Lassitter v. Intern. Union of Op. Engin., 349 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1977). · Go Syfert
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Lassitter v. Intern. Union of Op. Engin., 349 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1977). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“the terms compensatory and actual damages have been used interchangeably by the courts in dealing with the problem at hand.”
206 citation events (58 in the last 25 years) across 17 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Pinnacle Foods of California, LLC v. Popeyes Louisiana Kitchen, Inc. (flsd, 2022-12-16)
Treatment trajectory · 1977 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1977 2001 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Pinnacle Foods of California, LLC v. Popeyes Louisiana Kitchen, Inc.
S.D. Fla. · 2022 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the terms compensatory and actual damages have been used interchangeably by the courts in dealing with the problem at hand.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Horowitz v. Allied Marine, Inc
S.D. Fla. · 2024 · confidence medium
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 953 F.3d 1196, 1206 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Lassitter v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 349 So. 2d 622, 627 (Fla. 1976)), arrived at a verdict “within this range of values,” Kish v. McDonald’s Corp., 564 So. 2d 1177, 1180 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); see also Onemata Corp., 2022 WL 18278477 , at *3 (affirming a jury award of $5,000,000 in contract damages where “there was ample, competent evidence adduced at trial to support an award of at least the $5 million awarded by the jury”); Batista v. Avant Assurance Inc., 2023 WL 7545064 , at *6 (S.D.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Medley v. Dish Network, LLC
M.D. Fla. · 2023 · confidence medium
DISH’s Motion for Remittitur Under Fla. Stat. § 768.74 (Doc. 302) Regarding a trial court’s reduction of a jury’s award, the Florida Supreme Court has stated, “[u]nder the general rule a verdict should not be disturbed on the ground of excessiveness unless it is manifestly so excessive as to shock the judicial conscience, or unless it is so excessive as to be indicative of prejudice, passion or corruption on the part of the jury, or unless it clearly appears that the jury ignored the evidence or misconceived the merits of the case relating to the amount of damages recoverable as, for …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) AM Grand Court Lakes LLC v. Rockhill Insurance Company
11th Cir. · 2023 · confidence medium
Given the deference afforded a trial court’s deci- sion, an appellate court generally “should not disturb” a verdict as excessive “unless the verdict is inordinately large as obviously to exceed the maximum limit of a reasonable range within which the jury may properly operate.” Id. (quoting Lassiter v. Int’l Union of Op- erating Eng’rs, 349 So. 2d 622, 627 (Fla. 1976)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) SE Property Holdings, LLC v. Neverve LLC
11th Cir. · 2023 · confidence medium
Although not cited by SEPH, in Ault v. Lohr, 538 So. 2d 454 (Fla. 1989), the Florida Supreme Court held that “an express finding of a breach of duty should be the critical factor in an award of pu- nitive damages” and that, as such, “a finding of liability alone will support an award of punitive damages ‘even in the absence of fi- nancial loss for which compensatory damages would be appropri- ate.’” Id. at 456 (quoting Lassiter v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 349 So. 2d 622, 626 (Fla. 1976)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bavelis v. Doukas (2×)
S.D. Ohio · 2021 · confidence medium
(Id.). appropriate.” 538 So.2d at 456 (quoting Lassiter v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 349 So.2d 622, 626 (Fla. 1976)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) George Bavelis v. Ted Doukas
6th Cir. · 2020 · confidence medium
The court answered in the negative and explained that “a finding of liability alone will support an award of punitive damages ‘even in the absence of financial loss for which compensatory damages would be appropriate.’” Id. at 456 (quoting Lassiter v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 349 So.2d 622, 626 (Fla. 1976)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Ledoux
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Lassitter v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 349 So.2d 622, 627 (Fla. 1976); Townsend, 90 So.3d at 311 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Alexander
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
The Lassit-ter Court agreed that “the amount of the damage awards, coupled with these outside influences, was such as to shock judicial conscience [and compel a new trial on damages].” Id. at 627-28 (emphasis added).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Whitney v. Milien
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Lassitter v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 349 So.2d 622, 627 (Fla.1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Kayton
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Citing Lassitter v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 349 So.2d 622, 627 (Fla.1976), Philip Morris argues that the $8 million award for non-economic damages is so large “as to indicate that the jury must have found it while under the influence of passion, prejudice, or gross mistake.” Philip Morris complains on appeal about certain remarks that were made by plaintiffs counsel during closing arguments.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Montesinos v. Zapata
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
Additionally, an appellate court may order a remitti-tur if it believes the jury verdict amount “is so great or small as to indicate that the jury must have found it while under the influence of passion, prejudice, or gross mistake.” Lassitter v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 349 So.2d 622, 627 (Fla.1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rindner
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
The court should not order a new trial unless it believes that the *935 amount awarded is so great "as to indicate that the jury must have found it while under the influence of passion, prejudice or gross mistake." Glabman, 954 So.2d at 62 (quoting Lassitter v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 349 So.2d 622, 627 (Fla. 1977)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. Clark
M.D. Fla. · 2007 · confidence medium
In that event, the verdict should be “reduced to the highest amount which the jury could have properly awarded.” Rety v. Green, 546 So.2d 410, 420 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989) (quoting Lassitter v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 349 So.2d 622, 627 (Fla.1977)).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc. (3×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. · 2006 · confidence medium
Further, this Court has held that "a finding of liability alone will support an award of punitive damages `even in the absence of financial loss for which compensatory damages would be appropriate.' " Id. (quoting Lassitter v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 349 So.2d 622, 626 (Fla.1977)); see also Mortellite v. Am.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hebron Volunteer Fire Department, Inc. v. Whitelock
Md. Ct. Spec. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Alvey, 690 P.2d 733, 742 (Alaska 1984) (stating that “[i]n our view the ‘maximum possible recovery’ approach is more appropriate in a remittitur context, because it comes closer to approximating the decision *636 made by the jury”); Carney v. Preston, 688 A.2d 47, 56 (Del.Super.Ct.1996) (stating that “ ‘[ujnder the Delaware policy to highlight the role of the jury, our practice should be [in remittitur] to grant the plaintiff every reasonable factual inference from the record and determine what the record justifies as an absolute maximum’ ”); Lassiter …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Zuckerman v. Robinson
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
The issue presented by the motion for remittitur in this case required the court to assess whether the amount of punitive damages was within "the maximum limit of a reasonable range within which the jury may properly operate." See Bould v. Touchette, 349 So.2d 1181, 1186 (Fla.1977); and Lassiter v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 349 So.2d 622, 627 (Fla.1977) ("The appellate court should not disturb a verdict as excessive, where the trial court refused to disturb the amount, unless the verdict is so inordinately large as obviously to exceed the maximum limit of a reasonable range within which…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mortellite v. American Tower, LP
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Accordingly, we hold that a finding of liability alone will support an award of punitive damages `even in the absence of financial loss for which compensatory damages would be appropriate.'" Id. at 456 (quoting Lassiter *935 v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 349 So.2d 622, 626 (Fla.1976)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Palm Beach Polo, Inc. v. Columbia Propane Corp.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Lassitter v. Walton, 349 So.2d 622, 627 (Fla.1976)(a jury verdict can only be reduced to the highest amount which the jury could properly have awarded).
cited Cited as authority (rule) McElhaney v. Uebrich
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
In Lassiter v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 349 So.2d 622, 627 (Fla. 1976), the supreme court set out the standard of review for jury verdicts.
cited Cited as authority (rule) AUTO OWNERS INS. CO. v. Clark
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
Lassitter v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 349 So.2d 622, 627 (Fla.1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Joseph Land & Co. v. Gonzalez
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
Lassiter v. International Union Of Operating Eng’rs, 349 So.2d 622, 627 (Fla.1976); Taylor v. Ganas, 443 So.2d 251, 253 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hernandez v. Gisonni (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
Lassiter v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 349 So.2d 622, 627 (Fla. 1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pulla v. Amoco Oil Co.
S.D. Iowa · 1994 · confidence medium
Ct.App.1983); Lassitter v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 349 So.2d 622, 625-26 (Fla. 1976); Hospital Auth. of Gwinnett Co. v. Jones, 261 Ga. 613 , 409 S.E.2d 501, 503 (1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1096 , 112 S.Ct. 1175 , 117 L.Ed.2d 420 (1992); Davis v. Gage, 106 Idaho 735 , 682 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Idaho Ct.App.1984); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 644 F.Supp. 1240, 1263 (N.D.Ill.1986) (holding a nominal compensatory damages award will support a punitive damage award), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 827 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 993 , 108 S.Ct. 130…
cited Cited as authority (rule) American Medical Intern., Inc. v. Scheller
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
Lassitter v. International Union of Op. Engin., 349 So.2d 622, 626 (Fla. 1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Palm Beach Atlantic College, Inc., Cross-Appellant v. First United Fund, Ltd., Stanmar Corporation, Mario Renda, Cross-Appellees
1st Cir. · 1991 · confidence medium
We also noted, however, that in a case decided in 1976 the Florida Supreme Court stated that “ ‘the establishment of liability for a breach of duty will support an otherwise valid punitive damages award even in the absence of financial loss for which compensatory damages would be appropriate.’ ” Id. (quoting Lassitter v. International Union of Operating Eng’rs, 349 So.2d 622, 626 (Fla.1976)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) K.C. v. A.P.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
A jury “verdict should not be disturbed on the ground of excessiveness unless it is manifestly so excessive as to shock the judicial conscience, or unless it is so excessive as to be indicative of prejudice, passion or corruption on the part of the jury, or unless it clearly appears that the jury ignored the evidence_” Lassitter v. International Union of Operating Eng’rs, 349 So.2d 622, 627 (Fla.1976) (citing Odoms v. Travelers Ins.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kc v. Ap
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
A jury "verdict should not be disturbed on the ground of excessiveness unless it is manifestly so excessive as to shock the judicial conscience, or unless it is so excessive as to be indicative of prejudice, passion or corruption on the part of the jury, or unless it clearly appears that the jury ignored the evidence... ." Lassitter v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 349 So.2d 622, 627 (Fla. 1976) (citing Odoms v. Travelers Ins.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rowlands v. Signal Const. Co. (2×)
Fla. · 1989 · confidence medium
Delesdernier v. Porterie, 666 F.2d 116 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 839 , 103 S.Ct. 86 , 74 L.Ed.2d 81 (1982); Lassitter v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 349 So.2d 622, 627 (Fla. 1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rety v. Green (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1989 · confidence medium
It can only be reduced to the highest amount which the jury could properly have awarded." Lassitter v. International Union of Operating Eng's, 349 So.2d 622, 627 (Fla. 1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) ca11 1989
11th Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
Lassitter v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 349 So.2d 622, 626-27 (Fla.1976) (citation omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Finch v. City of Vernon
11th Cir. · 1989 · confidence medium
Lassitter v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 349 So.2d 622, 626-27 (Fla.1976) (citation omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ault v. Lohr
Fla. · 1989 · confidence medium
Lassiter, 349 So.2d at 625-26 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Albritton v. Gandy
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1988 · confidence medium
Finally, "the correctness of the jury's verdict is strengthened when the trial judge refuses to grant a new trial or a remittitur." Lassiter v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 349 So.2d 622, 627 (Fla. 1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ad-Vantage Telephone Directory Consultants, Inc., Cross v. Gte Directories Corporation, Cross-Appellee
11th Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
Union of Operating Engineers, 349 So.2d 622, 626 (Fla.1977); Moore v. Dugger, 504 So.2d 493 (Fla.App.1987).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cynthia Keehr and Bruce Keehr v. Consolidated Freightways of Delaware, Inc.
7th Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
In the following cases, courts have indicated that an award of nominal damages can support punitive damages: Ress v. Rediess, 130 Colo. 572, 579 , 278 P.2d 183, 186-87 (1954) (some amount must be awarded as actual damages, even if nominal in amount, to permit recovery of punitive damages); Topanga Corp. v. Gentile, 249 Cal.App.2d 681, 691 , 58 Cal.Rptr. 713, 719 (2d Dist.1967) (requirement that actual damages be recovered to support an award of punitive damages focuses on the establishment of a tor-tious act, not on the amount recovered); Lane County v. Wood, 298 Or. 191, 202 , 691 P.2d 473, 4…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Doran Jason Co. v. Braddon
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1986 · confidence medium
Although an appellate court is restricted in its review of an order denying a motion for a new trial on the ground of excessive verdict, the court can step in when the amount is so great “that the jury must have found it while under the influence of passion, prejudice, or great mistake.” Lassitter v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 349 So.2d 622, 627 (Fla.1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) City of Jacksonville v. Alexander
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1986 · confidence medium
Lassiter v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 349 So.2d 622, 627 (Fla. 1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pullum v. Regency Contractors, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1985 · confidence medium
In Lassitter v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 349 So.2d 622, 627 (Fla.1977), the court said: Although the verdict may be for considerably more or less than in the judgment of the court it ought to have been, still the court should decline to interfere, unless the amount is so great or small as to indicate that the jury must have found it while under the influence of passion, prejudice, or gross mistake.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) T.D.S. Incorporated v. Shelby Mutual Insurance Company (2×) also: Cited "see"
11th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
In order to shock the sense of justice of the judicial mind the verdict must be so excessive or so inadequate so as at least to imply an inference that the verdict evinces or carries an implication of passion or prejudice, corruption, partiality, improper influences, or the like. 45 Lassitter v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 349 So.2d 622, 627 (Fla.1976) (citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) T.D.S. Inc. v. Shelby Mutual Insurance (2×) also: Cited "see"
11th Cir. · 1985 · confidence medium
Lassitter v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 349 So.2d 622, 627 (Fla. 1976) (citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) American Cyanamid Co. v. Roy
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1984 · confidence medium
The appellate court should not disturb a verdict as excessive, where the trial court refused to disturb the amount, unless the verdict is so inordinately large as obviously to exceed the maximum limit of a reasonable range within which the jury may properly operate. 463 So.2d at 257 (quoting Lassitter v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 349 So.2d 622, 627 (Fla. 1976)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Globe Security Systems Co. v. Mayor's Jewelers, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1984 · confidence medium
The rule derives from the general principle that “exemplary or punitive damages are not recoverable in an action of tort unless actual damages are shown....” Lassitter v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 349 So.2d 622, 625 (Fla.1977) (citing McLain v. Pensacola Coach Corp., 152 Fla. 876 , 13 So.2d 221, 222 (1943)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Janssens
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1984 · confidence medium
Lassitter v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 349 So.2d 622, 627 (Fla. 1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nappe v. Anschelewitz, Barr, Ansell & Bonello (2×)
N.J. · 1984 · confidence medium
See Fisher v. Volz, 496 FI 2d 333, 346 & n. 25 (3d Cir.1974) (unauthorized entry into homes to execute arrest warrant; punitive damages may be awarded without also awarding compensatory damages); Reynolds v. Pegler, 223 FI 2d 429 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 US. 846, 76 S.Ct. 80 , 100 L.Ed. 754 (1955) (columnist charged that fellow journalist cavorted in the nude, was a war profiteer, and four-flusher; nominal damages of $1.00 supported punitive award of $175,-000); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Benatar, 99 Cal.App.2d 393 , 221 P. 2d 965, 970 (1950) (deliberate sale of products below agreed resale pr…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) White Const. Co., Inc. v. Dupont
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1983 · confidence medium
We further recognize that, as in this case, the "correctness of the jury's verdict is strengthened when the trial judge refuses to grant a new trial or a remittitur." Lassitter v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 349 So.2d 622, 627 (Fla. 1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Hickman (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1983 · confidence medium
Lassitter v. International Union of Operating *1029 Engineers, 349 So.2d 622, 627 (Fla. 1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) St. Regis Paper Co. v. Watson (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. · 1983 · confidence medium
Lassitter v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 349 So.2d 622, 627 (Fla. 1977).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Westbrook v. All Points, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1980 · confidence medium
Lassitter v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 349 So.2d 622, 627 (Fla. 1977).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Miller v. Dade County
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1980 · confidence medium
Union of Op. Engin., 349 So.2d 622, 626-627 (Fla.1976); Corbett v. Seaboard Coastline Railroad, 375 So.2d 34 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
Earl Lowell LASSITTER, Petitioner,
v.
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS, Respondent. Earl Lowell LASSITTER, Petitioner, v. Dennis WALTON, Respondent. Earl Lowell LASSITTER, Petitioner, v. INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS, LOCAL NO. 675, Respondent.
47869-47871.
Supreme Court of Florida.
May 26, 1977.
349 So. 2d 622
Per Curiam.
Cited by 138 opinions  |  Published

[*623] Rex Conrad, Ronald A. FitzGerald and Paul R. Regensdorf of Fleming, O'Bryan & Fleming, Fort Lauderdale, for petitioner.

Frank E. Hamilton, III of Hamilton, Douglas & Bennett, Tampa, Woll, Mayer & Gold, Washington, D.C., Cone, Wagner, Nugent, Johnson & McKeown, and Larry Klein, West Palm Beach, for respondents.

PER CURIAM.

Petitions for writ of certiorari have been granted in this cause, and oral argument has been dispensed with.

The decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, 325 So.2d 408, here under review is quashed with directions that the judgments entered in the trial court be reinstated.

ROBERTS, Acting C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD and HATCHETT, JJ., concur.

SUNDBERG, J., dissents.

ON REHEARING

ADKINS, Justice.

By petition for certiorari, we have for review a decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, (International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 675 v. Lassitter, 325 So.2d 408). This case has plowed through a slow, rough road of judicial labor, culminating in our quashal of the District Court decision and, now, by granting respondents' petition for rehearing.

An action was brought by Lassitter against union member Walton, the Local union and the International union for injuries sustained in union violence. The jury found for petitioner Lassitter and assessed compensatory damages of $240,000 jointly and severally against all of the defendants. The jury also awarded punitive damages in the amount of $10,000 against Walton, $300,000 against the Local union and $700,000 against the International union. Upon appeal, the finding of liability was affirmed but the verdicts for compensatory and punitive damages were reversed. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local No. 675 v. Lassitter, 295 So.2d 634 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974).

All parties then filed petitions for certiorari in this Court. The defendants' petitions were from that portion of the decision of the District Court affirming the liability and plaintiff Lassitter's petition was from that portion of the opinion reversing the damages. The defendants' cross-petitions for writ of certiorari were denied, but this Court granted plaintiff Lassitter's petition and quashed the decision of the Fourth District Court "insofar as it is inconsistent with Rinaldi v. Aaron, 314 So.2d 762, 79 A.L.R.3d 1132." The cause was then remanded for further proceedings consistent therewith. Lassitter v. Walton, 314 So.2d 761[*624] (Fla. 1975). This decision was brief, but confusing.

In a subsequent decision, upon our mandate, the District Court pointed out that the original opinion did three basic things: (1) affirmed the judgments as to liability; (2) reversed and remanded for a new trial on the issue of compensatory damages; and (3) reversed and remanded for a new trial on the issue of punitive damages. The District Court reasoned that numbers one and two stood undisturbed, but expressed deep concern as to their proper course of action in complying with our mandate to quash the opinion insofar as it was inconsistent with Rinaldi v. Aaron, supra. The District Court then said:

"A review of our opinion reveals, though, that we assigned two additional reasons as a basis for reversing the award of punitive damages and remanding that issue for a new trial, reasons that were not encompassed or contradicted by Rinaldi v. Aaron, supra, or otherwise compromised by Supreme Court action.
"First, we held:
"`It is our firm judgment that the awards singly and in combination are so manifestly excessive as to shock our judicial conscience. Under the circumstances the verdicts could only be indicative of the improper influences of passion and prejudice working on the jury. These influences probably emanated from usual well known union partisanships, excited by injuries to an innocent victim, coupled with the publicity and heated climate... .'" 325 So.2d at 409-10.
The District Court then said:
"Secondly, we held that, while an award of punitive damages was proper in the case, we were concerned with the amount of such award. We said:
"`[I]t is our understanding that there should be some reasonable, albeit imprecise, relationship between punitive and compensatory damages. Air Line Employees Ass'n Int. v. Turner, 291 So.2d 670 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1974); Crowell-Collier Pub. Co. v. Caldwell, 170 F.2d 941 (5th Cir.1948); Hutchinson v. Lott, 110 So.2d 442 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959). With this background we opine that there is an impermissible and gross inbalance here between the actual damages suffered and the punitive damages awarded.' 205 So.2d at 640." 325 So.2d at 410.

The holding that there should be some reasonable relationship between punitive and compensatory damages is in conflict with the decision in Levine v. Knowles, 197 So.2d 329, 331 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967) and Hutchinson v. Lott, 110 So.2d 442, 445 (Fla. 1st DCA 1959). We have jurisdiction.

In Hutchinson v. Lott, supra, it was said:

"While we do not follow the rule established in some jurisdictions to the effect that punitive damages must be `in proportion' to the compensatory damages, in McLain v. Pensacola Coach Corp., supra, it was held that punitive damages are not recoverable unless actual damages are shown. The relation of punitive damages to actual damages cannot be reduced to a mathematical certainty and is dependent upon the facts of each case. Punitive damages are awarded as a punishment to a defendant and as a warning to deter him from committing a similar offense in the future. Miami Beach Lerner Shops, Inc. v. Walco Mfg. of Florida, Inc., Fla. App., 106 So.2d 233; Ross v. Gore, Fla., 48 So.2d 412. Accordingly, they must bear some relation to the amount that the defendant is able to pay since the pecuniary punishment to a man of large means would not be the same as to a man of small means. Maiborne v. Kuntz, Fla., 56 So.2d 720; Jones v. Greeley, 25 Fla. 629, 6 So. 448."

The court in Air Line Employees Ass'n International v. Turner, 291 So.2d 670 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974), construed the quoted language in Hutchinson as not being dispositive of the issue and then decided that a jury is not authorized to award punitive damages in "a sum which does not bear some reasonable relation to the compensatory damages awarded, and which is excessively out of relation to the latter." 291 So.2d 670 at[*625] 672. In Lan-Chile Airlines, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 296 So.2d 498 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974), the court relying on Hutchinson and Turner, directed a remittitur of a portion of a punitive damage award that was forty-four times the amount of the compensatory damages. Text writers acknowledge that there is a diversity of opinion among the jurisdictions whether punitive damages must bear a reasonable relation to the compensatory damages awarded, but conclude that Florida is aligned with those jurisdictions which require such a relationship. See 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 265, and cases collected thereunder.

Federal courts have come to conflicting conclusions in attempting to discern the Florida rule on the subject. Judge Hutcheson writing for the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Scalise v. National Utility Service, 120 F.2d 938, 941 (5th Cir.1941), stated:

"In Florida as in the federal courts, the giving of punitive damages is not dependent upon, nor must it bear any relation to the allowance of actual damages... ."

Then in Crowell-Collier Pub. Co. v. Caldwell, 170 F.2d 941 (5th Cir.1948), the same judge opined that exemplary or punitive damages awarded must bear some, though not an exact relation to actual damages.

The next pronouncement by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on the subject is found in Smith v. McNulty, 293 F.2d 924, 926 (5th Cir.1961):

"We think also that the award of punitive damages was not legally excessive. It bore a reasonable relationship to the actual damages, although appellant admits in his brief that such a relationship is not necessary under Florida law, citing the case of Hutchinson v. Lott, Fla.App., 110 So.2d 442. But cf. Crowell-Collier Pub. Co. v. Caldwell, 5 Cir.1948, 170 F.2d 941."

Finally, in Wynn Oil Co. v. Purolator Chemical Corp., 403 F. Supp. 226 (N.D.Fla. 1974), a federal district judge sitting in Florida stated:

"In the opinion of this Court, the punitive damage awards bear a reasonable relationship to the actual damages sustained by plaintiff. However, Florida law does not require that such a reasonable relationship exist, but only requires that some actual damage be shown and that the acts of defendants were done with malice. See Hutchinson v. Lott, 110 So.2d 442 (Fla.App. 1st 1959); and Smith v. McNulty, 293 F.2d 924 (5th Cir.1961)... ." 403 F. Supp. at 232.

The terms compensatory and actual damages have been used interchangeably by the courts in dealing with the problem at hand. This probably stems from the language in McLain v. Pensacola Corp., 152 Fla. 876, 13 So.2d 221 (1943), approving and applying the following quotation from 4 Am.Jur. 219:

"The general rule that exemplary or punitive damages are not recoverable in an action of tort unless actual damages are shown finds application in cases of assault and battery." 13 So.2d at 222.

The Court in McLain, supra, held that the failure to submit the issue of punitive damages to a jury was not ground for reversal where the jury found no liability on the underlying cause of action, because an action for punitive damages cannot be maintained independently of an action for compensatory damages. The term "unless actual damages are shown" was used in McLain as synonymous with "unless liability is shown on the underlying cause of action." 13 So.2d at 222.

In a suit for slander the First District Court held that "nominal" damages are "actual" damages for the purpose of supporting an award of punitive damages. Elyria-Lorain Broad. Co. v. National Com. Indus., Inc., 300 So.2d 716 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), cert. discharged; National Com. Indus., Inc. v. Elyria-Lorain Broad. Co., 337 So.2d 809 (Fla. 1976). Some jurisdictions hold to the contrary. 22 Am.Jur.2d Damages § 242 and cases collected thereunder.

Nominal damages are awarded to vindicate an invasion of one's legal rights[*626] where, although no physical or financial injury has been inflicted, the underlying cause of action has been proved to the satisfaction of a jury. See, for example, Tampa Electric Co. v. Ferguson, 96 Fla. 375, 118 So. 211 (1928); Williams v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co., 56 Fla. 735, 48 So. 209 (1908); Lampert v. Judge and Dolph Drug Co., 238 Mo. 409, 141 S.W. 1095 (1911). Accordingly, the establishment of liability for a breach of duty will support an otherwise valid punitive damage award even in the absence of financial loss for which compensatory damages would be appropriate.

If a nominal damage award will support an award of punitive damages, then is it accurate to say that an award of punitive damages must bear some reasonable relation to the actual or compensatory damages awarded? We think not, if the statement of such a rule implies more than that a punitive award must bear some relationship to the fact of the injury or invasion of legal right and the cause thereof. See Hensley v. Paul Miller Ford, Inc., 508 S.W.2d 759 (Ky. 1974). It occurs to us that there is little sense in such a rule if the policy reasons for imposition of punitive damages are to be served, i.e., the theory of punishment, involving the ideas of retribution for gross, wanton or willful misconduct, and an example to deter from its repetition. 2 Sutherland on Damages, 3d ed. § 406, p. 1132. It is suspected that the idea of reasonable relationship arose simply out of a sense of orderliness to provide a "rule of thumb" or "rough working scale" to measure the exercise by the jury of its discretion in assessing punitive damages. McCormick on Damages, Sec. 85, p. 298. But as with so many "rules of thumb" which were intended only as broad guidelines, the concept has become, in some jurisdictions, an inflexible rule of law that translates into the application of strict mathematical formula.

The error in embracing such a rule of law is made apparent in circumstances where the conduct by a very affluent defendant is outrageous but the resultant injury or invasion of legal rights to the plaintiff is minimal, although the conduct has the propensity of causing great harm if continued. Subject to the other limitations mentioned in this opinion, the jury is the best judge of the amount necessary to be assessed in order to make an example of such a defendant and thereby deter him and others from such conduct in the future. The more pecunious the defendant the greater must be the punitive damages assessed in order "to get his attention" regardless of the amount of actual damages awarded the plaintiff. For these reasons we disavow the rule that punitive damages must bear some reasonable relationship to the actual damages awarded by the jury.

We now consider the amount of the awards. There are certain well-established rules which control a review of the question of excessiveness of a jury's verdict. The following formula first employed by Chancellor Kent in a libel case has been frequently quoted or paraphrased with approval in passing upon objections to verdicts in actions for bodily injury as excessive:

"The damages, therefore, must be so excessive as to strike mankind, at first blush, as being, beyond all measure, unreasonable and outrageous, and such as manifestly show the jury to have been actuated by passion, partiality, prejudice or corruption. In short, the damages must be flagrantly outrageous and extravagant, or the court cannot undertake to draw the line; for they have no standard by which to ascertain the excess." Coleman v. Southwick, 9 Johns. (N.Y.) 45, 6 Am.Dec. 253 (1812).

In Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Company v. McKelvey, 270 So.2d 705 at 706 (Fla. 1973), we said:

"Consistently, our Courts have vested juries with the sound discretion to render verdicts in personal injury cases, upon the equally consistent admonition that there is ample evidence to support such verdicts and that the verdicts are not clearly arbitrary or so excessive as to indicate passion, prejudice, corruption, improper motive or to shock the judicial conscience."

Also in Odoms v. Travelers Insurance Company, 339 So.2d 196 (Fla. 1976), we said:

[*627] "Under the general rule a verdict should not be disturbed on the ground of excessiveness unless it is manifestly so excessive as to shock the judicial conscience, or unless it is so excessive as to be indicative of prejudice, passion or corruption on the part of the jury, or unless it clearly appears that the jury ignored the evidence or misconceived the merits of the case relating to the amount of damages recoverable as, for example, by taking into consideration improper elements of damages." At p. 198.

Although the verdict may be for considerably more or less than in the judgment of the court it ought to have been, still the court should decline to interfere, unless the amount is so great or small as to indicate that the jury must have found it while under the influence of passion, prejudice, or gross mistake. In order to shock the sense of justice of the judicial mind the verdict must be so excessive or so inadequate so as at least to imply an inference that the verdict evinces or carries an implication of passion or prejudice, corruption, partiality, improper influences, or the like. See Damage Verdicts by Parmele, Vol. 1, § 1 (1972).

The correctness of the jury's verdict is strengthened when the trial judge refuses to grant a new trial or a remittitur. The appellate court may review the trial court ruling only for an abuse of discretion.

Two factors unite to favor a very restricted review of an order denying a motion for new trial on ground of excessive verdict. The first of these is the deference due the trial judge, who has had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and to consider the evidence in the context of a living trial rather than upon a cold record. The second factor is the deference properly given to the jury's determination of such matters of fact as the weight of the evidence and the quantum of damages.

The appellate court should not disturb a verdict as excessive, where the trial court refused to disturb the amount, unless the verdict is so inordinately large as obviously to exceed the maximum limit of a reasonable range within which the jury may properly operate.

This test should be applied in deciding whether a remittitur should be required as a condition for denying a motion for new trial. A court is never free to reduce a verdict, by remittitur, to that amount which the court itself considers the jury should have allowed. It can only be reduced to the highest amount which the jury could properly have awarded. See Taylor v. Washington Terminal Company, 133 U.S.App. D.C. 110, 409 F.2d 145 (1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 835, 90 S.Ct. 93, 24 L.Ed.2d 85; Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 429 F.2d 1033 (C.C.A. 5th 1970).

In the absence of improper influences a remittitur may be appropriate, but here the District Court concluded that the verdicts were indicative of improper influences of passion and prejudice working on the jury. The court in its opinion referred to the following:

"An appendix to the brief of the local union contains fourteen newspaper articles of moderate length which were published at various times during the trial. The articles discuss events leading to the trial and the trial progress. Some of the article headlines were: `Union Harassment Claimed in Trial,' and `More Testimony Given On Union Violence.' . . The trial itself brought heated exchanges. The trial court judge admonished one attorney for calling a witness a liar, was provoked to the point of threatening to jail a union attorney and the jury heard evidence during the trial of union harassment of a union member who testified for Lassitter." International U. of Op. Eng., Local No. 675 v. Lassitter, 295 So.2d at 639.

The court properly concluded that the amount of the damage awards, coupled with these outside influences, was such as to shock judicial conscience.

The portion of the opinion of the District Court in conflict with the views expressed herein is quashed, but the judgment or decision of the District Court is approved. This[*628] cause is remanded to the Fourth District Court for the purpose of a reversal and a further remand for a new trial on the issue of damages only.

It is so ordered.

OVERTON, C.J., and BOYD, SUNDBERG and HATCHETT, JJ., concur.