Phillips v. Phillips, 151 So. 3d 58 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). · Go Syfert
Search
Phillips v. Phillips, 151 So. 3d 58 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
3 citation events across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Douglas Joseph Thomas v. Caitlin Linglong Li (fladistctapp, 2024-07-17)
Top citers, strongest first. 3 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Douglas Joseph Thomas v. Caitlin Linglong Li
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
However, a person cannot be considered a current domestic violence victim, or have an objectively reasonable fear of becoming one, based on actions that are “too remote in time” and therefore “stale.” See, e.g., id. at 57 (agreeing with a former husband that his former wife’s evidence in support of issuance of a domestic violence injunction was “too remote in time for purposes of showing that she was in imminent danger of becoming a victim of domestic violence”); see also Dickson v. Curtis, 338 So. 3d 1001 , 1005 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (“Florida courts have found that the remotenes…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) JONATHAN CHISCUL v. MICHELLE GOMEZ HERNANDEZ
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
See Selph, 144 So. 3d at 678– 79 (the wife’s allegation that the husband ordered his dog to attack her 3 was insufficient to support entry of a domestic violence injunction because the incident occurred five months prior, there was no medical or police reports, and the parties had not been in contact with each other during the three months before the filing of the petition); Phillips v. Phillips, 151 So. 3d 58, 59 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (finding evidence legally insufficient to support a domestic violence injunction where, despite the allegations in her petition, the wife acknowledged in her t…
discussed Cited "see" JONATHAN TATE v. VANESSA TATE
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Phillips v. Phillips, 151 So. 3d 58, 59 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (reversing an injunction for protection against domestic violence because the estranged wife acknowledged "that there had been no violence or threats of violence from" the husband); Giallanza v. Giallanza, 787 So. 2d 162, 164 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (reversing the extension of an injunction because it was not based on any acts or threats of violence towards the wife but was based on evidence "that she is upset by the Husband's dealings with their children and that she believes that the Husband is using the children to harass her"). 1Und…
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Matthew Lane PHILLIPS, Appellant,
v.
Nofar PHILLIPS, Appellee
2D13-1233.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Nov 7, 2014.
151 So. 3d 58
Annette Marie Lang and Robert E. Bia-sotti of Biasotti and Associates, St. Peters-burg, for Appellant., No appearance for Appellee.
Kelly, Villanti, Larose.
Cited by 3 opinions  |  Published
KELLY, Judge.

Matthew Lane Phillips appeals an injunction for protection against domestic violence entered in favor of his estranged wife, Nofar Phillips. He argues that the trial court abused its discretion by entering the injunction because Mrs. Phillips failed to establish that she had reasonable cause to believe she was in imminent danger of becoming the victim of domestic violence. We agree and reverse.

In order for the trial court to issue an injunction for protection against domestic violence, the party seeking the injunction must establish that he or she has an objectively reasonable fear that he or she is in “imminent danger of becoming the victim of any act of domestic violence.” § 741.30(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2012); see Oettmeier v. Oettmeier, 960 So.2d 902, 904 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007); Moore v. Hall, 786 So.2d 1264, 1266 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). In determining whether the victim’s fear is reasonable, “the trial court must consider the current allegations, the parties’ behavior within the relationship, and the history of the relationship as a whole.” Giallanza v. Giallanza, 787 So.2d 162, 164 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (citing Gustafson v. Mauek, 743 So.2d 614, 616 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)).

Here, the evidence was legally insufficient to meet the statutory requirements for issuance of a domestic violence injunction. Despite the allegations in her petition, Mrs. Phillips acknowledged in her testimony at the injunction hearing that there had been no violence or threats of violence from Mr. Phillips since the parties’ separation four months before she filed the domestic violence petition' Because Mrs. Phillips failed to establish that she was the victim of domestic violence or that she had a reasonable fear of becoming the victim of domestic violence, we reverse. See Oettmeier, 960 So.2d at 905; Moore, 786 So.2d at 1267.

Although the injunction has expired, we reverse and remand with instructions to vacate the injunction because of the unintended collateral consequences that may result from such a judgment. See Young v. Smith, 901 So.2d 372, 373 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005); Stone v. Stone, 128 So.3d 239, 242 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013).

Reversed and remanded.

VILLANTI and LaROSE, JJ., concur.