Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...) Character of accused.—Evidence of a pertinent trait of character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the trait. (b) Character of victim— . . . . (c) Character of witness.—Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in ss. 90.608-90.610. (Emphasis supplied.) The only section referred to within section 90.404(1)(c) that is pertinent in this case is section 90.608(5), Florida Statutes (1997), which provides: Any party, including the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by: ....

...onetheless open the door to the prior crime evidence by (1) offering a trait of the defendant's good character, see § 90.404(1)(a) (character of accused), or (2) inaccurately testifying to material facts, see § 90.404(1)(c) (character of witness), § 90.608(5) (contradiction on relevant facts)....

...at killed Nelson. See Geralds, 674 So.2d at 99. [10] Thus, Robertson did not open the door to evidence that he allegedly threatened his ex-wife six years before with an assault rifle by testifying inaccurately to material facts. See § 90.404(1)(c); § 90.608(5); Geralds, 674 So.2d at 99....

...See Rolle v. State, 386 So.2d 3 (Fla. 3d Dist.Ct.App.1980) (general rule is that witness may not be interrogated as to prior arrests or pending charges, but only as to prior convictions). Nor is it likely that the evidence would be admissible under Fla.Stat. § 90.608 as evidence of bias in this case, where no criminal proceeding or even an investigation had begun....

...duction of the taped statement, the taped statement was plainly inconsistent with Harris's testimony at trial and constituted a prior inconsistent statement properly introduced for impeachment purposes only. State v. Smith, 573 So.2d 306 (Fla.1990); § 90.608, Fla.Stat....

...ce between the two statements." Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence, § 614.1, at 482 (1995 ed.). Considering the material inconsistencies in Harris's description of Gudinas' demeanor, we find that the State properly impeached its own witness. See § 90.608(1), Fla.Stat....

...offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. § 90.801(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (1989). The State raises alternative arguments on this point, the first being that Feagle's statement was properly admitted for purposes of impeachment under section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1989)....

...First, the prosecutor's reiteration of portions of the testimony of Beakley and Denigris was a proper predicate to asking Johnson if his account and theirs could be reconciled. A witness's credibility may be attacked via testimony presenting a different view of the facts by other witnesses. § 90.608(5), Fla....

...section 90.801(2)(a) and could not be admitted as substantive evidence here. However, introduction of a prior statement that is inconsistent with a witness's present testimony is also one of the main ways to attack the credibility of a witness. See § 90.608(1), Fla. Stat. (2001); see also Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 608.4 (2002 ed.). "The Florida Evidence Code does not require the witness's prior inconsistent statement to be reduced to writing in order to impeach the witness under section 90.608(1)(a)." Kimble v....

...early Monday morning. At this point the state attorney asked the court to declare Sutton a hostile witness. After a lengthy bench discussion, the trial judge declared Sutton to be adverse. This allowed the state to cross-examine and impeach Sutton, § 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (1979), whereupon Sutton cleared up his confusion about when he saw Lucas and Jackson and testified he saw them early Sunday....

...A mere lapse of memory is insufficient to render a witness adverse. In a seminal decision addressing the problem of forgetful witnesses, this Court held: It is very erroneous to suppose that, under this statute [§ 1101 Rev.Stat.Fla. (1892), precursor to § 90.608(2), Fla....

...Ehrhardt, West's Florida Practice, Florida Evidence 169-70 (1977). Although we find no case on point decided *463 under the current evidence code, we perceive no reason to conclude that the principles are any less applicable, with the exception that section 90.608 no longer requires the calling party to be surprised by the prejudicial testimony....

...these issues. The court found the testimony inadmissible. Admissibility of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent abuse of discretion. See Heath v. State, 648 So.2d 660, 664 (Fla.1994). Pursuant to section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1997), any party may attack the credibility of a witness based on inconsistent prior statements, criminal history, reputation for truthfulness, bias, an inability or lack of opportunity to observe or remember the events, or proof by other witnesses that the witness recalled material facts incorrectly. See § 90.608(1)(a)-(e), Fla....

...ose's mental health expert, Dr. Toomer, during cross-examination. Generally, matters affecting the credibility of a witness may be inquired into on cross-examination. See Chandler v. State, 702 So.2d 186, 195-96 (Fla.1997). As a form of impeachment, section 90.608(1), Florida Statutes (1997), provides, for example, that any party may attack the credibility of a witness by showing that the witness is biased....

...Dallas admitted to hearing rumors of abuse in the relationship, but stated many relationships had those kind of problems. The purpose of the prosecutor's cross-examination of Theodore Dallas was to test his credibility concerning the relationship between Butler and Fleming. Section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1997), provides: 90.608 Who may impeach.—Any party, including the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by: (1) Introducing statements of the witness which are inconsistent with the witness's present testimony....

...The State responds that the questions were proper because the same State Attorney's office had prosecuted them and was responsible for their sentences, and the State had no recourse against the witnesses if they committed perjury. A. APPLICABLE LAW Section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (2001), states that a party may attack the credibility of a witness by showing that the witness is biased....

...s been convicted of a crime if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 1 year under the law under which the witness was convicted...." Importantly, section 90.610(3) explicitly provides that the admissibility of evidence under section 90.608 is not affected by the limitations contained in section 90.610(1)....

...If the witness admits the conviction, "the inquiry by his adversary may not be pursued to the point of naming the crime for which he was convicted." Fulton, 335 So.2d at 284 (citations and footnote omitted). In Howard v. State, 397 So.2d 997 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), a case concerning section 90.608(2), the Fourth District Court of Appeal allowed the State to introduce evidence of a defense witness's prior conviction of obstructing justice....

...The State argued that the mandatory life sentence was relevant because it showed that there was nothing the State could do if Birchard committed perjury. The State's line of questioning and argument to the court demonstrates that the State believed the question to be proper under section 90.608(2)....

...ng perjury. Essentially, they could lie with impunity. Because Birchard and Stafford had a potential motive to lie at trial, the State's questions concerning their life sentences and immunity from perjury sanctions were relevant and admissible under section 90.608(2)....

...Calling such a court witness, however, rests within the trial court's discretion. Brumbley v. State, 453 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1984). Although the court did not make Pierson its own witness, it did declare him an adverse witness, thereby allowing the defense to place his credibility in doubt by attempting to impeach his testimony. § 90.608(2), Fla....

...That agent, Robert Dean Love, also testified at trial. Love testified that the car was found in June of 1996 and that he received the letter and key from Detective Stafford. Love further testified that he went to see the burned-out car and the key he was provided by Stafford opened the vehicle. Section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1997), provides that "[a]ny party, including the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by: ......

...oss-examination. See Moore, 485 So.2d at 1282 (Overton, J., concurring specially); Everett v. State, 530 So.2d 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). Moreover, to interpret section 90.803(23) otherwise would allow that section to be used to avoid the provision of section 90.608(1) that prohibits a party from impeaching his or her own witness....

...conduct, citing Rogers v. State, 511 So.2d 526 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 733, 98 L.Ed.2d 681 (1988); Hitchcock v. State, 413 So.2d 741 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 960, 103 S.Ct. 274, 74 L.Ed.2d 213 (1982). See also §§ 90.608 and 90.609, Fla....

...stantive evidence in its case, rather than solely as impeachment evidence as the majority suggests. Although I agree with the majority that the inconsistent statements would not be admissible for purposes of impeaching the state's own witnesses, see § 90.608(1), Fla....

...r truthfulness. Rogers v. State, 511 So.2d 526 (Fla. 1987), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 733, 98 L.Ed.2d 681 (1988); Hitchcock v. State, 413 So.2d 741 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 960, 103 S.Ct. 274, 74 L.Ed.2d 213 (1982). See also §§ 90.608 and 90.609, Fla. Stat. (1985) and C. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 801.6 (2d. ed. 1984). Section 90.608(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1985) provides that the character of a witness is subject to attack in accordance with the provisions of section 90.609, which states that "[a] party may attack or support the credibility of a witness, includin...

...1988) (the trial court has wide discretion in ruling on admissibility of evidence). Nor do I find that this impeachment evidence was probative of any motive, bias, or intent on the part of this witness and therefore also was not admissible on those grounds. See § 90.608, Fla....

...State, 545 So.2d 857 (Fla.1989), preclude the use of that statement as substantive evidence in the penalty phase. Clearly, the prior inconsistent statement was admissible in the guilt phase only for purpose of impeachment and could not be used as substantive evidence against Rodriguez. See § 90.608, Fla....

...LAZZARA: Then I object to that question, I'm sorry. THE COURT: Okay, I'll overrule the objection. BY MR. KIBBEY: Q Do you understand the question as to those three areas? What — what did you tell him during your deposition? This is clearly impeaching one's own witness in contravention of Section 90.608(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...ircumstances surrounding the charges. We find, under the circumstances presented here, that this prior inconsistent statement was used to buttress, not impeach, the credibility of the state's own witness and, used as such, it was not in violation of section 90.608(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...idence adduced from the witness by other parties, and to challenge the witness's credibility when appropriate. Contrary to the form generally used in *91 direct examination, counsel on cross-examination is authorized to lead and impeach a witness. §§ 90.608, 90.612, Fla. Stat. (1987). [10] Florida law has long followed the general rule that parties may not cross-examine and impeach their own witnesses. § 90.608, Fla....

...[11] "This rule resulted from a belief that the party who calls a witness to testify vouches to the court and jury for the credibility of that witness." [12] C. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 608.2, at 298 (2d ed. 1984). A narrow exception evolved for the cross-examination and impeachment of "adverse" witnesses. § 90.608(2), Fla....

...905, 908 (1894); see generally Ehrhardt, supra, § 608(2), at 299-302. If the witness proves adverse, the calling party may lead and impeach the witness with prior inconsistent statements, provided the trial court first finds that the live testimony was affirmatively harmful to the calling party. § 90.608(2), Fla....

...Classifying a witness as hostile merely authorizes counsel to ask leading questions to induce an otherwise credible witness to testify — not to impeach. Allowing counsel to lead falls far short of authorizing counsel to challenge the credibility of the witness. See §§ 90.608, .612, Fla....

...m's body. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 545 So.2d 260, 265 (Fla. 1989). [9] Section 90.615(1) of the Florida Statutes (1987) provides: 90.615 Calling witnesses by the court. — (1) The court may call witnesses whom all parties may cross-examine. [10] Section 90.608 of the Florida Statutes (1987) provides: 90.608 Who may impeach....

...wise require: (a) A party may not ask a witness a leading question on direct or redirect examination. (b) A party may ask a witness a leading question on cross-examination or re-cross examination. [11] Federal law follows a different rule. Compare §§ 90.608,.612, Fla. Stat. (1987), with Fed. R.Evid. 607, 611. [12] rule against a party impeaching his own witness, sometimes called the `voucher rule,' is retained in Section 90.608(1)....

...State, 202 So.2d 883, 884 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967); Moore v. State, 186 So.2d 56 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966). Evidence that a witness has received a lighter sentence in exchange for his or her testimony goes to the bias of the witness and is therefore a proper subject for impeachment. § 90.608, Fla....

...Have you ever engaged in any homosexual activities with Stephen Sias? ... . "A. Yes, I have. *1218 ... . "Q. How long have you been roommates? "A. About four years." It is axiomatic that a party may attack the credibility of a witness called by the opposition by showing that the witness is biased. See § 90.608(1)(b), Fla....

...Initially, we agree with Gibson that Roxanne's state of mind and possible motive for testifying were permissible subjects for inquiry. Our evidence code liberally permits the introduction of evidence to show the bias or motive of a witness. In relevant part, section 90.608(2) states: Any party, including the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by: (2) Showing that the witness is biased. § 90.608(2), Fla....

...er interview but currently could not remember. Hamilton now claims that the above dialogue constituted improper testimony because the impeachment served as "mere subterfuge" for getting the prior inconsistent statement before the jury. See generally § 90.608, Fla....

...This ruling by the trial judge was clearly not an abuse of discretion. The defense's proposed evidence does not fall under any of the express ways allowed to attack a witness's credibility — it does not deal with a prior inconsistent statement, bias, character or ability to observe, remember, or recount. See § 90.608, Fla....

...and to challenge the witness's credibility when *447 appropriate"). We have also stated, "Our evidence code liberally permits the introduction of evidence to show the bias or motive of a witness." Gibson v. State, 661 So.2d 288, 291 (Fla.1995). In relevant part, section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (1997), states: Any party, including the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by: ......

...witness and to impeach him through use of prior inconsistent statements regarding identification of defendant as perpetrator denied due process). The Florida Evidence Code addresses the proper methods of impeachment to attack a witness' credibility: 90.608 Who may impeach.—Any party, including the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of the witness by: (1) Introducing statements of the witness which are inconsistent with the witness's present testimony....

...(4) Showing a defect of capacity, ability, or opportunity in the witness to observe, remember, or recount the matters about which the witness testified, (5) Proof by other witnesses that material facts are not as testified to by the witness being impeached. § 90.608, Fla....

..., whereupon the prosecutor's objection was inexplicably sustained. The appellate court concluded that by so ruling, the trial court had erroneously prevented Nelson from impeaching McKenzie. Specifically, the erroneous ruling was found to contravene section 90.608, Florida Statutes, because it deprived the defense of the opportunity to conduct a full cross-examination of McKenzie, a crucial State witness, in an effort to impeach the witness by showing his bias and improper motive....

...in a proceeding in which he could be subjected to the penalty of perjury. Mincey's prior statement does not qualify because it was not made under oath. Nor would the state have been justified in eliciting Mincey's prior inconsistent statement under Section 90.608, Florida Statutes, which allows a party calling a witness, who proves adverse, to introduce a prior inconsistent statement....

...1st DCA 1981) (Smith, R., specially concurring); compare McNeil v. State, 433 So.2d 1294 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (testimony of witness exculpating defendant was prejudicial to state and witness was therefore adverse — thus, prior unsworn statement was properly admitted for impeachment purposes under Section 90.608 but inadmissible as substantive evidence under Section 90.801(2)(a)); and Mazzara v. State, 437 So.2d 716 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (prior statement not admissible under Section 90.801(2)(a) but admissible under Section 90.608(2))....

...The State then asked whether she had previously told Detective Linton that the composite did, in fact, resemble Hannon. The testimony of Detective Linton, regarding Acker's statement that the composite looked like Hannon, was proper impeachment of Acker's testimony. § 90.608, Fla....

...nt and that there was no proof that DeGuglielmo acted on behalf of the State in calling Warren or that DeGuglielmo attempted to influence Warren's opinion. The trial court's ruling to exclude this testimony on this basis was error. In relevant part, section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (1999), states: "Any party, including the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by... [s]howing that the witness is biased." Denying a defendant the opportunity to present evidence that a witness is biased not only violates section 90.608(2), it also implicates a defendant's constitutional right to cross-examination which is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 16 of the Florida Constitution....

...State, 608 So.2d 784, 791 (Fla.1992). The State acknowledges the general prohibition against impeachment with the specific nature of convictions but argues to this Court, as it did to the trial court, that the nature of the conviction was necessary to establish bias. Under section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (2007), any party may attack the credibility of a witness by showing that the witness is biased....

...ss's cooperation with the state. See Breedlove v. State, 580 So.2d 605, 607-08 (Fla.1991); Livingston v. State, 678 So.2d 895, 897 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). In this circumstance, the impeachment would not be pursuant to section 90.610(1), but pursuant to section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...Accordingly, we find no error here. Under Ortagus' fourth contention, he argues the trial court erred in forbidding him to cross-examine the victim's wife, Mrs. Fowler, as to the statement she allegedly made to prospective juror Wilds that "she didn't know anything," since Section 90.608(1), Florida Statutes (1983), allows a party to attack a witness' credibility with prior inconsistent statements....

...tempt. Moreover, Appellant could have used the deposition to impeach the victim even if it could not be used as substantive evidence, but the record in this case reflects that Appellant never attempted to use the deposition for any purpose. See e.g. § 90.608, Fla....

...Given this impeachment of Walker's direct testimony on the statement, the prosecutor did not refer to it in closing argument. Appellant's only objection to Walker's statement that Anna had invited the victims into the house was that it was hearsay. Here, the testimony was being offered to impeach Anna's testimony. See *495 § 90.608(1), Fla....

...otives, interest, or animus as connected with the cause or the parties thereto, upon which matters he may be contradicted by other evidence." The above case law and philosophy relating to impeachment is incorporated into the Florida Evidence Code in section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1979), which provides in part: 90.608 Who may impeach....

...s about which he testified. (e) Proof by other witnesses that material facts are not as testified to by the witness being impeached. [emphasis added] Contradictory testimony that falls within the first category (as set out above) is admissible under section 90.608(1)(e). With regard to the second category, evidence of bias (and implicitly corruption) is allowed under section 90.608(1)(b), evidence of lack of competency is allowed under section 90.608(1)(d), and evidence of the witness' general immoral character is allowed under 90.608(1)(c) but limited to evidence of the witness' reputation for untruthfulness by section 90.609 or evidence of a prior conviction by section 90.610....

...bstantially adopting the substance of Fed. R.Evid. 611(b). Section 90.612(3), Florida Statutes (1981), now provides generally for leading questions only on cross-examination and recross-examination and the topic of who may impeach is now provided in section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1981)....

...§ 90.612(3)(b), (1981). There is also a general principle that a party who calls a witness as his own vouches for that witness' credibility. It is for this reason that there is a traditional rule against impeaching a party's own witness. Fla. Stat. § 90.608(1), (1981)....

...CONTRADICTION: In a similar practical vein, a party should be able to present all available evidence that tends to support the party's case without regard to the fact that it may tend to impeach because it may contradict previous testimony of a witness called by that party (Fla. Stat. § 90.608(1)(a), (1981)), [6] or because it proves that material facts are not as testified to by some previous witness called by the party....

...entrapped by the testimony before the calling party could introduce a prior inconsistent statement of that witness. Although presenting a prior statement of the witness inconsistent with his present testimony is a general method of impeachment, see § 90.608(1)(a), Fla....

...r the purpose of getting the prior statement before the jury for its consideration as substantive evidence. [9] In any event, the previous requirement of surprise in order to introduce prior inconsistent statements has now been eliminated by present section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...ling party the adverse party gives testimony prejudicial (unfavorable) to the calling party (either on direct examination by the opposing party, on cross-examination or in the adverse party-witness' case in chief), notwithstanding the restriction in section 90.608(1), Florida Statutes (1981), against a party impeaching his own witness, the calling party may not only contradict but may also impeach the adverse party-witness by attacking his character by evidence as to bad reputation for truthfulness (§ 90.609) and prior conviction of crime (§ 90.610). In summary, section 90.608(1), Florida Statutes (1981), recognizes the general rule that a party cannot impeach his own witness. Section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (1981), recognizes one limited exception permitting impeachment of any adverse witness (which includes an adverse party) by contradiction by other evidence or by a prior inconsistent statement....

...This should also apply to a party-witness who by improper impeachment, in addition to damage to character, stands to risk the consequence of an unfair trial and of a judgment and an award of damages based on prejudice against the person of the party rather than on the relevant facts and law. Notwithstanding that present section 90.608(2) eliminates the necessity of surprise in order to use prior inconsistent statements to impeach an adverse witness, we believe the following statement from Foremost Dairies, Inc., of the South v....

...Indeed, a recent authority states: The Adverse-Party Witness called by you must not be confused with the merely Adverse (Hostile or Unwilling) Witness discussed in the preceding Section of this Chapter. The right to impeach the Adverse-Party Witness derives from Fla.R. Civ.P. 1.450(a) and not from Florida Evidence Code 90.608. As a result, such impeachment is not limited to the two methods approved by 90.608 (contradictory evidence, and proof of prior inconsistent statements); nor by the foundational requirements imposed by that statute....

...ala city policeman was largely the "inconsistency" in the testimony that was used as the basis for allowing the defendant to be impeached. [3] See Cox v. State, 58 Fla. 33, 50 So. 875 (1909); Bryant v. United States, 120 F.2d 483 (5th Cir.1941). [4] Section 90.608(1), Fla....

...Although some counsel favor the practice a witness cannot properly be questioned about collateral or immaterial matters for the purpose of "testing his credibility" or impeaching the witness by contradition or otherwise as to his answers. [6] See 3A Wigmore, Evidence § 902 (Chadbourne Rev. 1970). [7] § 90.608(1)(e), Fla....

...[11] In that circumstance the calling party is not bound by that party-witness' testimony and may introduce statements of the witness as described in section 90.801(2) or admissions under section 90.803(18), and such statements and admissions are incidentally considered as impeachment under section 90.608(1)(a), and may also introduce proof by other witnesses as to facts material to the issues in the cause although such material facts are not as testified to by the party-witness and are incidentally considered impeachment under section 90.608(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1981)....

...r evidence of the conviction from which the appeal was taken or for which the pardon was granted inadmissible. Evidence of the pendency of the appeal is admissible. (3) Nothing in this section affects the admissibility of evidence under s. 90.404 or s. 90.608....

...The only proper inquiry into a witness’s *1097 character for impeachment purposes goes to the witness’s reputation for truth and veracity.” Fernandez v. State, 730 So.2d 277, 282 (Fla.1999). In so holding, we have explained, “Allowing this testimony would violate sections 90.608, 90.609, and 90.610, Florida Statutes (1998), which prohibit impeachment by reference to specific bad acts other than convictions for felonies or misdemeanors involving dishonesty.” Fernandez, 730 So.2d at 282-83 ....

...Accordingly, we approve the First District’s decision in Pantoja , holding that section 90.610 does not permit impeachment of a witness with evidence of a prior accusation that did not result in a criminal conviction. Pantoja further argues that the victim’s prior false accusation is admissible under section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (2002), to prove bias or motive to lie. We disagree. Section 90.608(2) provides, “Any party, including the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by: ... (2) Showing that the witness is biased.” Although the facts of Jaggers did support the use of false reporting evidence to establish bias or motive pursuant to section 90.608(2), that provision is not applicable in the instant case....

...In Pantoja , the First District reasoned: The Second District reached this holding after concluding that such evidence is “relevant to the possible bias, prejudice, motive, intent or corruptness” of the witness. Id. Evidence that is relevant to a witness’ bias is admissible under section 90.608(2). Prejudice, motive to testify, and intent in testifying are all ways of showing the witness’ bias, and, thus, are also proper grounds for impeachment under section 90.608(2)....

...A witness was considered adverse only where the party expected the witness to give favorable evidence and the witness surprised the party by giving evidence that was prejudicial to the party producing the witness. Adams v. State, 34 Fla. 185, 15 So. 905 (1894). By the adoption of section 90.608, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...1976), as part of the new evidence code, the requirement of surprise was eliminated, but it continued to be necessary for the party attempting to impeach its own witness to show that the witness's testimony was affirmatively harmful. Jackson v. State, 451 So.2d 458 (Fla.1984); see 1976 Law Revision Council Note, § 90.608, Fla.Stat.Ann. (1979). In 1990, section 90.608 was amended to remove the necessity of showing that one's own witness had become adverse....

...The statute now reads in pertinent part: Who may impeach.—Any party, including the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by: (1) Introducing statements of the witness which are inconsistent with his present testimony. § 90.608, Fla.Stat. (1993). By its plain language, the statute now permits a party to impeach its own witness by introducing prior inconsistent statements without regard to whether the witness's testimony is prejudicial. While section 90.608 no longer requires that a party's witness be adverse, the statute maintains the requirement that a prior statement be inconsistent with the witness's in-court testimony before the statement will be admitted for impeachment....

...Even if the jury is instructed that the facts should only be considered for purposes of impeachment, it may be impossible for the jury to disregard these facts as substantive evidence. Thus, the impeachment which appears to be permitted under the literal wording of section 90.608 can be subject to abuse. There are no cases in Florida which directly address this problem in the wake of the 1990 amendment to section 90.608....

...We are convinced that any error which occurred in the guilt phase was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We cannot reach the same conclusion with respect to the penalty phase. This case bears some analogy to Dudley v. State, 545 So.2d 857 (Fla.1989), a decision which predated *265 the 1990 amendment to section 90.608....

...The defense also asserted that Reape’s incarceration was relevant to show that she was biased and trying to gain favor with the State for a possible modification of her sentence or the terms of her probation. While bias is a permissible basis for attacking a witness’s credibility under section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (2009), there must be some foundation for the claim of bias....

...960, 103 S.Ct. 274, 74 L.Ed.2d 213 (1982) for the proposition that evidence of particular acts of misconduct cannot be introduced to impeach the credibility of a witness. See also Simmons v. Baptist Hospital of Miami, 454 So.2d 681 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). *377 Section 90.608, Fla.Evid....

...Code (1991) governs impeachment by contradiction: (1) Any party, including the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by: * * * * * * (5) Proof by other witnesses that material facts are not as testified to by the witness being impeached. (emphasis supplied). The 1979 Sponsor's note to Section 90.608 states: Where it is sought to impeach a witness on the basis of testimony given on cross-examination, the testimony must, of course, be relevant and material .....

...at there is no evidence that Johnson was a confidential informant in this case. We do not agree with the State's contentions. The Florida Evidence Code provides that the credibility of a witness may be attacked by showing that the witness is biased. § 90.608(1)(b), Fla....

...Prior to the verdict, the court ruled that appellant violated his probation for failing to follow his curfew. The trial court erred in preventing appellant from telling about his past relationship with Golden and Melvin, since such testimony was evidence of the witness' bias, admissible under section 90.608(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1995). Section 90.608(1)(b), provides that any party may attack the credibility of a witness by "[s]howing that the witness is biased." Included in the types of matters that demonstrate bias are prejudice, interest in the outcome of a case, and any motivation for a witness to testify untruthfully....

...I would also hold that although the trial court erred in admitting evidence concerning the settlement, this error was harmless. Evidence of A-1's prior status as a defendant was admissible to attack the credibility of John Herring by showing that he was biased. Section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (2006), expressly authorizes the introduction of evidence to attack the credibility of a witness by "[s]howing that the witness is biased." This statutory provision should not be ignored in the analysis of the evidentiary question at issue here....

...nonetheless clearly established the point that the rule of exclusion in section 768.041(3) is not invariably applied in derogation of other applicable rules or principles of law. *1087 Here, section 768.041(3) should not be applied in derogation of section 90.608(2)....

...o consider the highly probative evidence of Herring's bias was not error. By the choice of Herring as an expert witness, the plaintiff unilaterally created the situation in which a choice was required between applying section 768.041(3) and applying section 90.608(2)....

...Detective Luchan on matters affecting his credibility. We disagree. During the trial, counsel for appellant stated that he wanted to bring out the level of professionalism of Detective Luchan for the purpose of determining his credibility. However, section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1983), provides in part: *1158 (1) Any party, except the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by: (a) Introducing statements of the witness which are inconsistent with his present testimony....

...which he testified. (e) Proof by other witnesses that material facts are not as testified to by the witness being impeached. We find that appellant's attack on Detective Luchan's professionalism was not a proper method of attacking credibility under section 90.608....

...It is evident from the record that the state was not seeking to impeach Grant, but rather to bolster his credibility by revealing his earlier inconsistent statements. In Bell v. State, 473 So.2d 734 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985), we sanctioned that form of trial strategy, and found it not offensive to section 90.608, Florida Statutes....

....” The State objected and asserted that Richaunda could not be impeached with the arrest affidavit because it was not her statement. The trial court sustained the objection. To impeach a witness by use of a prior inconsistent statement pursuant to section 90.608, Florida Statutes (2008), the prior statement must be both (1) inconsistent with the witness’s in-court testimony, and (2) the statement of the witness....

...Instead, the affidavit only includes a summation by the detective of their statements and briefly states that the four witnesses “denied any knowledge or involvement” in the burglary. Thus, the statements contained in Detective Hardy’s arrest affidavit were not “statements of the witness” as contemplated by section 90.608, and therefore could not be used to *384 impeach Richaunda’s trial testimony as argued by Wilcox....

...Nevertheless, the trial court admitted the deposition statement, but denied the defense request for a limiting instruction. Florida still adheres to the common law principle that impeachment of one's own witness is proper only in very limited circumstances. Section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes, provides in part that "[a] party calling a witness shall not be allowed to impeach his character ......

...1984), the court quoted Adams v. State, 34 Fla. 185, 195-196, 15 So. 905, 908 (1894), as the seminal case on this point. In Adams, the court held: It is very erroneous to suppose that, under this statute [§ 1101 Rev.Stat.Fla. (1892), precursor to § 90.608(2), Fla....

...of diligence. See id. Concerning the second prong of the Jones test, which assesses the probable effect of the newly discovered evidence at retrial, the court noted that Hollins' testimony would be admissible on retrial as impeachment evidence under section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...The "trial court's discretion is limited by the rules of evidence." Sybers v. State, 841 So.2d 532, 545 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (quoting Nardone v. State, 798 So.2d 870, 874 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001)). Under the rules of evidence, Appellant could attack Junior's credibility by "showing that a witness is biased." § 90.608(2), Fla....

...Junior was properly subject to cross-examination, not only as to facts relevant to the allegations laid out in the information, but also as to facts relevant to interest, animus, or any other type of bias that might have led him to testify falsely against Mr. Childers. See § 90.608(2), Fla. Stat. (2002) ("Any party... may attack the credibility of a witness by . . . (2) Showing that the witness is biased."). Entirely appropriately, Mr. Junior was also cross-examined at length about prior inconsistent statements he had made. See § 90.608(1), Fla....

..., and such rulings will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Welty v. State, 402 So.2d 1159, 1162-63 (Fla.1981). A court's discretion is limited, however, by the rules of evidence. Nardone *310 v. State, 798 So.2d 870 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). Section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (2001), provides that "[a]ny party ......

...1989) (evidence of drug use for the purpose of impeachment is admissible if it can be shown that the witness is using drugs at or about the time of the testimony itself or it is expressly shown by other relevant evidence that prior drug use affects the witness's ability to observe, remember, and recount); § 90.608(4), Fla....

...ntruthful deposition testimony in another case. Nor did the evidence demonstrate bias, corruption, or lack of competency on the part of Parnell. Appellants contend that such evidence was admissible for the purpose of attacking Parnell's credibility. Section 90.608, Florida Statutes, permits a party to attack a witness by: (1) Introducing statements of the witness which are inconsistent with the witness's present testimony....

...(4) Showing a defect of capacity, ability, or opportunity in the witness to observe, remember, or recount the matters about which the witness testified. (5) Proof by other witnesses that material facts are not as testified to by the witness being impeached. § 90.608, Fla....

...recanting witnesses. At the outset, we note that upon laying a proper foundation, the State might have offered such portions of the tape-recorded statements as might have been appropriate for the purpose of impeaching the recanting witnesses. See §§ 90.608(1), 90.614; Brumbley v....

...ord, 576 So.2d 737. The expansive view of section 90.801(2)(c) contended for by the State would seriously erode the rule that a witness's prior inconsistent statements are admissible for impeachment purposes only and not as substantive evidence. See § 90.608(1); Delgado-Santos, 497 So.2d 1199; Ivery, 548 So.2d 887....

...Impeachment Evidence and Harmless Error Review While I concede that the trial court erred in admitting as substantive evidence the other portions of the tape-recorded statements that were inconsistent with the trial testimony, those portions were nonetheless admissible—subject to a proper limiting instruction—under section 90.608(1) to impeach the in-court testimony of the recanting witnesses....

...unsel by leading the jury to believe that the defendants were not forthright with their own expert. The defendants argued both at trial and here that this cross-examination seeking to destroy the credibility of Dr. Sullivan was improper impeachment. Section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1997), provides the means for impeaching a witness, including (a) using prior inconsistent statements; (b) showing bias; (c) attacking the character of the witness; (d) showing a defect in capacity or ability to obse...

...and (b) the payroll record was not relevant because the evidence failed to connect the "Enrique Juares" record to the defendant, Henry Garcia, and it was not exculpatory. We agree with Garcia, reject the state's argument, and find reversible error. Section 90.608(1)(e) of the Florida Statutes (1981), provides a party the right to impeach by offering "[p]roof by other witnesses that material facts are not as testified to by the witness being impeached." Thus, Garcia had the right to have Paz pro...

...Rather, it appears that the plaintiff's counsel believed— based on the discrepancies in testimony between the gynecologist and the plaintiff, the primary care physician, and the diagnostic center's records custodian—that there was a sufficient basis to attack the gynecologist's credibility. See § 90.608(5), Fla....

...s, after; we put up a chain after the incident. Q: After the incident. A: Yes. IMPROPER IMPEACHMENT Even if admissible as an exception to section 90.407, as stated in Erp v. Carroll, 438 So.2d 31, 39 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983): Notwithstanding that present section 90.608(2) eliminates the necessity of surprise in order to use [other evidence] to impeach an adverse witness, we believe the following statement from Foremost Dairies, Inc....

...If a jury is going to hear it, it matters not when it is *539 heard. The choice of whether the jury hears it, however, should be left to the party who has the right to submit the issue to the fact finder or to waive it. NOTES [*] Impeaching one's own witness is generally proscribed. § 90.608, Fla....

...We hold that the limitation on the cross examination of this important state witness was reversible error. The proposed cross examination of Romero was proper not under section 90.610 cited by the state at trial, but as evidence of bias or interest pursuant to section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...se counsel should have been permitted to examine Tanner before the jury in order to discredit her testimony. The specific question we address concerns defendant's right to impeach the victim's credibility by introducing testimony of other witnesses. Section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1979) provides, in pertinent part: (1) Any party, except the party calling the witness, may attack the credibility of a witness by: .... (b) Showing that the witness is biased. .... (e) Proof by other witnesses that material facts are not as testified to by the witness being impeached. Section 90.608(1)(b) has been construed to permit the presentation of evidence to show bias or motive....

...put her prior statement before the jury. We agree with Street that Rocco's testimony was adverse. Therefore, under the Florida Evidence Code, Street should have been allowed to offer the prior inconsistent deposition statement to impeach Rocco. See § 90.608(2), Fla....

...Trop said that the vast majority of people with cocaine psychosis did not know right from wrong but indicated that he did not know whether Street fell within this group because he did not examine him. [5] Richardson v. State, 246 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1971). [6] In 1990 section 90.608(2) was amended to provide that a party may impeach its own witness, even if not adverse, by introducing prior inconsistent statements....

...an adverse party. In addition, under Florida's Evidence Code, once Edwards took the stand and gave his testimony, which both parties acknowledge was adverse, Botte was entitled to offer the prior inconsistent deposition testimony as impeachment. See § 90.608(2), Fla....

...As to the evidence of prior crimes, we note that section 90.610 of the evidence code specifically forbids the use of such evidence for impeachment of credibility. Also, section 90.404 states a general prohibition against using evidence of past crimes solely to prove bad character or propensity. Although section 90.608(1)(e) does provide for the impeachment of a witness with proof that material facts are not as testified to by the witness, neither Botte nor his economist testified regarding any past conduct or juvenile crimes....

...ithout hearing any comment from the state, the trial judge refused to allow this line of impeachment on the grounds that the state had just dismissed the charge involving this witness and therefore the witness had nothing to "let go away." [2] Under section 90.608(2), any party may attack the credibility of a witness by showing "that the witness is biased." "Our evidence code liberally permits the introduction of evidence to show the bias or motive of a witness." Gibson v....

...It is well settled that counsel is given wide latitude in cross-examining an opposing party's witness to show that witness's interest, inclination, bias or prejudice. See Pittman v. State, 51 Fla. 94, 41 So. 385, 394 (1906); Hair v. State, 428 So.2d 760 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Alvarez v. Mauney, 175 So.2d 57 (Fla. 2d DCA 1965); § 90.608(1)(b), Fla....

...Blackmon," including whether he intimidated or threatened Blackmon. Defense counsel then asked Officer Green whether he made certain specific promises and threats to Blackmon. Officer Green denied doing so. "To impeach a witness by use of a prior inconsistent statement pursuant to section 90.608, Florida Statutes (2008), the *44 prior statement must be both (1) inconsistent with the witness's in-court testimony, and (2) the statement of the witness." Wilcox v....

...Id. at 384 . We approved the trial court's decision not on the basis that the affidavit was an affidavit of another person but rather, in part, on the basis that the statements in the affidavit "were not 'statements of the witness' as contemplated by section 90.608." Id....

...d that those witnesses "denied any knowledge or involvement" in the crime. Id. Moreover, in Williamson v. State , 961 So.2d 229 , 234-35 (Fla. 2007), this Court in a postconviction case theorized that the defendant there could have introduced, under section 90.608, the affidavit of an unavailable (deceased) declarant to impeach one of the State's key witnesses through prior inconsistent statements and to show the witness's bias in favor of the State, assuming the witness first denied the statements....

...ross-examination. See Moore, 485 So.2d at 1282 (Overton, J., concurring specially); Everett v. State, 530 So.2d 413 (Fla.4th DCA 1988). Moreover, to interpret section 90.803(23) otherwise would allow that section to be used to avoid the provision of section 90.608(1) that prohibits a party from impeaching his or her own witness....

...he malpractice litigation. Indeed, it could hardly be argued otherwise, since the statements Dr. Battle had previously made, which were inconsistent with his trial testimony, were used to attempt to impeach him-a practice permitted and encouraged by section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1997)....

...Her testimony also supplies a possible motive for the shooting. She has, however, recanted the part of her statement where she said that the defendant called her and admitted shooting the victim. Under the Evidence Code, a party is allowed to impeach its own witness. § 90.608, Fla....

...ime). Furthermore, even if Pope is now recanting his trial testimony as Hunter's motion implied and would testify at a new trial, he could still be impeached at a new trial with his prior inconsistent statements given at Hunter's original trial. See § 90.608(1), Fla....

...We emphasize that the mere fact that Krauth was impeached by the defense did not open the door to any and all otherwise inadmissible extrinsic evidence. The job of the defense lawyer is to cross-examine the State’s witness to raise questions about his or her credibility. Section 90.608, Florida Statutes (2006), specifies the permissible methods of impeachment, including by introducing the witness’s inconsistent statements or showing that the witness is biased....

...ed homicide case which resulted in the confession and arrest of an elderly man for first degree murder, who was later determined to be innocent. The proposed cross-examination does not fit into any of the broad categories of impeachment contained in section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1999)....

..."memory, ability to observe, and overall credibility." 386 So.2d at 1212. In this case, the excluded cross-examination did not relate to the detective's ability to "observe, remember, or recount" the matters about which the detective testified. See § 90.608(4), Fla....

...Indeed, the Florida Evidence Code codifies existing case law by permitting a party to attack the credibility of a witness by "[s]howing a defect of capacity, ability, or opportunity in the witness to observe, remember, or recount the matters about which he testified." § 90.608(1)(d), Fla....

...Moreover, we are persuaded that section 90.410 was never intended to bar evidence of plea negotiations for the purpose of impeaching a witness who appears at trial to offer testimony against an accused. Rather, the admissibility of such evidence is governed by the provisions of section 90.608(1)(b) of the Florida Evidence Code, allowing a witness's credibility to be impeached upon a showing that he is biased....

...the witness is not qualified as an expert and to argue that even if he or she is qualified, the jury should not give the opinion testimony great weight. ... In addition, each of the methods of attacking the credibility of a lay witness specified in section 90.608 may be used to attack the credibility of an expert....

...The plaintiff argues in substance that the cross-examination amounted to an impermissible attack on the doctor's character. We disagree. The Evidence Code specifically allows "[a]ny party ... [to] attack the credibility of a witness by ... [s]howing that the witness is biased." § 90.608(2), Fla....

...vil matter unrelated to the case. We conclude that it was an abuse of discretion not to allow the defense to question King over any concern regarding a possible forfeiture of his money, where such evidence was relevant to show bias or motive to lie. Section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes, as well as the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, guarantee a defendant "the right to a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine prosecution witnesses in order to show their bias or motive to be untruthful." See Chadwick v....

...t demonstrated any abuse of discretion since the prohibited questions were not probative of any bias against appellant individually. *169 The Florida Evidence Code expressly provides that a witness's credibility may be attacked by a showing of bias, § 90.608(1)(b), Florida Statutes, although both the Code and case law permit judicial discretion in controlling the mode, order, and scope of cross-examination....

...Florida allows litigants to impeach their own witnesses, but that does not necessarily resolve the constitutional problem identified in Chambers. Although a witness may be impeached in Florida by "[a]ny party, including the party calling the witness," pursuant to section 90.608, Florida Statutes, it is still improper under Florida law for a party to call a witness merely as a device to place the impeaching testimony before the jury....

since such testimony was admissible under section 90.608(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1996). To introduce

the testimony of Brown as evidence of guilt. Section 90.608(1), Florida Statutes (1997), provides that:

material and would naturally have been mentioned. § 90.608(1), Fla. Stat. (1995). See State v. Smith, 573

Department. The City asserted that, pursuant to section 90.608, Florida Statutes (2009), evidence of these

Regulation which had called her as a witness. § 90.608, Fla. Stat. (1979). See also Gelabert v. State

with the witness's *1156 present testimony. See § 90.608(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1983). The law of evidence

to show the bias of prosecution witnesses. See § 90.608(2), Fla. Stat. (1993); see also Diaz v. State

to admit Mrs. Thornes' proffered testimony. Section 90.608(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1983), recognizes

been admitted to impeach Mr. Carre pursuant to section 90.608(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1981). Mr. Carre argues

observation of the entire traumatic event. See § 90.608(4), Fla. Stat. (1995). Accordingly, we hold that

defendant himself, and in light of the amendment to section 90.608, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990). [4] It is

added). Cf. § 90.404(1)(a) & (c), Fla. Stat.; § 90.608(5), Fla. Stat. Billie also claims on appeal that

(1) to establish bias or motive pursuant to section 90.608(2) Florida Statutes; or (2) when character

Sanchez-Velasco affidavit could be introduced under section 90.608, Florida Statutes (2006), to impeach Baez through

relationship with Robinson or the appellant. Section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes, as well as the Sixth

to attack the credibility of a witness. See section 90.608(1), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990). Reversed

Watts v. State, 450 So.2d 265 (Fla.2d DCA 1984); § 90.608, Fla. Stat. (1985). In summary, we find that the

an attack on the credibility of a witness. See § 90.608, Fla. Stat. (2005). The validity of an affidavit

Cruz v. State, 437 So.2d 692 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); § 90.608(1)(d), Fla. Stat. (1985). This latitude has been

them to limit their testimony accordingly. See § 90.608(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1999); see generally Charles

removed from the Bush home. We find no error. Section 90.608(5), Florida Statutes (1999), states that any

impermissible." Id. at 1108. In doing so, we noted that section 90.608, Florida Statutes, permits the credibility

partiality, improper relationships or motives. § 90.608, Fla. Stat. (2005); § 90.702, Fla. Stat. (2005)

prior testimony at his pretrial deposition. See § 90.608(1), Fla. Stat. (2002).[1] We conclude that the

rescue its position. Slocum did indeed read section 90.608 to exclude cross examination of a police officer

state could impeach him if he testified adversely. § 90.608, Florida Statutes. Defense counsel objected to

attacked by showing that the witness is biased. § 90.608(2), Fla. Stat. (2008). A criminal defendant has

was error to allow it to be impeached, see Section 90.608(1)(e), Florida Statutes, and 2) even if it

to have been made justifying application of section 90.608(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), of the evidence

the letter was proper impeachment evidence. Section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1997), identifies who may

admissibility of the prior false accusation under section 90.608, Florida Statutes (showing the witness is biased)

usually, one may not impeach his own witness. § 90.608(2), Fla. Stat. (1981). We are satisfied, however

that are inconsistent with his present testimony. § 90.608(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1983). The prior inconsistent

does not appear that the witness was misled. [8] § 90.608(1), Fla. Stat.

that he was biased in favor of Ms. Jimenez. See § 90.608(2), Fla. Stat. (2011); Steinger, Iscoe & Greene

testimony concerns facts not otherwise germane. See § 90.608, Fla. Stat. (2002) ("Any party, including the

form of the testimony of other witnesses. See § 90.608(5), Fla. Stat. (1991). Notwithstanding the collateral

be used for impeachment purposes at trial. Section 90.608(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), provides that

initial report of the incident to the police. Section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (2004), provides that

the prosecutor's interrogation of McBride to section 90.608, Florida Statutes, asserting that the questions

elicit testimony showing the bias of a witness. See § 90.608(2), Fla. Stat. (1991); Breedlove v. State, 580

trial was attempting to impeach Ragsdale under section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1990), by offering the witnesses

by ... [s]howing that the witness is biased.” § 90.608(2),. Fla. Stat. (2008). A party has the right

the tape did not refresh her recollection. Section 90.608(1), Florida Statutes, states that "[a]ny party

to call Vicky Cash to testify in the trial. Section 90.608(1), Florida Statutes, provides Any party, including

sustained the "negative impeachment" objection. Section 90.608(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1997) recognizes the

reversal and a new trial. Florida Statutes section 90.608(1) provides that a party may attack the credibility

that party unless the witness proves adverse. § 90.608(2), Fla. Stat. (1981); Johnson v. State, 178 So

raised by the appellant to be without merit. See § 90.608(1), Fla.Stat. (1995); Gibson v. State, 661 So

constitute adverse testimony as contemplated by section 90.608(2). As explained in Austin v. State, 461 So

method to attack the credibility of a witness. § 90.608(1), Fla. Stat. (2008). The theory of admissibility

showing the bias of prosecution witnesses. See § 90.608(2), Fla. Stat. (2000) *774 ("Any party...may attack

inconsistent Michigan statement as set forth in Section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (1981). Appellant contends

impeachment purposes under the Florida Evidence Code, section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1981). However, section

an adverse witness. This was clearly error. See § 90.608(2), Fla. Stat. (1983). See also Pitts v. State

may be by leading questions." In addition, section 90.608(1), Florida Statutes, states that "[a]ny party

impeachment recognized by the evidence code. See § 90.608, Fla. Stat. (2001). A witness cannot be impeached

of this statement to impeach was improper. Section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1999), sets out who may

State, 798 So.2d 870, 874 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001). Section 90.608, Florida Statutes, permits "[a]ny party, including

party calling the witness,” pursuant to section 90.608, Florida Statutes, it is still improper under

impeach Jolly by prior inconsistent statements. § 90.608(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1985). However, as presented

Grant's supposedly incriminating conduct. See § 90.608(4), Fla. Stat. (1997). Grant was well aware of

a means not listed in section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1983)). Section 90.608 provides a complete list

this witness declared adverse on the basis of section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (1989) and, therefore

recount the matters about which he testified." § 90.608(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1981). We concluded that

v. State, 596 So.2d 1034, 1035 (Fla.1992)). Section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes, permits cross-examination

impeachment with a prior inconsistent statement. See § 90.608(1), Fla. Stat. (2001). In her letter to the judge

was to impeach her with her prior statements. Section 90.608(1), Florida Statutes, states that "[a]ny party

by ... (2) Showing that the witness is biased.” § 90.608(2), Fla. Stat. (2008). We are unable to see any

recount the events of the evening in question. See § 90.608(4), Fla. Stat. (2016); Edwards v. State, 548

former girlfriend’s testimony. ’See § 90.608(1), Fla. Stat. (2015) (providing that' any party

which the state asserted was admissible under section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes. That statute provides:

688 So.2d 383, 384 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); see also § 90.608(1), Fla. Stat. (2010). In Pearce v. State, 880

C.J., and ORFINGER, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 90.608(1)(a), Florida Statutes, provides that "any

which are inconsistent with his present testimony. § 90.608(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1987). The Florida Evidence

attempting to impeach McKenzie. We find, pursuant to section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1989), and the authorities

affirmatively harmful testimony.” Id.; see also § 90.608, Fla. Stat. (2008) (“Any party, including the

[1] § 794.011(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (1983). [2] § 90.608(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1983); 90.614(2), Fla. Stat

(Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (emphasis original) (quoting § 90.608(5), Fla. Stat. (2009)). The test for determining

about which he wrote some years ago. Under section 90.608(2), any party may attack credibility by showing

impeach the victim's credibility pursuant to section 90.608(5), Florida Statutes (2001). Specifically,

provides that the admissibility of evidence under Section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1979) is not affected by

Collins as an "uncaring, unloving person." Section 90.608(1), Florida Statutes (1993), permits any party

the bias of the witness in accordance with section 90.608(1)(b), Florida Statutes, whether the witness

Constitution, Fla. Const. art I, § 16, Fla. Stat. § 90.608, and Florida case law.[7] The denial occurred

This court reversed for a new trial, citing section 90.608, Fla.Evid. Code (1991) (the credibility of

sarcastically dubbed him the "star witness"). Section 90.608 allowed counsel for the Harrises to impeach

however, is limited by the rules of evidence. Id. Section 90.608(2), Florida Statutes (2009), allows a party

reflecting upon his credibility in a particular case, § 90.608(2), Fla. Stat. (1991), the immigration issue does

credibility by prior inconsistent statements under section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1985). Nor is the testimony

inconsistent with the witness' trial testimony. § 90.608, Fla. Stat. (2006). Here, the defense sought to

this statement was admissible as impeachment. Section 90.608(1), Florida Statutes, permits the impeachment

to section 404(2)(a), the dissent relies on section 90.608(5), which reads as follows: Any party, including

allowed to attack a witness’s credibility” under section 90.608, Florida Statutes (1987). Id. Moreover, “[i]f

have cast doubt on Brianna's credibility. See § 90.608(5), Fla. Stat. (2006) (providing that the credibility

attacked by showing that the witness is biased. § 90.608(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (1981). As this court stated

Oil Co., 589 So.2d 373 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). Section 90.608(5), Florida Statutes (1995), allows impeachment

statute [§ 1101 Rev.Stat.Fla. (1892), precursor to § 90.608(2), Fla. Stat. (1979)], a party producing a witness

the proper subject for impeachment ■ under section 90.608, Florida Statutes (2007). That' provision allows

to by the witness being impeached.” Fla. Stat. § 90.608. . In Van Arsdall, the Supreme Court likewise