1, 2004, and June 30, 2006. § 775.15(15)(b). Similarly, the limitations period was not extended under section 775.15(16)(a)(4) based upon Mr. Lawson’s identification through DNA analysis. Section 775.15(16)(a)(4) does not apply to offenses that were barred from prosecution when subsection (16) took effect on July 1, 2006. § 775.15(16)(b); ch....

...Lawson with abuse of an elderly person under section 825.102(1). As with the charge of lewd or lascivious battery, the applicable statute of limitations for prosecution of that crime is three years, and the limitations period ran on January 25, 2006. See § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2002). Because the information was not filed until November 20, 2008, the State did not commence prosecution on the elder abuse charge until after the limitations period had run. In addition, section 775.15(15)(a) and (16)(a), Florida Statutes (2008), did not extend the limitations period because those subsections do not apply to the offense of abuse of an elderly person....

...3d DCA 1980) (robbery and burglary charges were first degree felonies and not life felonies even though they were punishable by a maximum of life imprisonment). A prosecution for a felony of the first degree must be commenced within four years of the commission of the offense. § 775.15(2)(a)....

...person’s consent, and in the process thereof uses or threatens to use a deadly weapon or uses actual physical force likely to cause serious personal injury commits a life felony ... ”). There is no statute of limitations defense to this charge. § 775.15(l)(a) (a prosecution for a capital felony, a life felony, or a felony that resulted in a death may be commenced at any time)....

...Petitioner had'not been arrested or served with a summons for the charges. The capias that issued that day was not served until September 2015, a full ten years later. A prosecution for a third-degree felony “must be commenced within 3 years after it is committed.” § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2004). A prosecution for a first-degree misdemeanor “must be commenced within 2 years after it is committed.” § 775.15(2)(c)....

...dant’s absence from the state shall be considered. The failure to execute process on or extradite a defendant in another state who has been charged by information or indictment with a crime in this state shall not constitute an unreasonable delay. § 775.15(5)(b), Fla....

...Because the State did not commence prosecution for the Organized Fraud and Uttering a Forged Check offenses before their respective statutes of limitations expired; and, because the State failed to demonstrate the delay in prosecution was reasonable, we find prosecution for these two offenses was time-barred. See § 775.15(5), Fla....

...two counts of lewd or lascivious exhibition, showing obscene material to a minor, and two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a child. In sum, he was accused of five second-degree felonies, one third-degree felony, and two misdemeanors. Section 775.15(2), Florida Statutes (2004), provides that a prosecution for second- or third- degree felonies must be commenced within three years and for misdemeanors within two years "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section." When, as her...

...has not previously been arrested on the charges, a prosecution is commenced upon the filing of an indictment or information, "provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay." § 775.15(5)(b)....

... The statute answers this question. "The failure to execute process on or extradite a defendant in another state who has been charged by information or indictment with a crime in this state shall not constitute an unreasonable delay." § 775.15(5)(b)....

...On its face, this last sentence of subsection (5)(b) sets forth a bright- line rule that requires us to reverse. We disagree with Soebhag’s assertion that in his case the rule is altered by language in the next subsection of the statute. Section 775.15(6) provides as follows: The period of limitation does not run during any time when the defendant is continuously absent from the state or has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state....

...limitations statute, this one did not include language that excluded from the limitations cap defendants who had been charged but not arrested due to their absence from Florida or that relieved the State of any obligation to seek extradition. Compare § 775.15(5)(b), (6), Fla. Stat. (1999), with § 812.035(10), Fla. Stat. (2000). Applying the principle that specific statutes must control over general ones, we held that subsections (5) and (6) of section 775.15 must "yield to section 812.035(10), and the State was limited to a maximum limitations period of six years." Perez, 72 So....

...State, 804 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). That case involved the 1991 statute of limitations, which predated the amendment that added the statutory language discussed above. See ch. 97-90, § 1, at 514, Laws of Fla. (adding the pertinent provisions to section 775.15(5) and (6))....

question I would answer in the negative under section 775.15(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2004), as explained

municipal charter, or ordinance? SUMMARY: Section 775.15(2)(d), F. S., which establishes a time limitation

...An “amended indictment” was returned on April 2, 1983, alleging verbatim the same kidnapping, under the same count. Amendments to the indictment entailed the addition of another de *120 fendant on Counts I, II and IV. No new charges were made against Domberg. Section 775.15(2), Florida Statutes (1981), requires that prosecution be commenced within four years....

...truction of our rules of court in this case. Deference to the substantive law reflected in the statute of limitations governing the charges in this case naturally steers us toward an interpretation of rule 3.191 that does not interfere with sections 775.15 and 812.035, Florida Statutes (or, at least interferes as little as possible with those statutes). Section 775.15(2)(b) gives the state three years following the burglary of a conveyance to file criminal charges....

...The State did not file an information on these charges until May 10, 2000. Appellant filed a motion to dismiss the information alleging that it violated the statute of limitations because it was filed more than three years after the date of the offenses. At the hearing on the motion, the State argued that section 775.15(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1995), 1 provides that the statute *756 of limitations may be extended for three years when the offenses are based on fraud and when the prosecution is commenced within one year after the fraud is discovered by the aggrieved party. Appellant argued that Samuel Gray was the aggrieved party, and thus, the operative date for purposes of section 775.15(3)(a) was the date that Samuel Gray received notice that his driver’s license was suspended for failure to pay the fines on the three traffic tickets....

...the State to establish that the offense is not barred by the statute.” Sutton v. State, 784 So.2d 1239, 1241 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). The burden is not on the defendant to establish that the State could not rely on the three-year extension set forth in section 775.15(3)(a)....

...Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to dismiss the information and his resulting conviction and sentence and remand with directions that appellant be discharged. Reversed and remanded with directions. THREADGILL, A.C.J., and SILBERMAN, J., concur. . Section 775.15, Florida Statutes (1995), provides, in part: (1) A prosecution for a capital or life felony may be commenced at any time....

...At his sentencing in January 2016, the State candidly raised with the trial court the possibility that the charge and conviction on Count 2 might be barred by the three- year statute of limitations applicable to lewd or lascivious sexual battery (section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes).3 Specifically, Count 2 of the 2015 amended 1 Each of the first 11 counts alleged the sexual battery crimes between January 1 and December 31 of the years between 2001 and 2011, respectively....

...Wainwright, 322 So. 2d 473, 475 (Fla. 1975). Section 914.22, Florida Statutes (2014), creates the crime of tampering with a witness, making it a third- degree felony when, as here, it “involves the investigation or prosecution of a misdemeanor,” and section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2014), grants the State three years from the offense date within which to file third-degree felony charges on the offense....

...committed, the State will be forever barred from charging or trying the accused, as a matter of substantive law. Substantive law also requires timely notice of the filed - 23 - charges to a defendant. This is accomplished by section 775.15(4)(b), which provides that the filing of an information only satisfies this substantive, statutory time limitation if the “capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable...

...because it misinterprets the rule as creating a substantive 175-day time bar to prosecution—contrary to the Legislature’s determination that “prosecution for a capital felony, a life felony, or a felony that resulted in a death may be commenced at any time.” § 775.15(1). There is no way to know how many times this Court’s misinterpretation of rule 3.191 has resulted in discharge without trial or acted to bar further prosecution in cases dropped by the State where evidence was later secured th...

...Goodwin, 625 F.2d 693, 700-701 (5th Cir.1980) (emphasis original). In determining whether the answers to these interrogatories can possibly have a tendency to incriminate Dr. Raass, we note that the statute of limitations for first-degree felonies is four years and for lesser felonies is three years. § 775.15, Fla.Stat....

CANADY, Judge. The State filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of an order from the circuit court sitting in its appellate capacity. The order determined that the *526 two-year statute of limitations period defined in section 775.15, Florida Statutes (1999), applied to the crime of petit theft charged against Beverly J....

...Townsend contended that the State had failed to make reasonable and diligent efforts to execute the capias 1 and that the statute of limitations had expired. Based on these circumstances and the application of the two-year statute of limitations period under section 775.15, Florida Statutes (1999), the county court dismissed the information....

...ity. Id. Here, as in Telesz , the five-year statute of limitations is applicable. 2 Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with Telesz . KELLY and WALLACE, JJ., concur. . See § 775.15(5)(b), Fla....

...Armengol Hernandez seeks a writ of prohibition preventing the circuit court from proceeding with his criminal prosecution. In a previous order of this court, we granted the petition for writ of prohibition, and this opinion now follows. Hernandez maintains that the State failed to timely commence prosecution. See § 775.15, Fla....

...State, 697 So.2d 903, 905 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997). For these purposes, prosecution is commenced “when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay.” § 775.15(5)(b)....

...An unexcused delay in executing service bars the prosecution for the offense charged. Norris, 784 So.2d at 1189 ; Neal, 697 So.2d at 905 . See generally Brown v. State, 674 So.2d 738 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995); State v. Miller, 581 So.2d 641 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Pursuant to section 775.15(6), the statute of limitations may be tolled if a defendant is continuously absent from the state or has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state. A review of the record demonstrates that the State failed to make a sufficient showing that would avoid the implication of the statute of limitations referenced in section 775.15....

...s could have occurred was November 13,1993. In response to these amended dates, Dankert filed a verified motion to dismiss the information, contending that his prosecution on these charges was barred by the three-year statute of limitations found in section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...Based on this testimony, Dankert argued that the prosecution of these charges was barred by the statute of limitations because the information was filed more than three years after the latest possible date on which the offenses could have occurred. In response, the State argued that the tolling provision of section 775.15(7), Florida Statutes (1993), applied and that the November 13, 1993, report was insufficient to trigger the statute of limitations because there was no evidence at that time to corroborate the allegations. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, finding that the November 13, 1993, report to HRS was legally insufficient because the statute of limitations was tolled under section 775.15(7) until there was “some substantiated report that would give the State Attorney, at least if not probable cause, at least reasonable ground to suspect that something was going on and they ought to investigate further.” Dankert was...

...nt. In this appeal, he raises numerous errors that occurred during trial and at sentencing, including challenging the denial of Ms motion to dismiss. Because that issue is dispositive, we need not address Dankert’s remaining arguments. *1223 Under section 775.15(2)(b), a prosecution for a second-degree felony must be commenced within three years after it is committed....

...Clearly, the State did not commence its prosecution against Dankert within three years after the offenses were committed. Therefore, unless some exception or tolling provision applies, this prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations. The State contends that the tolling provision of section 775.15(7) allows for this prosecution to go forward. Section 775.15(7) states: If the victim of a violation of s....

...rred. Here, the record firmly establishes that the alleged violation was reported to HRS and to law enforcement in November 1993 and that HRS promptly reported the results of its investigation to the State Attorney. Thus, under the plain language of section 775.15(7), the statute began to run in November 1993 with the report to HRS....

...lleged violation to the state attorney. This court is powerless to engraft additional requirements onto an unambiguous statute. Second, the State argues that no “violation” was reported in 1993 because the report was only an allegation. However, section 775.15(7) clearly states that law enforcement or the government agency must report “such allegation ” to the state attorney for the judicial district “in which the alleged violation occurred.” (Emphasis added.) Therefore, the statute...

...from expiring before discovery, or a reasonable opportunity of discovery, by the party whose legal rights were violated). Here, it is clear that the State had notice of A.C.’s molestation by Dankert in November 1993, and all of the requirements of section 775.15(7) were satisfied at that time....

...However, when this court is called upon to apply a statute, it must be guided by the language of the statute itself rather than by the popularity of the result of the statute’s proper application to the facts. Here, we cannot rewrite the clear provisions of section 775.15(7) to require corroboration of a reported offense, nor may we ignore the statutory language that allows an alleged violation to trigger the running of the statute of limitations....

interpretation of a different statute of limitations, section 775.15, Florida Statutes, not the statute at issue

...In this case we are asked to decide a question of law which the First District Court of Appeal certified to be of great public importance: DOES THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR “MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE” BY A PUBLIC OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE IN SECTION 775.15(12)(b), FLORIDA STATUTES, APPLY TO A PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHER? Crews v....

...twelve, including eight counts charging second- or third-degree felonies alleged to have been committed between June 2001 and June 2006.1 Ordinarily these charges would have been barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to second- and third-degree felonies. See § 775.15(2)(b), Fla....

...The statute of limitations that applies to a criminal charge is generally the one in effect at the time of the conduct giving rise to the charge. See State ex rel. Manucy v. Wadsworth, 293 So. 2d 345, 347 (Fla. 1974); Abdullah v. State, 883 So. 2d 843, 844 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). Section 775.15(2), Florida Statutes (2001), -2- However, the State also charged that when he committed the offenses, Petitioner was a public employee and that by committing them, he engaged in “misconduct in office” under section 775.15(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2001).3 Section 775.15(3)(b) extended the limitation period for offenses “based upon misconduct in office by a public officer or employee.”4 which remained the same in substance throughout the period when the offenses were alleged to have taken place...

...first degree must be commenced within 2 years after it is committed. (d) A prosecution for a misdemeanor of the second degree or a noncriminal violation must be commenced within 1 year after it is committed. 3. Section 775.15(3)(b) remained unchanged in substance throughout the period during which the offenses were alleged to have taken place, although it was readopted as section 775.15(12)(b), Florida Statutes, in 2005. See ch. 2005-110, § 1, Laws of Fla. 4. The relevant language of section 775.15(12)(b), Florida Statutes (2015), which in substance reads the same as the provision did at the time of the events in this case, provides as follows: (12) If the period prescribed in subsection (2) ....

...v. Dep’t of Revenue, 365 So. 2d 687, 689 (Fla. 1978). “[W]ords of common usage, when used in a statute, should be construed in their plain and ordinary sense.” Pedersen v. Green, 105 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1958). The relevant language of section 775.15(12)(b), Florida Statutes (2015), provides: (12) If the period prescribed in subsection (2) ....

...The argument is that the Legislature’s choice to include classroom teachers within the defined category of “instructional personnel” in the public education statute indicates an intent to exclude public school teachers from the reference to “public officer or employee” in section 775.15(12)(b). The rule of lenity, as expressed in section 775.021(1), applies when a statute is “susceptible of differing constructions.” The requirement to construe the language most favorably to the accused applies when the posited differing constructions are reasonable....

...y of two or more quite different but almost equally plausible interpretations.”). The statutory definition of teachers as “instructional personnel” applies in the context of public school personnel management and is not in pari materia with section 775.15(12)(b)....

...during their terms of office and connected with the duties of their office shall be commenced within two years after the officer retires from the office. Chapter 74-383, section 10, Laws of Florida, revised this provision and adopted it in amended form as section 775.15(3)(b), Florida Statutes, reading as follows: (3) If the period described in subsection (2) has expired, a prosecution may nevertheless be commenced for: .... (b) Any offense based on mi...

...In State v. Bruno, 107 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1958), a municipal officer was charged with grand larceny and moved to dismiss the charge for expiration of the statute of limitations. The case involved the application of section 932.06, Florida Statutes, the predecessor of section 775.15(12)(b), which extended the limitation period until two years after the end of the defendant’s term of office....

...As we held in Bruno, the policy issue involved in the present case—whether it makes good sense to extend the limitation period so substantially—is for the Legislature to determine. We answer the certified question in the affirmative and hold that section 775.15(12)(b), Florida Statutes, applies to public school teachers. - 18 -  II. Petitioner’s second argument is that the statute of limitations ex...

...The trial court found that a prima facie case was established and denied the motions to dismiss, following which Petitioner submitted his nolo pleas and the court adjudicated him guilty. As stated above, the district court of appeal affirmed, holding that section 775.15(12)(b) applied to the offenses in this case on the authority of LaMorte. - 19 -  Petitioner argues that the term “misconduct in office” requires that there be a connection between...

...NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING MOTION, AND IF FILED, DETERMINED. PARIENTE, J., dissenting. Under the guise of a “plain language” analysis, the majority has concluded that the statutory phrase “misconduct in office” in section 775.15(12)(b), Florida Statutes (2015), actually means misconduct in “employment.” The majority’s interpretation extends the statute of limitations for all public employees, for any crime connected with their employment and committed...

...st a minor victim. In fact, an extended statute of limitations already exists for certain criminal sexual offenses committed against minors, extending into the victim’s age of majority in some circumstances or even, in others, indefinitely. See § 775.15(13)(a)-(c), (14)(a)-(b), Fla....

...Crews was charged with, among other offenses, second- and third- degree felonies of lewd or lascivious molestation, lewd or lascivious exhibition, and showing obscene material to a minor. As the majority opinion notes, second- and third-degree felonies are ordinarily subject to a three-year statute of limitations under section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes....

...ty’s holding between the treatment of state employees and the treatment of private employees. For example, a private school teacher who steals a $500 piece of equipment is subject to a three-year statute of limitations, see § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2007), while a public school teacher, or perhaps even a janitor, who commits the same act is subject to a statute of limitations that may not expire for thirty years. See § 775.15(12)(b)....

VAN NORTWICK, J. Brian Michael Robinson challenges the denial of his motion to dismiss, arguing that the statute of limitations prohibited the State from proceeding against him. Because the running of the statute of limitations was tolled under section 775.15(5), Florida Statutes (2008), while Robinson was continuously absent from the state, his prosecution was not barred by the statute of limitations. Accordingly, we affirm. Under section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2008), prosecution for second and third degree felonies must be commenced within three years. This limitations period may be tolled, however, for the time during which the defendant is continuously absent from the state. § 775.15(5), Fla....

...2d DCA 2001). Once the jurisdiction of the court is challenged by the raising of the statute of limitations, the State has the burden to establish that the offense is not barred by the statute. Fleming v. State, 524 So.2d 1146,1146-47 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). Section 775.15(4)(b) provides that process must be executed without unreasonable delay and: In determining what is reasonable, inability to locate "the defendant after diligent search or the defendant’s absence from the state shall be considered. The failure to execute process on or extradite a defendant in another state who has been charged by information or indictment with a crime in this state shall not constitute an unreasonable delay. Section 775.15(5) provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he period of limitation does not run during any time when the defendant is continuously absent from the state.......

...failed to demonstrate that it made a diligent search for Robinson or that his absence from the state hindered prosecution. We do not agree. This court has held that, where the defendant is continuously absent from the state, the express language of section 775.15(5) does not require that the State undertake a diligent search or that the defendant’s absence hindered the prosecution for the statute of limitations to be tolled. Pearson, 867 So.2d at 519 . As we noted in Pearson, id., our reading of section 775.15(5) conflicts with the second district’s interpretation of that statute in Netherly v....

...The State alleged that Brown committed sexual battery on his two minor daughters— Y.B. and C.B.—from May 1, 1997 through July 31, 1998. At the time the offenses were committed, the applicable limitations period for the offenses charged was four years. See § 775.15(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997). Section 775.15(7) provided in relevant part: If the victim of a violation of s....

...The abuse of Y.B was reported to the Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) on April 29, 1998. C.B. turned 16 on May 1, 2001. The abuse against her was reported to DCF on November 15, 1999. Because the violations were reported to DCF before the victims turned 16, pursuant to section 775.15(7), the limitations period would have expired on April 29, 2002, for Y.B., and on November 15, 2003, for C.B., respectively. Appellant moved to dismiss both counts on the grounds that the prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations....

...offense was committed, a prosecution of the offense may be commenced at any time. This paragraph applies to any such offense except an offense the prosecution of which would have been barred by subsection (2) on or before October 1, 2003. § 775.15(7)(b), Fla....

...prosecutions for both crimes. Brown pled no contest and reserved the right to appeal the court’s denial of his motion to dismiss. He was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to concurrent 25-year terms of imprisonment. 1Subsequent to the 2003 amendment, Section 775.15(7)(b), was redesignated Section 775.15(13)(b) on July 1, 2005....

...at 179. Unlike the situation in Torgerson, the 2003 amended version of the statute added an entirely new subsection specifically providing that the prosecution of an offense satisfying certain requirements “may be commenced at any time.” See § 775.15(7)(b)....

...1999). -4-  The crime against Y.B. was reported to DCF on April 29, 1998, so the statute of limitations applicable to her expired on April 29, 2002, meaning that prosecution of the offense pertaining to her would have been barred “on or before October 1, 2003.” § 775.15(7)(b), Fla....

within the designated 30 days. The statute, like § 775.15(5), describing the time within which criminal

commenced within three years after it is committed. § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2007). Appellant was first

there are no time restrictions on prosecution, see § 775.15(1), Fla. Stat. (1989); and (2) kidnapping, in

...harge. The jury found the appellant guilty of both crimes. Mr. Blanche now contends that the trial court erred in allowing the amendment because the statute of limitations had run on the misdemeanor battery, as well as the time for speedy trial. See § 775.15(2)(c), Fla....

...e and the outstanding warrant was discovered. Defendant moved to dismiss the grand theft charge claiming that the three-year statute of limitations deprived the court of jurisdiction. The trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss. Section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1981), provides that prosecution of a non-capital, non-life felony such as grand theft must be commenced within three years of the alleged offense....

...3d DCA 1992) (two-year delay between filing information for escape and *127 the service of capias upon defendant’s recapture not unreasonable where state presented evidence on defendant’s intentional and successful elusion of state custody). Reversed. . Section 775.15(6) provides that the "period of limitation does not run during any time when the defendant is continuously absent from the state or has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state, but in no case shall this prov...

...This, too, is a defensive matter that must be raised at trial. Had it been raised, the state could have shown that, even though Sochor was indicted for kidnapping beyond the applicable four-year limitation period, his undisputed, continuous absence from the state tolled the running of the statute. See § 775.15(6), Fla.Stat. (1989). Thus, the trial court did not commit fundamental error by failing to instruct the jury in this regard. In addition, capital crimes are not subject to a statute of limitation. Section 775.15(1), Fla.Stat....

...We reverse the trial court’s denial of Cowan’s claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to seek Cowan’s discharge based on the running of the statute of limitations. Cowan was convicted of the sale and possession of cocaine occurring on April 6 and 11, 1989. Section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1989), requires prosecution for second-degree felonies to be commenced within three years of commission of the offense. Under section 775.15(5), a prosecution is commenced when an information is filed if the capias or other process is executed without unreasonable delay....

...Based on this information, the trial court concluded Co-wan was absent from Florida for at least two years before he was served with the warrant. The court found that Cowan was timely charged by indictment, but not arrested within three years, due to his absence from the State. Citing to section 775.15(5)(b), Florida Statutes (1999), the court concluded that failure to execute process on or extradite a defendant who has been charged by information did not constitute an unreasonable delay....

...That statutory provision states, in relevant part, “[t]he failure to execute process on or extradite a defendant in another state who has been charged by information or indictment with a crime in this state shall not constitute an unreasonable delay.” We conclude, that the 1999 version of section 775.15(5)(b) does not apply to Cowan’s case. In Brown v. State, 674 So.2d 738 , 740 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995), this court held the “statutes of limitation that apply are those that were in effect at the time of the incidents giving rise to the criminal charges.” Section 775.15(5) is *369 part of section 775.15(3), which provides the three-year statute of limitation for Co-wan’s crimes. Therefore, the 1989 version of section 775.15(5) applies to Cowan because the “incidents giving rise to the criminal charges” against him occurred in 1989. The 1989 version of section 775.15(5) does not contain the provision relied upon the trial court in denying relief....

...ther process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay. In determining what is reasonable, inability to locate the defendant after diligent search or the defendant’s absence from the state shall be considered. § 775.15(5). Under the 1989 version of the statute, a factual question is presented as to whether the State executed the capias “without unreasonable delay.” In Brown , this court held that, under a pre-1997 version of section 775.15(5) “a defendant’s out-of-state incarceration on an unrelated offense does not toll the statute of limitations, nor does it suspend the requirement that the capias, summons or other process issued on an indictment or information be executed without unreasonable delay.” 674 So.2d at 742 ....

NORTHCUTT, Judge. The circuit court dismissed charges of grand theft and failure to appear against Mark McCubbins on the ground that the *967 State had failed to timely commence prosecution. See § 775.15, Fla....

...Turning first to the grand theft charge, we find that Martinez controls and that the circuit court erred in dismissing this charge. 1 As in Martinez , McCubbins had counsel at the time the information was filed against him and a plea was entered on his behalf. “Other process” sufficient to commence prosecution under section 775.15(5) occurred by the time of his pretrial conference on January 10, 1994, well within the statute of limitations for his crime....

...custody or out on bail for the offense of failure to appear. While the information was filed within the limitations period, the capias was not executed until approximately seven years after its issuance, after the statute of limitations had run. See § 775.15(2)(b) (establishing a three-year statute of limitation for McCubbins’s crime). The question then becomes whether it was executed “without unreasonable delay.” § 775.15(5)....

...We note that the circuit court did not have the benefit of our decision in State v. Martinez, 790 So.2d 520 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), at the time it dismissed the grand theft charge against McCubbins. . The statute of limitations for grand theft is five years. § 812.035(10), Fla. Stat. (1993). .Under section 775.15(6), the statute of limitations does not run if the defendant is continuously absent from the State of Florida, "but in no case shall this provision extend the period of limitation otherwise applicable for more than three years.” But...

...The state, however, did not execute the capias until May 3, 1999, when appellee surrendered to Florida authorities after his arrest in South Dakota on an unrelated charge. Appellee filed a motion to dismiss the information. He argued that his prosecution was barred by a three-year statute of limitations under section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...The trial court concluded that the state failed to execute the capias without unreasonable delay and dismissed the information. The state argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the information because the statute of limitations may be extended up to three years under section 775.15(6), if appellee was continuously absent from the state....

...Ocksrider, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee. FORST, J. Appellant Wilgy Therlonge was convicted of lewd and lascivious battery of a person under sixteen years of age. His appeal challenges the trial court’s construction of section 775.15(16)(a)4., Florida Statutes (2007), which extends the statute of limitations for lewd and lascivious offenses. As Appellant’s DNA was not obtained during the “original investigation” within the meaning of the statute, we reverse....

...over three years had passed since the crime was reported to law enforcement—Appellant was charged with lewd and lascivious battery of a person under sixteen years of age. Despite the time lapse, the State argued that it was permitted to continue the prosecution under section 775.15(16)(a), which provides an extension to the statute of limitations period in certain circumstances: In addition to the time periods prescribed in this section, a prosecution for [a lewd or lascivious offense] may be...

...gh the analysis of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence, if a sufficient portion of the evidence collected at the time of the original investigation and tested for DNA is preserved and available for testing by the accused[.] § 775.15(16)(a)4., Fla. Stat. (2007) (emphasis added).1 Appellant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that section 775.15(16)(a) could not be applied to his case because his DNA was not obtained during the “original investigation” within the meaning of the statute....

...4th DCA 2013) (quoting Brook v. State, 999 So. 2d 1093, 1097 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009)). We reject the trial court’s conclusion that there was an “original, ongoing investigation” (emphasis added) sufficient to trigger the extension period of section 775.15(16)(a)4....

...Our decision is dictated by the plain language of the statute and the fact that no DNA evidence of the crime was collected during the “original investigation” to preserve for comparison against an accused and thus trigger the application of the extension period under section 775.15(16)(a)4....

...original investigation had first been declared “inactive.” Conclusion We reverse and vacate Appellant’s conviction and sentence, including his designation as a sexual offender, as the extension of the statute of limitations period under section 775.15(16)(a) is inapplicable in the instant case....

...This, too, is a defensive matter that must be raised at trial. Had it been raised, the state could have shown that, even though Sochor was indicted for kidnapping beyond the applicable four-year limitation period, his undisputed, continuous absence from the state tolled the running of the statute. See § 775.15(6), Fla.Stat. (1989). Thus, the trial court did not commit fundamental error by failing to instruct the jury in this regard. In addition, capital crimes are not subject to a statute of limitation. § 775.15(1), Fla.Stat....

...Turner by indictment for a life felony that allegedly occurred when he was a minor. First, there is no dispute that this offense is a life felony. See § 794.011(2), Fla. Stat. (1991). As a result, proceedings for this offense are not barred by any statute of limitations. See § 775.15(1), Fla....

period applicable to third degree felonies. See § 775.-15(2)(b), Fla.Stat. The amended information first

...orida. We agree with the defendant. A criminal prosecution commences "when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay." § 775.15(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). The indictment or information is executed when it is served on the defendant. State v. Fields, 505 So.2d 1336, 1337 (Fla.1987). Both sections 775.15 and 812.035, Florida Statutes (2001), provide for tolling of the statutory time period during any time that the defendant is "continuously absent from the state or has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state." Clearly, if the limitations period was not tolled while the defendant was in the federal prison in Florida, the statutes of limitations applicable to the defendant's charges expired prior to service of the arrest warrant. See §§ 775.15, 812.035(10)....

...(1989) (“a criminal proceeding ... may be commenced at any time within five years after the cause of action accrues.”). A prosecution is commenced when an information is filed, provided the capias or other process issued is executed without unreasonable delay. § 775.15(5), Fla....

...As we explained in Brown , due diligence requires monitoring the accused’s status while he is in custody out of Florida. Moreover, Polk County made no attempt to serve Williams at his address in Tennessee. Process was not served on Williams “without unreasonable delay.” § 775.15(5), Fla. Stat. (1989). The case against him must be dismissed for failure to commence prosecution within the statutory limitations period. Reversed and remanded with directions. BLUE, A.C.J., and WHATLEY, J., concur. . Section 775.15(6), Florida Statutes (1989), which provides that the limitations period may be tolled if the defendant is continually absent from the state, does not apply to this case because the crime charged was grand theft....

...A capias issued for the new charge, but the notice was sent to the wrong address. The capi-as was not served until December 10, 2011. Mora moved to dismiss the information. He argued that prosecution was not commenced within the three-year statute of limitations for this third-degree felony. 1 See § 775.15(2)(b), Fla....

...levation in the penalty. This petition follows. “A petition for writ of prohibition is a proper remedy to prevent a prosecution that is barred by expiration of the statute of limitations.” Beyer v. State, 76 So.3d 1132, 1134 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012). Section 775.15(4), Florida Statutes, provides: (4)(a) Prosecution on a charge on which the defendant has previously been arrested or served with a summons is commenced by the filing of an indictment, information, or other charging document....

...his rule 3.851 motion; (2) the trial court erred in denying his claim of newly discovered evidence; (3) the trial court erred in finding that trial counsel was not ineffective regarding the speedy trial issue; (4) the application of the amendment to section 775.15, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Manslaughter Jury Instruction Smith contends that the trial court erred in denying his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective in allowing the jury instruction on manslaughter because the statute of limitations for the offense had run as to victims Leon Hadley and Melvin Lipscomb. Smith contends that the application of section 775.15(2)(b), which extended the statute of limitations for manslaughter, violated the Ex Post Facto Clause....

...State, 526 So.2d 909, 911 (Fla. 1988) (finding a claim procedurally barred because it was not presented to the trial court in the defendant’s rule 3.850 motion and could not be raised for the first time on appeal). Effective October 1, 1996, the Florida Legislature amended section 775.15 and provided that a prosecution for “a felony that resulted in a death” may be commenced at any time....

...Spera does not afford Smith relief because the trial court found that Smith’s motion was untimely, not that there was a pleading deficiency. . First-degree murder is a capital felony, § 782.04(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995). "A prosecution for a capital ... felony may be commenced at any time.” § 775.15(1), Fla....

...of the crime (thus, prosecution must have commenced before August 7, 2021). It further explained: A prosecution is commenced when an information is filed, provided a capias, summons, or other process is executed without unreasonable delay. See § 775.15, Fla....

...motion to dismiss, applying the statute of limitations in effect at the time of the alleged crimes. See State v. Soebhag, 163 So. 3d 672, 2 673 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015); State v. Perez, 952 So. 2d 611, 612 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). Section 775.15(4)(b) provides: A prosecution on a charge on which the defendant has not previously been arrested or served with a summons is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the ca...

...tment or information is executed without unreasonable delay. In determining what is reasonable, inability to locate the defendant after diligent search or the defendant’s absence from the state shall be considered. § 775.15(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2018). Morreale argues that the term “executed” means completion of service on the defendant, and that the filing of a detainer is not the equivalent of the process contemplated by section 775.15. She argues the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss on the basis that a detainer and information were timely filed. 1 We agree with Morreale that the filing of a detainer is not the equivalent of the process contemplated by section 775.15(4)(b). See Lett v....

...iscovered evidence. We agree with Sheppard that Roberts’s statement would have been against his penal interests because his recantation could have resulted in his prosecution for perjury based upon his testimony at Sheppard’s 2012 trial. See § 775.15(6), Fla....

...6. In Lightbourne v. State, 644 So. 2d 54, 57 (Fla. 1994), this Court reasoned that no reasonable person “would believe they were subject to a perjury penalty eight years after providing testimony at a trial.” The Court in Lightbourne relied on section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1991), which, at the time, set the statute of limitations at three years for perjury committed in a capital case. However, in 1997, the Florida Legislature amended section 775.15 to say, “A prosecution for perjury in an official proceeding that relates to the prosecution of a capital felony may be commenced at any time.” Ch. 97-90, § 1, at 514, Laws of Fla. (amending § 775.15(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1996)). The statute has since been renumbered, but the language remains the same. See § 775.15(6), Fla....

...Some time limits are procedural, while others are substantive. Splash & Ski, Inc. v. Orange Cty., 596 So. 2d 491, 495 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). For example, the power to establish time limitations for bringing some actions resides with the legislature. See, e.g., § 775.15, Fla....

...to dismiss, arguing that the statute of limitations for the second-degree felony expired on September 6, 2008, and that even if the State could establish it was entitled to the -2- three-year tolling period afforded under section 775.15(5), Florida Statutes (2005)—a fact he expressly did not concede—the statute of limitations would have expired on September 6, 2011. At the hearing on the amended motion to dismiss, the trial court erroneously sugg...

...See, e.g., Davis v. State, 26 So. 3d 647, 649 n.1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010). -3- degree felony if the crash resulted in injury or death. § 316.027.2 Therefore, the State had three years to commence prosecution. See § 775.15(2)(b). However, section 775.15(1) provides that "[a] prosecution for a capital felony, a life felony, or a felony that resulted in a death may be commenced at any time." On its face, the statute requires that the commission of the felony result in the death of the victim. The trial court shall make specific findings based on the State's evidence as to whether Roblero Escalante's leaving the scene of the accident "resulted in" death and whether section 775.15(1) applies....

by the Legislature through its enactment of Section 775.15(2)(d), Florida Statutes. Accordingly, the Circuit

...4, and January 31, 1985. A capias for the appellant’s arrest was issued on January 15, 1986, but not served until January 23, 1989. The appellant filed a motion to dismiss the charge against him on the ground that the prosecution was prohibited by section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...The appellant then entered a plea of nolo contendere and reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion. The trial court accepted the plea, withheld adjudication of guilt, placed the appellant on one year’s probation, and ordered restitution. The appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Section 775.15(2)(b) requires the state to commence a prosecution for a third degree felony within three years of the offense. A prosecution is commenced by filing an information only if the capias issued as a result of that information is executed without unreasonable delay. § 775.15(5)....

...In this case the information was filed within the three year period, but the capias was not executed without unreasonable delay. In determining what is reasonable, the inability to locate a defendant after a diligent search, or the defendant’s absence from the state must be considered. § 775.15(5)....

...[5] Not surprisingly, however, the only prison sentence he received based on these pleas was with respect to one of the burglary charges. Thus, he posits that the only reason he is in prison for these offenses is because his lawyer failed to advise him that he had a valid limitations defense. Section 775.15, Florida Statutes (2001), provides in pertinent part: (2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, prosecutions for other offenses are subject to the following periods of limitation: (a) A prosecution for a felony of the first degree must be commenced within 4 years after it is committed....

...Stewart while he was in prison does not cure the problem. A detainer merely advises prison officials that a prisoner has other charges pending, and requests notification of the prisoner's release. It is not the equivalent of the process contemplated by section 775.15(5)....

...Department of Revenue, March 9, 1978. The offense proscribed by Section 212.-12(2) is a misdemeanor of the second degree. Since no specific limitation period is set out in Chapter 212 for this offense, the general time limitations are applicable. 1 Section 775.15, Florida Statutes (1975), provides: ****** *1081 (2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, prosecutions for other offenses are subject to the following periods of limitation: * * * * * # (d) A prosecution for a misdemeanor of the second degree ......

...1989) (noting that “the limitations period in effect at the time of the incident giving rise to the criminal charges controls the time within which prosecution must be begun”). However, Jean-Marie’s argument fails because the predicate acts underlying the RICO charge included multiple homicides. Section 775.15(1), Florida Statutes (2003), which prescribes general time limitations for criminal prosecutions, provides that “[a] prosecution for a capital felony, a life felony, or a felony that resulted in a death may be commenced at any time.” (emphasis added). Thus, because the RICO charge here was predicated on “a felony that resulted in a death,” section 775.15(1) governs the relevant time limitations rather than section 895.05(10). Jean-Marie nonetheless argues that section 775.15(1) cannot apply here because the statutory amendment adding the relevant language was passed after the enactment of section 895.05 and did not evince a legislative intent to abrogate the five-year limitation in the RICO statute. See Ch. 77- 334, § 5, Laws of Fla. (enacting RICO statute with same five-year limitation period); Ch. 96-145, § 2, Laws of Fla. (adding “felony that resulted in death” language to section 775.15 and providing that amendment will take effect 3 October 1, 1996)....

...ffect so important a measure as a repeal of a law without expressing an intention to do so.”). Accordingly, we assume the legislature knew of the existing five-year statute of limitations in section 895.05(10) and, through the clear language of 775.15(1), intended to remove that limitation in the subset of cases involving felonies resulting in death....

...with one another.”); see also McKendry v. State, 641 So. 2d 45, 46 (Fla. 1994) (“[W]hen two statutes are in conflict, the later promulgated statute should prevail as the last expression of legislative intent.”). Thus, we read the later-enacted section 775.15(1) in conjunction with section 895.05(10) to provide no time limitation on the State’s ability to bring a substantive RICO charge based on a predicate felonious act that resulted in a death....

...�s motion. Brown entered pleas of no contest to all charges but reserved the right to appeal this issue. Second-degree burglary, a violation of section 810.02(3), Florida Statutes (1985), is subject to a three year statute of limitations pursuant to section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1985). Criminal mischief, a violation of section 806.13, Florida Statutes (1985), is subject to a one year statute of limitations pursuant to section 775.15(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1985). The statutes begin to run on the day after the offenses are committed, § 775.15(4), Fla.Stat....

...In the alternative the state contends that prosecution was commenced when the delinquency petition was filed. The trial court based its decision on the latter. We disagree with both contentions and reverse. Section 932.465(2), Fla.Stat. (1973), the forerunner to section 775.15, the statute of limitations applicable in this case, did *363 not provide a definition for “commencement of prosecution.” Under section 932.-465(2), prosecution commenced once a warrant was issued or placed in the hands of the proper official for execution. Sturdi-van v. State, 419 So.2d 300 (Fla.1982); see generally State v. Fields, 505 So.2d 1336 (Fla.1987). In contrast, Section 775.15 specifically provides that “[a] prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay.” § 775.15(5), Fla....

LETTS, Judge. Prosecution for aggravated assault must be “commenced” within three years after it has been committed. With regard to the meaning of the word “commenced,” section 775.15(5), Florida Statutes (1985), reads in relevant part as follows: (5) A prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay....

...or the purposes of the statute of limitations, prosecution has commenced when a warrant has been issued and placed in the hands of the proper official for execution.” Yet it appears to us that the Sturdivan court did not purport to be in-terpretmg section 775.15(5), and never alluded to it....

...2d DCA 1965), as authority for its statement that prosecution is commenced when a warrant has been issued and placed in the hands of a proper official for execution. The court in Rosengarten, however, was interpreting section 932.05, Florida Statutes (1965), a predecessor statute to section 775.15 when it propounded the above-stated general rule. The predecessor statute, quite unlike the current statute in many respects, does not contain the language now expressed in section 775.15(5) regarding execution of a warrant without unreasonable delay....

(1991). The applicable statute of limitations is section 775.15(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1991), providing that

...As to Count I, sexual battery on a child under the age of twelve, a capital felony, appellant argues that the information upon which he was convicted was filed in violation of his constitutional due process right to a speedy trial. We affirm the conviction for capital sexual battery. See § 775.15(1), Fla. Stat. (1985)(“A prosecution for a capital or life *777 felony may be commenced at any time.”) The other convictions are subject to the tolling provisions contained in section 775.15(7), Florida Statutes (1985), the statute in effect at the time of the crimes here at issue: If the victim of a violation of s....

question I would answer in the negative under section 775.15(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2004), as explained

for prosecutions of misdemeanor charges under Section 775.15(2)(d) applies, and would bar the Department’s

chapter. . The statute of limitations is now Section 775.-15, Florida Statutes (1979), which went into effect

...Appellant was not arrested until May, 2008. Prosecution for grand theft must be commenced "within 5 years after the cause of action accrues." § 812.035(10), Fla. Stat. (2003). Here, the grand theft "accrued" when every element occurred, no later than April 26, 2003. See § 775.15(4), Fla....

...The statute of limitations began to run on April 27, 2003. See id. Where a defendant is not arrested prior to the filing of the information, a prosecution commences when an information is filed, provided that the "information is executed without unreasonable delay." § 775.15(5)(b), Fla....

...sonable delay. See Soto v. State, 982 So.2d 1290, 1291 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). "[I]nability to locate the defendant after diligent search or the defendant's absence from the state shall be considered" in determining what is a reasonable delay. Id.; see § 775.15(5)(b), Fla....

...Trejo successfully argued that the statute of limitations had run, thereby preventing prosecution. Ordinarily second degree murder is a felony of the first degree. § 782.04(2), Fla. Stat. (1987). A prosecution for a felony of the first degree must be commenced within four years of the commission of the offense. § 775.15(2)(a)....

...However, use of a weapon during the commission of a felony enhances the degree of that felony, except when the use of a weapon is an essential element of the offense. When a weapon is used a felony of the first degree shall be reclassified as a life felony. § 775.087(1)(a). There is no limitations period for life felonies. § 775.15(1)....

...A prosecution for an offense punishable by death may be commenced at any time. (2) Prosecution for offenses not punishable by death must be commenced within two years after commission.... Effective July 1, 1975, the time limitations were amended to section 775.15, Florida Statutes (1975) to provide: (1) A prosecution for a capital felony may be commenced at any time....

...Thus, in the trial court’s view, prosecution had to be commenced within two years if the offense occurred prior to July 1, 1975 (under section 932.465, Florida Statutes (1973)) and within four years of the date of the offense if it occurred on or after July 1, 1975 (under section 775.15, Florida Statutes (1975))....

...The jury acquitted the defendant of the murder charge, but convicted the defendant of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. The defendant moved to dismiss the conviction, arguing that his prosecution was barred by the four-year statute of limitations in effect in February 1992. *815 § 775.15(2)(a), Fla....

...In Calderon I, this Court held that if the defendant's case was not time-barred as of October 1, 1996, it was subject to the statutory amendment providing that a felony "that resulted in a death" can be brought at any time. Id. at 1035; see Ch. 96-145, § 1, at 130, Laws of Fla. (amending section 775.15(1) to provide that "[a] prosecution for a ....

...Thus, this Court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the case was time-barred as of October 1, 1996. On remand, the trial court: (1) extended the limitations period by three years due to the defendant's continuous absence from this state, see § 775.15(6), Fla....

...t's motion; and (4) reinstated the conviction. This appeal followed. ANALYSIS 1. Issues on Appeal The defendant concedes on appeal that he was continuously absent from the state during the original limitations period, and thus, the 1996 amendment to section 775.15(1) applies to his conviction for conspiracy to commit first-degree murder if the conspiracy resulted in the death of the victim....

...resolved is whether this conspiracy to commit first-degree murder "resulted in a death" for the purposes of the amended statute of limitations providing that such prosecutions may be brought "at any time." Ch. 96-145, § 1, at 130, Laws of Fla.; see § 775.15(1)(a), Fla....

...(2000) (providing, as amended, that prosecution for felony resulting in death may be commenced "at any time"). We hold that a conspiracy to commit first-degree murder can result in death, and in such situations, the co-conspirators are subject to prosecution at any time. We begin our analysis of section 775.15(1)(a) with consideration of its plain meaning....

...iracy had to end for the amended statute to apply. Here, that requirement was met when the conspiracy to commit first-degree murder ended in the victim's death. Accordingly, the instant conspiracy resulted in a death, and falls within the purview of section 775.15(1)(a), as amended....

...We must conclude that the legislature was aware of the breadth of *819 these phrases, and we must give those phrases full effect. Because the instant conspiracy to commit first-degree murder is a felony that resulted in a death, the amended language of section 775.15(1)(a) applies to the defendant's prosecution....

...Among those results, without question, was death. Here, the victim's death was the object of the conspiracy in which the defendant was involved. Due in no small part to the concerted actions of the group, the instant conspiracy achieved its criminal objective. Thus, for the purposes of section 775.15(1)(a), as amended, the instant conspiracy resulted in a death....

...the motion after an evidentiary hearing. We deny the writ based on the constitutional speedy trial claim without further discussion, but we grant the petition as to the burglary of a dwelling charge because that count is barred by the statute of limitations. § 775.15(2)(b), Fla....

...5th DCA 2010) (granting writ of prohibition based upon the expiration of the statute of limitations on a second-degree felony charge). In this case, the State argues that, while the statute of limitations on the burglary of a dwelling charge would have otherwise expired, prosecution is not barred based on section 775.15(16)(a)5., Florida Statutes (2022), because Bowers was identified with DNA. Section 775.15(16)(a)5....

...n that is barred by expiration of the statute of limitations. Lett v. State, 837 So.2d 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). The statute in effect at the time of the alleged offense controls. Id. at 615 (citing State v. Shamy, 759 So.2d 728 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)). Section 775.15, Florida Statutes (1987), applies to these February 1988 offenses. Pursuant to this statute, a prosecution for a second or third-degree felony had to be commenced within three years after it was committed. § 775.15(2)(b), Fla....

...ther process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay. In determining what is reasonable, inability to locate the defendant after diligent search or the defendant’s absence from the state shall be considered. § 775.15(5), Fla. Stat. (1987). Section 775.15(6), Florida Statutes (1987), provides: The period of limitation does not run during any time when the defendant is continuously absent from the state or has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state, but in no...

...In 1997, subsection (5) was substantially revised and the following language was added: “The failure to execute process on or extradite a defendant in another state who has been charged by information or indictment with a crime in this state shall not constitute an unreasonable delay.” § 775.15(5)(b), Fla....

...ereign. Brown v. State, 674 So.2d 738 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995). The trial court in this case, without holding a hearing, denied the motion to dismiss based on the State’s response which relied on the above language in the present version of the statute. § 775.15(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2010). See also § 775.15(5), Fla....

...by the passage of time and to minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts in the far-distant past. 397 U.S. at 114-15 , 90 S.Ct. 858 . The only basis argued by the State for tolling is petitioner’s continuous absence from the State. Section 775.15(6), Florida Statutes (1987), allowed extension of the period of limitation based on continuous absence from the State but the period could not be extended by more than three years....

...automatic dismissal upon motion after the expiration of 180 days. 1995 Amendment. Subdivision (a) was amended to make it clear that the speedy trial rule was not meant to be a “statute of limitations.” Under the existing statute of limitations (section 775.15(2)(d), Florida Statutes) infractions must be filed within one year of the date of the event that is the reason for the charge....

...but in no case shall this extend the period of limitation otherwise applicable by more than 1 year.” Here, the statute of limitations expired no earlier than February 25, 2006, because the five year limitations period was tolled for one year due to Paulk’s New Jersey incarceration. Section 775.15(5)(b) provides that prosecution commences when an information is filed, “provided ......

...ocess before the expiration of the statute of limitations provided an information or indictment has been filed and process executed “without unreasonable delay.” Delay caused by a defendant’s incarceration in another state is not unreasonable. Section 775.15(5)(b), on its face, addresses only when prosecution is deemed to have commenced where a defendant was not served with process prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Here, Paulk was served with process September 29, 2005, prior to the expiration of the limitations period. Even if she had not been so served, under section 775.15(5)(b) the period of her New Jersey incarceration could not contribute to a determination that the delay was unreasonable....

...The applicable limitation periods ranged from one to five years. A capias was issued in April, 1983 but not executed because the defendant was in federal custody, out of state. Brown was not arrested until after he returned to Florida following his release in August, 1992. Under the version of sections 775.15(5)(b) and 775.15(6) then in effect, a defendant’s out-of-state confinement did not excuse the state from serving process within the limitations period or toll running of the limitations period. After Brown , section 775.15(5), Florida Statutes was amended to provide that failure to execute process on or extradite a defendant in custody in another state does not contribute to an unreasonable delay in serving process....

...Brown addressed whether prosecution was timely commenced where the limitations period ran prior to service of process. Here, process was served prior to expiration of the limitations period so Brown is inapplicable. In any event, its holding has been superseded by statute. See § 775.15(5), Fla....

...ted him incompetent to proceed to trial on that charge. The stipulated dismissal is without prejudice. And, we note that the State may prosecute Mr. Perkins "for a capital felony, a life felony, or a felony that resulted in a death ... at any time." § 775.15(1), Fla....

...originally classified this action as a violation of section 794.011(4), Florida Statutes (2019). Because R.B. reported the battery within 72 hours, there is no applicable statute of limitations and the prosecution “may be commenced at any time.” § 775.15(13)(a). 2 A notation in a police report that the State Attorney declined to prosecute is not a grant of immunity. 4 jurisdictional issues that impacted prosecution in Broward may not apply in Miami...

...he charges because the information was filed after the statute of limitations had expired. Prosecution for the offense of robbery with a weapon must be commenced within four years, and within five years for the offense of first-degree grand theft. §§ 775.15(2)(a), 812.035(10), Fla. Stat. (1993). The time period begins to run the day after the offense is committed. Id. § 775.15(4). The commencement of prosecution begins when the indictment or information is filed, provided that process is issued and executed without unreasonable delay. Id. § 775.15(5)....

...ile an information charging him with grand theft. However, the information filed on November 4, 1999, was timely as to both charges because the statute of limitations was tolled due to the appellant’s continuous absence from the state, pursuant to section 775.15(6), Florida Statutes (1993). Section 775.15, Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part: (5) A prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without un *519 reasonable delay....

...applicable by more than 3 years. Neither subsection requires that the defendant’s absence from the state must have hindered the state from proceeding with the prosecution. Instead, case law from the second district added this requirement first to section 775.15(5), and later to section 775.15(6). See State v. Miller, 581 So.2d 641, 642 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)(holding where the defendant’s absence from the state is not the fault of defendant and does not hinder prosecution, the statute of limitations is not tolled pursuant to section 775.15(5), Florida Statutes); Netherly v. State, 804 So.2d 433, 436-37 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001)(holding where the state is unable to demonstrate that the defendant’s absence from the state delayed prosecution, the statute of limitations is not tolled pursuant to section 775.15(6), Florida Statutes). The second district’s holding in Miller appears to be proper because the dispositive issue under section 775.15(5) is whether the state’s delay in prosecution is reasonable. Thus, in considering the reasonableness of the delay, it is appropriate to look to whether the defendant’s absence from the state hindered the prosecution. However, we disagree with the second district’s holding in Netherly because section 775.15(6) does not require that the delay in prosecution be reasonable in order for the statute of limitations to be tolled. Therefore, we reject the holding in Netherly and apply section 775.15(6) as written. Based on the express language of section 775.15(6), prosecution in this matter was timely commenced, as the appellant was continuously absent from the state and his absence resulted in the tolling of the statute of limitations....

...first-degree misdemeanor and specifies it is punishable "as provided in Section 775.082 or 775.083." These sections define the penalty: a maximum of one-year imprisonment and a fine of no more than $1,000. There is no reference in section 106.15 to section 775.15....

...Section 106.28, Florida Statutes, provides: Actions for violation of this chapter must be commenced before 2 years have elapsed from the date of the violation. The State responds that section 106.28 does not apply to this criminal prosecution; rather, section 775.15, Florida Statutes (2004), which contains the general criminal statutes of limitation, governs and, under its provisions, particularly subsection 3(b), the prosecution of all charges in this case was timely. The State suggests that section 106.28 applies to civil claims only and that interpreting the statutes as such, would enable the lower court to "reconcile" both "conflicting" statutory provisions. Section 775.15(2)(c), Florida Statutes, provides that the limitation for prosecution of first-degree misdemeanors is two years after commission. However, Section 775.15(3)(b), Florida Statutes (2004) contains several exceptions and tolling provisions....

...within 2 years from the time he or she leaves public office or employment, or during any time permitted by any other part of this section, whichever time is greater. Thus, the question presented is whether the time limitation in section 106.28 or in section 775.15 applies to a charge of violation of section 106.15. The State's position is that because there is a statute of limitations applicable generally to first degree misdemeanors in section 775.15, we must apply the limitation contained in section 106.28 only to civil proceedings in order to "harmonize" conflicting statutes....

...aise v. Durden, 382 So.2d 1236 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980). Since Chapter 106 addresses the specific matter of misconduct by a candidate during an election, it seems logical that the statute of limitations set forth under the same chapter should also apply. Section 775.15 is a default statute that applies where no specific statute of limitations has been made applicable to a criminal offense or in situations where the Legislature has expressly called for its use....

...Several years later, the Legislature substantially rewrote this section and in the process eliminated the specific statute of limitations. Instead, they replaced the former provision with a new subsection (4) which specified that: "Criminal prosecution for offenses under this chapter is subject to the time limitations of s. 775.15." § 517.302(4), Fla....

...This example tells us a couple of things. First, the Legislature does, in certain circumstances, provide for special statutes of limitation for specified criminal offenses and those govern over the general time limits. Second, the Legislature knows how to direct the application of section 775.15 in a comprehensive legislative enactment that contains specially created criminal offenses....

...*667 the defendant resentenced accordingly. [1] AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED. ORFINGER and EVANDER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] In addition to the conclusion we have explained above, we are also dubious that the extension contained in section 775.15(3)(b) would apply to a chapter 106 prosecution....

...On July 15, the state nolle prossed the county court information. Spicer filed a motion for discharge pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 8.191. The court denied the motion and set the cause for trial. Spicer filed a petition for writ of prohibition. Section 775.15(5), Florida Statutes (1991) provides that “[a] prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, ......

...The information was filed on March 19, 1992, and a capias issued on June 22, 1992. However, the capias was not executed until June 19, 1997, nearly five years later. When Newman was recaptured, he moved to dismiss, relying upon the three-year statute of limitations for escape. See §§ 944.40, 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1991). According to section 775.15(5), Florida Statutes (1991): A prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay....

...or the defendant’s absence from the state shall be considered. The statute of limitations begins to run the day after the offense is alleged to have been committed. Brown v. State, 510 So.2d 361, 363 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987). The word “executed” in section 775.15(5) means served upon the defendant....

...urred that no issue was arguable in the case. This court, however, was concerned with Mr. Dixon’s position on the statute of limitations and, thus, ordered supplemental briefing. It now appears that, in charging Mr. Dixon, the prosecutors believed section 775.15(15)(a), Florida Statutes (2006) — which permits a prosecution for certain offenses within one year after the date on which the identity of the accused is established, or should have been established by the exercise of due diligence, through the analysis of DNA — authorized the prosecution of Mr....

...The State now concedes that this action could have been dismissed and Mr. Dixon discharged of this crime if the statute of limitations had been raised *1244 by his attorney as Mr. Dixon requested. See generally Lawson v. State, 51 So.3d 1287 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (holding that subsections 775.15(15) & (16) did not apply where three-year statute of limitations expired on January 25, 2006, and thus prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations)....

alleged to have been committed in April of 2000. See § 775.15(2)(b), Fla. Stat. The trial court denied the motion

...This will en *41 able the appellants to refile the action if the information has not been dismissed or set aside, but the capias, summons, or other process issued on such information has not been executed without unreasonable delay. As provided for in section 775.15(5), Florida Statutes (1993), in determining what is reasonable delay, inability to locate the appellant after diligent search or the appellants’ absence from the state shall be considered....

...State, 784 So.2d 1239, 1241 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Wright v. State, 600 So.2d 1248, 1249-1250 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). To do this, the state .had to present evidence that it made a diligent search to locate and serve the appellant within the statute of limitations period. See § 775.15(5), Fla....

...[2] The trial court properly determined that the count was a "distinctly new Count not previously *227 charged," which was a "substantial amendment" of the previously filed information. However, the statute of limitations for a first-degree felony is four years under section 775.15(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...It is conceded that during this period, Robinson was unavailable. Process was ultimately served on Robinson beyond six years of the commission of the offenses. Because he was out of state and because he used several aliases, the court denied Robinson’s motion to dismiss the causes against him. Section 775.15(5), Florida Statutes, permits the filing of the information to be considered the commencement of the action if the process is executed without unreasonable delay....

...After Robinson’s motion to dismiss based on the *1267 running of the statute of limitations, the State appears to have learned of Robinson’s absence from the state and his use of aliases, but made no effort to show that efforts to serve him were thwarted by these facts. And, in any event, section 775.15(6), Florida Statutes, which specifically considers a defendant’s absence from the state and permits the period of limitation to be extended therefor, limits such extension to a maximum of three years....

...December 21, 2023 SOUD, J. Petitioner Adrienne Whittamore seeks a writ from this Court prohibiting her prosecution below, arguing that the State failed to commence the prosecution within the time established by the statute of limitations in section 775.15, Florida Statutes (2020). We have jurisdiction....

...ber 11, 2021, before the capias was executed. The State argued that the statute of limitations was tolled until the time of Whittamore’s arrest because she had no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state, as contemplated by section 775.15(5), Florida Statutes. During hearing on the motion, evidence established that Whittamore was unemployed and had lived at no fewer than three locations since November 10, 2020, though timeframes provided were vague and uncertain b...

...3d 584, 590 (Fla. 2016) (citing State v. King, 282 So. 2d 162, 164 (Fla. 1973)). 1. Generally, when calculating the statute of limitations, “[t]ime starts to run on the day after the offense is committed.” § 775.15(3), Fla. Stat. Whittamore is charged with Soliciting Lewdness (First Offense) on November 10, 2020. Prosecution for this charged second-degree misdemeanor must be commenced within one year of commission of the crime. See § 775.15(2)(d), Fla....

...served with a summons at the time of the offense, the prosecution is deemed to have commenced “when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay.” § 775.15(4)(b), Fla....

...shall be considered.” Id. However, and importantly, “[t]he period of limitation does not run during any time when the defendant is continuously absent from the state or has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state.” § 775.15(5), Fla....

...Therefore, Whittamore posits, the case must be dismissed because the State failed to meet its burden of 2 When an individual has been previously arrested or served with a summons for a crime, prosecution is commenced by the filing of the indictment or information. § 775.15(4)(a), Fla....

...Stat. 4 establishing the capias was executed without unreasonable delay—i.e., the State failed to show that it conducted a diligent search to locate her and execute the capias before November 11, 2021. Whittamore’s argument is unavailing because, while sections 775.15(4)(b) and 775.15(5) address similar matters related to the State’s failure to execute the capias upon Whittamore before November 11, 2021, each subsection operates independently from the other. See State v. Picklesimer, 606 So. 2d 473, 475 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). Section 775.15(4)(b) allows the state to “relate back” the date of service of the summons or capias to the date the information was filed if such was executed without unreasonable delay....

...5th DCA 1989) (“Since this capias was executed after the three-year limitation period had expired, the state had the burden of proving that it had been diligent in its efforts to execute the capias in order to establish that the prosecution was timely.”). On the other hand, section 775.15(5) provides that the statute of limitations is tolled when an individual is either “continuously absent from the state or has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state.” § 775.15(5), Fla. Stat. Different than the relation back allowed by section 775.15(4)(b), section 775.15(5) provides that the statute is tolled—that the statute does not begin to run—when a defendant is continuously absent from the state or has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work in the state. Simply stated, section 775.15(5) allows for the delay of the commencement of prosecution involving a defendant with such a status. The State does not suggest Whittamore was continuously absent from the State. Rather, the State asserts the one-year statute of limitations was tolled because Whittamore had “no 5 reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work in the state.” 3 See § 775.15(5), Fla. Stat. Two categories of defendants are contemplated by this language in section 775.15(5): (1) a defendant who, in fact, has no fixed place of abode or employment because he or she moves about from place to place on a continual basis, and (2) a defendant whose circumstances are such that his or her place of abode or employment could not reasonably be ascertained from obvious sources of information. See generally Cunnell v. State, 920 So. 2d 810, 813 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). In this case sub judice, Whittamore had no reasonably ascertainable place of abode as contemplated by section 775.15(5). The State initially endeavored to serve a summons upon Whittamore at her last known address on Catalina Street in Titusville....

...The timeframes she provided for various residences were at best vague and uncertain. Indeed, Whittamore herself testified “[she] can’t just remember it off the top of [her] head” where she had lived “for every time period.” As a result, Whittamore had no reasonably ascertainable place of abode pursuant to section 775.15(5)....

...Therefore, the statute of limitations was tolled until Whittamore was arrested on the capias. The prosecution is not barred. 2. Since the statute of limitations was tolled, we need not address whether the capias was executed without unreasonable delay as required by section 775.15(4)(b). Yet, Whittamore argues that under section 775.15(5) the State was required—and failed— to provide evidence of its diligent search for her....

...ascertainable place of work. Indeed, at the hearing on her motion to dismiss, she testified she was unemployed. 6 requirements born of section 755.15(4)(b). We decline Whittamore’s invitation. The plain language of section 775.15(5) places no requirement on the State to conduct a diligent search for a defendant. As the Florida Supreme Court recognized in Robinson when construing the continual absence contemplated by section 755.15(5): Nowhere in section 775.15 does the statute require the State to prove that the continuous absence hindered the prosecution or that the State made a diligent search for a defendant who is continuously absent in order to toll the limitations period....

...Robinson contends should be required, but no such burden is imposed by the plain and ordinary language of the statute. Whether proof of a diligent search should be required for purposes of the tolling provision in section 775.15(5) is a policy matter best considered by the Legislature and not a requirement to be engrafted onto the statute by the courts. . . . Accordingly, we will not engraft onto section 775.15(5) any requirements that the State must prove it conducted a diligent search or that the defendant’s absence hindered the prosecution when the State has established that the defendant was continuously absent from the state during the limitations period. Robinson, 205 So. 3d at 591 (emphases added). The same reasoning applies here. Nothing in section 775.15 requires the State to conduct a diligent search for an individual who has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state. Different than section 775.15(4)(b)—which focuses on the State’s efforts to locate a defendant for purposes of determining 7 unreasonable delay in service of the capias—section 775.15(5) focuses on the status of a defendant as being “continuously absent from the state” or having “no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state” for tolling the statute. See 775.15(5), Fla. Stat. Certainly, to demonstrate that the applicable statute of limitations is tolled under this provision of section 775.15, the State must show it was unable to ascertain a defendant’s place of abode or work after reasonable efforts to do so. However, the plain language of the statute requires reasonable efforts to ascertain, which is different than—and does not rise to the level of—performing a diligent search for such person. III. As Whittamore did not have a reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state as contemplated by section 775.15(5), Florida Statutes, the one-year statute of limitations was tolled....

...gerson v. State, 964 So. 2d 178, 179 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (quoting State v. Shamy, 759 So. 2d 728, 730 n.2 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)); accord Rubin v. State, 390 So. 2d 322, 324 (Fla. 1980). Based on the date of the offense in this case, April 15, 2001, section 775.15(5)(b), Florida Statutes (2001) (enacted in Ch....

...The following chart illustrates the sequence of charges; the notations are explained in the analysis that follows. 2 4/15/01 Date of crime/Date crime reported to police. Statute SOL** § 775.15 Date 4/22/04 Information filed Charged (2001) Degree* (2001) SOL** Ran Count 1 Att 1° F....

...not a crime Count 2 L&L Batt (12-16) 800.04(4) 2°F (2)(b) - 3 yrs 4/14/04 Count 3 Sexual Batt 794.011(3) Life Fel. (1)(a) - any time never SOL** § 775.15 Date 5/4/10 Amended Information filed Stat....

...The initial information charging this count was filed beyond the limitations period. Count 2 charged the defendant with lewd and lascivious battery on a person 12 to 16 years old, a second degree felony. Under the three-year limitations period for commencing a second degree felony prosecution, § 775.15(2)(b), Fla....

...ar to the Count 1 charge in the amended information. It follows that the 2010 amended information Count 1 charged a wholly new crime, attempted felony murder, a first degree felony, which was subject to a four- year statute of limitations. § 775.15(2)(a), Fla....

...The 2010 Count 3 was a wholly new charge, not in the 2004 information. The 2010 prosecution for the aggravated battery with great bodily harm under section 784.045(1)(a)1., a second degree felony, was barred by the three-year statute of limitations. § 775.15(2)(b) (2001). As with Count 2, the continuation principle does not save this count....

...4 Nevertheless, at trial following presentation of the State’s case, Smith moved for dismissal of the attempted armed robbery charge, based upon the statute of limitations. The attempted armed robbery charge was a second-degree felony, 5 and was therefore subject to a three-year statute of limitations. See § 775.15(2)(b), Fla....

...§ 784.021(2), Fla. Stat. (1990). However, the allegation of use of a firearm reclassifies the offense to a second-degree felony, see section 775.087(l)(d), Florida Statutes (1990), and those charges were therefore subject to a three-year statute of limitations. See § 775.15(2)(b), Fla....

...Fla. Stat. (1990), and subject to a three-year statute of limitations. . As discussed infra, the State could have charged the armed burglary count in such a way that it would have constituted a life felony, not subject to any limitations period. See § 775.15(1), Fla....

...Chapter 39. See § 39.09(1 )(b), Fla. Stat. (1989) (providing that juvenile adjudicatory hearings are conducted without a jury). . The armed sexual battery is a life felony. “A prosecution for a ... life felony ... may be commenced at any time,” § 775.15(1), Fla....

...He argued that the statute of limitations on the criminal mischief count had expired on June 30, 2006, before the State filed the information. He further claimed that the criminal mischief and grand theft counts were not listed as delineated offenses to which the legislative DNA extension in section 775.15(15)-(16), Florida Statutes (2006), applied. Pulido acknowledged the burglary count was a delineated offense, but argued the burglary count was also time-barred. 2  The trial court...

...Jail to run concurrent with counts one and two as a prison release re-offender. We reverse Pulido’s conviction for criminal mischief. The applicable limitation period for this offense, a first-degree misdemeanor, was two years, pursuant to section 775.15(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2005)....

...Because Pulido committed the offense on January 6, 2005, the two-year statute of limitations period expired on January 5, 2007, well before the October 24, 2008 date on which the State filed the information. Additionally, criminal mischief is not one of the delineated offenses in section 775.15(16), Florida Statutes (2008), which extends the time for prosecution based upon DNA evidence for certain delineated offenses that were not time-barred on or after July 1, 2006....

...Woodruff, 676 So.2d 975, 977 (Fla.1996). Because Kirchhof was never charged with felony DUI in the initial proceeding and was subsequently charged beyond the limitations period, the trial court properly dismissed the information. AFFIRMED. GRIFFIN and EVANDER, JJ„ concur. . § 775.15(2)(b), Fla....

...The State appeals the trial court’s order granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss the State’s information based on expiration of the statute of limitations, and the amended order denying the State’s request to reconsider ruling. We reverse, finding that section 775.15(16)(a)3., Florida Statutes (2006), extends the statute of limitations in the case at hand. Background In 2017, the State charged the defendant, Pascal Estime, by information with two counts of sexual battery on a mentally defec...

...mentally defective person under section 794.011(4), Florida Statutes. The defendant moved to dismiss the information, arguing that the applicable four-year statute of limitations (“SOL”) had expired before commencement of the prosecution. He noted that under section 775.15(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2004), the SOL for the prosecution of a first- degree felony is four years from the date of the offense. He recognized that section 775.15(16)(a)3., Florida Statutes (2006) 1, extends the SOL under certain circumstances. It provides: ________________________________________________________________________ 1 On appeal, the defendant argues that subsection 16(a) does not apply retroactively to his case. In 2006, the Florida legislature amended section 775.15, adding subsection (16)(a)....

...sufficient portion of the evidence collected at the time of the original investigation and tested for DNA is preserved and available for testing by the accused: .... 3. An offense of sexual battery under chapter 794. § 775.15(16)(a)3., Fla....

...The defendant contended that the victim identified him as the perpetrator in 2004, and DNA evidence merely corroborated her allegations. Thus, he argued DNA did not “establish” his identity, and subsection 16(a) did not apply. The State responded, contending section 775.15(16)(a)3....

...before prosecution is barred by the old statute, and (b) clearly indicates that the new statute is to apply to cases pending when it becomes effective.” Bryson v. State, 42 So. 3d 852, 854 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (quoting Andrews v. State, 392 So. 2d 270, 271 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)). Further, section 775.15(16)(b) clearly states that the “subsection applies to any offense that is not otherwise barred from prosecution on or after July 1, 2006.” It is clear section 775.15(16)(a) would be applicable to the present case....

...It concluded that the DNA evidence only corroborated, but did not establish, the defendant’s identity. The State moved for rehearing, arguing the trial court incorrectly concluded that identity must be established solely through DNA in order for section 775.15(16)(a) to apply, which was “a limitation not imposed by the plain language of the statute itself.” The State noted that when law enforcement could not locate the defendant in 2004, the State “no actioned” the case because it believed that the evidence was legally insufficient....

...Her competency to testify was questionable. As such, the defendant’s identity was not established, or “put beyond doubt,” until the 2017 DNA analysis, which showed a 99.9997% likelihood of paternity. Thus, the SOL extension applies pursuant to section 775.15(16)(a)3., Florida Statutes (2006). Conclusion The trial court erred in granting the motion to dismiss the information; thus, we reverse the trial court’s ruling and remand for further proceedings. Reversed and Remanded. FORST, J., concurs. MAY, J., concurs specially with opinion. MAY, J., (specially concurring). I concur with the majority’s decision to apply section 775.15(16)(a)3., Florida Statutes, to extend the statute of limitations in this case....

...the capias and provided his current address and phone number. Defense counsel subsequently filed a motion to dismiss for the State’s failure to commence prosecution within the statute of limitations pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(b). Counsel argued that section 775.15(2)(c), Florida Statutes, requires the prosecution to commence a misdemeanor case within two years of the date of the offense and that the State failed to properly commence prosecution because the capias, summons, or other process was n...

...the incident was March 15, 2018, and the applicable limitations period expired on or March 15, 2020, unless tolled; (2) the State filed the information on July 31, 2019; and (3) the summons issued on March 13, 2019, came back unserved. The trial court noted section 775.15(2)(c) provides that prosecution for a first-degree misdemeanor “must be commenced within two years after it is committed,” and the State must file an information and serve the defendant with a notice in order to properly commence a prosecution. § 775.15(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2018). The trial court also noted section 775.15(4)(b) provides: Prosecution on a charge on which the defendant has not previously been arrested or served with a summons is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on the indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay. § 775.15(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2018). However, the trial court concluded that the supreme court’s March 13, 2020 pandemic administrative order suspended all time periods involving speedy trial procedure in criminal proceedings. Based on the administrative order, section 775.15(4)(b), and rule 3.191, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Matos subsequently petitioned to prohibit the prosecution. Analysis 3  Prohibition is...

...urt’s jurisdiction on a claim that the statute of limitations has expired. Manzini v. State, 115 So. 3d 1015, 1016 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013). Here, Matos was not arrested or served with a summons prior to the State filing the information. Therefore, section 775.15(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2018), applies: A prosecution on a charge on which the defendant has not previously been arrested or served with a summons is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed,...

...from the state shall be considered. The failure to execute process on or extradite a defendant in another state who has been charged by information or indictment with a crime in this state shall not constitute an unreasonable delay. § 775.15(4)(b), Fla....

..., “the crime was committed within the applicable statute of limitations,” and the defendant has not been surprised or hampered in his defense. Tingley, 549 So.2d at 650 . The objectionable aspect of the indictment before us is not incurable. See section 775.15(5) Fla.Stat....

...der eighteen years of age, the statute of limitations for a violation of section 800.04(5) is four years from when the victim reached the age of eighteen or when the violation was reported to a law enforcement agency, whichever occurs earlier. See §§ 775.15(2)(a) & (7)a., Fla....

...Based on the evidence contained in the Probable Cause Affidavit, including Frank's own admissions, such a charge, or charges, [1] appear to have been available. See § 794.011(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003); Coleman v. State, 484 So.2d 624 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). For such a charge, there is no statute of limitations. § 775.15(1)(a), Fla....

...ons for those counts, but affirm the remaining counts. In June 1992, the State filed a second amended information in circuit court case number 90-442. Powers moved to dismiss the third-degree felonies covered by a three-year limitations period under section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1987)....

...er, a savings and loan institution which had previously denied their loan application. The appellant received the last installment of the agreed-upon cash payments on July 12, 1985, a date outside the three-year period of the statute of limitations, section 775.15(2)(b), *1156 Florida Statutes (1987)....

...Such would be an illogical and absurd interpretation of the rule and the intent of the statute. Accordingly, we affirm the conviction for the violation of section 658.77, reverse the conviction for the violation of section 494.-093, and remand for resentencing. SCHOONOVER, C.J., and CAMPBELL, J., concur. . Section 775.15 provides further: (4) An offense is committed either when every element has occurred or, if a legislative purpose to prohibit a continuing course of conduct plainly appears, at the time when the course of conduct or the defendant's complicity therein is terminated....

...ear period preceding the filing of the information. We thus reverse the order of dismissal as it relates to Count II, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. With respect to Count I, unemployment compensation fraud, section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2012), provides that such a prosecution “must be commenced within 3 years after it is committed.” The information, filed December 4, 2012, alleged that the false statements or knowing, materi...

...Prohibition is a proper remedy for a defendant challenging a prosecution barred by a statute of limitations period. Lett v. State, 837 So.2d 614 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003). The limitation period on these third degree felonies is three years after the offense is committed, section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2001), and the information which commenced prosecution was filed beyond the limitation period. Where fraud is a material element of an offense, however, the prosecution may be commenced within one year after discovery of the offense by an aggrieved party. § 775.15(12)(a), Fla....

...bed in subsection (2) has expired, a prosecution may nevertheless be commenced for: (a) Any-offense a material element of which, is either fraud or breach of fiduciary obligation, within one year after discovery of the offense by an aggrieved party. § 775.15(3), Fla....

...A second incident allegedly occurred during a visit in 1985. Among the charges stemming from the 1981 episodes were two counts of lewd assault, a second degree felony. § 800.04, Fla.Stat. (1981). Ordinarily, the statute of limitations for second degree felonies is three years from the date of the offense. § 775.15(2)(b), Fla....

...Constantine contends this omission constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., People v. Grogan, 197 Ill.App.3d 18 , 143 Ill.Dec. 730 , 554 N.E.2d 665 (1990). 1 The state, in its response to Constantine’s motion, offered two alternative bases for denying relief. First, the state cited section 775.15(7), Florida Statutes (1989), applicable to sex offenses wherein the victims are under the age of sixteen....

...Alternatively, the state claimed that the statute of limitations was tolled by virtue of the fact Constantine moved to California in October, 1984. His “continuous absence from the state” could have extended the limitations period up to an additional three years. § 775.15(6), Fla.Stat....

...convicted. He also contends the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss because the statute of limitations had run on all counts. Prosecution for a second or third degree felony "must be commenced within 3 years after it is committed." § 775.15(2)(b), Fla....

...Abdullah was charged with possession of cocaine and possession of drug paraphernalia. He filed a motion to suppress, arguing that his arrest was illegal because prosecution for the 1993 offense had not “commenced” within the time limitations set forth in section 775.15(2), Florida Statutes (2003), which states that “[a] prosecution for a misdemeanor of the first degree must be commenced within two years after it is committed,” and “[a] prosecution for a misdemeanor of the second degree must be commenced within one year after it is committed.” See § 775.15(2)(c) & (d), Fla....

...The trial court denied the motion to suppress, ruling that the 1993 prosecution for petit theft had been timely “commenced” against Abdullah by the filing of the information in November 1993. In so holding, the court apparently relied on an amended version of section 775.15, Florida Statutes (2003), which provides that “[pjrosecution on a charge on which the defendant has previously been arrested or served with a summons is commenced by the filing of an indictment, information, or other charging document.” § 775.15(5)(a), Fla....

...on August 15, 2004, three years after the victim turned 16 years old. There is no dispute that the victim turned 16 on August 15, 2001, nor *179 any dispute that Torgerson was arrested on June 9, 2005. The lower court relied upon the 2001 version of section 775.15(7), Florida Statutes, which provides that the statute of limitations for the charged crimes does not begin to run “until the victim has reached the age of 18 or the violation is reported to a law enforcement agency ... whichever occurs earlier.” § 775.15(7), Fla....

...Previously, the statute of limitations read: “If the victim [of these applicable crimes] is under the age of 16, the applicable period of limitation, if any, does not begin to run until the victim has reached the age of 16 or the violation is reported to a law enforcement agency ... whichever occurs earlier.” § 775.15(7), Fla....

...2d DCA 1995); State v. Mack, 637 So.2d 18 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)). Based on the charging document, the State was bound by the statute of limitations in effect on August 14, 2001, the final date charged in the information. At that point in time, the applicable version of section 775.15(7), Florida Statutes, began to run when the victim turned 16, which would be August 15, 2001. Thus, the State had to commence prosecution by August 15, 2004, when the three-year limitations period ran out, pursuant to section 775.15(l)(b), (2)(b), Florida Statutes (2000)....

PER CURIAM. Petitioner seeks to prohibit his trial on charges of armed robbery alleging that the statute of limitations, section 775.15, Florida Statutes (1977), has expired. *66 Section 775.15 which was in effect at the time of the charged offense provides in pertinent part: 775.15 Time limitations.— (1) A prosecution for a capital or life felony may be commenced at any time.......

...by the issuance of a warrant. However, due to the express and unambiguous definition of the term “commencement” in the current statute, the rationale of Sturdivan is not applicable to prosecutions for crimes committed after the effective date of section 775.15....

...the testimony. He then made a motion for a mistrial, which was denied. At the instruction conference, Fridovich moved for a directed verdict of acquittal, claiming that the information on which he was tried was barred by the statute of limitations, section 775.15, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...rohibition if such findings are not supported by competent, substantial evidence. Mackey v. State, 333 So. 3d 775, 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022). “A prosecution for any [third degree] felony must be commenced within 3 years after it is committed.” § 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2015). Here, the information was filed within three years of the offense with the capias issuing the same day. Because petitioner had not been arrested or served prior to the filing of the information, section 775.15(4)(b) applies: A prosecution on a charge on which the defendant has not previously been arrested or served with a summons is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, sum...

...ch indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay. In determining what is reasonable, inability to locate the defendant after diligent search or the defendant’s absence from the state shall be considered. § 775.15(4)(b), Fla....

...DNA from a rape kit collected in 2005, shortly after the crime. Reaves moved to dismiss the charge on the basis that the state had failed to commence prosecution within the applicable four-year statute of limitations for a first-degree felony, section 775.15(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2005).  The state responded that two statutory exceptions to the limitations period applied pursuant to section 775.15(14)-(15)(a), Florida Statutes (2005), because (1) the crime was reported within 72 hours, and (2) the prosecution commenced within one year after Reaves had been identified through DNA. At the hearing on the motion and by separate...

...t; the offense continued to November 17, 1972. . By the revised criminal code effective July 1, 1975, tolling of the limitations period was made to depend for the first time on the filing of an indictment or information. Ch. 74-383, § 10, Fla.Laws; § 775.15(5), F.S....

...nt with a three-year mandatory minimum. Smith appealed to the Third District and argued for the first time that the prosecution for armed burglary, a first-degree felony punishable by life, was subject to the four-year limitations period provided in section 775.15(2)(a), Florida Statutes *55 (Supp....

...of our statute does not command a different approach. Timely commencement of prosecution is mandatory under our statute (as it is under the federal statute), but the statute does not make timeliness a nonwaivable issue of jurisdiction. See generally § 775.15, Fla. Stat. (2017) ; § 775.15, Fla....

...t for reinstatement of that conviction and sentence. It is so ordered. LABARGA, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANADY, and POLSTON, JJ., concur. PARIENTE, J., concurs with an opinion, in which QUINCE, J., concurs. LEWIS, J., concurs in result. Although section 775.15 now contains a tolling provision for burglary cases where the defendant's identity is discovered through a DNA match, that provision is inapplicable to this case because the prosecution was already time-barred before the effective date of the amendment. Smith , 211 So.3d at 192 n.21 (Emas, J., concurring) (citing ch. 2006-266, § 1, Laws of Fla., codified at § 775.15(16)(a), Fla....

...ad "filed a motion to dismiss this charge as barred by the statute of limitations, the State could validly have amended the information to charge the very same burglary, but as a life felony (a crime for which there is no statute of limitations, see section 775.15(1) ), Florida Statutes (1990)) given that Smith had committed a sexual battery during the burglary (the other offense charged in the information, which the jury found Smith guilty of)." Smith , 211 So.3d at 202-03 (Emas, J., concurring...

...tery with a firearm, a second degree rather than a first degree felony. See Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813 (Fla.1991); Torris v. State, 611 So.2d 57 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). Therefore, the prosecution was subject to the three-year statute of limitations. § 775.15(2)(b), Fla....

...ich the statute of limitations period is three years. 1 The State conceded that more than three years had passed pursuant to the limitations statute, but opposed the petitioners’ motions to dismiss by relying on the extension period established by Section 775.15(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...nvolvement of a public servant who violates, or is called upon to violate, her or his duty owed to the public), a breach of a fiduciary obligation is of necessity a material element of the offense. As a consequence we conclude that the provisions of section 775.15(a) have been met and the prosecutions are therefore not time barred. The petition for a writ of prohibition is denied. . Section 838.016(4), Florida Statutes (1995) made the offense a felony of the third degree. Section 775.15(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1995) established the three-year limitations period for third-degree felonies, inter alia....