TLF v. State, 536 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). · Go Syfert
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TLF v. State, 536 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
22 citation events (4 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Simms v. State (fladistctapp, 2011-01-28)
Treatment trajectory · 1988 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1988 2007 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 11 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Simms v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
See Springfield, v. State, 481 So.2d 975, 978 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (holding officer could not in any way base his decision to arrest appellant for loitering or prowling on residents’ report of seeing black male in their back yard carrying something); cf. T.L.F. v. State, 536 So.2d 371, 372 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (holding officers could not properly consider bystander’s identification of appellant as burglary suspect in determining whether probable cause existed to arrest him for loitering or prowling).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) KRR v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
See T.T. (juvenile observed at 8:30 p.m. as a passenger in a car in a parking lot behind a closed business); E.B. (boys observed riding on bicycles at 2:45 a.m.); D.A. v. State, 471 So.2d 147 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (juvenile observed standing by a stolen motor vehicle and then fleeing); T.L.F. v. State, 536 So.2d 371, 372 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (juvenile observed "conversing with two other individuals during business hours" near an office building).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) K.R.R. v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
See T.T. ((juvenile observed at 8:30 p.m. as a passenger in a car in a parking lot behind a closed business); E.B. (boys observed riding on bicycles at 2:45 a.m.); D.A. v. State, 471 So.2d 147 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (juvenile observed standing by a stolen motor vehicle and then fleeing); T.L.F. v. State, 536 So.2d 371, 372 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (juvenile observed “conversing with two other individuals during business hours” near an office building).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Gibbons
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
T.L.F. v. State, 536 So.2d 371, 372 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Lester v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
T.L.F. v. State, 536 So.2d 371, 372 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).
discussed Cited "see" GM v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rinehart v. State, 778 So.2d 331, 335 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (Alternbernd, J., concurring) ("Loitering has long been an offense that occasionally tempts good police officers to exercise power in a manner that is inconsistent with the standards of our free society"); E.C. v. State, 724 So.2d 1243, 1245 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (loitering statute is not directed at mere idling); see T.L.F. v. State, 536 So.2d 371 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)(no probable cause to arrest appellant for loitering and prowling where officers observed shirtless appellant conversing with two other individuals during business hours, w…
discussed Cited "see" G.M. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See Rinehart v. State, 778 So.2d 331, 335 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (Alternbernd, J., concurring) (“Loitering has long been an offense that occasionally tempts good police officers to exercise power in a manner that is inconsistent with the standards of our free society”); E.C. v. State, 724 So.2d 1243, 1245 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (loitering statute is not directed at mere idling); see T.L.F. v. State, 536 So.2d 371 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)(no probable cause to arrest appellant for loitering and prowling where officers observed shirtless appellant conversing with two other individuals during business hour…
discussed Cited "see" J.P. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See T.L.F. v. State, 536 So.2d 371, 372 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988)(holding that police officers lacked probable cause to arrest a juvenile for loitering and prowling where the juvenile “made no attempt to flee or conceal himself, and his shirtless attire was not unusual for Florida and certainly not unlawful.”).
cited Cited "see" WAE v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See T.L.F. v. State, 536 So.2d 371 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).
cited Cited "see" W.A.E. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See T.L.F. v. State, 536 So.2d 371 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Dunn v. City of Boynton Beach
S.D. Fla. · 2016 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Loitering and prowling cannot be used as a “‘catchall’ criminal offense” when the police can “not prove anything else.” Ecker, 311 So.2d at 112 ; see also T.L.F. v. State, 536 So.2d 371, 373 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1988) (referring to “the dark ages when police were able to use the loitering and prowling statute as a catchall charge to arrest persons at their whim”).
T.L.F., a Child, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
87-3057.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Dec 30, 1988.
536 So. 2d 371
Ryder.
Published

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender and Laura Griffin, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and David R. Gemmer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

[*372] RYDER, Judge.

Appellant pleaded nolo contendere to charges of burglary of a structure and theft, reserving the right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. After his adjudication of delinquency for those charges, he timely appealed. We reverse.

Appellant was arrested for loitering and prowling outside the office building of Crump, Mann and Webb Insurance in Fort Myers. Officers Nicholson and Jelks, of the Fort Myers Police Department, arrived at the Crump building on a weekday morning during business hours in response to a radio call that an unidentified individual was sleeping in a car. Officer Jelks, who first arrived at the scene, observed appellant standing outside the rear of the Crump building talking to a Crump employee and a construction worker. Appellant was dressed in pants and shoes but was not wearing a shirt. Another Crump employee pointed out appellant as someone who had been loitering in the past around the building. The employee also told Officer Jelks that the building had been broken into a few days earlier and had been vandalized.

When Officer Nicholson arrived, he attempted to question appellant. Appellant refused to identify himself, reluctantly providing only his first name, and he would not explain his presence at the rear of the building. Officer Nicholson arrested appellant for loitering and prowling. A search incident to the arrest revealed a set of keys, which were identified as the keys to the Crump building. The officer read appellant his Miranda rights and appellant then confessed to the burglary of the insurance office which had occurred a few days earlier. Appellant's confession and his possession of the keys led to his arrest for burglary and theft.

The trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to suppress the confession and the keys, because the officers did not have probable cause to arrest appellant for loitering and prowling. A police officer may make a warrantless arrest for loitering and prowling only if the officer observes the accused: (1) loitering and prowling in a place, at a time, or in a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals, and (2) under circumstances warranting a justifiable and reasonable alarm or immediate concern for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity. See State v. Ecker, 311 So.2d 104 (Fla. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019, 96 S.Ct. 455, 46 L.Ed.2d 391 (1975); Chamson v. State, 529 So.2d 1160 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). Since loitering and prowling is a misdemeanor, only the officer's own observations may be considered in determining whether probable cause exists to make a warrantless arrest for loitering and prowling. Ecker; Chamson; Springfield v. State, 481 So.2d 975 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). See § 856.021, Fla. Stat. (1987).

In this case, the officers observed appellant conversing with two other individuals during business hours. Appellant made no attempt to flee or conceal himself, and his shirtless attire was not unusual for Florida and certainly not unlawful. There was no basis for the officers to conclude that appellant was loitering or prowling or that his behavior imminently threatened the safety of persons or property. The statement by a Crump employee at the scene identifying appellant as a suspect in the recent burglary could not properly be considered by the officers in determining whether probable cause existed for a warrantless loitering and prowling arrest. See Ecker; Chamson; Springfield. In addition, appellant's failure to provide identification or explain his presence, in itself, does not constitute sufficient probable cause for a loitering and prowling arrest. Failure to provide identification is not an element of the charged offense, E.B. v. State, 537 So.2d 148 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), nor is failure to explain one's presence and conduct. Cf. Ecker at 110; E.B. See § 856.021, Fla. Stat. (1987).

Under the circumstances of this case, an arrest would only have been appropriate if probable cause had existed to arrest appellant for the burglary. The police cannot be allowed to use the loitering and prowling statute to detain an individual for another offense for which probable cause is lacking and then use the fruits of the unlawful[*373] detention as evidence that the individual committed the other offense. See E.B. To allow such "bootstrapping" of evidence would lead back to the dark ages when police were able to use the loitering and prowling statute as a catchall charge to arrest persons at their whim. See Ecker.

REVERSED.

SCHEB, A.C.J., and SCHOONOVER, J., concur.