The 2023 Florida Statutes (including Special Session C)

Title VI
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

Chapter 56
FINAL PROCESS

View Entire Chapter

F.S. 56.27

56.27 Executions; payment of money collected.—

(1) All money received under executions shall be paid, in the order prescribed, to the following: the sheriff, for costs; the levying creditor in the amount of $500 as liquidated expenses; and the priority lienholder under s. 55.10(1) and (2), s. 55.202, s. 55.204(3), or s. 55.208(2), as set forth in an affidavit required by subsection (4), or the levying creditor’s attorney, in satisfaction of the judgment lien, if the judgment lien has not lapsed at the time of the levy. The receipt of the attorney shall be a release of the officer paying the money to him or her. If the name of more than one attorney appears in the court file, the money shall be paid to the attorney who originally commenced the action or who made the original defense unless the file shows that another attorney has been substituted.

(2)(a) If property sold under execution brings more than the amount needed to satisfy the provisions of subsection (1), the surplus shall be paid in the order of priority to any judgment lienholders whose judgment liens have not lapsed, unless the affidavit required by subsection (4) discloses that the property is also subject to any recorded mortgage, financing statement, tax warrant, or other lien, other than a judgment lien, which is junior in priority to the levying creditor’s judgment lien. For the purpose of the sheriff’s distribution of the surplus to judgment lienholders under this paragraph, priority of judgment liens on personal property shall be based on the effective date of the judgment lien acquired under s. 55.202, s. 55.204(3), or s. 55.208(2), and priority of judgment liens on real property shall be based on the effective date of the judgment lien acquired under s. 55.10(1) and (2), as set forth in an affidavit required under subsection (4). If there is a surplus after all valid judgment liens and execution liens have been satisfied under this paragraph, the surplus must be paid to the owner of the property sold.

(b) If the affidavit required by subsection (4) discloses that the property is also subject to any recorded mortgage, financing statement, tax warrant, or other lien, other than a judgment lien, which is junior in priority to the levying creditor’s judgment lien, any surplus from the sale of the property shall be paid over to the registry of the court from which the execution issued for further proceedings to determine the priority in which such surplus shall be distributed among judgment lienholders, other lienholders, and the owner of the property sold.

(3) The value of the property levied upon shall not be considered excessive unless the value unreasonably exceeds the total debt reflected in all unsatisfied judgment liens that have not lapsed and any unsatisfied lien of the levying creditor.

(4) Before the date of the first publication or posting of the notice of sale provided for under s. 56.21, at the time of the levy request to the sheriff, the levying creditor shall deliver to the sheriff an affidavit setting forth all of the following as to the judgment debtor:

(a) For a personal property levy, an attestation by the levying creditor or the levying creditor’s attorney of record that he or she has reviewed the database or judgment lien records established in accordance with ss. 55.201-55.209 and that the information contained in the affidavit based on that review is true and correct. For a real property levy in accordance with s. 55.10(1) and (2), an attestation by the levying creditor or the levying creditor’s attorney of record that he or she has reviewed the records of the clerk of the court of the county where the property is situated, or that he or she has performed or reviewed a title search, and that the information contained in the affidavit, including a disclosure of all judgment liens, mortgages, financing statements, tax warrants, and other liens against the real property, based on that review or title search is true and correct.

(b) The information required under s. 55.203(1) and (2) for each judgment lien certificate indexed under the name of the judgment debtor as to each judgment creditor; the file number assigned to the record of the original and, if any, the second judgment lien; and the date of filing for each judgment lien certificate under s. 55.202 or s. 55.204(3). For each judgment lien recorded on real property, the information contained in the certified copy of recordation of lien under s. 55.10(1) and (2), and for each other lien recorded on real property, the name and address of the lienholder as shown in the copy of the recorded lien disclosed by the title search.

(c) A statement that the levying creditor either does not have any other levy in process or, if another levy is in process, the levying creditor believes in good faith that the total value of the property under execution does not exceed the amount of outstanding judgments.

(5) A sheriff may rely on the affidavit submitted as required under this section, and a sheriff paying money received under an execution in accordance with the information contained in the affidavit required under subsection (4) is not liable to anyone for damages arising from a wrongful levy or wrongful distribution of funds.

(6) A sheriff who is uncertain as to whom to disburse the proceeds from the sale of the levied property may apply for instructions from:

(a) The court that entered the judgment that is the basis of the judgment lien; or

(b) The appropriate court where the levied property was located at the time of the levy,

if the sheriff serves, by process pursuant to chapter 48, by certified mail, or by return receipt requested, a copy of his or her application and the notice of hearing on the levying creditor, the judgment debtor, and any other parties identified in the affidavit.

History.—s. 57, Nov. 23, 1828; RS 1206; GS 1636; RGS 2840; CGL 4527; s. 11, ch. 67-254; s. 307, ch. 95-147; s. 5, ch. 98-410; s. 19, ch. 2000-258; s. 13, ch. 2001-154; s. 11, ch. 2005-241; s. 6, ch. 2009-215; s. 4, ch. 2014-207; s. 16, ch. 2016-33.

Note.—Former s. 55.50.

F.S. 56.27 on Google Scholar

F.S. 56.27 on Casetext

Amendments to 56.27

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 56.27

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 56.27.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases from cite.case.law:

NEW JERSEY CARPENTERS AND THE TRUSTEES THEREOF, v. TISHMAN CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION OF NEW JERSEY, 760 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2014)

. . . . § 34:11-56.27. . . .

S. STETTNER, v. RICHARDSON,, 143 So. 3d 987 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . Richardson had filed an affidavit pursuant to section 56.27, Florida Statutes, for issuance of the notice . . . Richardson’s affidavit, filed pursuant to section 56.27, Florida Statutes (2013) was signed and sworn . . .

UNITED STATES Ru z, v. VILLAGE OF PORT CHESTER,, 704 F. Supp. 2d 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)

. . . Hispanic VAP in District 4 is 77.27 percent of the population there, and the Hispanic CVAP makes up 56.27 . . . Plaintiffs have proven that Hispanics comprise 56.27 percent of the CVAP in proposed District 4 under . . . The majority-minority district has 56.27% Hispanic Citizen Voting Age Population (CVAP) according to . . .

FLEURIMOND, v. STATE, 10 So. 3d 1140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . sentencing guidelines scoresheet, the judge sentenced Fleurimond to the minimum permissible sentence of 56.27 . . . The court also imposed sentences of 56.27 months for the two convictions of possession of cocaine, and . . .

In D. VAN BODEGOM SMITH, Y., 383 B.R. 441 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2008)

. . . performing all of the necessary calculations, the debtors were left with a monthly disposable income of $56.27 . . .

F. BIGGINS v. THE HAZEN PAPER CO., 899 F. Supp. 809 (D. Mass. 1995)

. . . Moore, Federal Practice, ¶ 56.27[3], at p. 56-870 (2d. . . .

SMITH, v. RICHERT,, 35 F.3d 300 (7th Cir. 1994)

. . . National Theatres Corp., 269 F.2d 785, 787-88 (2d Cir.1959); 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.27[3], at . . .

USA PETROLEUM COMPANY, v. ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY,, 13 F.3d 1276 (9th Cir. 1994)

. . . Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.27[1], at 56-858 n. 55 (1993) (“But if a genuine issue of . . .

HOTEL RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES UNION LOCAL v. J. P. MORGAN HOTEL,, 996 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1993)

. . . . ¶56.27[3], at'867 (“Where the reversed judgment is on the pleadings, this should not foreclose a motion . . .

JACKSON, E. v. NASSAU COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, N. P. L. A. P., 818 F. Supp. 509 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)

. . . least one vote from another municipality on the Board for a measure to carry, even though Hempstead had 56.27% . . .

JONATHAN S LANDING, INC. v. TOWNSEND, 960 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1992)

. . . See Moore’s Federal Practice, ¶ 56.27[1], at 858-59 (2d ed.) (citations omitted). . . . .

JONATHAN S LANDING, INC. v. TOWNSEND, 960 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir. 1992)

. . . See Moore’s Federal Practice, ¶ 56.27[1], at 858-59 (2d ed.) (citations omitted). . . . .

L. WATERS, v. THORNBURGH,, 888 F.2d 870 (D.C. Cir. 1989)

. . . Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.27[2] at 56-860 (2d ed.1988). . . .

JACKSON, v. J. ELROD,, 881 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1989)

. . . Id., § 56.27[1], at pp. 850-52. 6 Moore & Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.23, at p. 786 (2d ed. . . .

METROPOLITAN DADE COUNTY, v. RUDOFF, R., 544 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)

. . . based upon a finding that, for an injury to be “service-connected” within the meaning of section 2-56.27 . . .

GRUBB v. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, 868 F.2d 1151 (10th Cir. 1989)

. . . Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶56.27[1], at 56-847 (2d ed. 1988). . . .

JEWELERS VIGILANCE COMMITTEE, INC. v. ULLENBERG CORP., 853 F.2d 888 (Fed. Cir. 1988)

. . . Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice pt. 2, ¶ 56.27[2], at 56-1562 (2d ed. 1987) ("an appellate court has . . .

HARTFORD ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY COMPANY, a v. GULF INSURANCE COMPANY, a, 837 F.2d 767 (7th Cir. 1988)

. . . Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice 11 56.27[3] at 56-1563 (2d ed. 1987). . . .

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, v. SEARS, ROEBUCK COMPANY,, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988)

. . . Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶56.27[1] (1987 & Cum.Supp.1986-1987). . . .

B. PASHMAN, v. CHEMTEX, INC., 825 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1987)

. . . Cargill, Inc., 582 F.2d 333, 334 (5th Cir.1978) (per curiam); 6 Moore’s Federal Practice 11 56.27, at . . .

CORAL PETROLEUM, INC. v. BANQUE PARIBAS- LONDON,, 797 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1986)

. . . , Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2716 at 658 (1983); 6 (Part 2) Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.27 . . .

CORAL PETROLEUM, INC. v. BANQUE PARIBAS- LONDON,, 797 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1986)

. . . , Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2716 at 658 (1983); 6 (Part 2) Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.27 . . .

C. STAFFORD, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, UAW, 790 F.2d 702 (8th Cir. 1986)

. . . Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.27[1] (1985). . . .

UNITED STATES v. VALDOSTA- LOWNDES COUNTY HOSPITAL AUTHORITY,, 628 F. Supp. 901 (M.D. Ga. 1986)

. . . Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.27[3] (2d ed.1985); United States v. . . .

BERLANTI, v. BODMAN, s, 780 F.2d 296 (3d Cir. 1985)

. . . Id. at § 34:11-56.27. . . . .

LITTON INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS, INC. v. SOLID STATE SYSTEMS CORP., 755 F.2d 158 (Fed. Cir. 1985)

. . . Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.27[1] (2d ed. 1984). . . .

GHANDI, v. POLICE DEPARTMENT OF CITY OF DETROIT,, 747 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1984)

. . . Moore’s Federal Practice 11 56.27(1), at 56-1557; see also Smith v. . . .

CLOUTIER, v. TOWN OF EPPING, CLOUTIER, v. TOWN OF EPPING, J. E. K. CLOUTIER, v. TOWN OF EPPING, CLOUTIER, v. TOWN OF EPPING, CLOUTIER, v. TOWN OF EPPING,, 714 F.2d 1184 (1st Cir. 1983)

. . . Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2716 (2d ed. 1983); 6 Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.27 . . .

LIBERLES, v. COUNTY OF COOK C. J., 709 F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1983)

. . . General Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 420, 440-41 (D.C.Cir.1975); 6 Moore’s, Federal Practice ¶ 56.27[1] at . . .

EDEN TOYS, INC. v. FLORELEE UNDERGARMENT CO. INC., 697 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1982)

. . . Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.27[1], at 56-1557 to 56-1558 (1976). . . .

UNITED STATES v. STATE OF WASHINGTON,, 694 F.2d 1374 (9th Cir. 1982)

. . . Wicker, Moore’s Federal Practice H 56.27[1] at 56-1557 (2d ed. 1982). . . .

THORP COMMERCIAL CORPORATION, v. NORTHGATE INDUSTRIES, INC. E., 654 F.2d 1245 (8th Cir. 1981)

. . . See generally 6, Part 2 Moore’s Federal Practice fl 56.27[1], [2] (2d ed. 1980). . . .

THORP COMMERCIAL CORPORATION, v. NORTHGATE INDUSTRIES, INC. E., 654 F.2d 1245 (8th Cir. 1981)

. . . See generally 6, Part 2 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.27[1], [2] (2d ed. 1980). . . .

WEIT v. CONTINENTAL ILLINOIS NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF CHICAGO, 641 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1981)

. . . for itself whether there are any genuine issues of material fact. 6 Pt. 2 Moore’s Federal Practice *' 56.27 . . .

C. MILLER, v. GATEWAY TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC. a, 616 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1980)

. . . Cir. 1975); 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.27[1], at 56-1561 (2d ed. 1979); 10 C. Wright & A. . . .

COUNTY OF PATRICK, VIRGINIA, C. I. a v. UNITED STATES IBLM,, 596 F.2d 1186 (4th Cir. 1979)

. . . Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 467, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962); 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶56.27 . . .

SMITH, Jr. v. OLIN CHEMICAL CORPORATION, 555 F.2d 1283 (5th Cir. 1977)

. . . appeal is normally an insufficient means of resisting summary judgment. 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.27 . . .

A. UZZELL v. C. FRIDAY,, 547 F.2d 801 (4th Cir. 1977)

. . . ., 411 U.S. at 605, 614-17, 93 S.Ct. 1736 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see 6 Moore’s Federal Practice 56.27 . . .

CROSBY, v. GENERAL TIRE RUBBER COMPANY, v. VULCAN PAINTERS, INC., 543 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1976)

. . . Ry., ill F.2d 1303 (5th Cir. 1973); 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.27[1] (1976). . . .

J. VON BRIMER Co- W. v. WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION,, 536 F.2d 838 (9th Cir. 1976)

. . . Cummings, 453 F.2d 320, 324 (5th Cir. 1972), 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.27[1], at 2975. . . .

CALNETICS CORPORATION v. VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA, INC. CALNETICS CORPORATION, v. VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA, INC., 532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1976)

. . . Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 56.27[1], at 2975 (2d ed. 1948, as amended, 1975). . . .

DAVIS, v. LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a, 525 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1976)

. . . Blood Services, 506 F.2d 841, 844 n.2 (5th Cir. 1975); 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.27[1], at 2975 . . .

ZOLAR PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC. v. DOUBLEDAY COMPANY, INC., 529 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1975)

. . . our only concern is whether there were genuine issues of material fact. 6 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 56.27 . . .

DANSKIN, INC. v. DAN RIVER, INC., 498 F.2d 1386 (C.C.P.A. 1974)

. . . Moore, Federal Practice 56.27 [1] at 2973 (2d ed. 1974). . . .

HANOVER INSURANCE COMPANY, v. HAWKINS d b a E. STEWART C. v. E. POWELL, 493 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1974)

. . . Moore, Federal Practice, ¶ 56.27 [1] (2d ed. 1948); rule 83, Fed.R.Civ.P. . . .

UNITED STATES v. BISSETT- BERMAN CORPORATION, M V NESCO I,, 481 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1973)

. . . .) ¶ 56.27 [1] at 2973; Vickery v. Fisher Governor Co., 417 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1969). . . .

S. BLOOMGARDEN, v. B. COYER, 479 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir. 1973)

. . . Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 56.27 [1] at 2973 (2d ed. 1972). . See Nyhus v. . . .

W. R. LLOYD, Jr. v. H. LAWRENCE, Jr., 472 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1973)

. . . Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed. 2d 458 (1962); Moore’s Federal Practice, ¶ 56.27 . . .

JAMES, v. ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY,, 464 F.2d 173 (10th Cir. 1972)

. . . See 6 Moore’s Federal Practice §§ 56.15(1), (3), (8), 56.27(1); Avrick v. . . .

T. DeBARDELEBEN s v. M. CUMMINGS,, 453 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1972)

. . . Charteris, 5 Cir., 1952, 197 F.2d 77; 6 Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 56.27[1]. . . .

JAMES TALCOTT, INC. v. ALLAHABAD BANK, LTD. CITY TRADE INDUSTRIES, LTD. v. NEW CENTRAL JUTE MILLS COMPANY,, 444 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1971)

. . . j[ 56.27[1]. . . .

VICKERY, v. FISHER GOVERNOR COMPANY,, 417 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1969)

. . . adjudication, and, if not, whether the substantive law was correctly applied.” 6 Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 56.27 . . .

ENDICOTT TRUST COMPANY, J. v. UNITED STATES, 305 F. Supp. 943 (N.D.N.Y. 1969)

. . . See 6 Moore, supra, Para. 56.12, 56.13, 56.27 [2].” . . .

E. M. PIPER, v. UNITED STATES UNITED STATES v. E. M. PIPER,, 392 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1968)

. . . should make such a disposition of the appeal as will permit him to do so.” 6 Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 56.27 . . .

STEIN, a H. v. OSHINSKY, J., 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1965)

. . . See 6 Moore, supra, ¶¶ 56.12, 56.13, 56.27 [2]. . . .

INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN S ASSOCIATION, AFL- CIO, v. SEATRAIN LINES, INC., 326 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1964)

. . . 830, 83 S.Ct. 1872, 10 L.Ed.2d 1053 (1963); 6 Moore, Federal Practice ¶¶56.12 (particularly p. 2091), 56.27 . . .

KAZ MANUFACTURING CO. v. CHESEBROUGH- POND S, INC., 211 F. Supp. 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1962)

. . . Rule 56(f).” 6 Moore, Federal Practice, § 56.15 [3] p. 2131; see also, 6 Moore, Federal Practice, § 56.27 . . .

K. A. COCKRELL, v. A. L. MECHLING BARGE LINES, INC., 192 F. Supp. 622 (S.D. Tex. 1961)

. . . in short, all doubts are resolved against the movant. 6 Moore’s Federal Practice (2d Ed. 1953), Sec. 56.27 . . .

UNITED STATES v. TOYS OF THE WORLD CLUB, INC., 288 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1961)

. . . . § 2106; 6 Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed. 1953), par. 56.27 [2]; United States v. . . .

J. MURPHY v. LIGHT, 257 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1958)

. . . Fidelity & Casualty Co., 5 Cir., 199 F.2d 561; 6 Moore’s Federal Practice, #56.27 [3]. . . .

E. HELMS, W. v. F. DUCKWORTH, 249 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1957)

. . . See 6 Moore, Federal Practice §§ 56.12, 56.13, 56.27 [2] (2d ed. 1953). . . . .

v. A., 4 D.C. 253 (C.C.D.C. 1832)

. . . the balance due on that note, took it up, and took the following receipt, indorsed thereon : “Balance 56.27 . . .