Britt v. State, 775 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). · Go Syfert
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Britt v. State, 775 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
19 citation events (19 in the last 25 years) across 7 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Doe 1 v. City Of San Diego (casd, 2019-01-29)
Top citers, strongest first. 13 distinct citers. How cited ↗
cited Cited as authority (rule) Doe 1 v. City Of San Diego
S.D. Cal. · 2019 · confidence medium
Britt , 775 So.2d at 416-17 (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Walker Whatley v. Dushan Zatecky
7th Cir. · 2016 · confidence medium
See 511 Detroit Street, Inc. v. Kelley, 807 F.2d 1293 (6th Cir. 1986) (finding an obscenity statute not vague when it punishes a knowing dissemination of obscene materials that comprise “a predomi *782 nant and regular part of the person’s business” and a “principal part or substantial part of the stock in trade” of that business); Britt v. State, 775 So.2d 415, 416-17 (Fla. Ct. App. 2001) (upholding against a vagueness challenge a statute that prohibited defendant from living or working within 1000 feet of “a school, daycare center, park, playground, or other place where children …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Does v. Cooper (2×)
M.D.N.C. · 2015 · confidence medium
See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 338 F.3d 1280, 1286 (11th Cir.2003) (supervised release condition prohibiting “entering into any area where children frequently congregate, including schools, day care centers, theme parks, playgrounds, etc.” is not vague); Britt v. State, 775 So.2d 415, 416-17 (Fla.Dist.Ct.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Fantasyland Video, Inc. v. County of San Diego
S.D. Cal. · 2005 · confidence medium
See 511 Detroit St., Inc. v. Kelley, 807 F.2d 1293 , 1295-97 (6th Cir.1986) (anti-obscenity law imposing criminal penalties for dissemination of obscene materials as a “predominant and regular part” of a business found not unconstitutionally vague, reasoning a statute is not unconstitutional just because “there are cases near the margin where it is difficult to draw the line”); Britt v. State of Florida, 775 So.2d 415, 416-17 (Fla.Ct.App.2001) (parole condition forbidding those convicted of sexual crimes against children from working, volunteering, or living near any “school, daycare…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Paul
5th Cir. · 2001 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
The Restrictions on Access to Computers and the Internet Paul argues that the condition of his supervised release prohibiting him from having, possessing, or having access to “computers, the Internet, photographic equipment, audio/video equipment, or any item capable of producing a visual image” is that a restriction instructing the defendant to “avoid places where minors congregate” and not to “frequent places where minors are known to congregate” was not impermissibly vague); cf. Britt v. State, 775 So.2d 415, 416-17 (Fla. Dist.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Ronald Scott Paul
5th Cir. · 2001 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
See, e.g., State v. Riles, 135 Wash.2d 326 , 957 P.2d 655, 666 (1998) (finding that a restriction instructing the defendant to "avoid places where minors congregate” and not to "frequent places where minors are known to congregate” was not impermissibly vague); cf. Britt v. State, 775 So.2d 415, 416-17 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001) (finding that a restriction prohibiting the defendant from doing "volunteer work, employment, or community activity at any school, daycare center, park, playground, or other place where children regularly congregate ” and prohibiting the defendant from "living within…
discussed Cited "see" Lawson v. State
Fla. · 2007 · signal: accord · confidence high
We agree with the Fifth District that a condition of probation should "provide reasonable individuals of common intelligence the basis to know and understand its meaning." Lawson, 941 So.2d at 489 ; accord Britt v. State, 775 So.2d 415, 417 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (stating that two probation conditions were "sufficiently precise to `give [ ] a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct.'") (quoting Brown v. State, 629 So.2d 841, 842 (Fla.1994)).
cited Cited "see" Saucer v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Britt v. State, 775 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Greenwood v. State, 754 So.2d 158 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Wilcox v. State, 783 So.2d 1150 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (en banc).
cited Cited "see" Ellison v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Britt v. State, 775 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Greenwood v. State, 754 So.2d 158 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Wilcox v. State, 783 So.2d 1150 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (en banc).
cited Cited "see" Thomas v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Britt v. State, 775 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Greenwood v. State, 754 So.2d 158 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Wilcox v. State, 783 So.2d 1150 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (en banc).
cited Cited "see" Banks v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Britt v. State, 775 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Greenwood v. State, 754 So.2d 158 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); Wilcox v. State, 783 So.2d 1150 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (en banc).
cited Cited "see" Archambeault v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Britt v. State, 775 So.2d 415 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Greenwood v. State, 754 So.2d 158 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Wilfong v. Commonwealth
Ky. Ct. App. · 2004 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Britt v. State, 775 So.2d 415 (FIa.App.2001)(hoIding condition that prohib *101 ited probationer from living near or working at a "school, daycare center, park, playground, or other place where children regularly congregate” was not unconstitutionally vague). 82 . 274 F.3d 155 (5th Cir.2001). 83 .
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Tross BRITT, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
1D99-3416.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
Jan 5, 2001.
775 So. 2d 415
Webster.
Cited by 16 opinions  |  Published

[*416] Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender; Phil Patterson, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General; Lori D. Stith, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

WEBSTER, J.

In this direct criminal appeal, appellant raises two issues: (1) whether the trial court committed fundamental error when it imposed conditions of community control in its written order that were not orally pronounced; and (2) whether conditions of community control prohibiting him from living near or working at a "school, day-care center, park, playground, or other place where children regularly congregate" are unconstitutionally vague and, therefore, void. We affirm.

Appellant did not raise the first issue in the trial court. Therefore, it has not been preserved. It does not constitute fundamental error, which may be raised for the first time on appeal. E.g., Maddox v. State, 760 So.2d 89, 104-05 (Fla.2000); Klarich v. State, 730 So.2d 419 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999), approved, 760 So.2d 150 (Fla. 2000). Accordingly, we will not address the merits of the issue challenging the inclusion in the written order of certain conditions of community control that were not orally pronounced.

Appellant next challenges as unconstitutionally vague two conditions of community control. The first prohibited appellant from doing "volunteer work, employment, or community activity at any school, daycare center, park, playground, or other place where children regularly congregate"; and the second prohibited appellant from "liv[ing] within 1,000 feet of a school, daycare center, park, playground, or other place where children regularly congregate." Both conditions of supervision are now mandatory for individuals convicted of sexual battery upon a minor and other similar offenses, as was appellant. § 948.03(5)(a)2 & 6, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1998). According to appellant, impermissible vagueness is created by the phrase "or[*417] other place where children regularly congregate." We disagree.

"The standard for testing vagueness under Florida law is whether the statute gives a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct." Brown v. State, 629 So.2d 841, 842 (Fla.1994) (citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972)). The state contends that the doctrine of ejusdem generis requires that the phrase "or other place where children regularly congregate" be read in conjunction with the enumeration of specific places identified, i.e., schools, daycare centers, parks and playgrounds. See generally Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla. 1992) ("Under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, where an enumeration of specific things is followed by some more general word, the general word will usually be construed to refer to things of the same kind or species as those specifically enumerated"). We agree with the state. Applying this general rule of construction, we are of the opinion that the two conditions challenged by appellant are sufficiently precise to "give[] a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct." 629 So.2d at 842. We note that, although this appears to be a matter of first impression in Florida, other states that have addressed the issue have held that substantively indistinguishable conditions are not unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., People v. Delvalle, 26 Cal.App.4th 869, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 725, 730-31 (1994) (a condition of probation requiring the defendant to stay away from places where minor children congregate, such as elementary schools, daycare centers, and parks, did not violate the defendant's rights of free association and due process of law, and was neither overbroad nor ambiguous); State v. Riles, 135 Wash.2d 326, 957 P.2d 655, 666 (1998) (community placement conditions requiring a sex offender to have no contact with minor children, avoid places where minors congregate, and not frequent places where minors were known to congregate, were not unconstitutionally vague, and were within the trial court's authority); State v. Simonetto, 232 Wis.2d 315, 606 N.W.2d 275 (1999) (a condition of probation which prohibited the defendant, who had been convicted of possessing child pornography, from going where children may congregate was not vague or overbroad because it clearly prevented the defendant from going to places where children were likely to gather such as schools, daycare centers, and playgrounds). We, too, hold that the conditions at issue are not unconstitutionally vague. Accordingly, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

BARFIELD, C.J. and VAN NORTWICK, J., concur.