Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...The expressed legislative purpose under the Code is articulated thusly: "The primary purpose of sentencing [pursuant to the Code] is to punish the offender. Rehabilitation is a desired goal of the criminal justice system but is subordinate to the goal of punishment." § 921.002(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). "The penalty imposed [for an offense] is commensurate with the severity of the offense and the circumstances surrounding [it]." § 921.002(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). In addition, "[t]he severity of the sentence increases with the length and nature of the offender's prior record." § 921.002(1)(d), Fla....

...State, 342 So.2d 469 (Fla. 1976); O'Donnell v. State, 326 So.2d 4 (Fla.1975). Moreover, under the Code, a trial court is free to sentence below the lowest permissible sentence established by the Code provided the court gives written reasons for doing so. § 921.002(1)(f), Fla....

...on of criminal penalties, and to make the best use of state prisons so that violent criminal offenders are appropriately incarcerated, has determined that it is in the best interest of the state to develop, implement, and revise a sentencing policy. § 921.002(1), Fla....

...[5] *764 7. Due Process Notice and Apprendi v. New Jersey In instances where the lowest permissible sentence exceeds the statutory maximum for an offense, the Code requires the trial court to sentence a defendant at the lowest permissible sentence. See § 921.0024(2), Fla....

...State, 661 So.2d 1274, 1276 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995), overruled on other grounds by White v. State, 714 So.2d 440 (Fla.1998). Accordingly, the Code provides proper notice of a permissible sentence and does not run afoul of due process for lack of notice. Hall also contends that section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), violates the holding of Apprendi v....

...i, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Because the sentence for each of Hall's offenses did not exceed the statutory maximum, we conclude that Apprendi is inapplicable. Hall also asserts that the Code violates due process principles in Apprendi because section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998) creates "wandering" or "floating" statutory maximums....

...ANSTEAD, C.J., and HARDING, WELLS, PARIENTE, LEWIS, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] According to the information, Hall committed his offenses on November 21, 1998, which subjected him to the Criminal Punishment Code for offenses committed on or after October 1, 1998. See § 921.002, Fla....

...punishment provision of Florida's Constitution, article I, section 17, states that "[e]xcessive fines, cruel or unusual punishment, attainder, forfeiture of estate, indefinite imprisonment, and unreasonable detention of witnesses are forbidden." [4] Section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), gives the trial court authority to sentence consecutively or concurrently under the Code. [5] Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.120(d) states as follows: "The reply brief shall contain argument in response and rebuttal to argument presented in the answer brief." [6] Section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), states in relevant part: "If the lowest permissible sentence under the code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s....

...provided statutory authority for the trial court to impose a higher sentence than allowed by the "statutory maximum." See Mays v. State, 717 So.2d 515, 516 (Fla.1998). Similarly, for those defendants who committed their crimes after October 1, 1998, section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (1999), provides that "if the lowest permissible sentence under the code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s....

...for direct appeal. [14] We note that the Legislature recently amended the sentencing statute applicable to felonies committed after October 1, 1998. See ch. 97-194, Laws of Florida (creating the Florida Criminal Punishment Code, codified at sections 921.002-921.0026, Florida Statutes (1997)); see also § 921.0027, Fla. Stat. (1999). Under this statute, the trial judge must calculate the "lowest permissible sentence." See § 921.00265, Fla. Stat. (1999). Written reasons for imposing a departure sentence are still required when a judge imposes a downward departure. See §§ 921.002(1)(f), .0025, .0026, Fla. Stat. (1999); see Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.704(d)(25)(26). However, the statute allows the judge to impose a sentence "up to and including the statutory maximum for any offense," section 921.002(1)(g), without requiring the filing of any reasons for doing so. See §§ 921.002(1)(f)(h), 921.0026; Fla....

the definitions in Florida Statutes § 921.01 and § 921.02, F.S.A.[3] support the distinction made here between

...The State's objection made clear that the State sought imposition of a nondeparture sentence because there was no legal reason justifying a downward departure. We therefore turn to an evaluation of the merits of the State's claim that there was no legal basis for the downward departure sentence. Section 921.0026(1), Florida Statutes (2003), provides that a sentence less severe than the lowest permissible sentence shown on the Criminal Punishment Code scoresheet "is prohibited unless there are circumstances or factors that reasonably *945 justify the downward departure." See also § 921.00265(1). Section 921.0026(2), which sets forth a nonexclusive list of such mitigating circumstances, provides in pertinent part: "Mitigating circumstances under which a departure from the lowest permissible sentence is reasonably justified include... (j) The offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse." Under section 921.002(3), "[t]he level of proof necessary to establish facts supporting the mitigation of a sentence is a preponderance of the evidence" and any downward departure sentence "must be explained in writing by the trial court judge." See also § 921.00265(2). Here, although the trial court failed to explain in writing the reason for the downward departure, the transcript of the sentencing hearing makes clear that the trial court relied on the mitigating circumstance set forth in section 921.0026(2)(j) as the basis for imposing a downward departure. The transcript makes equally clear that the trial court's reliance on that mitigating circumstance was unwarranted. Three elements must be shown to establish the existence of the mitigating circumstance listed in section 921.0026(2)(j): (a) the offense must have been "committed in an unsophisticated manner," (b) the offense must have been "an isolated incident," and (c) the defendant must have "shown remorse" for the offense....

...The fact that a defendant who has previously committed numerous offenses has not in the past committed the same crime as the offense for which he is being sentenced does not mean that the current offense is "an isolated incident." See id. Although the trial court made reference to two of the elements in section 921.0026(2)(j) in the court's attempt to articulate an appropriate basis for the downward departure, the entirety of the trial court's comments shows that the underlying basis for the decision to impose a departure sentence was the trial cour...

...In the Criminal Punishment Code, the legislature has made the policy determination that certain offenders, because of *946 their prior criminal record, should receive sentences which exceed the statutory maximum ordinarily applicable to the offense for which they are being sentenced. See § 921.0024(2) ("If the lowest permissible sentence under the code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s....

...[1] On appeal, the district court affirmed the trial court's denial of the petitioner's rule 3.850 motion and agreed that the sentence was legally based on this Court's statement in Maddox v. State, 760 So.2d 89, 101 n. 9 (Fla.2000), that "for those defendants who committed their crimes after October 1, 1998, section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (1999), provides that `if the lowest permissible sentence under the code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s. 775.082, the sentence required by the code must be imposed.'" The district court then recognized potential statutory conflict between two provisions of the Criminal Punishment Code: (1) section 921.002(1)(g), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998), which does not authorize a court to impose a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum; and (2) section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), which directs that "[i]f the lowest permissible sentence under the [Criminal Punishment Code] exceeds the statutory maximum sentence ..., the sentence required by the code must be imposed." Due to th...

...If the lowest permissible sentence under the Code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in section 775.082, the sentence required by the Code must be imposed. (Emphasis added.) This rule harmonizes the two provisions. The first provision (section 921.002(1)(g)) applies to general sentencing, while the second provision (section 921.0024(2)) applies to those circumstances in which "the lowest permissible sentence under the Code exceeds the statutory maximum." By this rule, application of section 921.0024(2) is an exception to the general provision of section 921.002(1)(g) that sentences cannot exceed the statutory maximum. We do, however, hold that when section 921.0024(2) applies so that the statutory maximum sentence as provided in section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2002), is exceeded by the lowest permissible sentence under the code, the lowest permissible sentence under the code becomes the maximum sentence which the trial judge can impose. Because section 921.002(1)(g) and section 921.0024(2) were amended at the same time and deal with the same general subject, they should be read as in pari materia....

...e sentencing guidelines may have, for some cases, provided statutory authority for the trial court to impose a higher sentence than allowed by the "statutory maximum." Similarly, for those defendants who committed their crimes after October 1, 1998, section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (1999), provides that "if the lowest permissible sentence under the code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s....

...Accordingly, we answer the certified question in the affirmative and find that the petitioner's sentence is legal. We therefore approve the decision below affirming the denial of the petitioner's rule 3.850 motion. We reject the petitioner's second issue, a constitutional attack based on our construction of section 921.0024(2), and hold that section 921.0024(2) is not vague....

...which governs sentencing. In support of this contention, the State relies upon Montgomery v. State, 897 So.2d 1282, 1286 (Fla.2005), in which this Court held, in the context of sentencing guidelines, that the statutory definition of "conviction" in section 921.0021, Florida Statutes (2002), includes those felonies to which a defendant pled no contest, regardless of whether adjudication was withheld. A review of the legislative history of the definition of "conviction" leads us to conclude that the Legislature did not intend for the definition in section 921.0021, Florida Statutes (2003), to apply to the "prior violent felony conviction" aggravator. See generally § 921.002(1), Fla....

...plain language of section 921.0011, the 1993 definition of "conviction" applied to section 921.141(5)(b), and a plea, regardless of whether adjudication was withheld, constituted a conviction. In 1997, section 921.0011 was repealed and renumbered as section 921.0021. See ch. 97-194, §§ 1, 4, at 3674-75, Laws of Fla. While renumbered, section 921.0021 still indicated in 1997 that it applied to the whole of chapter 921....

...ss of whether adjudication is withheld. Ch. 98-204, § 3, at 1937-38, Laws of Fla. (emphasis supplied). In Montgomery v. State, 897 So.2d 1282, 1285-86 (Fla.2005), we subsequently held that, under the statutory definition of "conviction" provided in section 921.0021, a no contest plea with adjudication withheld constituted a conviction for purposes of the sentencing guidelines, *878 which do not apply to capital felonies. The specific decision of the Legislature in 1998 to limit section 921.0021 to noncapital felonies demonstrates that it did not intend for the broader definition of the word "conviction" to apply to the "prior violent felony" aggravating circumstance in capital cases....

...Dakan, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent. LEWIS, J. We have for review a decision of a district court of appeal on the following question, which the court certified to be of great public importance: WHEN SENTENCING PURSUANT TO THE CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT CODE (§§ 921.002-921.0027, Fla.Stat.(1999)) FOR A VIOLATION OF A PROBATIONARY TERM ORIGINALLY IMPOSED TO RUN CONSECUTIVELY TO A PRISON TERM IMPOSED FOR A DIFFERENT OFFENSE, DO Tripp v....

...It was then within the judge's discretion to sentence the defendant within that narrow range. In contrast, under the now-applicable CPC, "[t]he permissible range for sentencing shall be the lowest permissible sentence [as determined by the number of total sentencing points] up to and including the statutory maximum." § 921.0024(2), Fla....

...These restrictions were eliminated by the CPC. Under the CPC, "[t]he trial court judge may impose a sentence up to and including the statutory maximum for any offense, including an offense that is before the court due to a violation of probation or community control." § 921.002(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (1999) (emphasis added). The Legislature expressed that the primary purpose of sentencing is to be punishment. See § 921.002(1)(b), Fla....

..."The permissible range for sentencing shall be the lowest permissible sentence up to and including the statutory maximum ... for the primary offense and any additional offenses before the court for sentencing. The sentencing court may impose such sentences concurrently or consecutively." § 921.0024(2), Fla....

...purposes of the sentencing guidelines. For sentencing purposes, chapter 921, Florida Statutes, provides that prior convictions are scored on the sentencing guidelines worksheet in computing a defendant's sentence. See § 921.0014, Fla. Stat. (2002). Section 921.0021 defines a conviction as "a determination of guilt that is the result of a plea or a trial, regardless of whether adjudication is withheld." See § 921.0021(2), Fla....

...State, 395 So.2d 1145 (Fla.1980), reiterated the position that guilty pleas with adjudication withheld are considered convictions for purposes of capital sentencing. Despite this language in Garron, the Legislature, eleven years after Garron, enacted section 921.0021, [1] defining convictions and specifically including convictions whether or not adjudication is withheld. A finding that a no contest plea is a prior conviction, regardless of adjudication being withheld, is consistent with the legislative intent of section 921.0021(2)....

...State, 802 So.2d 281, 286 (Fla.2001) (citation omitted) (quoting Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992)). Here, the statutory language is clear and unambiguous. A conviction is a "determination of guilt that is the result of a plea or a trial, regardless of whether adjudication is withheld." § 921.0021(2), Fla....

...Also, "[t]he primary purpose of sentencing is to punish the offender. Rehabilitation is a desired goal of the criminal justice system but is subordinate to the goal of punishment.... The severity of the sentence increases with the length and nature of the offender's prior record." § 921.002(1)(b), (d), Fla....

...ithheld, are prior convictions for purposes of sentencing under section 921.0014. For sentencing purposes, a conviction is defined as "a determination of guilt that is the result of a plea or a trial, regardless of whether adjudication is withheld." § 921.0021(2), Fla. Stat. (2002). Prior record is defined as "a conviction for a crime committed by the offender, as an adult or a juvenile, prior to the time of the primary offense." § 921.0021(5), Fla....

...I believe a plain reading of the sentencing statute compels that the question be answered in the negative. I therefore respectfully dissent. In the sentencing statute, the term "conviction" is defined as "a determination of guilt that is the result of a plea or a trial, regardless of whether adjudication is withheld." § 921.0021(2), Fla....

...(2004) (defining "conviction" as "a determination of guilt which is the result of a trial or the entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, regardless of whether adjudication is withheld"). In chapter 921, on the other hand, the Legislature did not employ such a broad definition, and any interpretation of section 921.0021(2) should account for this fact....

appeal. Committee Note: To the same effect as Section 921.02, except the portion reading "in writing, signed

...The state argues that appellant's five-year sentence is not subject to appellate review because it falls within the statutory limits of the Code. The Code provides that "the trial court may impose a sentence up to and including the statutory maximum for any offense ...." § 921.002(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (2000). "The permissible range for sentencing shall be the lowest permissible sentence up to and including the statutory maximum...." Section 921.0024(2), Fla....

...The state contends that because the trial court imposed a legal sentence under the statutes, this issue is not cognizable on direct appeal. As authority, the state cites sections 924.06(1)(d) and (e), Florida Statutes (2000) (a defendant may appeal an illegal sentence or a sentence imposed under section 921.0024 which exceeds the statutory minimum), and Rule 9.140(b)(1)(D), Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure (a defendant may appeal an unlawful or illegal sentence)....

...Section 921.001(1)(h) grants only the state the right to appeal a departure sentence, which is defined as a sentence below the lowest permissible sentence. Observing that a statute cannot be construed so as to restrict a defendant's right to appeal contained in the Florida Constitution, we interpreted section 921.002(1)(h) as not prohibiting all appeals by defendants from sentences under the Code....

...The trial court "sentenced him to the maximum sentence authorized by law on each charge: life imprisonment for the armed burglary and 15 years for the attempted armed robbery." Id. at 2020. Importantly, "[b]ecause Florida... abolished its parole system, see Fla. Stat. § 921.002(1)(e) (2003), a life sentence gives a defendant no possibility of release unless he is granted executive clemency." Id....

...If the Supreme Court has more in mind, it will have to say what that is. We conclude that Henry's aggregate term-of-years sentence is not invalid under the Eighth Amendment and affirm the decision below. AFFIRMED. ORFINGER, C.J., and PALMER, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 921.002(1)(e), Florida Statutes, provides: The sentence imposed by the sentencing judge reflects the length of actual time to be served, shortened only by the application of incentive and meritorious gain-time as provided by law, and may not...

...The State objected to the downward departure sentences at the time they were imposed. At a minimum, the trial court must impose the lowest permissible sentence calculated according to the Criminal Punishment Code unless the court finds that the evidence supports a valid reason for a downward departure. See e.g., § 921.002(1)(f) & (3), Fla....

...use of discretion. Discretion is abused only where no reasonable person would agree with the trial court's decision." Id. An appellate court will uphold a departure sentence if any reason given by the trial judge is a valid reason for departure. See § 921.002(3), Fla. Stat. (1999). Section 921.0026, Florida Statutes (1999), sets out a list of mitigating grounds for sentencing departures. Specifically, section 921.0026 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (1) A downward departure from the lowest permissible sentence, as calculated according to the total sentence points pursuant to s. 921.0024, is prohibited unless there are circumstances or factors that reasonably justify the downward departure....

...rison sentence. * * * (i) The defendant cooperated with the state to resolve the current offense or any other offense. (j) The offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse. § 921.0026, Fla. Stat. (1999). The list of statutory departure reasons is not exclusive, so departures based on reasons not delineated in section 921.0026, which are supported by the record, may be permissible....

...See State v. Randall, 746 So.2d 550, 552 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); State v. Turro, 724 So.2d 1216, 1217 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). We are mindful, however, that under the Criminal Punishment Code, "[t]he primary purpose of sentencing is to punish the offender." § 921.002(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (1999). REMORSE Turning now to the grounds utilized by the trial court for departure, we first discuss Appellees' remorse as a basis for departure. While it is true that at sentencing each Appellee expressed remorse for his conduct, section 921.0026(2)(j), Florida Statutes (1999), requires, in addition to remorse, that the crime be committed in an unsophisticated manner, and constitute an isolated incident....

...No evidence was presented regarding these requirements. To the contrary, the record clearly indicates that the crimes were committed in a sophisticated manner and were not isolated incidents. Simply saying "I'm sorry" at sentencing is not enough to satisfy the requirements of section 921.0026(2)(j)....

...Laroe was a fugitive until this morning." The record contains no competent substantial evidence that Appellees persuaded Laroe to surrender or otherwise cooperated with the State to resolve the instant offenses or any other offenses. *127 NEED FOR RESTITUTION Section 921.0026(2)(e) allows the court to impose a downward departure sentence if the need for restitution to the victim outweighs the need for a prison sentence....

...JONES'S MEDICAL CONDITION Finally, the trial court considered Jones's medical condition as a basis for downward departure. Jones introduced medical records showing that he had surgery for an aneurysm in 1990. As a result, he suffers from seizures and takes medication on a regular basis. While section 921.0026(1)(d) allows the court to depart downward if a defendant requires specialized treatment for a mental or physical disability, there was no evidence presented showing that Jones required specialized treatment for his condition, or that...

...departure were not established); State v. Arvinger, 751 So.2d 74 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). SENTENCES VACATED; REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING. THOMPSON, C.J. and COBB, J., concur. NOTES [1] § 895.03(3), Fla. Stat. (1999). [2] § 796.05, Fla. Stat. (1999). [3] § 921.002, et seq., Fla....

...Mann, 866 So.2d 179, 181 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). We hold that the basis for downward departure was not supported by competent, substantial evidence. *1057 DISCUSSION The provision of criminal penalties is a matter of predominantly substantive law determined by the legislature. § 921.002(1), Fla. Stat. (2003); State v. Ayers, 901 So.2d 942, 946 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). Ordinarily, the lowest permissible guideline sentence is "assumed to be the lowest appropriate sentence for the offender being sentenced." § 921.00265(1); Mann, 866 So.2d at 181. A downward departure is prohibited unless circumstances reasonably justify the departure, which must be articulated in writing. § 921.0026(1); 921.002(1)(f); Mann, 866 So.2d at 181, 183; Ayers, 901 So.2d at 944-45; Staffney v....

...Mann, 866 So.2d at 181; Staffney, 826 So.2d at 511. UNSOPHISTICATION AS A REASON FOR DEPARTURE A valid basis for departure exists where "[t]he offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse." § 921.0026(2)(j); Mann, 866 So.2d at 182; Thompson, 844 So.2d at 815; Ayers, 901 So.2d at 945; Staffney, 826 So.2d at 511....

...Munro, 903 So.2d 381, 382 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Staffney, 826 So.2d at 511-12. However, " intoxication at the time of the offense is not a mitigating factor . . . and does not, under any circumstances, justify a downward departure from the permissible sentencing range." § 921.0026(3) (emphasis added); Thompson, 844 So.2d at 815. The trial court did not explain the departure in writing, but the transcript shows that the court relied on the "unsophisticated manner" language in section 921.0026(2)(j)....

...uch as he was inebriated . . . [a]nd that's why I detail it as being somewhat clumsy in the approach and what transpired." This contravened the plain language of the statute, which forbids the use of intoxication to justify a downward departure. See § 921.0026(3); Thompson, 844 So.2d at 815....

the court's judgment. Appellant refers us to Section 921.02, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., which reads as follows:

...The court does find that he qualifies as a habitual felony offender and I am going to enter the order finding that he qualifies as a habitual felony offender. I am going to find that he does not—it is not necessary to protect the public in this case to sentence him as a HFO. I'm instead going to downward depart under 921.0026....

...ent Code, explaining: At a minimum, the trial court must impose the lowest permissible sentence calculated according to the Criminal Punishment Code unless the court finds that the evidence supports a valid reason for a downward departure. See e.g., § 921.002(1)(f) & (3), Fla....

...n abuse of discretion. Discretion is abused only where no reasonable person would agree with the trial court's decision." Id. An appellate court will uphold a departure sentence if any reason given by the trial judge is a valid reason for departure. Section 921.0026(1) and (2)(j), Florida Statutes (2006), which governs mitigating circumstances justifying a downward departure from the lowest permissible sentence, provides in relevant part: (1) A downward departure from the lowest permissible sentence, as calculated according to the total sentence points pursuant to s. 921.0024, is prohibited unless there are circumstances or factors that reasonably justify the downward departure....

...asonably justified include, but are not limited to: . . . (j) The offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse. However, the list of statutory departure reasons provided in section 921.0026(2) is not exclusive. State v. Randall, 746 So.2d 550, 552 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999). Therefore, the trial court may impose a downward departure for reasons not delineated in section 921.0026, so long as the reason given is supported by competent, substantial evidence and not otherwise prohibited....

...Here, the trial court gave three reasons for downward departure: Mr. Stephenson's remorse, his family support obligations, and the fact that he had "kept his nose clean" since being released from prison in 2004. The first reason, remorse, is specifically authorized under section 921.0026(2)(j), Florida Statutes. However, section 921.0026(2)(j) requires, in addition to remorse, that the crime be committed in an unsophisticated manner and constitute an isolated incident....

...Further, the record contains no competent, substantial evidence that would support a finding that the charged offense was committed in an unsophisticated and isolated manner. See Tyrrell, 807 So.2d at 126 ("Simply saying `I'm sorry' at sentencing is not enough to satisfy the requirements of section 921.0026(2)(j)."). Therefore, a downward departure under section 921.0026(2)(j) was unjustified....

...f you served fifteen months. The state then objected to the downward departure sentence "for the record," but stated no grounds. Assuming the earlier objection can carry over to the court's reasons for departure, the state is not entitled to relief. Section 921.0026(2) provides a list of mitigating circumstances which will justify a downward departure....

...This list includes the instance in which a defendant cooperates with the state to resolve the offense, the offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner, and the criminal acts constitute isolated incidents for which the defendant has shown remorse. § 921.0026(2)(i) and (j), Fla. Stat.(1999). However, this list of statutory departure reasons is not exclusive. § 921.0026(1). See also State v. Turro, 724 So.2d 1216 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). In addition, even if some of the court's stated reasons are insufficient, only one valid reason is necessary to sustain a departure. § 921.002(3)....

...r lack of jurisdiction. FACTS The order from the Second District in Gandy's case reads in its entirety: "Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus is treated as a petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and is denied. See § 921.002(g), Fla....

...to have committed a delinquent act that would be a felony if committed by an adult." The difference between subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) is not arbitrary; rather, it recognizes the fundamental difference between criminal proceedings and juvenile proceedings. The primary purpose of criminal sentencing is to punish. § 921.002(1)(b), Fla....

...ue to a violation of probation or community control. (h) A sentence may be appealed on the basis that it departs from the Criminal Punishment Code only if the sentence is below the lowest permissible sentence or as enumerated in s. 924.06(1). [e.s.] § 921.002 Fla. Stat. (2003). Section 924.06(1) provides: A defendant may appeal from ... a sentence, on the ground that it is illegal; or ... [a] sentence imposed under s. 921.0024 of the Criminal Punishment Code which exceeds the statutory maximum penalty provided in s....

...Instead, the sentences imposed were each for a specified term of years, albeit for an *973 extraordinary length because of the consecutive requirement. Further, pursuant to Florida law, after serving eighty-five percent of the sentence, Mr. Walle may qualify for a lessening of his sentence. See § 921.002(l)(e), Fla....

Notes 1968 Adoption. To the same effect as section 921.02, Florida Statutes, except the portion reading

....00 to be paid at a rate of $425.82 per month. The trial court based this downward departure sentence on a finding that the need for restitution outweighed the need for incarceration. II "The primary purpose of sentencing is to punish the offender." § 921.002(1)(b), Fla....

...A defendant's minimum sentence is based on the crime he committed and the points he earned. Accordingly, departures below the lowest permissible sentence established by the Criminal Punishment Code must be articulated in writing and supported by a preponderance of the evidence. See § 921.002(1)(f) & (3), Fla....

...ll not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. See id. A victim's need for restitution is a valid reason for a downward departure sentence only if competent, substantial evidence shows the victim's need outweighs the need for incarceration. See § 921.0026(2)(e), Fla....

...In his motion, Carpenter claimed that the alleged episode from which the charges against him arose did not occur on October 5, 1998, but on September 28, 1998. The alleged difference in the date on which the offenses occurred is significant because the Criminal Punishment Code became effective on October 1, 1998. See § 921.002, Fla. Stat. (1997). Under the Criminal Punishment Code the sentencing judge has unfettered discretion to impose the statutory maximum for offenses committed on or after October 1, 1998. See § 921.002(1)(g)....

...impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. " Under the Criminal Punishment Code, a trial court may impose any sentence up to the statutory maximum without any additional factual findings. See § 921.002(1)(g), Fla....

...2d DCA 2003) (victim injury points must be submitted to jury if addition of points causes sentence to go beyond statutory maximum). Below, the appellant also asserted that the trial court erred, as a matter of law, by scoring victim injury points for "death" when the jury acquitted him of all murder charges. We agree. Section 921.0021(7)(a), Fla....

...In this case, we are faced with a situation where Appellant, if he serves the entirety of his sentence, will be ninety-seven when he is released. Even if Appellant received the maximum amount of gain time, the earliest he would be released is at age eighty-five. See § 921.002(l)(e), Fla....

...Under the new Criminal Punishment Code, if a sentence of imprisonment is authorized, the maximum sentence is never less than the statutory maximum and the scoresheet determines the lowest permissible sentence in the absence of a reason for a downward departure sentence. See § 921.002, Fla....

...ida State Prison. § 775.082(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (2010). Under Florida’s Criminal Punishment Code, the trial court is permitted to sentence the defendant to any permissible sentence not to exceed the maximum sentence allowed for the degree of crime. § 921.002(g), Fla....

...We have for review the decision in State v. VanBebber, 805 So.2d 918 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), which certified conflict with the decision in State v. Warner, 721 So.2d 767 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), approved on other grounds, 762 So.2d 507 (Fla.2000), on the issue of whether the mitigator in section 921.0026(2)(j), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998), is available to support a downward departure from a sentence for a driving under the influence (DUI) conviction. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons explained below, we hold the mitigator in section 921.0026(2)(j) is available to support a downward departure from a sentence for a felony DUI conviction....

...Defense counsel argued for a downward departure from the guidelines sentence of *1048 175.9 to 240 months based on the statutory mitigator of "offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse." § 921.0026(2)(j), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). The trial court agreed that the evidence fulfilled the requirements of section 921.0026(2)(j) and imposed a downward departure....

...ticated manner. The State objected to the downward departure, thus preserving this issue, which it then appealed. VanBebber, 805 So.2d at 919 (footnotes omitted). The Second District affirmed the decision of the trial court and held the mitigator in section 921.0026(2)(j) is available to support a downward departure from a sentence for a DUI conviction, but certified conflict with Warner on this issue. See VanBebber, 805 So.2d at 921. DISCUSSION Section 921.0026 is part of the Florida Criminal Punishment Code [2] and provides, in relevant part: 921.0026 Mitigating circumstances.—This section applies to any felony offense, except any capital felony, committed on or after October 1, 1998. (1) A downward departure from the lowest permissible sentence, as calculated according to the total sentence points pursuant to s. 921.0024, is prohibited unless there are circumstances or factors that reasonably justify the downward departure....

...(3) The defendant's substance abuse or addiction, including intoxication at the time of the offense, is not a mitigating factor under subsection (2) and does not, under any circumstances, justify a downward departure from the permissible sentencing range. § 921.0026, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). In concluding that the mitigator in section 921.0026(2)(j) is available to support a downward departure from a sentence for a DUI conviction, the Second District reasoned: (1) section 921.0026 states unequivocally, *1049 "This section applies to any felony offense, except any capital felony, committed on or after October 1, 1998," and (2) cognizant of the public policy against drunk driving, the Legislature still did not exempt DUI crimes from application of section 921.0026(2)(j). VanBebber, 805 So.2d at 920. [3] We agree with the Second District's reasoning. Section 921.0026 plainly states, "This section applies to any felony offense, except any capital felony, committed on or after October 1, 1998." [4] Because the mitigator in section 921.0026(2)(j) applies to any felony offense, except any capital felony, committed on or after October 1, 1998, [5] it is available to support a downward departure from a felony DUI conviction. The fact that the Legislature specifically exempted only capital felonies is further support for the conclusion that section 921.0026(2)(j) applies to felony DUI convictions....

...Beck, 763 So.2d 506, 508 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) ("We also note that drunk driving cannot be committed in an unsophisticated manner."). Although we fully recognize the State's strong public policy against DUI, we find that the issue in this case, whether the mitigator in section 921.0026(2)(j) is available to support a downward departure from a DUI conviction, is resolved by the clear and unambiguous statutory language of section 921.0026. Because the statute states that the mitigator in section 921.0026(2)(j) applies to any felony offense, except any capital felony, committed on or after October 1, 1998, we hold that the mitigator in section 921.0026(2)(j) is available to support a downward departure from a felony DUI conviction. The State also argues, however, that to hold section 921.0026(2)(j) applicable to felony DUI convictions would create conflict with section 921.0026(3), which provides: (3) The defendant's substance abuse or addiction, including intoxication at the time of the offense, is not a mitigating factor under subsection (2) and does not, under any circumstances, justify a downward departure from the permissible sentencing range. We find that no conflict is created by holding section 921.0026(2)(j) applicable to felony DUI convictions....

...Under subsection (3), intoxication at the time of the offense cannot be used as a mitigating factor to support a downward departure from a sentence under the sentencing guidelines. There is no prohibition, however, against using the mitigators listed in section 921.0026(2) in cases where the offense is intoxication....

...As the Second District noted, "we shall not judicially legislate and interpret the law to negate the clear language used by the legislature." VanBebber, 805 So.2d at 920. Finally, the State argues that the Second District improperly relied on State v. Sachs, 526 So.2d 48 (Fla.1988), to buttress its conclusion that section 921.0026(2)(j) is available in this case....

...iously found the same reasons for departure valid in a case involving a DUI offense, even before the reasons were codified as a mitigator in the Florida Statutes. Therefore we find that the Second District did not err by relying on Sachs. CONCLUSION Section 921.0026 is clear and unambiguous and provides that the mitigators found therein are applicable to all felony offenses except capital felonies. The offense of DUI is a noncaptial felony offense. Therefore, we hold that the mitigator in section 921.0026(2)(j) is available to support a downward departure from a sentence for a felony DUI conviction....

...PARIENTE, J., concurs with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs. QUINCE, J., dissents with an opinion, in which WELLS, J., concurs. PARIENTE, J., concurring. I write to express my agreement with the majority and elaborate on my reasons for concurring. Section 921.0026(2)(j), Florida Statutes (2002), allows the trial court to impose a downward departure sentence if the trial court finds that the offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse....

...been required to impose a Criminal Punishment Code prison sentence of no less than 175.9 months (14.65 years) up to 240 months (20 years) in prison. The evidence presented in the trial court establishes the basis for a downward departure pursuant to section 921.0026(2)(j): this was an isolated instance and the defendant exhibited "extreme and sincere remorse while recognizing his fault." These facts are more fully detailed in Judge Altenbernd's concurrence: Mr....

...He pleaded guilty to these offenses with no promise as to the sentence he would receive. He is a religious man, who has repeatedly stated that he wishes that he could have been the person who died in this accident. State v. VanBebber, 805 So.2d 918, 921 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (Altenbernd, A.C.J., concurring). Section 921.0026(2)(j) appears to have been written exactly for a defendant such as VanBebber....

...although he or she has demonstrated remorse for an offense that was an "isolated" incident, nonetheless committed the crime in a sophisticated manner either in its planning or execution. As the Second District succinctly stated in this case: First, section 921.0026, which lays out certain mitigating circumstances, states unequivocally: "This section applies to any felony offense, except any capital felony, committed on or after October 1, 1998." There is no exception provided for DUI offenses, as was done for a capital felony....

...erious and real problem of DUI. [8] I likewise urge the Legislature to examine whether a prison term under the guidelines must necessarily be imposed for this type of offense in the absence of one of the twelve grounds for a downward departure under section 921.0026....

...These substantial sanctions fashioned by the trial court are tailored to fit the crime and offender, and also serve in some way to attempt to repair the damage caused by his terrible act. [9] For all these reasons, I agree with the majority's conclusion that the trial court in this case was permitted to use section 921.0026(2)(j) to support a downward departure sentence for a felony DUI conviction. ANSTEAD, C.J., concurs. QUINCE, J., dissenting. I disagree with the majority that because section 921.0026, Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), provides that the mitigators in that section are applicable to all felonies except capital felonies, that the mitigator in section 921.0026(2)(j) is applicable to the felony of driving under the influence (DUI). I would affirm the view espoused by the Fourth District in State v. Beck, 763 So.2d 506 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), and State v. Warner, 721 So.2d 767 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998), that the mitigating factor in section 921.0026(2)(j) is not applicable to DUI convictions. In Beck, the Fourth District reversed a trial court's downward departure from the sentencing guidelines. One of the reasons given for the departure was the section 921.0026(2)(j) mitigating factor....

...If the crime is one that is not capable of being committed in a sophisticated manner, then logically, it cannot be committed in an unsophisticated manner. As the Fourth District held, DUI is a crime which cannot be committed in a sophisticated or unsophisticated manner. This reading of section 921.0026(2)(j) does not run afoul of the general provision that the mitigators in this section are applicable to all noncapital felonies....

...In determining whether a mitigating factor is applicable, the sentencing court must look at the facts and circumstances of the offense as well as the type of crime that was committed. When the facts and circumstances and the type of crime are considered in this case, I reach the conclusion that section 921.0026(2)(j) is not applicable to the crime of DUI....

...WELLS, J., concurs. NOTES [1] The State contends this is a slight misstatement. The mitigator at issue in this case has three parts-the offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse. See § 921.0026(2)(j), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). The State agreed that the offense was an isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse, but disputed whether the offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner. [2] §§ 921.002-921.0027, Fla....

...und the manner of committing the offense, the fact that it was an isolated incident, and the fact that the defendant had shown remorse were valid reasons for a downward departure in a DUI case. See VanBebber, 805 So.2d at 920-21. [4] As noted above, section 921.0026(2)(j) is part of the Florida Criminal Punishment Code. See §§ 921.002-921.0027, Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998). The introduction to the Code also provides: "The Criminal Punishment Code shall apply to all felony offenses, except capital felonies, committed on or after October 1, 1998." § 921.002, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1998). [5] The offense in this case was committed on May 23, 1999. [6] Section 921.0016(4) was repealed effective October 1, 1998, with the implementation of the Florida Criminal Punishment Code. See §§ 921.002-921.0026, Florida Statutes (1997). Section 921.0026 was enacted effective October 1, 1998. The mitigators listed in sections 921.0016(4) and 921.0026(2) are identical....

...ial court erred in imposing a discretionary cost of $150. We find reversible error only as to the third issue. *574 Mr. Patterson committed his offenses on February 19, 1999, and is thus subject to the provisions of the Criminal Punishment Code. See § 921.002, Fla....

...whose statistical life expectancy is arguably longer, then a fifty-six-year sentence is not a de facto life sentence. Moreover, as we raised in Henry, it is unclear whether gain time would be a factor in this analysis. Id. If it is, and, pursuant to section 921.002(l)(e), Florida Statutes (2002), Peterson serves only eighty-five percent of his sentence, then his sentence is not a de facto life sentence, but then the sixty-year sentence in Guzman, that Justice Pariente clearly inferred would be a...

factor is not one of the enumerated factors in section 921.002(1), Florida Statutes (2014), and' the Florida

(1997) (abolishing parole for capital felonies); § 921.002(l)(a)(5), Fla. Stat. (1997) (stating chapter 947

...criminal penalties, and to make the best use of state prisons so that violent criminal offenders are appropriately incarcerated, has determined that it is in the best interest of the state to develop, implement, and revise a sentencing policy. *409 § 921.002(1), Fla....

...of punishment. The penalty imposed is commensurate with the severity of the primary offense and the circumstances surrounding the primary offense. The severity of the sentence increases with the length and nature of the offender’s prior record. . § 921.002(l)(b), (c), and (d), Fla....

...d convictions. § 921.231(l)(c), Fla. Stat. (2010). In other words, by definition, the arrests and convictions considered by a trial judge in.sentencing occur “prior to the time of the primary offense,” and not subsequent to the primary offense. § 921.0021(5), Fla. Stat. (2010). Additionally, the terms “primary offense” and “prior record,” which are included in the CPC’s sentencing principles, do not include a subsequent arrest and its . related charges. See §§ 921.0021(4)(5), Fla....

...The Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.992(a) Criminal Punishment Code Scoresheet contains this notation: "Departure based on mental health for depression & vascular dementia." The sentence computation shown on the scoresheet reflects a lowest permissible prison sentence of fifty-one months. II. Analysis Section 921.0026(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), provides that, under the Criminal Punishment Code, "[a] downward departure from the lowest permissible sentence ... is prohibited unless there are circumstances or factors that reasonably justify the downward departure." See also § 921.002(1)(f). Section 921.0026(2) provides in pertinent part: Mitigating circumstances under which a departure from the lowest permissible sentence is reasonably justified include, but are not limited to: . . . . (d) The defendant requires specialized treatment for a mental disorder that is unrelated to substance abuse or addiction or for a physical disability, and the defendant is amenable to treatment. Section 921.002(3) provides in pertinent part: "The level of proof necessary to establish facts supporting the mitigation of a sentence is a preponderance of the evidence.... Any sentence imposed below the lowest permissible sentence must be explained in writing by the trial court judge." The sentencing scoresheet shows that the circuit court determined that a departure sentence was warranted under section 921.0026(2)(d)....

...and the matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Sentence reversed; case remanded. ALTENBERND, C.J., and WHATLEY, J., concur. NOTES [1] We note that although the circuit court did not expressly rely on section 921.0026(2)(c), which provides that a defendant's "substantially impaired" capacity "to appreciate the criminal nature of the conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements of law" is a mitigating circumstance, that subsection might b...

...ntencing range would have remained that of a non-state prison sanction. Thus, we conclude that the error regarding the exclusion of the prior misdemeanors does not require resentencing. Affirmed. BLUE, A.C.J., and SALCINES, J., Concur. NOTES [1] See § 921.002, Fla....

...After having heard the testimony and arguments of the attorneys, the trial judge concluded that Appellee had "a serious problem with alcohol [that caused Appellee] to act in an unsophisticated manner." Based thereon, the court chose to impose a downward departure probationary sentence, pursuant to section 921.0026(2)(j), Florida Statutes, (2002). For the reasons stated herein, we conclude that the imposition of the departure sentence was error. Section 921.0026, Florida Statutes, contains a non-exclusive list of mitigating circumstances a court may use as the basis for a departure sentence. One such circumstance is where the offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse. § 921.0026(2)(j), Fla....

...lated incident, committed in an unsophisticated manner, and for which the defendant had shown remorse. Id. Any departure based on these grounds must be supported by written reasons or orally pronounced findings of fact on each of the three elements. § 921.00265(2), Fla....

...tted in an unsophisticated way. The trial judge made no findings related to the other two elements, nor was there record evidence to support any conclusion that the offenses were isolated or that Appellee had shown remorse. Departure predicated upon section 921.0026(2)(j), Florida Statutes, therefore, was not proper. Although the statutory list of mitigating circumstances upon which downward departure may be based is not intended to be exhaustive, the legislature has clearly prohibited departure on the basis of substance abuse or addiction. Section 921.0026(3), Florida Statutes, states as follows: The defendant's substance abuse or addiction, including intoxication at the time of the offense, is not a mitigating factor......

...On remand, therefore, the court should determine whether Appellee entered an open plea to the court without agreement for a particular sentence. If so, the court should simply sentence Appellee *816 in accordance with the Criminal Punishment Code. § 921.002, Fla....

...legally insufficient to meet the statutory requirements for such departure. In particular, the State argues that Green failed to establish that the Department of Corrections could not provide the specialized treatments for his physical disabilities. Section 921.002(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2004), provides: The Criminal Punishment Code embodies the principles that: ....

...rt judge and made only when circumstances or factors reasonably justify the mitigation of the sentence. The level of proof necessary to establish facts that support a departure from the lowest permissible sentence is a preponderance of the evidence. Section 921.0026, entitled "Mitigating circumstances," provides in pertinent part: (1) A downward departure from the lowest permissible sentence, as calculated according to the total sentence points pursuant to s. 921.0024, is prohibited unless there are circumstances or factors that reasonably justify the downward departure....

...justified include, but are not limited to: . . . (d) The defendant requires specialized treatment for a mental disorder that is unrelated to substance abuse or addiction or for a physical disability, and the defendant is amenable to treatment. . . . § 921.0026, Fla....

...ve in treating his problems. At the close of the evidence, the trial court concluded that "there was testimony that he is only able to receive in his incarceration Tylenol and not other drugs better to treat him." "To receive a sentence pursuant to [section 921.0026(2)(d)], a defendant must prove that the Department of Corrections (DOC) cannot provide the specialized treatment required." State v....

...2 Included in this statu *97 tory scheme are a number of non-exclusive mitigating grounds for departure that may establish a basis for a more lenient sentence. 3 The issue we must resolve is whether competent substantial evidence supports the trial court’s decision to impose a departure sentence pursuant to section 921.0026(2)(j), Florida Statutes (2011), which allows a sentence below the minimum guideline range when the crime was “committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse.” We must...

...ds. If the statutory ground is supported by competent substantial evidence in the record, affirmance is appropriate. Banks . As to the non-statutory grounds, “[t]he trial court can impose a downward departure sentence for reasons not delineated in section 921.0026(2), so long as the reason given is supported by competent, substantial evidence and is not otherwise prohibited.” State v....

...Henderson, 108 So.3d 1137, 1140 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (citing State v. Stephenson, 973 So.2d 1259, 1263 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008)). The facts that support a departure from the lowest permissible guideline sentence must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. §§ 921.002(1)(0, (3), Fla....

...a mitigated sentence based on their own predilections. See Williams v. State, 492 So.2d 1308 (Fla.1986); State v. Whiteside, 56 So.3d 799 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); State v. Ayers, 901 So.2d 942 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). We will begin with the statutory ground. Section 921.0026(2)(j) allows for a departure sentence when: 1) the crime was committed in an unsophisticated manner; 2) it was an isolated incident; and 3) the defendant expressed remorse for his wrongful acts....

...Deleon, 867 So.2d 636 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004). Regarding the second statutory element, Thompkins has a significant criminal history, including a prior conviction for burglary of a dwelling, that clearly indicates that his crimes are not isolated incidents within the meaning of section 921.0026(2)(j)....

...eparture is consistent with legislative sentencing policies.” State v. Knox, 990 So.2d 665, 669 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008) (citations omitted); see also Chestnut. The stated policy of the Criminal Punishment Code is to punish miscreants for their crimes. § 921.002(l)(b), Fla....

...McKnight, 85 So.Bd 995, 997 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010); Chestnut, 718 So.2d at 313 (“Further, the first purpose of sentencing is to punish, not rehabilitate.”). Whether there is any redeeming value to the criminal in sending him to prison is largely of secondary concern. See § 921.002(l)(b), Fla....

...(2011); State v. Hall, 47 So.3d 361 , 364 n. 5 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (“Rehabilitation is a secondary goal, and it is a stated policy that a defendant’s sentence should increase with the length and nature of the defendant’s prior record.” (citing § 921.002(l)(b), (d))); Chestnut, 718 So.2d at 314 (“It is obvious that prison will always be detrimental to one’s future even if it is essential to his appropriate punishment....

...(citations omitted)). We have analyzed each of the reasons given by the trial court to justify the sentence it imposed because if just one is a valid ground for departure that is supported by competent evidence, then the sentence should be affirmed. § 921.002(3), Fla....

...Having done so, we conclude that the statutory ground is not supported by competent sub *101 stantial evidence and that none of the non-statutory grounds are valid. The sentence is reversed and the case is remanded for resentencing. REVERSED and REMANDED. ORFINGER, C.J. and COHEN, J., concur. . §§ 921.002-.0027, Fla. Stat. (2011). . §§ 921.0024(2)-(3), 921.0026(1), 921.00265(1), Fla. Stat. (2011). The Criminal Punishment Code does not apply to defendants charged with capital felonies. § 921.002, Fla. Stat. (2011); see also § 775.082(8)(d), Fla. Stat. (2011). . § 921.0026(2), Fla....

...The existence of prior convictions has long been taken into consideration by sentencing judges. Both the sentencing guidelines as well as the Criminal Punishment Code scale sentences based upon prior criminal conduct. See § 921.001, et seq., Fla. Stat. (sentencing guidelines); § 921.002, et seq., Fla....

(1997) (abolishing parole for capital felonies); § 921.002(l)(a)(5), Fla. Stat. (1997) (stating chapter 947

...in a minimum permissible sentence of 13.1 months in prison. In order to depart downward from 13.1 months, the trial judge would have had to have provided written reasons in writing. § 921.0017(3). The state can appeal downward departure sentences. § 921.002(1)(h)....

...PETERSON and PLEUS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] § 893.13(1)(a)(1), Fla. Stat. (1999), a first degree felony. He had been charged with trafficking in cocaine, but was convicted of the lesser included offense. [2] § 893.247(1), Fla. Stat. (1999), a first degree misdemeanor. [3] §§ 921.002(1)(g), (h); 924.06, Fla....

...The plea agreement provided a fifteen-year prison sentence for Mora, and the trial court imposed a shorter term of ten years in prison. And, last, a trial court has great discretion in determining the length of a sentence, so long as it is within the statutory limits. § 921.002(1)(g), Fla....

...See generally, e.g., Dwight v. State, 677 So.2d 1363, 1365 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). "[A] trial court has great discretion in determining the length of a sentence, so long as it is within the statutory limits." Mora v. State, 964 So.2d 881, 884 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (citing § 921.002(1)(g), Fla....

...ls under this exception; therefore, his life sentence for the burglary is not illegal. Affirmed. MORRIS and BLACK, JJ., Concur. . A life sentence imposed under the Criminal Punishment Code in Florida does not carry with it the possibility of parole. § 921.002(l)(e), Fla....

...ld have sentenced Appellant to the same term if the error was corrected. See State v. Anderson, 905 So.2d 111 (Fla.2005). Under the Criminal Punishment Code, trial courts are authorized to sentence convicted defendants to the maximum statutory term. § 921.002(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (2003). The minimum calculation limits a trial court's authority to depart below the lowest permissible sentence. § 921.00265, Fla....

...got a license. A downward departure sentence less severe than the lowest permissible sentence shown on the criminal punishment code scoresheet "is prohibited unless there are circumstances or factors that reasonably justify the downward departure." § 921.0026(1), Fla. Stat. (2009). At a minimum, the trial court must impose the lowest permissible sentence calculated according to the Criminal Punishment Code unless the court finds that the evidence supports a valid reason for a downward departure. See e.g., § 921.002(1)(f) & (3), Fla. Stat. (1999); State v. Henderson, 766 So.2d 389, 390 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). Section 921.0026(2) sets forth the circumstances under which a departure from the lowest permissible sentence is reasonably justified. The statutory list of mitigating factors is not exclusive and the trial court may impose a downward departure sentence for reasons not delineated in section 921.0026....

...9.140(b)(1)(E), (F); § 924.06(1)(d), (e), Fla. Stat. (2000). As this sentence was not illegal, in that it was not beyond the statutory maximum for the crime, there is no appellate issue raised. For each defendant, the Criminal Punishment Code establishes a "lowest permissible sentence." § 921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. (2000). The code provides that a "court may impose a departure below the lowest permissible sentence based upon circumstances or factors that reasonably justify the mitigation of the sentence." § 921.002(3), Fla. Stat. (2000) (emphasis added). One of those mitigating factors is physical disability which is amenable to treatment. See § 921.0026(2)(d), Fla....

...We therefore reverse the life sentence on the violation of probation and remand the case to the trial court for resentencing on the violation only. Reversed and Remanded. DAMOORGIAN and CONNER, JJ., concur. . Because Florida abolished parole, a life sentence is without the possibility of parole. See § 921.002, Fla....

...a downward departure from the minimum permissible sentence. See State v. Adkison, 56 So.3d 880 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (“A sentence consisting of a suspended prison term followed by probationary period is treated as a downward departure sentence.”). Section 921.0026(1), Florida Statutes, prohibits a downward departure “unless there are circumstances or factors that reasonably justify the downward departure.” In addition, “[a]ny sentence imposed below the lowest permissible sentence must be explained in writing by the trial court judge.” § 921.002(3), Fla....

...2d DCA 2011). The trial court’s first step is to “determine whether it can depart, i.e., whether there is a valid legal ground and adequate factual support for that ground in the case pending before it.” Banks v. State, 732 So.2d 1065, 1067 (Fla.1999). Section 921.0026(2) lists valid mitigating factors which may support a downward departure, but a trial court is authorized to depart for non-statutory reasons as well....

...Further, the trial court must determine if a non-statutory mitigator “is consistent with legislative sentencing policies.” State v. Knox, 990 So.2d 665, 669 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008). In this case, the issue is whether the trial court based its departure sentence on a valid legal ground not listed in section 921.0026(2)....

...d no case applying this federal policy to Florida sentences. “The provision of criminal penalties and of limitations on such penalties is a matter of predominantly substantive law and, as such, is a matter properly addressed by the Legislature.” § 921.002(1), Fla. Stat. The Florida Legislature has codified Florida’s policies for sentencing, including departure sentences, in Florida’s Criminal Punishment Code, sections 921.002-921.0027, Florida Statutes....

...from the sentencing range indicated by the Criminal Punishment Code (CPC) scoresheet. Because we lack the authority to review the sentence imposed below, we affirm. The trial court here imposed a sentence within the CPC scoresheet sentencing range. Section 921.002(1)(h), Florida Statutes (2005), provides that "[a] sentence may be appealed on the basis that it departs from the Criminal Punishment Code only if the sentence is below the lowest permissible sentence or as enumerated in s. 924.06(1)." Under sections 924.06(1)(d) and (e), Florida Statutes (2005), a defendant is authorized to appeal an illegal sentence or a sentence imposed under section 921.0024 which exceeds the statutory maximum penalty....

...give the trial judge the opportunity to re-sentence the defendant and provide the written reasons for the departure sentence or to allow the defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea and proceed to trial or be resentenced under the guidelines. § 921.002(3), Fla....

...concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics.” Id. at D522 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949)). The sentencing judge has broad discretion to impose a sentence within the statutory range set forth by the legislature, see § 921.002(g), Fla. Stat....

...State, 766 So.2d 1126 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (reversing guidelines sentence where trial court suffered from misimpression that it could not consider lower sentence of more culpable defendant). [2] If a legal reason is received by a court, we are compelled by section 921.002(3) of the Criminal Punishment Code in effect at the time of the crime, § 921.002(3), Fla. Stat. (2002), to affirm the court's decision to depart even though all but one of the proffered reasons are not valid grounds to authorize a trial court to award a downward departure. Section 921.002(3) states: A court may impose a departure below the lowest permissible sentence based upon circumstances or factors that reasonably justify the mitigation of the sentence in accordance with s. 921.0026....

...stance or factor justifies the mitigation regardless of the presence of other circumstances or factors found not to justify mitigation. Any sentence imposed below the lowest permissible sentence must be explained in writing by the trial court judge. § 921.002(3), Fla....

...Parisi, 660 So.2d 372 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (trial court may not base downward departure on State's revoked offer); State v. Caride, 473 So.2d 1362 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985) (non-violent nature of crime not sufficient because already contemplated by the guidelines). See also § 921.0026(2)(a)-( l ), Fla....

...citing Albritton v. State, 476 So.2d 158, 160 (Fla. 1985). Because, unlike Sanders and Albritton, the crimes in this case occurred after the effective date of the 1987 amendment, we are required to follow this more current legislative directive. See § 921.002, Fla....

...he meaning of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a)). The Criminal Punishment Code defines the “lowest permissible sentence” as the “the minimum sentence that may be imposed by the trial court, absent a valid reason for departure.” § 921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. (2013) (emphasis added). The Code allows for imposition of sentences that are less than the “lowest permissible sentence.” See id.; see also § 921.002(1)(f), Fla....

...“The question then becomes whether the sentencing 2 The state alternatively argues that it would have had the ability to appeal the 48-month sentence, because it fell below the lowest permissible sentence without valid, written reasons for downward departure. See § 921.002(1)(h), Fla....

...ing scoresheet reflected a minimum sentence of 27.375 months in the Department of Corrections. Appellee sought a downward departure, arguing the offense was committed in an unsophisticated manner, was an isolated incident, and he showed remorse. See § 921.0026(j), Fla....

...5 months' prison sentence contingent upon successful completion of probation. The State then filed this appeal. Appellee shouldered the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts reasonably justifying a downward departure. See § 921.002(3) Fla....

..., 1986. [2] The Criminal Punishment Code, which is inapplicable to Daniels, does not recognize the idea of an "upward departure sentence." Rather, the statutory maximum for a given offense limits the length of a prison sentence for that offense. See § 921.002(1)(g), Fla....

...Thus, the issue squarely facing us is whether the willing participation of a seventeen-year-old young woman in a statutorily prohibited sexual relationship, although not a defense to the crime, can be considered by the judge in determining the appropriate sentence. We agree that section 921.0026, Florida Statutes, gives the trial judge the discretion to mitigate under appropriate circumstances, that the circumstances found by the trial court to exist herein are supported by the record and are appropriate, and affirm recognizing our contrary holding in State v....

...te based on the willing participation of a minor victim, did the court err in this case by doing so? Even if the court finds that a mitigating factor exists, it is still within the judge's discretion whether the guideline sentence should be reduced. Section 921.002(3), Florida Statutes, provides: "A court may impose a departure below the permissible sentencing range based upon circumstances or factors that reasonably justify the mitigating of the sentence in accordance with s. 921.0026." Thus, when we are asked to review a downward departure, there are two questions that we must consider....

...m . . . for the primary offense and any additional offenses before the court for sentencing. The sentencing court may impose such sentences concurrently or consecutively.” Moore v. State, 882 So. 2d 977, 985 (Fla. 2004) (quoting § 921.0024(2), Fla....

...de is articulated thusly: “The primary purpose of sentencing [pursuant to the Code] is to punish the offender. Rehabilitation is a desired goal of the criminal justice system but is subordinate to the goal of punishment.” § 921.002(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1998). “The penalty imposed [for an offense] is commensurate with the severity of the offense and the circumstances surrounding [it].” § 921.002(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1998). In addition, “[t]he severity of the sentence increases with the length and nature of the offender’s prior record.” § 921.002(1)(d), Fla....

...onment. Over the State’s objections, the trial court imposed a downward departure sentence, orally stating specific reasons to support it. Id. The trial court, however, did not file written reasons as required by statute and rule. Id.; see also § 921.00265(2), Fla....

...July 1, 2009, which is a third degree felony but not a forcible felony as defined in [section] 776.08, and excluding any third-degree felony violation under chapter 810, and if the total sentence points pursuant to [section] 921.0024 are 22 points or fewer, the court must sentence the offender to a nonstate prison sanction....

...e failure to provide a valid reason. Pope, 561 So. 2d at 556. Further, we recognize that the applicable statutes for imposing either an upward or downward departure sentence require the trial court to enter written findings. See §§ 775.082(10), 921.0025-.0026(2), Fla....

...nce and failure to show remorse in determining what sentence to impose. A trial court generally has discretion to impose any sentence within the minimum and maximum allowed by law. Nusspickel v. State, 966 So.2d 441, 444 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); see also § 921.002(1)(f), (g), Fla....

...ally provided valid reasons for departure. Jackson, 22 So.3d at 818 . The district court concluded further that the ground provided orally for the downward departure — that Jackson was amenable to drug rehabilitation — was not valid. Id. (citing § 921.0026(3), Fla....

...termined to be invalid. This issue presents a legal question and thus is subject to de novo review. See Sanders v. State, 35 So.3d 864, 868 (Fla.2010). The CPC governs sentencing in all non-capital felonies committed on or after October 1, 1998. See § 921.002, Fla....

...Jackson committed the aforementioned offenses on April 11, 2008, thus subjecting him to sentencing under the CPC. Generally, a trial court must impose, at a minimum, the lowest permissible sentence calculated according to the CPC unless there is a valid reason to impose a downward departure sentence. See § 921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. (2008). For noncapital offenses committed on or after October 1, 1998, “[t]he lowest permissible sentence provided by calculations from the total sentence points pursuant to s. 921.0024(2) is assumed to be the lowest appropriate sentence for the offender being sentenced.” § 921.00265(1), Fla. Stat. (2008). A departure sentence is one that “decreases an offender’s sentence below the lowest permissible sentence” provided by calculations from the total sentence points. § 921.00265(2), Fla. Stat. (2008); see also Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.704(d)(27)(A). A trial court must not impose a downward departure sentence unless mitigating circumstances or factors are present which reasonably justify such a departure. §§ 921.0026(1), 921.00265(1), Fla. Stat. (2008); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.704(d)(27). Section 921.0026(2) sets forth a nonexclusive list of mitigating factors under which a departure from the lowest permissible sentence is reasonably justified. § 921.0026(2), Fla....

...State, 565 So.2d 1329, 1331 (Fla.1990), receded from on other grounds by Smith v. State, 598 So.2d 1063 (Fla.1992). However, the CPC and applicable rules now require a sentencing court to file written reasons supporting the imposition of a downward departure sentence within seven days after the date of sentencing. § 921.00265(2); see also Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.704(d)(27)(A). A court may file a written transcription of reasons stated orally at sentencing for a downward departure within seven days after the date of sentencing. § 921.00265(2); see also Fla....

...t. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.704(d)(27)(A). The CPC is silent on how a trial court must resentence a defendant when the original departure sentence is reversed on appeal. However, the Legislature has expressed certain principles embodied by the CPC. See § 921.002(1)....

...udge and made only when circumstances or factors reasonably justify the mitigation of the sentence. The level of proof necessary to establish facts that support a departure from the *93 lowest permissible sentence is a preponderance of the evidence. § 921.002(1)®, Fla....

...ided statutory authority for the trial court to impose a higher sentence than allowed by the “statutory maximum.” See Mays v. State, 717 So.2d 515, 516 (Fla.1998). Similarly, for those defendants who committed their crimes after October 1, 1998, section 921.0024(2), Florida Statutes (1999), provides that "if the lowest permissible sentence under the code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s....

...r direct appeal. . We note that the Legislature recently amended the sentencing statute applicable to felonies committed after October 1, 1998. See ch. 97-194, Laws of Florida (creating the *107 Florida Criminal Punishment Code, codified at sections 921.002-921.0026, Florida Statutes (1997)); see also § 921.0027, Fla. Stat. (1999). Under this statute, the trial judge must calculate the "lowest permissible sentence.” See § 921.00265, Fla. Stat. (1999). Written reasons for imposing a departure sentence are still required when a judge imposes a downward departure. See §§ 921.002(1)©, .0025, .0026, Fla. Stat. (1999); see Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.704(d)(25)-(26). However, the statute allows the judge to impose a sentence "up to and including the statutory maximum for any offense,” section 921.002(l)(g), without requiring the filing of any reasons for doing so. See §§ 921.002(1)©-(h), 921.0026; Fla....

...2d DCA 2000), were inapplicable because they dealt with "Sentencing Guidelines" cases and not cases governed by the "Criminal Punishment Code." The court observed that Bracero's offenses were committed in 2002 and were governed by the Criminal Punishment Code. See § 921.002, Fla. Stat. (2002) (stating effective date of October 1, 1998, for the Criminal Punishment Code). The court stated that section 921.002(1)(g) allows "the Court to impose a sentence up to and including the statutory maximum for any offense before the Court due to a violation of probation" and denied Bracero's motion....

...of probation. “The primary purpose of sentencing [pursuant to- the Criminal Punishment Code (“CPC”) ] is to punish the offender. Rehabilitation is a desired goal of the criminal justice system but is subordinate to the goal of . punishment.” § 921.002(1)(b), Fla....

...State, 64 So.3d 90 (Fla.2011), the Florida Supreme Court explained sentencing requirements under the CPC as follows: Generally, a trial court must impose, at a minimum, the lowest permissible sentence calculated according to the CPC unless there is a valid reason to impose a downward departure sentence. See § 921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. (2008). For noncapital offenses committed on or after October 1, 1998, “the lowest permissible sentence provided by calculations from the total sentence points pursuant to s. 921.0024(2) is assumed to be the lowest appropriate sentence for the offender being sentenced.” § 921.00265(1), Fla. Stat. (2008). A departure sentence is one that “decreases an offender’s sentence below the lowest permissible sentence” provided by calculations from the total sentence points. § 921.00265(2), Fla. Stat. (2008); see also Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.704(d)(27)(A). A trial court must not impose a downward departure sentence unless mitigating circumstances or factors are present which reasonably justify such a departure. §§ 921.0026(1), 921.00265(1), Fla. Stat. (2008); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.704(d)(27). Section 921.0026(2) sets forth a nonexclusive list of mitigating factors under which a departure from the lowest permissible sentence is reasonably justified. § 921.0026(2), Fla....

...Because we find that the court erred under the first step, we need not address the second step. At sentencing, the trial court set forth two reasons for a downward departure sentence. First, the trial court found that Lindsay “cooperated with the State to resolve the current offense or any other offense.” See § 921.0026(2)©, Fla....

...Therefore, the trial court was not justified in using Lindsay’s cooperation with law enforcement as a mitigating circumstance. Second, the trial court found that the crime “was committed in an unsophisticated manner and was an isolated incident for which the defendant has shown remorse.” See § 921.0026(2)(j), Fla....

...stantial evidence, we reverse. Though the lowest permissible sentence under the Criminal Punishment Code was 15.15 months in the Department of Corrections, the trial court imposed a downward departure sentence of 51 weeks in the county jail. ’ See § 921.002(1)’(bj, Fla....

...w and whether competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s reason for imposing a downward departure sentence.” State v. Leverett, 44 So.3d 634, 636 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) (citing State v. Mann, 866 So.2d 179, 181 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004)). Section 921.0026(2), Florida Statutes (2015), sets forth a list of mitigating circumstances that permit the imposition of a downward departure. Only one reason given by the trial judge at the time of the offense, that Appellee was too young to appreciate the consequences of the offense, is found on that list. § 921.0026(2)(k), Fla, Stat....

...Butterworth, Attorney General, and Karen M. Holland, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee. KAHN, J. The question in this case is whether a defendant may, pursuant to a negotiated plea, be sentenced pursuant to both the Criminal Punishment Code (CPC), sections 921.002 through 921.0027, Florida Statutes (2000), and also the Prison Releasee Reoffender Punishment Act (PRRPA), section 775.082(9), Florida Statutes (2000)....

...The Defendant cites two very recent decisions from the Second and Fifth District Courts of Appeal in support of his instant motion. This Court finds that the Defendant's argument is without merit. The CPC provides a method for calculating the "lowest permissible sentence." § 921.0024(2), Fla....

...97-194, § 1, at 3674, Laws of Fla. The CPC was intended to apply to "any felony" committed on or after October 1, 1998. Ch. 97-194, § 2, at 3674, Laws of Fla. Consistent with this scheme, the CPC, as enacted, refers to the "former sentencing guidelines." § 921.002(2), Fla....

...ould be imposed, not the maximum as Thomas seems to contend. Because Thomas's offenses were committed after the effective date of the Criminal Punishment Code, October 1, 1998, Thomas could have been given the statutory maximum for his offenses. See § 921.002(g), Fla....

...hird-degree felony, is illegal. We conclude that Champagne's twenty-year sentence is legal, and we certify a question of great public importance. Champagne was sentenced under the Criminal Punishment Code, chapter 921, Florida Statutes (2005) (CPC). Section 921.0024(2) states that when "the lowest permissible sentence under the [CPC] exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s....

...ence on the robbery count. 2 The court then sentenced Champagne to twenty years (240 months) in prison on the false imprisonment count. 3 In his postconviction motion, Champagne argued that his twenty-year sentence is illegal based on his reading of section 921.0024(2) and Butler v....

...ntences for any additional offenses must not exceed the individual statutory maximums for those offenses. Essentially, Champagne contends that the LPS is a collective minimum sentence. The postconviction court denied Champagne's motion, finding that section 921.0024 does not require the LPS to be imposed "only if it exceeds the statutory maximum for the primarily scored offense....

...the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning." Eustache v. State , 248 So.3d 1097 , 1100 (Fla. 2018) (quoting Holly v. Auld , 450 So.2d 217 , 219 (Fla. 1984) ). III. Applicable law A. Statutory language The CPC provides that "[t]he primary purpose of sentencing is to punish the offender." § 921.002(1)(b)....

...It also provides that "[t]he penalty imposed is commensurate with the severity of the primary offense and the circumstances surrounding the primary offense" and that "[t]he severity of the sentence increases with the length and nature of the offender's prior record." § 921.002(1)(c), (d)....

..."Primary offense" is defined as the "the offense at conviction pending before the court for sentencing for which the total sentence points recommend a sanction that is as severe as, or more severe than, the sanction recommended for any other offense committed by the offender and pending before the court at sentencing." § 921.0021(4). "Prior record" is defined as "a conviction for a crime committed ... prior to the time of the primary offense." § 921.0021(5). Additional offenses, those "for which an offender is convicted and which [are] pending before the court for sentencing at the time of the primary offense," § 921.0021(1), are scored and included in the total sentence points calculation, which is then used solely to determine the offender's LPS, see § 921.0024(1)(a), (2)....

...Additional offenses are also referenced as part of the CPC's sentencing range: "The permissible range for sentencing shall be the [LPS] up to and including the statutory maximum, as defined in s. 775.082, for the primary offense and any additional offenses before the court for sentencing." § 921.0024(2). The LPS "is assumed to be the lowest appropriate sentence for the offender being sentenced," § 921.00265(1), and it "is the minimum sentence that may be imposed by the trial court, absent a valid reason for departure," § 921.0024(2)....

...imum sentence " does not reference primary or *633 additional offenses, statutory maximum s , or multiple sentences: "If the [LPS] exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s. 775.082, the sentence required by the [CPC] must be imposed." § 921.0024(2); cf....

...y additional offenses as provided in s. 775.082, F.S., unless the [LPS] exceeds the statutory maximum." (emphasis added) ). The CPC also provides that the trial court "may impose a sentence up to and including the statutory maximum for any offense," § 921.002(1)(g), and expressly allows for concurrent or consecutive sentencing, § 921.0024(2)....

...ffense at sentencing for which it exceeds that offense's statutory maximum, or a collective minimum sentence. If the LPS is an individual minimum sentence, our analysis is complete and the LPS was legally imposed. But as is apparent, the language of section 921.0024(2) is not consistent; both singular and plural terms are used, and the terms statutory maximum and statutory maximum sentence are used without explanation or definition. Although the supreme court has interpreted section 921.0024(2), it has not addressed the issue presented to us. And as will be seen, courts have not consistently applied the language. B. Precedent 1. Butler v. State , 838 So.2d 554 (Fla. 2003) In Butler , the supreme court determined that sections 921.002(1)(g) and 921.0024(2), respectively providing that a court may sentence an offender up to the statutory maximum for any offense and that a court must impose the LPS where it exceeds the statutory maximum sentence, are not in conflict and can be harmonized. 838 So.2d at 556 . In so concluding, the supreme court held that "when section 921.0024(2) applies so that the statutory maximum sentence as provided in section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2002), is exceeded by the [LPS], the [LPS] becomes the maximum sentence which the trial judge can impose." Id....

...But Moore does not address how to apply the directive to impose the LPS when it exceeds the statutory maximum sentence. Nor does it address whether the LPS is an individual minimum sentence or whether the "statutory maximum" referenced in the range is different than the "statutory maximum sentence" in the directive of section 921.0024(2). IV. Analysis Although courts have applied the language of section 921.0024(2) and the holdings of Butler and Moore , they have often done so inconsistently, with conflicting application and results, and without analysis....

...have imposed in the instant case is [the LPS of] 64.5 months" without distinguishing between the two convictions). 7 The inconsistencies may be strictly the result of courts addressing only the discreet issues presented and the terms or portions of section 921.0024(2) about which they were asked. Nonetheless, the results of these cases and their applications of section 921.0024(2) are often conflicting and, at a minimum, imprecise....

...idual offense; and that where it exceeds the statutory maximum sentence, the LPS becomes the maximum sentence which may be imposed. What has not been analyzed, except in two concurrences and one dissent, is how to interpret and apply the language of section 921.0024(2) where there are multiple convictions at sentencing....

...State , 199 So.3d 960 , 964 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (Warner, J., concurring specially); Dennard v. State , 157 So.3d 1055 , 1056-57 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (Conner, J., concurring specially); Id. at 1057-61 (Warner, J., dissenting). And although it has been stated that section 921.0024(2) "is unclear on how a sentence should be imposed in cases where there are multiple offenses for sentencing and the sentencing points result in a[n] [LPS] above the statutory maximum," we disagree. See Dennard , 157 So.3d at 1056-57 (Conner, J., concurring specially) (discussing two potential interpretations of section 921.0024(2) as requiring imposition of the LPS "for each offense" for which it exceeds that offense's statutory maximum or as requiring imposition of the LPS where it exceeds the primary offense's statutory maximum); see also Colon , 199 So.3d at 964 (Warner, J., concurring specially) (discussing application of section 921.0024(2)'s *636 directive when the statutory maximum of the primary offense exceeds the LPS but the additional offense statutory maximum is less than the LPS); Dennard , 157 So.3d at 1059-61 (Warner, J., dissenting) (interpreting Butler and the language of section 921.0024(2) as requiring the court to sentence the offender to at least the LPS on the primary offense where the primary offense's statutory maximum exceeds the LPS but prohibiting the court from sentencing the offender to the LPS on an addit...

...ceeds the statutory maximum for the additional offense and determining that in light of Moore , the LPS "is the collective total minimum sentence for all offenses" and " not the sentence which must be applied to each offense at sentencing" such that section 921.0024(2)'s directive "appl[ies] to the collective total statutory maximum of the individual sentences "). Based on the language of section 921.0024(2) and bounded by the language of Butler and Moore , we conclude that the LPS is an individual minimum sentence which applies to each felony at sentencing for which the LPS exceeds that felony's statutory maximum sentence, regardless of whether the felony is the primary or an additional offense....

...As noted previously, because Butler appears to have involved misdemeanor additional offenses, to which the CPC does not apply and for which consecutive sentencing would be impossible, 9 Butler 's holding in this context is questionable. Likewise, while Moore did not address the directive of section 921.0024(2) requiring imposition of the LPS when it exceeds the statutory maximum where multiple convictions are before the court for sentencing, the court's holding that once the *637 minimum sentence is established the offenses are no longer interrelated is important to our conclusion....

...ximums, as well as the absence of limiting or clarifying language, i.e., restricting mandatory imposition of the LPS to circumstances where the LPS exceeds the statutory maximum for the primary and any additional offenses on the scoresheet). But cf. § 921.002(1)(h) ("A sentence may be appealed on the basis that it departs from the [CPC] only if the sentence is below the [LPS] or as enumerated in s....

...775.082 for an offense at conviction, or the consecutive statutory maximums for offenses at conviction, unless otherwise provided by law." (emphasis added) ). Although this court has not previously analyzed the statutory language or how it is to be applied, it has cited Butler and section 921.0024(2) and remanded for resentencing where the sentences were illegal, exceeding both the LPS and the statutory maximums....

...son for departure, to sentence the defendant to the [LPS] for each crime" and that "[o]nly the State's agreement to cap [the offender's] sentence ... enabled the trial court to depart from imposing the [LPS] for both counts" (emphasis added) (citing § 921.0024(2), Fla....

...1st DCA 2016) (concluding, in part, that the LPS was required to be imposed on each of two third-degree felony convictions, neither of which would have been the primary offense where a second-degree felony conviction was also pending before the court for sentencing, stating "[p]er section 921.0024(2) and Butler , [the LPS] becomes the required sentence" for both third-degree felony convictions not subject to habitual felony offender enhancement)....

...11 But see *638 Colon , 199 So.3d at 964 (Warner, J., concurring specially) ("[I]n this case, as the statutory maximum for [the primary offense] was life, well in excess of the LPS, sentencing appellant to the LPS for the primary offense satisfies the statutory directive of section 921.0024(2). The sentences for the remaining third degree felonies should not exceed the statutory maximum for each crime."); Dennard , 157 So.3d at 1060-61 (Warner, J., dissenting) (determining that the directive of section 921.0024(2) can be harmonized with the language from section 921.002(1)(g) that the trial court "may impose a sentence up to and including the statutory maximum for any offense" and courts may impose concurrent or consecutive sentences, directing "consecutive sentencing to achieve an LPS without exceeding the statutory maximum for any one offense"); but cf....

...to counts one to three, for a total of 48.5 years. In case 2D14-4920, the trial court sentenced him to 15 years for each of the seven counts .... [T]he sentences imposed on Mr. Walsh are legal ." (emphasis added) ). It is evident that the effect of section 921.0024(2)'s directive differs significantly if the LPS is an individual minimum sentence rather than a collective minimum sentence....

...Conclusion We affirm the postconviction court's order and conclude that Champagne's sentence on the false imprisonment conviction is legal. Recognizing the importance of the issue, we certify the following question: IS THE LOWEST PERMISSIBLE SENTENCE AS DEFINED BY AND APPLIED IN SECTION 921.0024(2), FLORIDA STATUTES (2017), AN INDIVIDUAL MINIMUM SENTENCE AND NOT A COLLECTIVE MINIMUM SENTENCE WHERE THERE ARE MULTIPLE CONVICTIONS SUBJECT TO SENTENCING ON A SINGLE SCORESHEET? Affirmed; question certified....

...KELLY and LUCAS, JJ., Concur. A single scoresheet is prepared "for each defendant to determine the permissible range for the sentence that the court may impose," and the scoresheet "must cover all of the defendant's offenses pending before the court for sentencing." § 921.0024(3); see also Fla....

...ree-time violent felony offender and a VCC. The propriety of listing the robbery as the primary offense, given those enhancements, has not been raised. See § 775.084(4)(h), Fla. Stat. (2005) ("A sentence imposed under this section is not subject to s. 921.002."); see also Fla....

...l offender sentence for an offense, the trial court removes that offense from sentencing under the guidelines and cannot include that offense either as a primary or additional offense on the guidelines scoresheet."). However, we note that "[s]ection 921.0021 does not differentiate original sentencing proceedings ......

...2010). Neither the State, the sentencing court, nor the postconviction court addressed the difference between the LPS of 240.15 months and the sentence of 240 months. A departure sentence is one "that decreases an offender's sentence below the [LPS]." § 921.00265(2). The CPC expressly states that it applies "to all felony offenses, except capital felonies, committed on or after October 1, 1998," § 921.002, but it also allows for misdemeanors to be scored as additional offenses and prior record, § 921.0024(1)(a); see Fudge v....

...Hall's maximum sentence under her scoresheet, which is ten years' imprisonment."). We recognize that our conclusion may result in the State successfully appealing additional-offense sentences which are individually less than the LPS and for which a basis for departure has not been established. See § 921.002(1)(h) ("A sentence may be appealed on the basis that it departs from the [CPC] only if the sentence is below the [LPS] ...."), § 924.07(1)(i), Fla....

...[a] sentence imposed below the [LPS] established by the [CPC] under chapter 921."). See § 775.08(2); Kittles v. State , 31 So.3d 283 , 284-85 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) ; see also Bautista v. State , 128 So.3d 117 , 118 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) ("The defendant's first degree misdemeanor conviction was not subject to the [CPC]." (citing § 921.002, Fla....

open court in the presence of the appellants. Section 921.02, Florida Statutes, F.S.A.; Brown v. State,

...delines scoresheet. Because there was no reason, valid or otherwise, proffered for the downward departure, the sentence is reversed and the cause is remanded for resentencing within the guidelines or to permit the defendant to withdraw his plea. See § 921.002(1)(f), Fla....

...nd convictions, and not mere arrests subsequent to the charged crime. Id. ("[A]rrests and convictions considered by a trial judge in sentencing occur 'prior to the time of the primary offense,' and not subsequent to the primary offense." (quoting § 921.0021(5), Fla....

..."The provision of criminal penalties and of limitations upon the - 13 - application of such penalties is a matter of predominantly substantive law and, as such, is a matter properly addressed by the Legislature." § 921.002(1); see also Woods v. State, 740 So....

...community control must be imposed according to the sentencing law applicable at the time of the commission of the original offense."), the trial court had to use the sentencing scoresheet associated with the 1998 CPC when sentencing him for his violation of community control. The 1998 version of section 921.0024(1)(b) directs that the assessment of "[c]ommunity sanction violation points [be] assessed when a community sanction violation is before the court for sentencing." See also § 921.0021(6)(b) (enumerating community control as a "community sanction")....

...e the sentencing court, twelve (12) community sanction violation points are assessed for such violation, and for each successive community sanction violation involving a new felony conviction. § 921.0024(1)(b)....

...2010) ("As a result of these community sanction violation points, the scoresheet prepared for a sentencing upon revocation of probation necessarily will differ from the scoresheet prepared for the original sentencing. Recalculation is not only permitted but required by section 921.0024."). Because the scoresheet's inclusion of Mr....

...Hall's request for downward departure sentences. The Criminal Punishment Code requires that a sentencing scoresheet, including "the permissible range for the sentence that the court may impose," be prepared for every defendant sentenced for a felony offense. § 921.0024(3), (7), Fla. Stat. (2008). "The lowest permissible sentence is the minimum sentence that may be imposed by the trial court, absent a valid reason for departure." § 921.0024(2). And "[i]f the lowest permissible sentence under the [C]ode exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s. 775.082, the sentence required by the [C]ode must be imposed." § 921.0024(2). A court may impose a departure below the lowest permissible sentence based upon circumstances or factors that reasonably justify the mitigation of the sentence in accordance with s. 921.0026....

...ce. When multiple reasons exist to support the mitigation, the mitigation shall be upheld when at least one circumstance or factor justifies the mitigation regardless of the presence of other circumstances or factors found not to justify mitigation. § 921.002(3)....

...ed not address the trial court's discretionary determination *364 of whether it should impose a departure sentence. State v. Knox, 990 So.2d 665, 668 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008). Here, neither of the stated grounds for departure is expressly set forth under section 921.0026(2) as a basis for imposing a departure sentence. But the list of mitigating factors under section 921.0026(2) is not exclusive....

...5th DCA 2010) (noting that a trial court may not grant a departure "based on factors already taken into account by the sentencing guidelines"). As noted above, "[i]f the lowest permissible sentence under the [C]ode exceeds the statutory maximum sentence ... the sentence required by the [C]ode must be imposed." § 921.0024(2). Thus imposing a sentence below the minimum permissible sentence because the minimum permissible sentence exceeds the statutory maximum sentence conflicts with the mandate of section 921.0024(2)....

...Although it is true that 66.1 months' imprisonment exceeds the statutory maximum sentence for a single grand theft, it does not exceed Ms. Hall's maximum sentence under her scoresheet, which is ten years' imprisonment. See §§ 775.082(3)(d), 812.014(2)(c)(1), 921.0024(2), Fla....

...ence of ten years' imprisonment. [5] As suggested by the State, the concepts of acceptance and early acceptance of responsibility set forth under the federal sentencing guidelines are arguably incorporated into the mitigating factors set forth at subsection 921.0026(2)(i) (cooperation) and subsection 921.0026(2)(j) (remorse) of the Code....

...), (j). Moreover, Florida's primary goal under its sentencing scheme is punishment. Rehabilitation is a secondary goal, and it is a stated policy that a defendant's sentence should increase with the length and nature of the defendant's prior record. § 921.002(1)(b), (d)....

...In November 2000, appellant entered no-contest pleas to charges of grand theft and felony failure to appear in case number 99-2202, and to identical charges in case number 99-4516. In January 2001, the trial court sentenced appellant pursuant to the Criminal Punishment Code (§§ 921.002-921.0027, Fla.Stat.(1999)) to concurrent 24-month prison terms on the two counts in case number 99-2202, to be followed by concurrent 5-year probationary terms on the two counts in case number 99-4516....

...We begin our analysis with recognition of the fact that, "[i]n Florida, the plenary power to prescribe the punishment for criminal offenses lies with the legislature, not the courts." Woods v. State, 740 So.2d 20, 23 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (citations omitted). See also § 921.002(1), Fla....

...perly addressed by the Legislature"); Hall v. State, 823 So.2d 757, 763 (Fla.2002). Accordingly, to answer the question posed by this appeal we must determine what the legislature intended the result to be pursuant to the Criminal Punishment Code (§§ 921.002-921.0027, Fla.Stat.(1999))....

...cing guidelines. The Code states that "[t]he trial court judge may impose a sentence up to and *618 including the statutory maximum for any offense, including an offense that is before the court due to a violation of probation or community control." § 921.002(1)(g), Fla....

...The sentencing court may impose such sentences concurrently or consecutively. However, any sentence to state prison must exceed 1 year. If the lowest permissible sentence under the code exceeds the statutory maximum sentence as provided in s. 775.082, the sentence required by the code must be imposed. § 921.0024(2), Fla....

...imposed in case number 99-2202. IV. We affirm appellant's sentences. However, we also certify to the supreme court the following question, which we believe to be of great public importance: WHEN SENTENCING PURSUANT TO THE CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT CODE (§§ 921.002-921.0027, Fla....

...thority to so depart: At a minimum, the trial court must impose the lowest permissible sentence calculated according to the Criminal Punishment Code unless the court finds that the evidence supports a valid reason for a downward departure. See e.g., § 921.002(1)(f) & (3), Fla....

...use of discretion. Discretion is abused only where no reasonable person would agree with the trial court's decision." Id. An appellate court will uphold a departure sentence if any reason given by the trial judge is a valid reason for departure. See § 921.002(3), Fla. Stat. (1999). Section 921.0026, Florida Statutes (1999), sets out a list of mitigating grounds for sentencing departures. Specifically, section 921.0026 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (1) A downward departure from the lowest permissible sentence, as calculated according to the total sentence points pursuant to s. 921.0024, is prohibited unless there are circumstances or factors that reasonably justify the downward departure....

...de, but are not limited to: * * * (i) The defendant cooperated with the state to resolve the current offense or any other offense. *1202 * * * The list of statutory departure reasons is not exclusive, so departures based on reasons not delineated in section 921.0026, which are supported by the record, may be permissible....

...See State v. Randall, 746 So.2d 550, 552 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999); State v. Turro, 724 So.2d 1216, 1217 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). We are mindful, however, that under the Criminal Punishment Code, "[t]he primary purpose of sentencing is to punish the offender." § 921.002(1)(b), Fla....

...At that time, the defense requested 4 that the court depart below the minimum guidelines sentence of 31.94 years by imposing a lengthy term of imprisonment followed by a lengthy term of probation. The defense argued that the statutory basis for the downward departure was section 921.0026(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2009), which provides that a downward departure may be granted if “[t]he defendant requires specialized treatment for a mental disorder that is unrelated to substance abuse or addiction or for a physical di...

...o support the ruling; whereas the second prong involves a judgment call within the sound discretion of the trial court, which will be sustained on appellate review absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Salgado, 948 So.2d 12, 15 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006). Section 921.002(l)(f), Florida Statutes (2009) provides: Departures below the lowest permissible sentence established by the code must be articulated in writing by the trial court judge and made only when circumstances or factors reasonably justify the mitigation of the sentence. The level of proof necessary to establish the facts that support a departure from the lowest permissible sentence is a preponderance of the evidence. Section 921.0026(2)(d) further provides that mitigating circumstances include those in which “[t]he defendant requires specialized treatment for a mental disorder that is unrelated to substance abuse or addiction or for a physical disability, and t...

...he contents of their reports, including the source and accuracy of the information they relied upon in forming their opinions as they pertain to Davis’ need for "specialized treatment for a mental disorder that is unrelated to substance abuse[J” § 921.0026(2)(d), Fla....

...lied if it requires the court to impose a mandatory, nondiscretionary sentence of *22 life without possibility of parole for every juvenile convicted in this context. See §§ 782.04(l)(a)(2), 782.04(l)(b), 775.082(1), 775.082(2), Fla. Stat. (2006); § 921.002(l)(e), Fla....

passed the Criminal Punishment Code, section 921.002. Section 921.002(1)(g) states that "[t]he trial court

effective date of the Criminal Punishment Code. See § 921.002(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (effective Oct. 1, 1998); Ch

provided no written findings as required under section 921.002(1)(f), Florida Statutes (2015). Cf. State v

conclusively established, without more, by section 921.002, Florida Statutes (2009), which provides: The

of the sentence.” § 921.002(1)(f), Fla. Stat. (2013); see also § 921.002(3), Fla. Stat. (2013)

Florida has abolished its parole system, see § 921.002(l)(e) Fla. Stat. (2003), the appellant — a juvenile

has abolished its parole system, see Fla. Stat. § 921.002(1)(e) (2003), a life sentence gives a defendant

of sentencing is to punish the offender." Section 921.002(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2009). Therefore, a trial

denied the motion and this appeal followed. Section 921.002(1), Florida Statutes (1998) allows the sentencing

that were committed on or after October 1, 1998. § 921.002, Fla. Stat. (1999). Thus, Appellant was sentenced

purpose of sentencing is to punish the offender.” § 921.002(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (2015). A defendant’s minimum

misdemeanor conviction was not subject to the Code. § 921.002, Fla. Stat. (2004). We affirm the remainder of

valid reason for a downward departure. See e.g., § 921.002(1)(f) & (3), Fla. Stat. (1999); State v. Henderson

964 So.2d 881, 884 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (citing § 921.002(l)(g), Fla. Stat. (2006)). The court has the discretion

punish miscreants for their crimes. § 921.002(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2011) (“The primary

noncapital felonies in the State of Florida. See § 921.002(l)(e), Fla. Stat. (2014) (“The provisions of chapter

pursuant to the Criminal Punishment Code. See § 921.002(l)(g), Fla. Stat. (2002). See also Hall v. State

authorized by the Criminal Punishment. Code, section 921.002, Florida Statutes (2014), Macintosh correctly

(2001), also known as the 1983 guidelines, or section 921.002, Florida Statutes (2001), also known as the

violation of probation or community control." § 921.002(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (1999). But the state's argument

is not supported by the present record. [1] § 921.002, et seq., Fla. Stat. [2] § 921.0026(2)(a), Fla

implement, and revise a sentencing policy.” § 921.002(1), Fla. .Stat. (1998). The Code “embodies” these

violation of probation or community control.” § 921.002(l)(g), Fla. Stat. (1999) (emphasis added). The

violation of probation or community control.” § 921.002(l)(g), Fla. Stat. (1999) (emphasis added). The

the Criminal Punishment Code, specifically section 921.002(1)(h), which provides: A sentence may be appealed

released is at age eighty-five. See § 921.002(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (1998) (providing that parole

is a fact that Green does not dispute. . See § 921.002(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1997).

... The two bases cited by the trial court justifying the downward departure are found in section 921.0026(2), Florida Statutes, as: “(e) The need for payment of restitution to the victim outweighs the need for a prison sentence” and “(j) The offense was committed in an ...

... is the floor, or bottom-limit of any sentence to be imposed, rather than its ceiling. Compare § 921.0024(2), Fla. Stat. (2015) (“The lowest permissible sentence is the minimum sentence that may be imposed by the trial court, absent a valid reason for departure.”), with § ...

or factors found not to justify mitigation.” § 921.002(3), Fla. Stat. (2012). Under subsection (j), the

felonies, committed on or after October 1, 1998." § 921.002, Fla. Stat. (2003). [2] The crime defined in

hearing to support the downward departure. Section 921.002(1)(f) provides that "[t]he level of proof necessary

the criminal punishment code. See § 921.002, Fla. Stat. (2014). That decision was mistaken

release absent the grant of executive clemency. See § 921.002(l)(c), Fla. Stat. (2003). The United States Supreme

committed on or after October 1, 1998. See § 921.002, Fla. Stat. (2013). Consequently, Tyner should

a sentence for a prisoner’s natural life. See § 921.002(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (2009) (“The sentence imposed

purpose of sentencing is to punish the offender,” § 921.002(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (2010), and that under our system

basis for the downward departures pursuant to section 921.002(3), Florida Statutes (“Any sentence imposed

provision of the criminal punishment code, section 921.002(1)(g), Florida Statutes (2000). See Willingham

October 1, 1998, the effective date of the CPC. See § 921.002, Fla. Stat. (2001); Bradley, 998 So.2d at 1214

offense . . . that is before the court . . . .” § 921.002(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (2014). “The permissible range

Notes 1968 Adoption. To the same effect as section 921.02, Florida Statutes, except the portion reading

light of “the circumstances surrounding” it. § 921.002(1)(c), Fla. Stat. The United States Supreme Court

Code (the Code) for the first-degree felonies. § 921.002, Fla. Stat. (2003). He cites additional grounds

807 So.2d 122 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); see also § 921.002(l)(f), (3), Fla. Stat. The legal grounds for a

and becomes a productive member of society. See § 921.002(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (stating that rehabilitation

imposed within the statutory-maximum term under section 921.002(1)(g), Florida Statutes. Lane v. State, 981

any offense” before the court for sentencing. § 921.002(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1998); see §§ 775.082(3)(c)

defendant is a valid sentencing consideration. See § 921.002(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (stating that “the circumstances

nature of the offender’s prior record. § 921.002(1)(b), (c), and (d), Fla. Stat. (2010) . . .

PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See § 921.002(g), Fla. Stat. SHARP, W., PALMER and TORPY, JJ., concur.

offense and the defendant's prior record, see § 921.002(1)(c), (d), Fla. Stat. (2015), consideration

purpose of sentencing is to punish the offender. § 921.002(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (2011). A settlement and release

the sentence in accordance with s. 921.0026.” § 921.002(3), Fla. Stat. (2011). The mitigating factors

of the Florida Criminal Punishment Code. See § 921.002, Fla. Stat. (1997). For crimes committed after

Notes 1968 Adoption. To the same effect as section 921.02, Florida Statutes, except the portion reading

PER CURIAM., AFFIRMED. See § 921.002(3), Fla.Stat. (2000); Banks v. State, 732 So.2d 1065 (Fla.1999);

So. 3d 1174, 1175 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (citing § 921.002(g), Fla. Stat. (2012)). The sentencing factors

argues that the Criminal Punishment Code, section 921.002(1)(h), violates the state constitutional provision

PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See § 921.002(1)(5), Fla. Stat. (2000); Moore v. State, 882 So.2d 977, 985 (Fla

before that date. Ch. 97-194, § 1, Laws of Fla. Section 921.002, et seq., The Florida Criminal Punishment Code

Code does not apply to capital felonies. See § 921.002, Fla. Stat. Easterling was convicted only of first

consideration when sentencing an adult. See § 921.002(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2024) (“The primary purpose

maximum (or the ceiling), at the other end. See § 921.002(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (“The trial court judge may

about a potential statutory conflict between section 921.002(1)(g), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1998) (providing

“lowest permissible sentence.” See id.; see also § 921.002(1)(f), Fla. Stat. (2013) (“Departures below the

the sentence in accordance with s. 921.0026.” § 921.002(3), Fla. Stat. (2013). Indeed, the trial court

Perkins v. Mayo, Fla.1957, 92 So.2d 641. . F.S. § 921.02, F.S.A. . Sneed v. Mayo, Fla.1953, 66 So.2d

this analysis. Id. If it is, and, pursuant to section 921.002(1)(e), Florida Statutes (2002), Peterson serves

any valid reasons for the sentence imposed. See § 921.002(1)(f), Fla. Stat. (requiring that departures below

Appellant’s undisputed criminal history. See § 921.002(1)(d), Fla. Stat.

probationer on probation”) (emphasis added); § 921.002(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (stating that under the Criminal

PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See § 921.002(g), Fla. Stat. (2003); State v. Faulk, 840 So.2d 319 (Fla. 5th DCA

offense when imposing an in-range sentence. See § 921.002(1)(c), Fla. Stat; Garcia v. State, 346 So. 3d

177 So.3d 95, 96 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) (quoting § 921.002, Fla. Stat. (1998)). Because Patterson’s offense

offenses committed on or after October 1, 1998. § 921.002, Fla. Stat. Separate scoresheets should have been

appellant's sentence cannot be appealed under section 921.002(1)(h), Florida Statutes, which provides: A

sentenced under the Criminal Punishment Code, section 921.002, Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), that became

defendant is a valid sentencing consideration. See § 921.002(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (stating that “the circumstances

sentence is a preponderance of the evidence." § 921.002(1)(f), Fla. Stat. (2021). Geske contends

Criminal Punishment Code (CPC). See generally § 921.002(1)(b), (c), Fla. Stat. (2015). The State asserts

provision of the criminal punishment code, section 921.002(g), Fla. Stat. (1999).” The transcript of the

not the Criminal Punishment Code, see generally § 921.002, Fla. Stat. (2011); see also § 775.084(4)(h),

offenses committed on or after October 1, 1998. See § 921.002, Fla. Stat. (2013). In 1998, Mr. Blair pleaded

circumstances surrounding’ it.” Id. at 963 (quoting § 921.002(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2017)). The district court

departing downward into writing. See § 921.002(l)(f) (requiring that “[d]epar-tures below the

crimes for which appellant was being sentenced. § 921.002(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2022); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.701(b)(3)

clinical condition of battered woman’s syndrome. See § 921.002(3), Fla. Stat. (2016) (“The level of proof necessary

PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See § 921.002(l)(g), (h), Fla.Stat. (1997); Skidmore v. State, 688 So.2d 1014

imposed by the Criminal Punishment Code. See § 921.002, Fla. Stat. (2003). The time a defendant is required

those grounds was made to the trial court. See § 921.002(1)(h), Fla. Stat. (2018) (“A sentence may be appealed

3 on or after October 1, 1998. See § 921.002, Fla. Stat. (2018). The Florida Legislature enacted

Manago, 375 So. 3d 190, 192 (Fla. 2023); see also § 921.002(1), (1)(g), Fla. Stat. While sentencing judges

offense before the court for sentencing. See also § 921.002(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (2012) (“The trial court judge

purpose of sentencing is to punish the offender." § 921.002(1)(b). It also provides that "[t]he penalty imposed

sentencing is to punish the offender." § 921.002(1)(b). It also provides that "[t]he penalty

including the statutory maximum for any offense[,]” § 921.002(1)(g), Fla. Stat. (2011), statutory construction

and well-being of the children committed”); cf. § 921.002(1), Fla. Stat. (1997) (“primary purpose of [adult]