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State v. Taylor, 648 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 1995). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“refusal is relevant to show consciousness of guilt. if he has an innocent explanation for not taking the tests, he is free to offer that explanation in court.”
109 citation events (75 in the last 25 years) across 15 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Robert Roy Macomber v. State of Florida (fladistctapp, 2018-08-30)
Treatment trajectory · 1995 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1995 2010 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 40 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Robert Roy Macomber v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
refusal is relevant to show consciousness of guilt. if he has an innocent explanation for not taking the tests, he is free to offer that explanation in court.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Cinthia Vargas v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
State v. Taylor, 648 So. 2d 701, 704 (Fla. 1995); see § 316.1932(1)(a)1.a.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Oscar David Osorio v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
State v. Taylor, 648 So. 2d 701, 704 (Fla. 1995); Grzelka v. State, 881 So. 2d 633, 634 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) STATE OF FLORIDA v. ELIANA VELASCO
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
Consistent with Origi, we hold that these observations provided sufficient reasonable suspicion to detain Defendant for the purpose of conducting a DUI investigation. 79 So. 3d at 42 ; see also State v. Ameqrane, 39 So. 3d 339, 342 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (finding reasonable suspicion for DUI investigation where the defendant was speeding, smelled of alcohol, and had glassy, bloodshot eyes); State v. Taylor, 648 So. 2d 701, 703 (Fla. 1995) (finding reasonable suspicion for DUI where defendant was speeding; staggered upon exiting his car; and had slurred speech, watery, bloodshot eyes, and a strong …
cited Cited as authority (rule) DAVID OBRIEN v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
State v. Taylor, 648 So. 2d 701, 704 (Fla. 1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Terry Smith v. State of Florida & Terry Smith v. Mark S. Inch, etc.
Fla. · 2021 · confidence medium
If the evidence is logically probative, it is relevant and admissible unless there is a reason for not allowing the jury to consider it.” State v. Taylor, 648 So. 2d 701, 704 (Fla. 1995) (quoting Charles W.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Terence Tobias Oliver v. State of Florida (2×)
Fla. · 2017 · confidence medium
If the evidence is logically probative, it is relevant and admissible unless there is a reason for not allowing the jury to consider it.” State v. Taylor, 648 So. 2d 701, 704 (Fla. 1995) (quoting Charles W.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Mecham
Wash. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Superior Court, 149 Ariz. at 274 ; State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 176-77, 184 , 579 A.2d 484 (1990); State v. Taylor, 648 So. 2d 701, 703-04 (Fla. 1995); State v. Golden, 171 Ga. App. 27, 30 , 318 S.E.2d 693 (1984); State v. Wyatt, 67 Haw. 293 , 687 P.2d 544, 552-53 (1984); State v. Pick, 124 Idaho 601, 605 , 861 P.2d 1266 (1993); State v. Stevens, 394 N.W.2d 388, 391-92 (Iowa 1986); Blasi, 167 Md.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State Of Washington v. Mark Tracy Mecham
Wash. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Superior Court. 149 Ariz, at 274; State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 176-77, 184 , 579 A.2d 484 (1990); State v. Taylor. 648 So. 2d 701, 703-04 (Fla. 1995); State v. Golden. 171 Ga. App. 27, 30 , 318 S.E.2d 693 (1984); State v. Wvatt. 67 Haw. 293 , 687 P.2d 544, 552-53 (1984); State v. Pick. 124 Idaho 601, 605 . 861 P.2d 1266 (1993); State v. Stevens. 394 N.W.2d 388, 391-92 (Iowa 1986); Blasi. 167 Md.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Santiago v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
See, e.g., State v. Castaneda, 79 So.3d 41 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (reasonable suspicion present where defendant was speeding, smelled of alcohol, and had bloodshot and watery eyes); State v. Ameqrane, 39 So.3d 339 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (reasonable suspicion existed where the defendant was speeding at four o’clock in the morning, had bloodshot, glassy eyes, and smelled of alcohol); Origi v. State, 912 So.2d 69 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (reasonable suspicion present where defendant was speeding, smelled of alcohol, and had bloodshot eyes); State v. Jimoh, 67 So.3d 240, 241 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (reasonable s…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McCormick v. State
Md. Ct. Spec. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
See Johnson v. State, 337 Ark. 196 , 987 S.W.2d 694, 698 (1999) (stating that refusal to take a breath or field sobriety test indicates consciousness of guilt); State v. Taylor, 648 So.2d 701, 704 (Fla.1995) (holding that a defendant’s refusal to submit to a field sobriety test is admissible because it is relevant to the defendant’s consciousness of guilt); Hoffman v. State, 275 Ga.App. 356 , 620 S.E.2d 598, 600 (2005) (refusal to submit to a field sobriety test is admissible as circumstantial evidence to prove the driver was impaired); State v. Mellett, 642 N.W.2d 779, 788 (Minn.Ct.App.20…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Bernokeits
N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. · 2011 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Wilder v. Turner, 490 F.3d 810, 815 (10th Cir.2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1181 , 128 S.Ct. 1229 , 170 L.Ed.2d 62 (2008); Miller v. Harget, 458 F.3d 1251, 1259-60 (11th Cir.2006), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 957 , 127 S.Ct. 2429 , 167 L.Ed.2d 1130 (2007); Bernardi v. Klein, 682 F.Supp.2d 894, 902 (W.D.Wis.2010); Galimba v. Municipality of Anchorage, 19 P.3d 609, 611-12 (Alaska Ct.App.2001); State v. Superior Court, 149 Ariz. 269 , 718 P.2d 171, 176 (1986); State v. Taylor, 648 So.2d 701, 703-04 (Fla.1995); State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474 , 988 P.2d 700, 706-07 (Idaho Ct.App.1999), cert…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hayward v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 565 , 103 S.Ct. 916 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983) (holding that it was permissible for state to use appellee's refusal to take blood-alcohol test as evidence of guilt in trial for driving under the influence); State v. Taylor, 648 So.2d 701, 704 (Fla.1995) (holding that appellee's refusal to take field sobriety tests was "relevant to show consciousness of guilt"); Kurecka v. State, ___ So.3d ___, ___, 2010 WL 3766727 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (noting that where State introduces evidence of defendant's refusal to take breath test as consciousness of guilt, the def…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Ameqrane (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
In State v. Taylor, 648 So.2d 701, 703-04 (Fla.1995), the supreme court provided an example of what constitutes “reasonable suspicion” sufficient to conduct a DUI investigation: When [the defendant] exited his car, he staggered and exhibited slurred speech, watery, bloodshot eyes, and a strong odor of alcohol.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Skinner v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
See § 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (2007); State v. Taylor, 648 So.2d 701, 703 (Fla.1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jones v. Commonwealth
Va. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Longley v. State, 776 P.2d 339, 345 (Alaska Ct.App.1989) (holding evidence admissible because "[a] refusal to take the [breath] test is ... probative of guilt ... ”); Johnson v. State, 337 Ark. 196 , 987 S.W.2d 694, 698 (1999) ("The refusal to be tested is admissible evidence on the issue of intoxication and may indicate the defendant’s fear of the results of the test and the consciousness of guilt.”); State v. Taylor, 648 So.2d 701, 704 (Fla. 1995) (Appellant’s “refusal [to take field sobriety tests] is relevant to show consciousness of guilt.”); People v. Johnson, 353 …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lavallee v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
If the evidence is logically probative, it is relevant and admissible unless there is a reason for not allowing the jury to consider it.’ ” State v. Taylor, 648 So.2d 701, 704 (Fla.1995) (quoting Charles W.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Blasi v. State
Md. Ct. Spec. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
See McCormick v. Municipality of Anchorage, 999 P.2d 155, 160 (Alaska Ct.App.2000); State v. Lamme, 19 Conn.App. 594 , 563 A.2d 1372, 1375 (1989), aff'd, 216 Conn. 172 , 579 A.2d 484 (1990); State v. Taylor, 648 So.2d 701, 703-04 (Fla.1995); State v. Golden, 171 Ga.App. 27 , 318 S.E.2d 693, 696 (1984); State v. Wyatt, 67 Haw. 293 , 687 P.2d 544, 552-53 (1984); State v. Pick, 124 Idaho 601 , 861 P.2d 1266, 1270 (1993); State v. Stevens, 394 N.W.2d 388, 391 (Iowa 1986); State v. Little, 468 A.2d 615, 617-18 (Me.1983); Commonwealth v. Blais, 428 Mass. 294 , 701 N.E.2d 314, 317 (1998); *508 Columb…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Origi v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
In State v. Taylor, 648 So.2d 701, 703-04 (Fla.1995), the supreme court held that law enforcement may temporarily detain a driver for a DUI investigation based upon a reasonable suspicion.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Menna v. State (4×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. · 2003 · confidence medium
However, although there is information in the record that Menna had been to the bathroom and washed her hands before being asked to submit to the test, there was no testimony that Menna continued washing her hands after being asked to submit to the test. [2] Notably, in State v. Taylor, 648 So.2d 701, 704 (Fla.1995), we determined that the facts surrounding a defendant's refusal to take a field sobriety test were relevant to show his consciousness of guilt.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Kline
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
This was pointed out by the Florida Supreme Court in State v. Taylor, 648 So.2d 701, 704 (Fla.1995), which held that, when a DUI defendant knows that his refusal is not a “safe harbor” free of adverse consequences, his refusal is relevant to show consciousness of guilt.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) McCormick v. Municipality of Anchorage (2×)
Alaska Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
See State v. Superior Court, 154 Ariz. 275 , 742 P.2d 286, 289 (App.1987); State v. Taylor, 648 So.2d 701, 704 (Fla.1995); People v. Roberts, 115 Ill.App.3d 384 , 71 IIl.Dec. 16, 450 N.E.2d 451, 453-54 (1983); Commonwealth v. Blais, 428 Mass. 294 , 701 N.E.2d 314, 318 (1998) ("It is well-settled that roadside sobriety tests are considered analogous to physical (as opposed to testimonial) evidence.”); State v. Wright, 116 N.M. 832 , 867 P.2d 1214, 1215-17 (App.1994) (listing cases); State v. Hoenscheid, 374 N.W.2d 128, 130 (S.D.1985); Farmer v. Commonwealth, 12 Va.App. 337 , 404 S.E.2d 371, 3…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Ferreira
Idaho Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
See, e.g., State v. Superior Court, 149 Ariz. 269 , 718 P.2d 171, 176 (1986); State v. Lamme, 19 Conn.App. 594 , 563 A.2d 1372, 1374 (1989), aff'd 216 Conn. 172 , 579 A.2d 484 (1990); State v. Taylor, 648 So.2d 701, 703 (Fla.1995); Dixon v. State, 103 Nev. 272 , 737 P.2d 1162, 1163-64 (1987); People v. Califano, 255 A.D.2d 701 , 680 N.Y.S.2d 700, 701 (N.Y.App.Div.1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Blais
Mass. · 1998 · confidence medium
We answer the reported questions, “No.” The specific questions reported by the judge were: “(1) Do standard, roadside field sobriety tests such as those involving walking and turning, lifting a leg for a specified number of seconds, reciting the alphabet, or following an object such as a pen or light with one’s eyes as it passes across one’s field of vision require the police to have probable cause to arrest or to search, or may they be undertaken on the basis of reasonable suspicion as part of an otherwise valid threshold inquiry? “(2) In order for a defendant to validly consent t…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
See State v. Burns, 661 So.2d 842, 849 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), dismissed, 676 So.2d 1366 (Fla.1996)(refusal to perform the physical, non-testimonial field sobriety tests on videotape at the center and refusal to submit to the breathalyzer test are admissible.); State v. Taylor, 648 So.2d 701, 704 (Fla.1995)(in a pre-arrest situation, a defendant's refusal to take a field sobriety test (not involving a testimonial response) is admissible to show consciousness of guilt).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State, Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Guthrie
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
In reaching its decision the court below did not have the benefit of the supreme court’s recent decision in State v. Taylor, 648 So.2d 701, 703 (Fla.1995), which established that the standard for compelling road sobriety-tests is “reasonable suspicion,” holding: When Taylor exited his ear, he staggered and exhibited slurred speech, watery, bloodshot eyes, and a strong odor of alcohol.
cited Cited "see" State of Florida v. Theodore Barnes Tatum
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Taylor, 648 So. 2d 701, 703 (Fla. 1995).
discussed Cited "see" State of Florida v. Michelle Lynn Howard
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See Taylor, 648 So. 2d at 704 (refusal to perform field sobriety exercises admissible as a suspect’s consciousness of guilt and can factor into a finding of probable cause).
discussed Cited "see" State of Florida v. Evelyn Barone (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2023 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Taylor, 648 So. 2d 701 , 703–04 (Fla. 1995) (recognizing an officer was authorized to request the defendant to perform FSEs where the officer had reasonable suspicion that a DUI was being committed); State v. Castaneda, 79 So. 3d 41, 42 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (same); see also Origi v. State, 912 So. 2d 69, 71 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (“[L]aw enforcement may temporarily detain a driver for a DUI investigation based upon a reasonable suspicion.
cited Cited "see" STATE OF FLORIDA vs ASHLY DANIEL JOHNSON
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2023 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 702 .
cited Cited "see" State v. Castaneda
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Taylor, 648 So.2d 701, 703 (Fla.1995).
discussed Cited "see" Kurecka v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Taylor, 648 So.2d 701, 704-05 (Fla.1995) (recognizing the legislature's authority to enact statute that permits evidence of a driver’s refusal at any subsequent trial); State v. Bender, 382 So.2d 697 (Fla.1980) (recognizing compelling state interest in highway safety justifies suspension of drivers’ licenses for refusing to take breath test); Smith v. State, 681 So.2d 894 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (recognizing that refusal to submit to chemical test after reading of implied consent law is admissible).
discussed Cited "see" Concha v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Taylor, 648 So.2d 701 (Fla.1995) (holding that Taylor's refusal was not elicited in violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and "that the refusal is probative of the issue of consciousness of guilt").
cited Cited "see" Evans v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Taylor, 648 So.2d 701 (Fla.1995); State v. Jackson, 784 So.2d 1229 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001), rev. denied, 805 So.2d 807 (Fla.2002).
cited Cited "see" State v. Menna
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Taylor, 648 So.2d 701 (Fla.1995).
examined Cited "see" State v. Whelan (3×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See 648 So.2d at 702 .
discussed Cited "see" Hulse v. State, Department of Justice
Mont. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Taylor (Fla. 1995), 648 So.2d 701 ; State v. Lamme (Conn.App. 1989), 563 A.2d 1372 ; State v. Gray (Vt. *21 1988), 552 A.2d 1190 ; State v. Stevens (Iowa 1986), 394 N.W.2d 388 , cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1057 , 107 S.Ct. 935 , 93 L.Ed.2d 986 (1987); State v. Golden (Ga.App. 1984), 318 S.E.2d 693 ; State v. Wyatt (Haw. 1984), 687 P.2d 544 ; State v. Little (Me. 1983), 468 A.2d 615 . ¶38 We agree with the sound rationale of the Arizona Supreme Court in Superior Court that public safety is equally threatened by a person driving under the influence of alcohol as by a person illegally co…
cited Cited "see" Vanhouton v. Commonwealth
Mass. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Taylor, 648 So. 2d 701, 704 (Fla. 1995) (field sobriety tests do not violate any Fourth Amendment rights); State v. Burns, 661 So. 2d 842, 845 (Fla. Dist.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." State v. Kinney (2×)
Vt. · 2011 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 648 So.2d 701, 704 (Fla.1995) (rejecting claim that refusal to perform field sobriety tests was not probative of guilt because the refusal may have been "motivated by a factor other than guilt, such as a simple desire to end the encounter," and holding that defendant was "free to offer that explanation in court").
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Morris v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · signal: see also · confidence low
Id.; see also State v. Taylor, 648 So.2d 701 (Fla.1995) (holding that Taylor’s refusal was not elicited in violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and “that the refusal is probative of the issue of consciousness of guilt”); State v. Bus- ciglio, 976 So.2d 15 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (holding that a refusal to submit to a breath test is not compelled testimony protected by the Fifth Amendment).
STATE of Florida, Petitioner,
v.
James E. TAYLOR, Respondent.
82631.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Jan 5, 1995.
648 So. 2d 701
Shaw.
Cited by 56 opinions  |  Published

[*702] Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Peggy A. Quince, Susan D. Dunlevy, Tampa, and Amelia L. Beisner, Tallahassee, Asst. Attys. Gen., for petitioner.

Robert E. Jagger, Public Defender, and Terry M. Staletovich, Asst. Public Defender, Sixth Judicial Circuit, Clearwater, for respondent.

SHAW, Judge.

We have for review a decision presenting the following certified question of great public importance:

IS A DUI SUSPECT'S REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO PRE-ARREST FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE?

Taylor v. State, 625 So.2d 911, 913 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We answer in the affirmative as explained below and quash the decision of the district court.

I. FACTS

Officer Quant observed Taylor's automobile traveling at a high rate of speed on August 10, 1991, in St. Petersburg. Quant made a U-turn and pursued the vehicle. When Taylor stopped to drop off a passenger, Officer Quant approached, asked to see his driver's license and registration, and asked him to exit the car. Quant noted that Taylor "staggered out" of the vehicle, and had a "strong odor of alcoholic beverages, slurred speech, and watery, bloodshot eyes." Taylor asked if he would be requested to do any field sobriety tests, which are simple physical tasks designed to test coordination, e.g., finger-to-nose, walk-the-line, stand-on-one-foot,[*703] etc.[1] Quant responded that he would be, and Taylor replied that he had been told by his lawyer not to perform any tests and he was going to follow that advice.

Officer Quant explained the purpose of the tests and Taylor again refused. Quant arrested him. At the stationhouse, Taylor was read Florida's implied consent law, which provides that once a person is arrested for any crime while operating a motor vehicle, he or she may be asked to submit to alcohol or substance tests. See § 316.1932, Fla. Stat. (1991). These post-arrest tests are sophisticated blood, urine, and breath tests, which differ substantially from the simple pre-arrest field sobriety tests noted above. Taylor acknowledged that he understood the law, but refused to take a breath test.

Taylor was charged with driving under the influence of an intoxicating substance (DUI) and, prior to trial, moved to suppress his refusal to take the field sobriety tests. He argued that he had not been told by police that he was required to take the tests or that his refusal could be used against him. Officer Quant testified that although he did not specifically advise Taylor that his refusal could be used against him, he did tell him that there could be adverse consequences to refusal:

Q. Did you tell him that there would be adverse consequences upon not doing those tests?
A. Yes, ma'am. We did have one of our officers retrieve the video camera from the cruiser. I did ask again if he would. I explained to him the purpose of the test and he did state that he would refuse. I explained to him that by his refusal that I would have to take up what I had seen to that point in making a decision as far as to whether or not he was impaired.

The county court granted the motion to suppress, ruling that Taylor had not been told the tests were compulsory or that refusal would have adverse consequences. The circuit court reversed. The district court then quashed the circuit court order, ruling that "it would be unfair to admit an individual's refusal to submit to a test as circumstantial evidence of his consciousness of guilt where he was not advised of the consequences attaching to his refusal." Taylor, 625 So.2d at 912. The court certified the above question.

Taylor contends that admission of his refusal would violate his constitutional rights and that his refusal is not probative of guilt.

II. LEGAL ISSUES

Taylor's refusal was obtained in conformity with the Fourth Amendment. The United States Supreme Court held in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and subsequent cases that certain investigative stops are permissible under the Fourth Amendment when based on an officer's reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. This rule is codified in section 901.151, Florida Statutes (1991):

Whenever any law enforcement officer of this state encounters any person under circumstances which reasonably indicate that such person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a violation of the criminal laws of this state ... he may temporarily detain such person for the purpose of ascertaining the identity of the person temporarily detained and the circumstances surrounding his presence abroad which led the officer to believe that he had committed, was committing, or was about to commit a criminal offense.

§ 901.151(2), Fla. Stat. (1991).

When Taylor exited his car, he staggered and exhibited slurred speech, watery, bloodshot eyes, and a strong odor of alcohol. This, combined with a high rate of speed on the highway, was more than enough to provide Quant with reasonable suspicion that a crime was being committed, i.e., DUI. The officer was entitled under section 901.151 to conduct a reasonable inquiry to confirm or deny that probable cause existed to make an arrest. Quant's request that Taylor perform[*704] field sobriety tests was reasonable under the circumstances and did not violate any Fourth Amendment rights.

Taylor's refusal does not constitute compelled self-incrimination, and its use at trial does not offend due process principles. The United States Supreme Court ruled in South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983), that a suspect's refusal to submit to a post-arrest blood-alcohol test could be admitted at trial even though police failed to warn the suspect that refusal could be used against him in court. The Court reasoned that the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination was inapplicable because, given the painless nature of the test, there was no compulsion to refuse, and the Due Process Clause was not violated because the suspect was not misled into believing that refusal was a "safe harbor" free of adverse consequences, i.e., he was told that he could lose his license.

The same rationale applies here. Taylor's refusal was not compelled in any way since he was given a choice whether to submit to the tests or not, and the tests themselves are noninvasive, painless, and commonplace. Thus, the refusal was not elicited in violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. Nor was Taylor misled concerning the consequences of refusal. Although Officer Quant did not expressly tell him that his refusal could be used against him in court, he did explain the purpose of the tests and told him of possible adverse consequences, i.e., he could be arrested based on the available evidence. Use of his refusal at trial thus does not violate the Due Process Clause of our state or federal constitutions.

III. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES

The provisions of the Florida Evidence Code defining relevant evidence and governing its admissibility are set forth in chapter 90, Florida Statutes (1991):

90.401 Definition of relevant evidence. — Relevant evidence is evidence tending to prove or disprove a material fact.
90.402 Admissibility of relevant evidence. — All relevant evidence is admissible, except as provided by law.

§§ 90.401, .402, Fla. Stat. (1991). Professor Ehrhardt explains further: "The concept of `relevancy' has historically referred to whether the evidence has any logical tendency to prove or disprove a fact. If the evidence is logically probative, it is relevant and admissible unless there is a reason for not allowing the jury to consider it." Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 401.1 at 95-96 (1994) (footnote omitted).

Taylor argues that his refusal to take the tests is not probative of the issue of guilt because his refusal may have been motivated by a factor other than guilt, such as a simple desire to end the encounter with Officer Quant. We reject this argument. When Officer Quant confronted Taylor, he watched him stagger out of his car and noticed a strong odor of alcohol, slurred speech, and watery, bloodshot eyes. Officer Quant asked him twice to take the field sobriety tests, explained the purpose of the tests, and warned Taylor that if he refused to take the tests he, Quant, would be forced to make a decision concerning arrest based on his observations up to that point.

Taylor had ample incentive to take the tests: He was aware of the circumstances surrounding the officer's request; he knew the purpose of the tests; and he had ample warning of possible adverse consequences attendant to refusal. Further, he has had some experience in this area — the state attorney asked the trial court to take judicial notice of his prior driving record which included two DUI convictions. Taylor had expressly discussed with his lawyer the advisability of taking field sobriety tests. Given the strong incentives to take the tests, Taylor's claim that his refusal was an innocent act loses plausibility. In short, he knew that refusal was not a "safe harbor" free of adverse consequences and acted in spite of that knowledge. His refusal thus is relevant to show consciousness of guilt. If he has an innocent explanation for not taking the tests, he is free to offer that explanation in court.

[*705] IV. CONCLUSION

We hold that Taylor's refusal to take the field sobriety tests was not elicited in violation of his statutory or constitutional rights and its use at trial does not offend constitutional principles. We further hold that the refusal is probative of the issue of consciousness of guilt. We quash the decision of the district court and answer the certified question in the affirmative as explained in this opinion. We remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

GRIMES, C.J., OVERTON and HARDING, JJ., and McDONALD, Senior Justice, concur.

KOGAN, J., dissents with an opinion.

KOGAN, Justice, dissenting.

I would answer the certified question in the negative based on article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution, which states that residents of this state may not be compelled to be witnesses against themselves in any criminal matter. To permit evidence of a refusal to take sobriety tests is little better than informing the finder of fact that the defendant refused to deny guilt. I further would hold that a roadside sobriety test may only be conducted on the basis of probable cause. People v. Carlson, 677 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1984); Jones v. State, 459 So.2d 1068 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).

1 The parties do not argue that the tests here required a testimonial response. Cf. Allred v. State, 622 So.2d 984 (Fla. 1993) (field sobriety tests requiring a testimonial response implicate the privilege against compelled self-incrimination under the Florida Constitution and require Miranda warnings).