Butler v. State, 838 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 2003). · Go Syfert
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Butler v. State, 838 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 2003). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
84 citation events (84 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Arthur Preston Harris, III v. State of Florida (fladistctapp, 2025-11-21)
Treatment trajectory · 2003 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2003 2014 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 35 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Arthur Preston Harris, III v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Moreover, when “the statutory maximum sentence as provided in section 775.082, Florida Statutes, is exceeded by the lowest permissible sentence under the code, the lowest permissible sentence under the code becomes the maximum sentence which the trial judge can impose.” Butler v. State, 838 So. 2d 554, 556 (Fla. 2003).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Peter Ramos v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Gabriel, 314 So. 3d at 1249; Butler v. State, 838 So. 2d 554, 556 (Fla. 2003) (holding that when the statutory maximum sentence is exceeded by the lowest permissible sentence under the CPC, the lowest permissible sentence under the CPC becomes the maximum sentence the court can impose).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State of Florida v. Ridge Gabriel
Fla. · 2021 · confidence medium
This Court’s Precedent In Butler v. State, 838 So. 2d 554, 555 (Fla. 2003), the defendant was sentenced to 75.6 months in prison, the LPS, on his possession of cocaine conviction and filed a postconviction motion “alleging that his sentence of 75.6 months exceeded the statutory maximum of five years for the third-degree felony of cocaine possession.” The district court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s postconviction motion and agreed that the sentence was legal but questioned a potential statutory conflict between section 921.002(1)(g), Florida Statutes (Supp. 199…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) PATTY DAVIS v. SHERIDAN HEALTHCARE, INC. AND SHERIDAN RADIOLOGY SERVICES OF PINELLAS, INC.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
One requires a direct connection between a "matter" and reimbursing a health care provider while the other reaches conduct only indirectly or tangentially related to reimbursement, such as the activity of collection.1 Any ambiguity is easily resolved in favor of the former interpretation. 1The dissent points out that section 440.13(1)(q) defines a "reimbursement dispute" as "any disagreement between a health care provider and carrier concerning -7- It is "presumed that statutes are passed with the knowledge of existing statutes, so courts must favor a construction that gives effect to both sta…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) JASON MAURICE WILLIAMS v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
P. 3.704(d)(1), (d)(25); Moore v. State, 882 So. 2d 977, 985 (Fla. 2004); Butler v. State, 838 So. 2d 554, 556 (Fla. 2003); Parks v. State, 223 So. 3d 380, 383 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (en banc); see also Colon v. State, 199 So. 3d 960 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016); Dennard v. State, 157 So. 3d 1055 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Reginald Lee Booker, I I I v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
Instead, we see subsection (10) as authorizing trial judges to depart from the mandatory nonstate prison sanctions that same subsection compels. 3 In Butler v. State, 838 So. 2d 554, 556 (Fla. 2003), the supreme court held that when the statutory maximum sentence as provided in section 775.082 is “exceeded by the lowest permissible sentence under the code,” the latter “becomes the maximum sentence which the trial judge can impose.” Unlike here, no judge- imposed upward departure was at issue in Butler, only the harmonizing of sections 775.082 and 921.0024(2), to determine the maximum s…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City of Treasure Island v. Tahitian Treasure Island, LLC
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Relatedly, it is also "presumed that statutes are passed with the knowledge of existing statutes, so courts must favor a construction that gives effect to - 15 - both statutes rather than construe one statute as being meaningless or repealed by implication." Butler v. State, 838 So. 2d 554, 556 (Fla. 2003).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Christopher Busbee v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
However, “when section 921.0024(2) applies so that the statutory maximum sentence ... is exceeded by the lowest permissible sentence under the code, the lowest permissible sentence under the code becomes the maximum sentence which the trial judge can impose.” Butler v. State, 838 So.2d 554, 556 (Fla.2003).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) William Lee Rudd v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
WOLF and MAKAR, JJ., concur. 1 . " 'The sentence required by the Code is the minimum permissible sentence and no more.’ ” Thompson v. State, 79 So.3d 208, 208 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (quoting Horne v. State, 6 So.3d 99, 101 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009), and citing Butler v. State, 838 So.2d 554, 556 (Fla.2003) (holding that "when section 921.0024(2) applies so that the statutory maximum sentence as provided in section 775.082, Florida Statutes ... is exceeded by the lowest permissible sentence under the code, the lowest permissible sentence under the code becomes the maximum sentence which the trial judg…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gretna Racing, LLC. v. Department of Business and Prof. etc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Inserting the word “enacted” also strips the quoted statutory language of any legal effect.13 13 See Butler v. State, 838 So. 2d 554, 555-56 (Fla. 2003) (“Because the Legislature does not intend to enact purposeless or useless laws, the primary rule of statutory interpretation is to harmonize related statutes so that each is given effect.” (citation omitted)); Sharer v. Hotel Corp. of Am., 144 So. 2d 813, 817 (Fla. 1962) (“It should never be presumed that the legislature intended to enact purposeless and therefore useless, legislation.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alachua County School Board v. OFFICE OF the STATE, Chief Financial Officer for the Department of Financial Services, Division of Worker's Compensation
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
When faced with two different, but applicable statutes, “courts must favor a construction that gives effect to both statutes rather than construe one statute as being meaningless or repealed by implica tion.” Butler v. State, 838 So.2d 554, 555-56 (Fla.2003) (citations omitted). “ ‘The rule of construction ... is that if the courts can by any fair, strict or liberal construction find for the two provisions a reasonable field of operation, without destroying their evident intent and meaning, preserving the force of both, and construing them together in harmony with the whole course of l…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ledger v. City of St. Petersburg
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
“Because the Legislature does not intend to enact purposeless or useless laws, the primary rule of statutory interpretation is to harmonize related statutes so that each is given effect.” Butler v. State, 838 So.2d 554, 555-56 (Fla.2003) (citation omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Montgomery v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
See § 775.082(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (2009); Butler v. State, 838 So.2d 554, 556 (Fla.2003).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ricks v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
P. 3.704(d)(25); § 921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. (2006); Butler v. State, 838 So.2d 554, 555-56 (Fla.2003).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
On appeal, Brown argues that his fourteen-year sentence for Count I is illegal because it exceeds the statutory maximum, which in this case is 95.25 months, the "lowest permissible" sentence under the scoresheet. [5] See Butler v. State, 838 So.2d 554, 556 (Fla.2003).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Agosto-Molina v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
NOTES [1] Under the Criminal Punishment Code, where the statutory maximum for an offense is exceeded by the lowest permissible sentence as calculated on the Criminal Punishment Code scoresheet, "the lowest permissible sentence under the Code becomes the maximum sentence which the trial judge can impose." Butler v. State, 838 So.2d 554, 556 (Fla.2003).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Moss v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
See § 921.0024(2); Butler v. State, 838 So.2d 554, 556 (Fla.2003) (“If the lowest permissible sentence under the Code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in section 775.082, the sentence required by the Code must be imposed.”).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Cone v. State, Dept. of Health
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
In such cases, "the primary rule of statutory interpretation is to harmonize related statutes so that each is given effect." Butler v. State, 838 So.2d 554, 556 (Fla.2003).
cited Cited "see" HARRY MARTIN WALSH v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Butler v. State, 838 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 2003); State v. Ayers, 901 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).
discussed Cited "see" Edward Abruscato v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Butler v. State, 838 So. 2d 554, 556 (Fla. 2003) (“[W]hen section 921.024(2) [Fla. Stat.] applies so that the statutory maximum as provided in section 775.082[] is exceeded by the lowest permissible sentence under the code, the lowest permissible sentence under the code becomes the maximum sentence which the trial judge can impose.”); see also Busbee v. State, 187 So. 3d 1266, 1268-69 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (concluding lowest permissible sentence under code scoresheet would be appropriate rather than statutory maximum for two crimes committed).
cited Cited "see" RONALD E. MC BRIDE, I I I v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Butler v. State, 838 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 2003); State v. Ayers, 901 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).
discussed Cited "see" Champagne v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 555 .
discussed Cited "see" RENALDO CHAMPAGNE v. STATE OF FLORIDA (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 555 .
discussed Cited "see" Champagne v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 555 .
cited Cited "see" Rodriguez v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hannah v. State , 869 So.2d 692 , 693 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (citing Butler v. State , 838 So.2d 554 (Fla. 2003) ).
cited Cited "see" Rodriguez v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hannah v. State , 869 So.2d 692 , 693 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (citing Butler v. State , 838 So.2d 554 (Fla. 2003) ).
discussed Cited "see" DARIUS Q. JOHNSON v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Butler v. State, 838 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 2003); State v. Ayers, 901 So. 2d 942 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Knarich v. State, 866 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004); Contreras v. State, 749 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).
discussed Cited "see" Gretna Racing, LLC v. Department of Business & Professional Regulation
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See Butler v. State, 838 So.2d 554 ; 555-56 (Fla,2003) ("Because the Legislature does not intend to enact purposeless or useless laws, the primary rule of statutory interpretation' is to harmonize related statutes so that each is given effect.” (citation omitted)); Sharer v. Hotel Corp. of Am., 144 So.2d 813, 817 (Fla. 1962) ("It should never-be presumed that the legislature intended to enact purposeless and therefore useless, legislation.
discussed Cited "see" Thomas Saunders v. Florida Dept. of Children and Families
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See Butler v. State, 838 So.2d 554, 555-56 (Fla.2003) (“Because the Legislature does not intend to enact purposeless or useless laws, the primary rule of statutory interpretation is to harmonize related statutes so that each is given effect.” (citation omitted)).
cited Cited "see" Robinson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
See Butler v. State, 838 So.2d 554, 556 (Fla.2003).
cited Cited "see" Perkins v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See Butler v. State, 838 So.2d 554, 556 (Fla.2003).
discussed Cited "see" Taplin v. Taplin
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See Butler v. State, 838 So.2d 554, 556 (Fla.2003) (“It is presumed that statutes are passed with the knowledge of existing statutes, so courts must favor a construction that gives effect to both statutes rather than construe one statute as being meaningless or repealed by implication.”).
cited Cited "see" Sasser v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Butler v. State, 838 So.2d 554, 555-56 (Fla. 2003); Daniels v. State, 838 So.2d 617, 618 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); §§ 921.002(g), 921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. (2002).
cited Cited "see" Daniels v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Butler v. State, 838 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 2003).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Thompson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · signal: see also · confidence medium
“The sentence required by the Code is the minimum permissible sentence and no more.” Horne v. State, 6 So.3d 99, 101 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (emphasis omitted) (citing § 921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. (2005)); see also Butler v. State, 838 So.2d 554, 556 (Fla.2003) (holding that “when section 921.0024(2) applies so that the statutory maximum sentence as provided in section 775.082 ... is exceeded by the lowest permissible sentence under the [CJode, the lowest permissible sentence under the [C]ode becomes the maximum sentence which the trial judge can impose”).
Winyatta BUTLER, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
SC01-2465.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Jan 30, 2003.
838 So. 2d 554
Wells.
Cited by 47 opinions  |  Published

[*555] Caroline E. Kravath, Florida Institutional Legal Services, Inc., Gainesville, FL, for Petitioner.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, and Kellie A. Nielan and Pamela J. Koller, Assistant Attorneys General, Daytona Beach, FL, for Respondent.

WELLS, J.

We have for review a decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal on the following question, which the court certified to be of great public importance:

MAY A TRIAL COURT SENTENCE A DEFENDANT TO A TERM IN EXCESS OF THE STATUTORY MAXIMUM FOR AN OFFENSE COMMITTED AFTER OCTOBER 1, 1998, WHERE THE LOWEST PERMISSIBLE SENTENCE UNDER THE CODE EXCEEDS THE STATUTORY MAXIMUM?

Butler v. State, 774 So.2d 925, 927 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We answer the certified question in the affirmative.

Petitioner Winyatta Butler pled guilty to possession of cocaine, possession of cannabis, driving with a suspended license, resisting arrest without violence, and driving under the influence. He was sentenced to 75.6 months of incarceration. The petitioner filed a motion under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, alleging that his sentence of 75.6 months exceeded the statutory maximum of five years for the third-degree felony of cocaine possession. The trial court denied the petitioner's rule 3.850 motion, ruling that although the sentence imposed for possession of cocaine exceeded the statutory maximum, the sentence of 75.6 months was the lowest permissible sentence under the guidelines and therefore was legal.[1]

On appeal, the district court affirmed the trial court's denial of the petitioner's rule 3.850 motion and agreed that the sentence was legally based on this Court's statement in Maddox v. State, 760 So.2d 89, 101 n. 9 (Fla.2000), that "for those defendants who committed their crimes after October 1, 1998, section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (1999), provides that `if the lowest permissible sentence under the code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s. 775.082, the sentence required by the code must be imposed.'" The district court then recognized potential statutory conflict between two provisions of the Criminal Punishment Code: (1) section 921.002(1)(g), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998), which does not authorize a court to impose a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum; and (2) section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), which directs that "[i]f the lowest permissible sentence under the [Criminal Punishment Code] exceeds the statutory maximum sentence ..., the sentence required by the code must be imposed." Due to this potential conflict, the district court certified the question that is now before this Court.

We agree with the district court that the petitioner's sentence is legal, and we therefore uphold the district court's affirmance of the denial of the petitioner's rule 3.850 motion. We further conclude that there is no conflict between the statutes and therefore answer the certified question in the affirmative. Because the Legislature does not intend to enact purposeless or useless laws, see Sharer v. Hotel Corp. of America, 144 So.2d 813, 817[*556] (Fla.1962), the primary rule of statutory interpretation is to harmonize related statutes so that each is given effect. See Carawan v. State, 515 So.2d 161, 168 (Fla. 1987). The two provisions of the Criminal Punishment Code can be harmonized.

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.704(d)(25) states in pertinent part:

The permissible range for sentencing must be the lowest permissible sentence up to and including the statutory maximum, as defined in section 775.082, for the primary offense and any additional offenses before the court for sentencing. The sentencing court may impose such sentences concurrently or consecutively. However, any sentence to state prison must exceed 1 year. If the lowest permissible sentence under the Code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in section 775.082, the sentence required by the Code must be imposed.

(Emphasis added.) This rule harmonizes the two provisions. The first provision (section 921.002(1)(g)) applies to general sentencing, while the second provision (section 921.0024(2)) applies to those circumstances in which "the lowest permissible sentence under the Code exceeds the statutory maximum." By this rule, application of section 921.0024(2) is an exception to the general provision of section 921.002(1)(g) that sentences cannot exceed the statutory maximum. We do, however, hold that when section 921.0024(2) applies so that the statutory maximum sentence as provided in section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2002), is exceeded by the lowest permissible sentence under the code, the lowest permissible sentence under the code becomes the maximum sentence which the trial judge can impose.

Because section 921.002(1)(g) and section 921.0024(2) were amended at the same time and deal with the same general subject, they should be read as in pari materia. See State ex rel. Sch. Bd. of Martin County v. Dep't of Education, 317 So.2d 68, 72-73 (Fla.1975). It is presumed that statutes are passed with the knowledge of existing statutes, so courts must favor a construction that gives effect to both statutes rather than construe one statute as being meaningless or repealed by implication. Palm Harbor Special Fire Control Dist. v. Kelly, 516 So.2d 249, 251-52 (Fla.1987). Thus, the district court correctly followed our decision in Maddox v. State, 760 So.2d 89 (Fla.2000):

We recognize that pursuant to section 921.001(5), Florida Statutes (1993), the sentencing guidelines may have, for some cases, provided statutory authority for the trial court to impose a higher sentence than allowed by the "statutory maximum." Similarly, for those defendants who committed their crimes after October 1, 1998, section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (1999), provides that "if the lowest permissible sentence under the code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s. 775.082, the sentence required by the code must be imposed." Prior to the enactment of these statutes, a court could not impose a guidelines sentence outside the statutory limits.

Id. at 101 n. 9 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).

Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the affirmative and find that the petitioner's sentence is legal. We therefore approve the decision below affirming the denial of the petitioner's rule 3.850 motion. We reject the petitioner's second issue, a constitutional attack based on our construction of section 921.0024(2), and hold that section 921.0024(2) is not vague. See State v. Mitro, 700 So.2d 643,[*557] 645 (Fla.1997); Trushin v. State, 425 So.2d 1126, 1130 (Fla.1982).

It is so ordered.

ANSTEAD, C.J., PARIENTE, LEWIS, QUINCE, and CANTERO, JJ., and SHAW, Senior Justice, concur.

1 Butler does not contest the trial court's finding that the lowest permissible sentence authorized by his sentencing score sheet was 75.6 months.