Florida Statutes

Fla. Stat. § 775.15 (2025)

Time limitations; general time limitations; exceptions.

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775.15 Time limitations; general time limitations; exceptions.—

(1) A prosecution for a capital felony, a life felony, or a felony that resulted in a death may be commenced at any time. If the death penalty is held to be unconstitutional by the Florida Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court, all crimes designated as capital felonies shall be considered life felonies for the purposes of this section, and prosecution for such crimes may be commenced at any time.

(2) Except as otherwise provided in this section, prosecutions for other offenses are subject to the following periods of limitation:

(a) A prosecution for a felony of the first degree must be commenced within 4 years after it is committed.

(b) A prosecution for any other felony must be commenced within 3 years after it is committed.

(d) A prosecution for a misdemeanor of the second degree or a noncriminal violation must be commenced within 1 year after it is committed.

(3) An offense is committed either when every element has occurred or, if a legislative purpose to prohibit a continuing course of conduct plainly appears, at the time when the course of conduct or the defendant’s complicity therein is terminated. Time starts to run on the day after the offense is committed.

(4)(a) Prosecution on a charge on which the defendant has previously been arrested or served with a summons is commenced by the filing of an indictment, information, or other charging document.

(b) A prosecution on a charge on which the defendant has not previously been arrested or served with a summons is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without unreasonable delay. In determining what is reasonable, inability to locate the defendant after diligent search or the defendant’s absence from the state shall be considered. The failure to execute process on or extradite a defendant in another state who has been charged by information or indictment with a crime in this state shall not constitute an unreasonable delay.

(c) If, however, an indictment or information has been filed within the time period prescribed in this section and the indictment or information is dismissed or set aside because of a defect in its content or form after the time period has elapsed, the period for commencing prosecution shall be extended 3 months from the time the indictment or information is dismissed or set aside.

(5) The period of limitation does not run during any time when the defendant is continuously absent from the state or has no reasonably ascertainable place of abode or work within the state. This provision shall not extend the period of limitation otherwise applicable by more than 3 years, but shall not be construed to limit the prosecution of a defendant who has been timely charged by indictment or information or other charging document and who has not been arrested due to his or her absence from this state or has not been extradited for prosecution from another state.

(6) A prosecution for perjury in an official proceeding that relates to the prosecution of a capital felony may be commenced at any time.

(7) A prosecution for a felony that resulted in injury to any person, when such felony arises from the use of a “destructive device,” as defined in s. 790.001, may be commenced within 10 years.

(8) A prosecution for a felony violation of chapter 517 or s. 409.920 must be commenced within 5 years after the violation is committed.

(9) A prosecution for a felony violation of chapter 403 must be commenced within 5 years after the date of discovery of the violation.

(10)(a) A prosecution for a felony violation of s. 817.5695, s. 825.102, or s. 825.103 must be commenced within 5 years after it is committed.

(b) If the period prescribed in paragraph (a) has expired, a prosecution may nevertheless be commenced for any offense, a material element of which is either fraud or a breach of fiduciary obligation, within 5 years after discovery of the offense by an aggrieved party or by a person who has a legal duty to represent an aggrieved party and who is not a party to the offense.

(11) A prosecution for a felony violation of s. 440.105 or s. 817.234 must be commenced within 5 years after the violation is committed.

(12) If the period prescribed in subsection (2), subsection (8), subsection (9), subsection (10), or subsection (11) has expired, a prosecution may nevertheless be commenced for:

(a) Any offense, a material element of which is either fraud or a breach of fiduciary obligation, within 1 year after discovery of the offense by an aggrieved party or by a person who has a legal duty to represent an aggrieved party and who is himself or herself not a party to the offense, but in no case shall this provision extend the period of limitation otherwise applicable by more than 3 years.

(b) Any offense based upon misconduct in office by a public officer or employee at any time when the defendant is in public office or employment, within 2 years from the time he or she leaves public office or employment, or during any time permitted by any other part of this section, whichever time is greater.

(13)(a) If the victim of a violation of s. 794.011, former s. 794.05, Florida Statutes 1995, s. 800.04, s. 826.04, or s. 847.0135(5) is under the age of 18, the applicable period of limitation, if any, does not begin to run until the victim has reached the age of 18 or the violation is reported to a law enforcement agency or other governmental agency, whichever occurs earlier. Such law enforcement agency or other governmental agency shall promptly report such allegation to the state attorney for the judicial circuit in which the alleged violation occurred. If the offense is a first or second degree felony violation of s. 794.011, and the offense is reported within 72 hours after its commission, the prosecution for such offense may be commenced at any time. This paragraph applies to any such offense except an offense the prosecution of which would have been barred by subsection (2) on or before December 31, 1984.

(b) If the offense is a first degree felony violation of s. 794.011 and the victim was under 18 years of age at the time the offense was committed, a prosecution of the offense may be commenced at any time. This paragraph applies to any such offense except an offense the prosecution of which would have been barred by subsection (2) on or before October 1, 2003.

(c) If the offense is a violation of s. 794.011 and the victim was under 16 years of age at the time the offense was committed, a prosecution of the offense may be commenced at any time. This paragraph applies to any such offense except an offense the prosecution of which would have been barred by subsection (2) on or before July 1, 2010.

(14)(a) A prosecution for a first or second degree felony violation of s. 794.011, if the victim is 16 years of age or older at the time of the offense and the offense is reported to a law enforcement agency within 72 hours after commission of the offense, may be commenced at any time.

(b) Except as provided in paragraph (a) or paragraph (13)(b), a prosecution for a first or second degree felony violation of s. 794.011, if the victim is 16 years of age or older at the time of the offense, must be commenced within 8 years after the violation is committed. This paragraph applies to any such offense except an offense the prosecution of which would have been barred by subsection (2) on or before July 1, 2015.

(15)(a) In addition to the time periods prescribed in this section, a prosecution for any of the following offenses may be commenced within 1 year after the date on which the identity of the accused is established, or should have been established by the exercise of due diligence, through the analysis of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence, if a sufficient portion of the evidence collected at the time of the original investigation and tested for DNA is preserved and available for testing by the accused:

1. An offense of sexual battery under chapter 794.

2. A lewd or lascivious offense under s. 800.04 or s. 825.1025.

(b) This subsection applies to any offense that is not otherwise barred from prosecution between July 1, 2004, and June 30, 2006.

(16)(a) In addition to the time periods prescribed in this section, a prosecution for any of the following offenses may be commenced at any time after the date on which the identity of the accused is established, or should have been established by the exercise of due diligence, through the analysis of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence, if a sufficient portion of the evidence collected at the time of the original investigation and tested for DNA is preserved and available for testing by the accused:

1. Aggravated battery or any felony battery offense under chapter 784.

2. Kidnapping under s. 787.01 or false imprisonment under s. 787.02.

3. An offense of sexual battery under chapter 794.

4. A lewd or lascivious offense under s. 800.04, s. 825.1025, or s. 847.0135(5).

5. A burglary offense under s. 810.02.

6. A robbery offense under s. 812.13, s. 812.131, or s. 812.135.

7. Carjacking under s. 812.133.

8. Aggravated child abuse under s. 827.03.

(b) This subsection applies to any offense that is not otherwise barred from prosecution on or after July 1, 2006.

(17) In addition to the time periods prescribed in this section, a prosecution for digital voyeurism in violation of s. 810.145 may be commenced within 1 year after the date on which the victim of digital voyeurism obtains actual knowledge of the existence of such a recording or the date on which the recording is confiscated by a law enforcement agency, whichever occurs first. Any dissemination of such a recording before the victim obtains actual knowledge thereof or before its confiscation by a law enforcement agency does not affect any provision of this subsection.

(18) If the offense is a violation of s. 800.04(4) or (5) and the victim was under 16 years of age at the time the offense was committed, a prosecution of the offense may be commenced at any time, unless, at the time of the offense, the offender is less than 18 years of age and is no more than 4 years older than the victim. This subsection applies to an offense that is not otherwise barred from prosecution on or before October 1, 2014.

(19) A prosecution for a violation of s. 787.06 may be commenced at any time. This subsection applies to any such offense except an offense the prosecution of which would have been barred by subsection (2) on or before October 1, 2014.

(20) If a victim is younger than 18 years of age at the time the offense was committed, a prosecution for a violation of s. 794.011 may be commenced at any time. This subsection applies to an offense that is committed on or after July 1, 2020.

(21) In addition to the time periods prescribed in this section, a prosecution for any offense under s. 827.071(2) or (3), if the offender was 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense, may be commenced at any time. This subsection applies to any offense that is not otherwise barred from prosecution on or before July 1, 2022.

(22)(a) A prosecution for a misdemeanor violation of s. 784.049 must be commenced within 5 years after the commission of the offense or within 3 years after the date the victim discovers the offense, whichever is later.

(b) A prosecution for a felony violation of s. 784.049 must be commenced within 7 years after the commission of the offense or within 3 years after the date the victim discovers the offense, whichever is later.

History.—s. 78, Feb. 10, 1832; s. 1, ch. 4915, 1901; RS 2357; GS 3181, 3182; RGS 5011, 5012; CGL 7113, 7114; s. 1, ch. 16962, 1935; s. 10, ch. 26484, 1951; s. 109, ch. 70-339; s. 10, ch. 74-383; s. 1, ch. 76-275; s. 1, ch. 77-174; s. 12, ch. 78-435; s. 6, ch. 84-86; s. 1, ch. 84-550; s. 10, ch. 85-63; s. 4, ch. 89-143; s. 2, ch. 90-120; s. 2, ch. 91-258; s. 16, ch. 93-156; s. 17, ch. 95-158; s. 139, ch. 95-418; s. 1, ch. 96-145; s. 3, ch. 96-280; s. 3, ch. 96-322; s. 4, ch. 96-409; s. 1, ch. 97-36; s. 1, ch. 97-90; s. 1812, ch. 97-102; s. 1, ch. 97-104; s. 17, ch. 98-174; s. 7, ch. 99-201; s. 5, ch. 99-204; s. 3, ch. 2000-246; s. 1, ch. 2001-102; s. 1, ch. 2002-168; s. 1, ch. 2003-116; s. 1, ch. 2004-94; s. 1, ch. 2005-110; s. 1, ch. 2006-266; s. 15, ch. 2008-172; s. 2, ch. 2010-54; s. 6, ch. 2011-220; s. 2, ch. 2014-4; s. 6, ch. 2014-160; s. 2, ch. 2015-133; s. 30, ch. 2016-24; s. 2, ch. 2020-81; s. 6, ch. 2022-169; s. 1, ch. 2022-170; s. 2, ch. 2023-133; s. 6, ch. 2024-132; s. 2, ch. 2025-84.

Note.—Former ss. 932.05, 932.06, 915.03, 932.465.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 240 cases (16 in the last 5 years), 1976–2025 · leading case: William R. Crews v. State of Florida, 183 So. 3d 329 (Fla. 2015).

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William R. Crews v. State of Florida, 183 So. 3d 329 (Fla. 2015). · cites it 56× “15(3)(b) remained unchanged in substance throughout the period during which the offenses were alleged to have taken place, although it was readopted as section 775.15(12)(b), Florida Statutes, in 2005.”

Smith v. State, 211 So. 3d 176 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016). · cites it 42× “To illustrate the stark contrast with Florida’s original statute of limitations, I set forth below the full text of our present statute, section 775.15, Florida Statutes (2016): 775.”

Connolly, Jr. v. State, 172 So. 3d 893 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015). · cites it 30× “” § 775.15(1), Fla. Stat. (2014). 3 As will be detailed herein: (1) the defendant failed to raise an objection to any defect in the charging document and therefore waived his objection to the indictment, and no fundamental error has been demonstrated; (2) his argument regarding…”

State of Florida v. Earvin Smith, 241 So. 3d 53 (Fla. 2018). · cites it 18× “(2017); § 775.15, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1990). While we have called the timeliness of the prosecution a “jurisdictional fact,” the Third District correctly observed that we do not consider it jurisdictional “in the sense of depriving the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction.”

Brian Michael Robinson v. State of Florida, 205 So. 3d 584 (Fla. 2016). · cites it 31× “*586 BACKGROUND AND FACTS On July 20, 2012, Brian Michael Robinson was charged in an information in Count 1, a second-degree felony, with promoting sexual conduct by a child in violation of section 827.”

Goings v. State, 76 So. 3d 975 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). · cites it 24× “See § 775.15(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1993) (requiring that the prosecution be commenced within four years of commission of the offense).”

Bryson v. State, 42 So. 3d 852 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). · cites it 16× “The trial court found that the State exercised due diligence in establishing Appellant’s identity through DNA analysis, noting that “they were diligent in the collection of the materials and in the ascertaining of who was alleged to have been ... involved in the shooting.”

& SC13-2112 Corey Smith v. State of Florida & Corey Smith v. Julie L. Jones, etc., 213 So. 3d 722 (Fla. 2017). · cites it 12× “851 motion; (2) the trial court erred in denying his claim of newly discovered evidence; (3) the trial court erred in finding that trial counsel was not ineffective regarding the speedy trial issue; (4) the application of the amendment to section 775.15, Florida Statutes - 15 -…”

LaMorte v. State, 984 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). · cites it 20× “465, Florida Statutes (1973), and renumbered it to become section 775.15. Prior to renumbering and amendment, the 1973 version of section 932.”

Pearson v. State, 867 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). · cites it 17× “Section 775.15, Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part: (5) A prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without un *519 reasonable delay.”

Overton v. State, 976 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 2007). · cites it 6× “See § 775.15, Fla. Stat. (1991); Perez v. State, 545 So.”

Clements v. State, 979 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). · cites it 22× “(1989-1992) (proscribing the offense, a first-degree felony); § 775.15(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1990-1992) (providing the time limitations for prosecution of first-degree felony).”

Show all 240 citing cases →

— 775.15(1) — 24 cases

Connolly, Jr. v. State, 172 So. 3d 893 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015). “” § 775.15(1), Fla. Stat. (2014). 3 As will be detailed herein: (1) the defendant failed to raise an objection to any defect in the charging document and therefore waived his objection to the indictment, and no fundamental error has been demonstrated; (2) his argument regarding…”

Smith v. State, 211 So. 3d 176 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016). “To illustrate the stark contrast with Florida’s original statute of limitations, I set forth below the full text of our present statute, section 775.15, Florida Statutes (2016): 775.”

& SC13-2112 Corey Smith v. State of Florida & Corey Smith v. Julie L. Jones, etc., 213 So. 3d 722 (Fla. 2017). “851 motion; (2) the trial court erred in denying his claim of newly discovered evidence; (3) the trial court erred in finding that trial counsel was not ineffective regarding the speedy trial issue; (4) the application of the amendment to section 775.15, Florida Statutes - 15 -…”

State of Florida v. Earvin Smith, 241 So. 3d 53 (Fla. 2018). “(2017); § 775.15, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1990). While we have called the timeliness of the prosecution a “jurisdictional fact,” the Third District correctly observed that we do not consider it jurisdictional “in the sense of depriving the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction.”

Leo C. Bettey Jr. v. State of Florida, 244 So. 3d 364 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018).

— 775.15(1)(a) — 3 cases

Bulgin v. State, 912 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 2005).

State v. Sacco, 849 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).

Frank v. State, 23 So. 3d 129 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009).

— 775.15(1)(b) — 1 case

Billy Jim Sheppard, Jr. v. State of Florida & SC20-422 Billy Jim Sheppard, Jr. v. Ricky D. Dixon, etc. (Fla. 2022).

— 775.15(12)(a) — 2 cases

Laverde v. State, 933 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).

— 775.15(12)(b) — 3 cases

William R. Crews v. State of Florida, 183 So. 3d 329 (Fla. 2015). “15(3)(b) remained unchanged in substance throughout the period during which the offenses were alleged to have taken place, although it was readopted as section 775.15(12)(b), Florida Statutes, in 2005.”

LaMorte v. State, 984 So. 2d 548 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008). “465, Florida Statutes (1973), and renumbered it to become section 775.15. Prior to renumbering and amendment, the 1973 version of section 932.”

Crews v. State, 130 So. 3d 698 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).

— 775.15(13) — 1 case

Mathis v. State, 204 So. 3d 104 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).

— 775.15(13)(a) — 3 cases

Mathis v. State, 204 So. 3d 104 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).

Dani Shimon v. R.B. (Fla. 3d DCA 2021).

— 775.15(14) — 1 case

Thomas Reaves v. State of Florida (Fla. 4th DCA 2025).

— 775.15(15) — 1 case

Mathis v. State, 204 So. 3d 104 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).

— 775.15(15)(a) — 3 cases

Dixon v. State, 53 So. 3d 1242 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).

Lawson v. State, 51 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).

— 775.15(15)(a)(2) — 1 case

Lawson v. State, 51 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).

— 775.15(15)(b) — 1 case

Lawson v. State, 51 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).

— 775.15(16) — 2 cases

Mathis v. State, 204 So. 3d 104 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).

Pulido v. State, 181 So. 3d 1191 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015).

— 775.15(16)(a) — 8 cases

Bryson v. State, 42 So. 3d 852 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). “The trial court found that the State exercised due diligence in establishing Appellant’s identity through DNA analysis, noting that “they were diligent in the collection of the materials and in the ascertaining of who was alleged to have been ... involved in the shooting.”

Wilgy Therlonge v. State of Florida, 184 So. 3d 1120 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).

State of Florida v. Pascal Estime, 259 So. 3d 884 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018).

— 775.15(16)(a)(4) — 1 case

Lawson v. State, 51 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).

— 775.15(16)(b) — 3 cases

Lawson v. State, 51 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).

State of Florida v. Pascal Estime, 259 So. 3d 884 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018).

— 775.15(2) — 10 cases

Norris v. State, 784 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).

Crews v. State, 130 So. 3d 698 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).

State v. Soebhag, 163 So. 3d 672 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015).

— 775.15(2)(a) — 32 cases

Barrow v. State, 940 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).

Goings v. State, 76 So. 3d 975 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). “See § 775.15(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1993) (requiring that the prosecution be commenced within four years of commission of the offense).”

— 775.15(2)(b) — 92 cases

Robinson v. State, 707 So. 2d 688 (Fla. 1998).

— 775.15(2)(c) — 15 cases

Sawko v. Sawko, 625 A.2d 692 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).

Cunnell v. State, 920 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).

Coleman v. State, 655 So. 2d 1239 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

Rodriguez-Cayro v. State, 828 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).

State v. Telesz, 873 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).

— 775.15(2)(d) — 8 cases

Ivory v. State, 588 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991).

Brown v. State, 510 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).

Donaldson v. State, Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 425 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).

Adrienne Nicole Whittamore v. State of Florida (Fla. 5th DCA 2023).

Donaldson v. St., Dept. of Health & Rehab. S., 425 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).

— 775.15(2)(e) — 1 case

Pulido v. State, 181 So. 3d 1191 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015).

— 775.15(3) — 5 cases

Lieble v. State, 933 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006).

Laverde v. State, 933 So. 2d 1289 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006).

Adrienne Nicole Whittamore v. State of Florida (Fla. 5th DCA 2023).

Cowan v. State, 779 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000).

— 775.15(3)(a) — 7 cases

Cordes v. State, 842 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).

Rosen v. State, 757 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).

Gray v. State, 803 So. 2d 755 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).

O'MALLEY v. Mounts, 590 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).

Alvarez v. State, 800 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).

— 775.15(3)(b) — 4 cases

Crews v. State, 130 So. 3d 698 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).

Day v. State, 977 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008).

— 775.15(4) — 10 cases

State v. Diaz, 814 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002).

Kidd v. State, 985 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

Clements v. State, 979 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007). “(1989-1992) (proscribing the offense, a first-degree felony); § 775.15(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1990-1992) (providing the time limitations for prosecution of first-degree felony).”

Pearson v. State, 867 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). “Section 775.15, Florida Statutes, provides in pertinent part: (5) A prosecution is commenced when either an indictment or information is filed, provided the capias, summons, or other process issued on such indictment or information is executed without un *519 reasonable delay.”

Rodriguez-Cayro v. State, 828 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).

— 775.15(4)(a) — 5 cases

Hampton v. State, 103 So. 3d 98 (Fla. 2012).

Overton v. State, 976 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 2007). “See § 775.15, Fla. Stat. (1991); Perez v. State, 545 So.”

Davis v. State, 42 So. 3d 807 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

Tucker v. State, 987 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008).

Adrienne Nicole Whittamore v. State of Florida (Fla. 5th DCA 2023).

— 775.15(4)(b) — 10 cases

Luis Born-Suniaga v. State of Florida, 256 So. 3d 783 (Fla. 2018).

State v. Perez, 72 So. 3d 306 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011).

Beyer v. State, 76 So. 3d 1132 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).

Fabio Matos v. State of Florida (Fla. 4th DCA 2021).

Norton v. State, 173 So. 3d 1124 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015).

— 775.15(5) — 70 cases

Goings v. State, 76 So. 3d 975 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). “See § 775.15(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1993) (requiring that the prosecution be commenced within four years of commission of the offense).”

Brian Michael Robinson v. State of Florida, 205 So. 3d 584 (Fla. 2016). “*586 BACKGROUND AND FACTS On July 20, 2012, Brian Michael Robinson was charged in an information in Count 1, a second-degree felony, with promoting sexual conduct by a child in violation of section 827.”

State v. Shamy, 759 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000).

Starling v. State, 799 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).

State v. Fields, 505 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 1987).

— 775.15(5)(a) — 6 cases

Starling v. State, 799 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).

Cunnell v. State, 920 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).

Abdullah v. State, 883 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).

State v. Parks, 866 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).

McLaughlin v. State, 15 So. 3d 872 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009).

— 775.15(5)(b) — 20 cases

State v. Perez, 952 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).

Ehrlick v. State, 898 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).

Cunnell v. State, 920 So. 2d 810 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006).

State v. Paulk, 946 So. 2d 1230 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

State v. Soebhag, 163 So. 3d 672 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015).

— 775.15(6) — 44 cases

Goings v. State, 76 So. 3d 975 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). “See § 775.15(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1993) (requiring that the prosecution be commenced within four years of commission of the offense).”

Sochor v. State, 619 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1993).

Netherly v. State, 804 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001).

State v. Perez, 952 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007).

— 775.15(7) — 11 cases

Torgerson v. State, 964 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

Scharfschwerdt v. Kanarek, 553 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989).

Hemphill v. State, 820 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).

David Timothy Curry v. State of Florida, 227 So. 3d 628 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017).

— 775.15(7)(a) — 1 case

David Timothy Curry v. State of Florida, 227 So. 3d 628 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017).

— 775.15(7)(b) — 1 case

Markus Leon Brown v. State of Florida, 179 So. 3d 466 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).

— 775.15(a) — 1 case

Alvarez v. State, 800 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).

— 775.15(b)(3) — 1 case

— 775.15(l)(a) — 2 cases

Morris v. State, 909 So. 2d 428 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005).

Calderon v. State, 52 So. 3d 813 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011).

— 775.15(l)(b) — 2 cases

Torgerson v. State, 964 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

State v. Riveron, 723 So. 2d 845 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).

Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.