Liscinsky v. State, 700 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). · Go Syfert
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Liscinsky v. State, 700 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“in any event, if such were error, we deem it harmless because the officer's testimony was merely cumulative of several other witnesses' testimony at trial.”
7 citation events (6 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Sharnika Lashay Moore-Bryant v. State of Florida (fladistctapp, 2024-05-15) · Strongest negative: Smith v. State (fladistctapp, 2004-05-28)
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "but see" Smith v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see Liscinsky v. State, 700 So.2d 171 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (holding testimony that witness to crime identified defendant by name as perpetrator at initial investigation immediately following incident was admissible under section 90.801(2)(c) or, in the alternative, was harmless error). [3] The tape-recorded statements of the recanting witnesses were largely accusatory narratives that recited the witnesses' accounts of the shooting and Smith's role in it.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Sharnika Lashay Moore-Bryant v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
in any event, if such were error, we deem it harmless because the officer's testimony was merely cumulative of several other witnesses' testimony at trial.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ZACHARY JOSEPH PENNA v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Blanton v. State, 978 So. 2d 149, 157 (Fla. 2008) (erroneous admission of evidence that was “merely cumulative” to “properly admitted evidence” was harmless under DiGuilio standard); Casica v. State, 24 So. 3d 1236, 1241 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (erroneous admission of evidence “was harmless” where evidence “was cumulative” to other “properly admitted” evidence); Liscinsky v. State, 700 So. 2d 171, 172 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (admission of challenged testimony, if erroneous, was harmless where “testimony was merely cumulative of several other witnesses’ testimony at t…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Robinson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
Id. at 739-40 . (emphasis added) (footnote omitted.) See also Liscinsky v. State, 700 So.2d 171, 172 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (officer could testify under section 90.801(2) that a witness to a crime identified the accused by name, as the perpetrator at the initial investigation immediately following the incident).
cited Cited "see" Wheeler v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Liscinsky v. State, 700 So.2d 171 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
David LISCINSKY
v.
STATE of Florida
No. 96-1026.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Oct 15, 1997.
700 So. 2d 171
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Marcy K. Allen, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant., Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and David M. Schultz, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for ap-pellee.
Polen, Stevenson, Stone.
Cited by 6 opinions  |  Published
STONE, Chief Judge.

Appellant’s conviction for burglary is affirmed. The trial court did not err by allowing an officer to testify that a witness to the crime identified Appellant, by name, as the perpetrator at the initial investigation immediately following the incident. Such testimony is not hearsay when the identifying witness is before the court and testifies to that effect at trial. See § 90.801(2), Fla. Stat. (1995). See also Power v. State, 605 So.2d 856, 862 (Fla.1992); Harrell v. State, 647 So.2d 1016 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).

We have considered our language in Stanford v. State, 576 So.2d 737, 739-40 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), in which we stated that:

We believe that the typical situation contemplated by the code and the case law is one where the victim sees the assailant shortly after the criminal episode and says, “that’s the man.” Hence, the phrase “identification of a person made after perceiving him” refers to the witness seeing a person after the criminal episode and identifying that person as the offender. We do not believe this code provision was intended to allow other out-of-court statements by a witness to others naming the person that the witness believes committed the crime. To extend the rule that far would permit countless repetitions by a witness to others, regardless of time and place, of the witnesses’ belief as to the guilty party, a result we do not believe intended by the drafters of the rule.

That comment does not preclude admitting such identification testimony under these circumstances because the witness’ comments in the instant case were made immediately after the incident. In any event, if such were error, we deem it harmless because the officer’s testimony was merely cumulative of several other witnesses’ testimony at trial. See Erickson v. State, 565 So.2d 328, 334 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).

POLEN and STEVENSON, JJ., concur.