Kellerman v. Kellerman, 659 So. 2d 1390 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). · Go Syfert
Kellerman v. Kellerman, 659 So. 2d 1390 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
9 citation events (4 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Mobley v. Mobley (fladistctapp, 2009-10-09) · Strongest negative: Engesser v. Engesser (fladistctapp, 2010-07-09)
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited "but see" Engesser v. Engesser
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Kellerman v. Kellerman, 659 So.2d 1390 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (finding that less than seven-year marriage is short-term marriage).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mobley v. Mobley
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
See Walker v. Walker, 818 So.2d 711, 713 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (stating that a twelve-year marriage is in the gray area for which there is no presumption for or against alimony); Bailey v. Bailey, 617 So.2d 815, 816 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (treating eight-year marriage as in the gray area for purposes of alimony); Kellerman v. Kellerman, 659 So.2d 1390, 1390 (Fla. 3d DCA *728 1995) (stating the parties’ marriage of less than seven years was a short-term marriage).
discussed Cited "see" MAUREEN KING v. STETSON WILKIE KING
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Kellerman v. Kellerman, 659 So. 2d 1390, 1390 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (stating that the parties' marriage -2- of less than seven years was a short-term marriage); see also Reeves v. Reeves, 821 So. 2d 333, 334 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (noting that a rebuttable presumption against awarding permanent alimony arises in the case of a short-term marriage).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Layeni v. Layeni
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Kellerman v. Kellerman, 659 So.2d 1390 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (less than seven-year marriage is a short term marriage).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Michael KELLERMAN, Appellant,
v.
Stella Denise KELLERMAN, Appellee.
94-2683.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Sep 13, 1995.
659 So. 2d 1390
Nesbitt, Goderich and Green.
Cited by 7 opinions  |  Published

Leinoff & Silvers and Andrew M. Leinoff and Ellen Dee Silvers, for appellant.

Simon, Schindler & Sandberg and Theodore Dempster, for appellee.

Before NESBITT, GODERICH and GREEN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The husband appeals from a final judgment of dissolution of marriage and contends that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding the wife $300.00 per month in permanent periodic alimony. We agree.

In Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So.2d 1197 (Fla. 1980), the Florida Supreme Court explained:

Permanent periodic alimony is used to provide the needs and the necessities of life to a former spouse as they have been established by the marriage of the parties... . The criteria to be used in establishing this need include the parties' earning ability, age, health, education, the duration of the marriage, the standard of living enjoyed during its course, and the value of the parties' estates.

Canakaris, 382 So.2d at 1201-02.

When examining the instant case in light of Canakaris, the record below reflects that the wife is a Florida real estate sales person making an annual gross income over the past three years ranging from $29,000.00 to $40,000.00, that she is thirty-three years old and in good mental and physical health, that the parties had a short-term marriage lasting less than seven years, that the parties had a comfortable lifestyle during the course of their marriage, and lastly, that neither party has substantially more assets or liabilities than the other. Based on the foregoing, specifically, the wife's earning ability, her education, her age, her health, and the parties' short-term marriage, we find that the trial court's award of permanent periodic alimony was an abuse of discretion because the award was not necessary to provide the needs and the necessities of life to the wife as they had been established by the parties' marriage. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's award of permanent periodic alimony.

[*1391] However, because the wife's earning ability may be diminished by her obligation to care for the parties' two minor children, a five-year-old and a one-year-old, we find that an award of rehabilitative alimony is appropriate. "The principle purpose of rehabilitative alimony is to establish the capacity for self-support of the receiving spouse." Canakaris, 382 So.2d at 1202. Therefore, we award the wife rehabilitative alimony in the amount of $300.00 per month until the youngest child begins kindergarten.

The husband's remaining points lack merit.

Affirmed, in part, reversed, in part, and rehabilitative alimony awarded.