Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

transitional rules, we apply the provisions of former INA § 106, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (1996), except for subsection (b)

...ncy of the asserted ground for disqualification in this case are Florida's statutory limitation on campaign contributions and the statutorily required disclosure of the names of contributors and the amounts of their contributions. §§ 106.07(4)(a); 106.08(1)(e)-(g), Fla. Stat. (1987). Section 106.08(1) provides in pertinent part: (1) No person, political committee, or committee of continuous existence shall make contributions to any candidate or political committee in this state, for any election, in excess of the following amounts: ........

held that the judicial review provisions of section 106, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a, include only those determinations

...oneering communication organizations, and political parties. Id. §§ 106.011–106.36. A candidate may not accept a contribution in excess of $500 from any person, political committee, or committee of continuous existence during an election. Id. § 106.08(1)(a)....

...business trust, syndicate, or other combination of individuals having collective capacity.” Id. § 106.011(8). For the purpose of contribution limits, the statute considers primary and general elections separate elections for all opposed candidates. Id. § 106.08(1)(c). By law, a candidate for statewide office may not accept contributions that exceed $250,000 in the aggregate from national, state, or county executive committees of a political party. Id. § 106.08(2)(b). Florida law does not limit the amount that a candidate may contribute personally to his campaign. Id. § 106.08(1)(b)(1)....

...as eligible to participate in the system, the candidate is entitled to receive matching funds for certain qualifying contributions. Id. § 106.35. Participating candidates remain subject to the $500 cap on campaign contributions from persons or committees, id. § 106.08(1)(a), but become eligible as participants in the public financing system to receive matching state funds, up to $250, for each contribution 12 made by a Florida resident after September 1 of the calendar year before the election, id....

...than their 30 nonparticipating peers. As we have explained, in Florida, every candidate for public office, whether participating or not, is subject to a $500 limit on campaign contributions. Fla. Stat. § 106.08(1)(a)....

copyright encompasses the exclusive rights set out in § 106. [8] Section 117(a) provides: "[I]t is not an infringement

...by a candidate or political committee pursuant to s. 106.021 shall file regular reports of all contributions received, all all (sic) expenditures made, by or on behalf of such candidate or political committee. 145 * * * 146 * * * 147 Florida Statute 106.08 Contributions; limitations on.-- 148 (1) No person or political committee shall make contributions to any candidate or political committee in this state, for any election, in excess of the following amounts: 149 (a) To a candidate for countywi...

...rida (November 28, 2001) Before BIRCH, COX and ALARCON*, Circuit Judges. BIRCH, Circuit Judge: Florida Right to Life Committee, Inc., (“FRL”)1 appeals from the district court’s final judgment upholding § 106.08(5), Florida Statutes, a campaign finance provision that precludes political candidates from making financial contributions to certain organizations....

...abortion, euthanasia, and infanticide. To raise funds for its endeavors, FRL desired to obtain contributions from candidates for public office in Florida. Candidates, however, refrained from contributing because of concern over the application of § 106.08(5), Florida Statutes, which provides in part that “[c]andidates ....

...make contributions to any religious, charitable, civic, or other causes or * Honorable Arthur L. Alarcon, U.S. Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation. 1 Plaintiff Florida Right to Life Political Action Committee did not challenge the portion of § 106.08(5), Florida Statutes, at issue here and consequently is not a party to this appeal. 2 organizations established primarily for the public good.”2 This and other problems experienced under state campaign finance laws, Chapter 106, Florida Statutes, led FRL to bring this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. FRL facially challenged § 106.08(5) and several additional Florida campaign finance provisions as violative of its First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of expression and association....

...After commencing this suit, FRL moved for partial summary judgment. The district court granted FRL’s motion as to some of Florida’s campaign finance provisions.3 The district court, however, denied FRL’s motion as to the ban on contributions from candidates under § 106.08(5) because the court ruled that the provision was susceptible to a narrowing construction. Following a bench trial on other issues not raised here, the district court upheld § 106.08(5) as constitutional 2 Florida does not dispute that FRL is an organization established primarily for the public good under § 106.08(5). 3 One of the provisions upon which the district court granted summary judgment in FRL’s favor was § 106.011(1), which provides the definition of “political committee” under Florida campaign finance law....

...3 “[p]ursuant to the reasoning set forth in [its summary judgment] Order.” R6-161- 24. Upon entry of final judgment, FRL timely commenced this appeal to challenge the district court’s ruling with regard to § 106.08(5). II. DISCUSSION A. Justiciability Prior to determining the constitutionality of § 106.08(5), Florida Statutes, we must address threshold justiciability issues....

...nt, and (3) that the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling.” Harris v. Evans, 20 F.3d 1118, 1121 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc). On appeal, Florida argues that FRL has not proven an actual or threatened injury with regard to § 106.08(5). Florida contends that § 106.08(5) forbids candidates from making contributions to organizations like FRL, but it does not forbid the organizations themselves from soliciting or receiving such contributions. Florida concludes that because § 106.08(5) places prohibitions on the conduct of candidates, not the organizations, the provision only affects the rights of candidates. Therefore, in Florida’s view, FRL cannot challenge § 106.08(5) unless it meets the strict requirements for third-party standing, a doctrine that in rare circumstances allows a party to premise its claim for relief on the constitutional rights of another party. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 629, 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (1991). We disagree. Third-party standing is unnecessary here because FRL premises its § 1983 suit on the violation of its own constitutional rights caused by § 106.08(5)....

...Amendments, not on the separate and distinct constitutional rights of political candidates.4 Thus, Florida’s argument based on third-party standing is misplaced. Furthermore, FRL has demonstrated that it is suffering actual injury caused by § 106.08(5). The record contains a letter sent to FRL by Katherine Harris, a candidate for Secretary of State of Florida at the time,5 in which she explains that she desires to contribute to FRL but has refrained because of § 106.08(5). This letter shows that FRL is losing donations because of the provision and thus is suffering an economic injury. This injury, in turn, will be redressed if § 106.08(5) is held facially unconstitutional because candidates will no longer fear prosecution and will proceed with their donations....

...2000) (noting that “[t]he requirements for standing are somewhat more lenient for facial challenges to statutes on the grounds of overbreadth” in the First Amendment context). Therefore, FRL could have brought a First Amendment facial challenge to § 106.08(5) under the overbreadth doctrine even if its own constitutional rights had not been violated, as long as FRL had established that it suffered some type of injury caused by the challenged statute....

...1997). Despite the low threshold for proving ripeness in the First Amendment context, Florida argues that FRL’s claim is not ripe for two reasons. First, Florida asserts that FRL’s contention that candidates would make contributions to the organization absent § 106.08(5) is too speculative. Second, Florida asserts that because FRL’s conduct is not directly regulated by § 106.08(5), FRL does not face enforcement action if it chooses to solicit or receive candidate contributions....

...It follows, according to Florida’s reasoning, that FRL will not suffer any hardship if we withhold judicial consideration from its claim. We disagree with Florida’s crabbed ripeness analysis. FRL’s assertion that candidates would make contributions absent § 106.08(5) is not speculative because the record substantiates it. As we have explained, the record contains a letter sent to FRL from candidate Katherine Harris in which she states that she desires to 7 contribute to FRL but has chosen against it because of § 106.08(5). There is no speculation here because the letter establishes that Florida electoral candidates would contribute to FRL absent the § 106.08(5) prohibition.6 Indeed, the letter shows that FRL is suffering actual hardship in the form of economic loss resulting from foregone candidate contributions. 6 We also note that even though there is no current election and thus no “candidates” at this time, FRL’s claim is not moot....

...e expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again.” Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S. Ct. 347, 349 (1975) (per curiam). Election periods are too short to fully litigate the constitutionality of § 106.08(5) before a given election ends....

...We thus conclude that the present case falls within the contours of the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” exception to mootness. 8  Moreover, it is far from obvious whether FRL can solicit and receive candidate contributions prohibited under § 106.08(5) without itself facing the hardship of criminal and civil penalties. The language found in § 106.19(1)(a) & (2), which details the penalties for campaign law violations, is unclear on this point.7 In any event, Florida’s focus on whether § 106.08(5) directly regulates FRL is beside the point. FRL suffers an immediate injury because, as the Harris letter demonstrates, § 106.08(5) has led candidates to refrain from contributing to FRL out of fear of prosecution. This fear has credence because the Florida Election Commission has taken action against several candidates for making donations. See Burke, FEC No. 94-066; Waters, FEC No. 96-122. Thus, irrespective of whether § 106.08(5) directly regulates FRL, the record indicates that FRL suffers economic hardship because of the provision. FRL has established that its claim is ripe, and its substantive challenge can proceed. B. Contributions by Candidates under § 106.08(5), Florida Statutes 7 Section 106.19(1)(a) provides that any “person who knowingly and willfully . . . [a]ccepts a contribution in excess of the limits prescribed by s. 106.08 ....

...Whether an organization like FRL is subject to these provisions is dependant on the interpretation that Florida courts give to the “excess of the limits” language contained in § 106.19(1)(a). If that language is meant to limit civil and criminal penalties to those subsections of § 106.08(5) that deal with contribution price caps, then FRL does not face liability. A contrary result is reached if the courts interpret the ban on contributions enunciated in § 106.08(5) as a “limit” on contributions for purposes of § 106.19(1)(a). 9  FRL challenges § 106.08(5), Florida Statutes, as facially unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. FRL argues that § 106.08(5) should be interpreted as precluding political candidates from making any donations to public-minded organizations out of personal or campaign funds, save for in the three particular circumstances enunciated in the provision. Consequently, FRL contends that the district court erred in holding that § 106.08(5) can be narrowly construed to avoid constitutional difficulties by applying the provision only to candidate contributions made in exchange for political support. Extrapolating from the district court’s construction, Florida argues that § 106.08(5) should be narrowly construed as prohibiting candidates from using funds from their campaign account for personal purposes, as in making personal donations to a charity or other organization. We agree with FRL’s interpretation of § 106.08(5) because it best accords with the plain language of that provision. 1. The Plain Language of § 106.08(5) We review de novo a district court’s interpretation of a statute....

...Moreover, “it is axiomatic” that in interpreting a statute, “a court must begin with the plain language of the statute.” United States v. Prather, 205 F.3d 1265, 1269 (11th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, we turn first to the precise wording of § 106.08(5), which states in 10 relevant part that “[c]andidates . . . may not . . . make contributions to any religious, charitable, civic or other causes or organizations established primarily for the public good.” In turn, § 106.08(5) delineates three distinct exceptions to this blanket rule. First, “it is not a violation ....

...candidate has been a regular donor for more than 6 months.” Third, “[a] candidate may purchase with campaign funds, tickets, admission to events, or advertisements from religious, civic, political party, or charitable groups.” Our reading of the plain language of § 106.08(5) leads us to conclude that the provision creates a general rule forbidding political candidates from making any donations out of personal or campaign funds to the organizations referenced therein. This blanket restriction on donations is then diluted somewhat by the three distinct exceptions. A wide range of donative options, however, remain forbidden to candidates. Section 106.08(5) precludes a candidate from placing money in a church offering plate when she visits for the first time. It precludes a candidate from contributing to a charity she has just discovered. Indeed, it precludes a candidate from almost all spontaneous acts of charitable giving. Thus, § 106.08(5) 11 sweeps broadly to curtail the donative impulses of candidates and, conversely, to curtail the ability of many organizations to solicit and receive candidate donations. As such, the provision is on a collision course with the First Amendment. 2. The District Court’s Narrowing Construction of § 106.08(5) To avoid this collision with First Amendment values, the district court narrowly construed § 106.08(5) and thus rejected FRL’s facial challenge to the provision....

...facial challenge,” and, as a federal court, “we must be particularly reluctant to rewrite the terms of a state statute.” Id. Mindful of these interpretive principles, we turn to the narrowing construction imposed by the district court upon § 106.08(5). In ruling that § 106.08(5) passed constitutional muster, the district court incorporated the reasoning contained in its prior order regarding FRL’s motion for partial summary judgment....

...limited by the courts of that state to a range of conduct that may be constitutionally restricted.” Dimmit v. City of Clearwater, 985 F.2d 1565, 1572 (11th Cir. 1993). This principle has no bearing on the present case, however, because no Florida court has narrowed the scope of §106.08(5). 12 “contribution” in § 106.08(5) is subject to the definition of that term contained in § 106.011(3)(a). Section 106.011(3)(a) defines “contributions” as gifts and other distributions “made for the purpose of influencing the results of an election.”9 Having determined that § 106.08(5) can be read in pari materia with § 106.011(3)(a), the district court had held in its prior order that the provision “is readily susceptible to a narrowing construction that limits its reach to a contribution made in exchange for political support.” R5-138-19. Based on its prior interpretation of § 106.08(5), the court ruled that the provision was constitutional. In contrast, we conclude that the plain language of § 106.08(5) will not bear the district court’s narrowing construction.10 Because the district court relied on the definition of “contribution” contained in § 106.011(3)(a) to conclude that § 106.08(5) was susceptible to a narrowing construction, we must address the applicability of the former to the latter provision. Section 106.011(3)(a) limits the meaning of “contribution” to gifts made in order to influence election results,...

...or anything of value, including contributions in kind having an attributable monetary value in any form, made for the purpose of influencing the results of an election.” 10 Because we determine that contributions in the context of § 106.08(5) cannot be circumscribed to include only donations made for the purpose of influencing an election outcome, we do not reach the question of whether such a construction would itself render the provision unconstitutional under the First Ame...

...therein apply to Chapter 106 “unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.”11 We decide that context clearly does indicate that the definition of “contribution” provided in § 106.011(3)(a) cannot be applied to the use of that term in § 106.08(5) without effectively rewriting the latter provision. We turn first to the interpretive canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius under which “the expression of one thing implies the exclusion of another.” Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta v. Thomas, 220 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 2000). Under this canon, the three exceptions expressed in § 106.08(5) for certain “gifts of money” and “donations” made by candidates imply the exclusion of other possible types of donations from that list of exceptions. Yet, if the definition of “contribution” contained in § 106.011(3)(a) applies to § 106.08(5), the latter provision necessarily would contain a blanket exception for all donations that are made for altruistic purposes rather than for the purpose of influencing election results. Such a blanket exception would fly in the face of the three explicit exceptions articulated in § 106.08(5), which under the expressio unius canon imply the exclusion of all other possible exceptions. It is also telling that the Florida legislature chose the terms “gifts of money” 11 Florida courts have refused t...

...context militates against it. See Ferre v. State, 478 So.2d 1077, 1081-82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985), aff’d 494 So.2d 214 (Fla. 1986). 14 and “donations” in articulating the three exceptions to § 106.08(5). If the general rule under § 106.08(5) is that candidates cannot make contributions to certain organizations for the purpose of influencing election results, there would be no need to refer generally to “gifts of money” and “donations” in the exceptions to that rule. That is, if the definition of “contribution” in § 106.08(5) itself does not encompass ordinary gifts of money and donations, it would have been unnecessary to articulate exceptions for types of contributions that already are exempted in the first instance as a matter of definition. Otherwise the three exceptions listed in §106.08(5) thus would be entirely superfluous, and we look askance at interpretations that render statutory language devoid of purpose and effect. In re Griffith, 206 F.3d 1389, 1393 (11th Cir. 2000). Conversely, if we read the § 106.011(3)(a) definition of “contribution” in pari materia with § 106.08(5) but interpret the three exceptions of § 106.08(5) so as not to render them superfluous, we end up with a worse result still. If “contribution” in § 106.08(5) only refers to candidate donations that are meant to influence election results, then, to avoid the superfluousness concern, we would have to construe the three exceptions as carving out a set of transfers in which a candidate can make donations aimed at influencing election results....

...If Florida has an interest in precluding candidates from making donations to influence election results, it would be illogical for the state to exempt donations made for such a purpose just because, for example, the candidate made the donation to an organization in which he is a member. We refuse to interpret § 106.08(5) in this manner when we can avoid this absurd result by concluding that the definition of “contribution” contained in § 106.011(3)(a) does not apply....

...See United States v. 6640 S.W. 48th St., 41 F.3d 1448, 1452 (11th Cir. 1995) (noting that a statute should be construed in a manner that avoids an absurd result). For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the meaning of “contribution” in § 106.08(5) cannot be narrowly construed as limited to the definition of that term found in § 106.011(3)(a).12 To do so would “rewrite the clear terms” of § 106.08(5). See Dimmit, 985 F.2d at 1572. We instead interpret “contribute” more generally as meaning to give or to donate. See The Random House Dictionary 442 12 Our conclusion is buttressed by the fact that in § 106.08(5) enforcement actions brought before the Florida Election Commission, the Commission itself has not limited the scope of “contribution” to include only donations made with the purpose of influencing election results. See Burke, FEC No....

...1987) (defining “contribute” as “to give . . . to a common supply, fund, etc., as for charitable purposes”). Because the district court premised its interpretation on the definition of “contribution” found in § 106.011(3)(a), we conclude that the court erred in finding that § 106.08(5) was susceptible to a narrowing construction. 3. Florida’s Construction of § 106.08(5) Building off of the district court’s narrowing construction, Florida argues that § 106.08(5) should be read in view of the entire state campaign finance regime, including §§ 106.011(3)(a), 106.021(1)(b),13 and 106.11(1).14 Based on these provisions, Florida contends that § 106.08(5) should be narrowly construed as only prohibiting a candidate from using funds from his campaign account for personal donation to an organization. We disagree with Florida because we would have to rewrite § 106.08(5) before it could be read in this manner.15 We begin by noting that Florida’s interpretation cannot be reconciled with the plain language of § 106.08(5)....

...Section 106.11(1) provides that a candidate’s “campaign account shall be separate from any personal or other account and shall be used only for the purpose of depositing contributions and making expenditures for the candidate.” 15 Because we determine that § 106.08(5) goes beyond prohibiting a candidate from using funds from his campaign account for personal donations, we do not address whether Florida’s construction of the provision would itself violate the First Amendment, as FRL has argued....

...Other donations from personal or business funds, such as donations to a charity in which the candidate is a nonmember or new donor, are not included among these exceptions. Certain types of donations from personal or business funds thus remain within the scope of § 106.08(5)....

...campaign expenditures. Read together, Florida contends, these provisions show that when “contribution” is used in Chapter 106, it means funds from a candidate’s campaign account used in furtherance of the campaign. Consequently, Florida argues, when § 106.08(5) forbids candidates from making contributions to an organization, it should be read as precluding a candidate only from using campaign account funds to make personal donations. 18  We reject this line of argument. As we have explained, the definition of “contribution” in § 106.011(3)(a) does not apply to § 106.08(5). Florida’s argument is premised in part on the applicability of § 106.011(3)(a), so its argument becomes unhinged when that provision is deemed inapplicable with regard to § 106.08(5). Moreover, even if the definition of “contribution” under § 106.011(3)(a) were applicable to § 106.08(5), Florida’s argument–arrived at through a synthesis of several statutory provisions–still would be unpersuasive. If “contribution” in § 106.08(5) referred to candidate donations made in order to influence election results, as it must if § 106.011(3)(a) were held to apply, it would be irrelevant whether such donations came from personal or campaign account funds. The relevant consideration would be the purpose or motive behind the donation, not the particular account from which the funds were drawn. It follows that even if § 106.011(3)(a) did apply, § 106.08(5) still would proscribe candidate donations beyond Florida’s proffered definition, which focuses too narrowly on the type of account used by the candidate in making her donation. For these reasons, we reject Florida’s attempt to construe narrowly § 106.08(5) as only precluding candidates from using campaign funds for the purpose of making personal donations....

...To do otherwise would require us to ignore our commitment, as a federal court, to be vigilant against rewriting the terms of state 19 statutes. See Dimmit, 985 F.2d at 1572. Florida’s construction of § 106.08(5) thus fairs no better than the narrowing construction offered by the district court. D. The Constitutionality of § 106.08(5) We have concluded that the plain language of § 106.08(5) creates a blanket rule forbidding political candidates from making any donations out of personal or campaign funds to an organization, unless one of the three exceptions applies. Florida concedes that if this is the proper interpretation of § 106.08(5), the provision is facially unconstitutional. Thus, we hold that § 106.08(5) is facially unconstitutional in that it infringes upon basic First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of expression and association held by organization like FRL.16 III. CONCLUSION In this appeal, we have concluded that § 106.08(5), Florida Statutes, cannot be narrowly construed in a manner that avoids constitutional infirmities. As a result, we have decided that the provision is facially unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s ruling that § 106.08(5) is susceptible to a narrowing construction that survives 16 Because § 106.08(5) is facially unconstitutional, the entire subsection must be struck down in its entirety. To remove one portion of § 106.08(5) while leaving the remainder of the subsection intact would constitute “interference with the state legislative process.” Dimmitt, 985 F.2d at 1572....

...of $1,000 each. Some time later, the State filed a civil complaint against Ferre, in which, as amended, it was alleged that he had accepted and failed to return the $35,000 of post-election contributions in violation of Sections 106.141(10) [1] and 106.08(2) [2] , Florida Statutes (1981), respectively....

...im by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution; (2) the money received by him does not fall within the definition of contributions under the statutes involved; and (3) the mandatory penalty of "twice the amount contributed" set forth in Section 106.08(5) violates the constitutional prohibition against excessive punishment. There being no genuine issue of material fact requiring resolution, the trial court entered summary judgment for the State, limiting, however, the penalty for violation of Section 106.08(5) to $35,000....

...Ferre's claims here are identical to his claims in the court below, and we reject them in their entirety. Thus, we differ from the trial court in one respect only: the trial court having found that Ferre received and failed to return $35,000 in post-election contributions, it was required by Section 106.08(5), Florida Statutes (1981), to order Ferre to pay as a penalty a sum equal to twice the amount of the contributions, that is, $70,000, since such a penalty, in our view, is not unconstitutionally excessive....

...shall have the meanings set forth, "unless the context clearly indicates otherwise." The context in which the challenged statutes use the term "contribution" clearly indicates that the term includes post-election contributions. Sections 106.141 and 106.08 deal specifically with contributions received after an election. If the definition of "contribution" found in Section 106.011(3)(a) were used, Sections 106.141 and 106.08 would be nullities, since a contribution, according to *1082 the definition contained in Section 106.011(3)(a) could not be made after an election....

...3d DCA 1982) ("[A]n axiom of statutory construction [is] that an interpretation of a statute which leads to an unreasonable or ridiculous conclusion or a result obviously not designed by the Legislature will not be adopted."). Therefore, because the context in which the term contribution is used in Sections 106.141 and 106.08 requires a different meaning than that set forth in Section 106.011(3)(a), a contribution need not be made for the purpose of influencing an election in order for a violation of Sections 106.141 or 106.08 to be found. Lastly, we consider the State's contention on its cross-appeal that the trial court, having found that Ferre received and failed to return $35,000 of contributions, erred in not imposing a $70,000 penalty under Section 106.08(5)....

...minated as a candidate or elected to office, or after the second anniversary of the date the campaign account of such candidate was established, is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083." [2] Section 106.08(2) provides: "Any contribution received by a candidate with opposition in an election or the campaign treasurer or a deputy treasurer of such candidate, or by the treasurer or a deputy treasurer of a political committee supporting or o...

...he person or political committee contributing it and shall not be used or expended by or on behalf of the candidate." [3] Section 775.083(1)(d) provides that the fine for a conviction of a misdemeanor of the first degree shall not exceed $1,000. [4] Section 106.08(5) provides: "Any person who knowingly and willfully violates the provisions of this section shall, in addition to any other penalty prescribed by this chapter, pay to the state a sum equal to twice the amount contributed in violation of this chapter....

...Gen., and Ken Rouse, General Counsel, Dept. of State, Tallahassee, for appellants. Terrell C. Madigan of Papy, Weisenborn & Papy, Tallahassee, for appellee. KOGAN, Justice. We have on appeal an order of the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit declaring unconstitutional section 106.08(8), Florida Statutes (1989) (the "Campaign Financing Act"), which has been certified as a matter of great public importance requiring immediate resolution by this Court....

...te who is running for legislative office or a statewide office, except a candidate for a vacant office being filled by special election, may not accept or solicit any campaign contribution during a regular or special session of the Legislature. *264 § 106.08(8), Fla....

...concurs in result only with an opinion. SHAW, J., recused. OVERTON, Justice, concurring. While I find that the legislature has the authority to broadly restrict contributions to prevent corruption or an appearance of corruption, I fully agree with the majority and conclude that section 106.08(8), Florida Statutes (1989), does not provide the least intrusive means to accomplish this purpose....

...d it be utilized in such a manner. Accordingly, although I cannot completely concur with the majority's analysis, I do concur that the statute is facially unconstitutional. McDONALD, J., concurs. McDONALD, Justice, concurring in result. I agree that section 106.08(8), Florida Statutes (1989) (the Campaign Financing Act), is unconstitutional....

...Above the benchmark level, the trial judge would be subject to disqualification; below the benchmark, the judge would not. See Note, 40 Stan.L.Rev. at 482. Respondent suggests, as did the commentator, that the benchmark be $1,000. Since Florida law establishes a maximum limit of $1,000 per election for trial judges, § 106.08(1)(e), Fla....

...Like any election campaign, a judicial campaign requires funds. The Florida legislature has acted to balance the first amendment right to freedom of political association with the need for fair, open, and aboveboard elections. Thus, we have the campaign finance limitation law, section 106.08, Florida Statutes (1987), and the contribution disclosure law, section 106.11, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...legally sufficient ground for disqualification is found in the interplay of our statutes, rules of procedure, and canons of judicial conduct. Section 38.10, Florida Statutes (1987) creates the substantive basis for disqualification of a trial judge. Section 106.08(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1987) authorizes a person to contribute a sum not to exceed $1,000 toward the campaign of a judicial candidate....

...ntributions by judicial candidates can be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest. However, in State v. Dodd , the Supreme Court of Florida addressed a related type of prohibition. The Campaign Financing Act, Florida Statutes § 106.08(8) (1989), prohibited candidates for legislative or statewide office from accepting or soliciting any campaign contribution during a regular or special session of the legislature....

...Gen., and Stephen Marc Slepin of Slepin & Schwartz, Tallahassee, for appellees. KARL, Justice. This cause is before us on direct appeal to review the final judgment of the Circuit Court in and for Leon County upholding the constitutionality of certain portions of the election law, Sections 106.011(2) and 106.08(1), Florida Statutes (1975), as they apply to the Dade County Judicial Trust Fund, thereby vesting jurisdiction in this Court pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution....

...Vernmar, Ltd., 151 So.2d 439 (Fla. 1963). The primary question presented for review in this cause is whether the Dade County Judicial Trust Fund is a "political committee" within the definition of Section 106.011(2), Florida Statutes (1975), and as utilized in Section 106.08, Florida Statutes (1975), and if so, whether Section 106.011(2) is unconstitutionally overbroad....

...In October, 1974, in response to his inquiry, the Secretary of State wrote Judge Sepe advising him that the Dade County Bar Association could not lawfully make a contribution of $1,800 to him as a candidate for circuit judge since the maximum contribution allowed by Section 106.08(1)(a) or (b), Florida Statutes (1975), is $1,000....

...Appellant voluntarily appeared before the Commission to respond to questions and to produce all documents requested. At the conclusion of the proceedings, the Commission issued a notice of determination on February 14, 1977, finding that probable cause exists to believe that the Dade Judicial Trust Fund has violated Section 106.08, Florida Statutes (1975), by having contributed as a political committee to candidates in excess of the amounts prescribed by Section 106.08, Florida Statutes (1975), notwithstanding warning of the Attorney General....

...it on the basis that this issue was moot. The trial court concluded that the Dade County Trust Fund is a political committee defined by Section 106.011, Florida Statutes (1975), and is subject to the limitations on campaign contributions imposed by Section 106.08, Florida Statutes (1975)....

...Organizations which are determined by the Department of State to be committees of continuous existence pursuant to s. 106.04 *1204 and political parties regulated by chapter 103 shall not be considered political committees for the purposes of this chapter... ." Section 106.08(1)(a) provides: "(1) No person or political committee shall make contributions to any candidate or political committee in this state, in moneys, material, or supplies or by way of loan, in excess of the following amounts: "(a) To a can...

...r how unwise or unpolitic they might be, so long as there is no plain violation of the Constitution. [Cases cited.]" See also In re Apportionment Law, SJR 1305, 263 So.2d 797 (Fla. 1972). We find that Section 106.011(2), Florida Statutes (1975), and Section 106.08, Florida Statutes (1975), are not unconstitutionally overbroad as applied to the Dade County Trust Fund because the Legislature did not exempt organizations who set up their own procedures for policing themselves. The Legislature, in promulgating Section 106.011(2) and Section 106.08, regulating campaign contributions, determined that individuals in a collective capacity should only be permitted to have a limited amount of political clout....

...able under the facts of this cause. We, therefore, cannot resolve the question of the constitutionality of the composition of the Elections Commission in the present cause. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we find that Sections 106.011(2) and 106.08, Florida Statutes (1975), are not unconstitutional as applied to the Dade County Judicial Trust Fund and affirm the judgment of the trial court....

...This cause is before the Court on appeal of a judgment of the Dade County Court that passed on the constitutionality of a state law. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. (1972). The appellant corporation was charged by information with violating section 106.08(1)(e), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...*212 Approximately $24,000 was spent for advertising in the campaign against the container ordinance. After the campaign, the remainder of the money was returned to Winn-Dixie's general fund. Appellant contended in its motion that under these undisputed facts, section 106.08(1)(e) could not constitutionally be applied to it because what it did was to make independent expenditures and not contributions to a candidate....

...ible infringement on freedom of expression. Following the denial of its motion to dismiss, appellant entered a plea of nolo contendere, reserving the right to appeal the court's ruling on the constitutionality of the statute. Appellant contends that section 106.08(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1974), violates its right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, and that the judgment of conviction thereunder cannot stand....

...est and must be narrowly drawn so as to involve no more infringement than is necessary. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976). Section 106.08(1)(e) imposes such limitations and has substantial impact on protected freedoms....

...companion provisions, was at issue in Let's Help Florida v. McCrary, 621 F.2d 195 (5th Cir.1980). The court there looked at the principles enunciated in the Bellotti and Buckley cases and reasoned that one of the asserted state interests underlying section 106.08(1)(d) and (e), the prevention of corruption and the appearance thereof, was simply not compelling in the context of an issue referendum....

...would see only under an innocuous title such as "Let's Help Florida" or "Dade Voters for a Free Choice." Although promoting disclosure of campaign contributors is an important state interest, the restrictions upon political contributions in sections 106.08(1)(d), (e) cannot be justified as disclosure measures because the statutes are not closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms....

...Measures such as these provide adequate disclosure without directly restricting contributions or other important first amendment rights. Id. at 200-01. We find the reasoning and the holding of McCrary to be directly applicable to the instant case. Section 106.08(1)(e), Florida Statutes (1974), impinges upon First Amendment rights....

"final order of deportation" and therefore, INA § 106, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1105a, does not bar this Court's jurisdiction

...r, deputy treasurer, or other officer of any political committee; agent or person acting on behalf of any candidate or political committee; or other person who knowingly and willfully: (a) Accepts a contribution in excess of the limits prescribed by § 106.08; (b) Fails to report any contribution required to be reported by this chapter; (c) Falsely reports or deliberately fails to include any information required by this chapter; or (d) Makes or authorizes any expenditure in violation of § 106....

"copyright-granting" statutory provisions of 17 U.S.C. § 106,[8] the Sixth Circuit looked to 17 U.S.C. § 114(b)

...Counsel, Florida Dept. of State, Tallahassee, Fla., for Bruce Smathers. MEMORANDUM OPINION STAFFORD, District Judge. On February 27, 1978, plaintiffs filed this action for declaratory and injunctive relief seeking to permanently enjoin enforcement of Fla.Stat. § 106.08(1)(d) (1977), which provides: (1) No person or political committee shall make contributions to any candidate or political committee in this state, for any election, in excess of the following amounts: * * * * * * (d) To any political commit...

...atewide election, $3,000. Jurisdiction is predicated upon 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(3). On March 8 a hearing was held on plaintiffs' application for preliminary injunction and on March 29 an order was entered prohibiting defendants from enforcing section 106.08(1)(d), pendente lite....

...The estimated cost of the entire campaign is in excess of one million dollars. (Plaintiffs' ex. 3). Plaintiff Paul M. Bruun is an individual who, according to the allegations of the complaint, is desirous of contributing money to Let's Help Florida in an amount which exceeds the limitation of section 106.08(1)(d)....

...Because the *1007 committee currently espouses only one view, it may properly be said that the committee and its "members" are for all practical purposes identical, thereby satisfying the first sub-part of the NAACP v. Alabama, supra , test. Likewise, there is no doubt that section 106.08(1)(d) directly impacts upon the committee in curtailing its ability to effectively campaign for its position....

...ided court. It must, of course, be recognized that the Bellotti decision is distinguishable from the case at bar. The Massachusetts law at issue in that case directly prohibited political *1008 expression. This is clearly not the situation here, for section 106.08(1)(d) does not prohibit or limit the content of political speech and limits only indirectly the quantity of such speech....

...consultation with, any candidate, *1009 political committee, or agent of such candidate or committee. Fla.Stat. § 106.011(5). Plaintiff's Claim and The Legal Standard Let's Help Florida contends that the $3,000 contribution limitation contained in section 106.08(1)(d), as it relates to a committee supporting an issue in a statewide election, violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States....

...The Act's contribution ceilings thus limit one important means of associating with a candidate or committee . . .." Id., at 22, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659. Id. 431 U.S. at 255, 97 S.Ct. at 1810, 52 L.Ed.2d at 297-8. In light of this language, it cannot be gainsaid that the contribution limitations in section 106.08(1)(d) impinge on First Amendment freedoms....

...Were the court to accept defendants' rather ingenious argument the resultant effect on freedom to associate could well be catastrophic for it would leave a state free to regulate any pooling of resources so long as it did not restrict the right to combine. Accordingly, the fact that section 106.08(1)(d) of Florida's campaign finance act does not affect the "symbolic" act of associating with a political committee is of little consequence because it undeniably renders that association less effective. Finally, defendants claim that the constitutionality of section 106.08 has been decided by the Florida Supreme Court in Richman v....

...Shevin, 354 So.2d 1200 (Fla.1978). The facts and opinion of the court belie this position. In Richman the appellant was challenging the inclusion of the Dade County Judicial Trust Fund within the definition of a "political committee" as used in Fla. Stat. §§ 106.011(2) and 106.08. The contribution limitations contained in section 106.08 were not in issue....

...ionality of the contribution limitation but, rather, only questions the imposition of such limitation on the Judicial Trust Fund. Richman v. Shevin, supra at 1204. It is therefore clear that any argument that Richman upholds the constitutionality of section 106.08, as that section applies to Let's Help Florida, is totally without merit....

...Defendants next contend that the contribution ceiling is necessary to assure that contributions which are received by a committee which has expressed a position on a particular issue are used in a manner which is consistent with that purpose. This argument appears to be an attempt by defendants to justify section 106.08(1)(d) by pointing out the weaknesses in the act as a whole....

...urpose and that purpose will not change during its campaign. (Testimony of Samuel Vitali). Further, even if it were established with reasonable certainty that such an abuse would occur, the statute at issue here does nothing to remedy or prevent it. Section 106.08(1)(d) limits contributions to political committees in support of or in opposition to an issue to be voted on in a state-wide election....

...It is therefore clear that in the context of an issue campaign and election, if there is to be one, the threat of corruption is minimal at best and is not sufficiently compelling to sustain this ceiling on contributions as it applies to plaintiff. Finally, defendants argue that if section 106.08(1)(d) is declared unconstitutional a political committee need only express an interest in an issue and it is then free to avoid all campaign contribution limitations....

...It cannot be disputed that large sums of money would be required to secure the petition signatures necessary to place such a proposed amendment before the electorate. It therefore becomes virtually impossible for persons with limited resources to utilize Art. XI § 3 under the present restrictions imposed by section 106.08(1)(d)....

...ida Constitution to a mere illusory right without demonstrating the existence of a compelling interest. Such an interest has not been shown in this case. ORDER In accordance with the foregoing opinion it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Fla.Stat. § 106.08(1)(d) (1977) as it applies to plaintiff Let's Help Florida only under the facts of this action is violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. The Clerk of this Court is directed to enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendants declaring Fla.Stat. 106.08(1)(d) (1977) to be unconstitutional and permanently enjoining defendants from enforcing against plaintiff the limitations contained therein in the context of an issue election as defined in Fla.Stat....

...osen. [2] Throughout this litigation the defendants have been represented by different counsel. Recognizing that in the memoranda on file and at oral argument the defendants do not necessarily rely on the same arguments and authorities in support of section 106.08(1)(d), for ease of reference they will be treated collectively in this opinion....

...as opposed to candidate elections. 6  Case: 12-14074 Date Filed: 06/14/2013 Page: 7 of 35 unconstitutional, thus vindicating Challengers’ position in that regard. See Fla. Stat. § 106.08(4)....

...Thereafter, Brown inflated the number of hours that his law firm invoiced to Riscorp to recoup the reimbursement bonuses. Riscorp paid the invoices. *1084 The referee found that at the time Brown solicited the checks from his firm, Brown was not "politically active" and was not aware of section 106.08, Florida Statutes (1993), which limits contributions to candidates for statewide office to $500 per person and provides criminal penalties for making contributions in excess of that amount....

...However, Brown was again contacted by Riscorp in October 1994 regarding contribution checks for another campaign. This time, Brown became suspicious and asked another attorney in his firm to research the campaign contribution statutes. When the researching attorney notified Brown of section 106.08, Brown immediately met with Malone and strongly advised him that Riscorp should cease the campaign contribution activities....

...See Florida Bar v. Frederick, 756 So.2d 79, 86 (Fla.2000). In light of our narrow scope of review here, we approve the referee's factual findings and recommendations as to guilt. The Bar argues that the referee's finding that Brown was not aware of section 106.08, Florida Statutes (1993) (prohibiting campaign contributions in excess of $500) at the time Malone asked him to *1085 solicit contributions is clearly erroneous. At the hearing below, there was testimony on both sides of this matter, with Malone testifying that Brown informed him of section 106.08 prior to soliciting the contributions, and with Brown testifying that he was not aware of section 106.08 at the time....

...Malone to advise him to stop its reimbursement activities is also consistent with a finding that Malone lacked the intent to violate the campaign laws when he first agreed to the reimbursement scheme. The referee's finding that Brown was unaware of section 106.08 when he solicited the contributions is supported by Brown's testimony, and we decline to reach a different factual finding here. The Bar next contends that regardless of when Brown became aware of section 106.08, his solicitation of the contributions constituted a first-degree misdemeanor under section 106.08(7)(a), Florida Statutes (1993), and therefore the referee should have recommended guilt as to rule 4-8.4(b) (lawyer shall not commit criminal act which reflects adversely on lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness). The referee found that "[t]he evidence did not establish that [Brown] knowingly and willfully violated section 106.08." Rule 4-8.4(b) provides that a lawyer is not to commit a criminal act "that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects." Assuming without deciding that a violation of section 106.08 does not require that the violation be knowing and willful, [1] we conclude that a negligent violation of the statute in this instance does not reflect adversely on Brown's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness....

...duct) for failing to report Malone's illegal activity to a higher authority in Riscorp. However, the referee recommended a finding of not guilty because Brown was unaware of the scope of Riscorp's reimbursement practices, and when he became aware of section 106.08, Brown advised Malone, then president of Riscorp, against the practice, and was assured by Malone that the practice would cease....

...nces, supports the referee's conclusion that Brown acted "as reasonably necessary in the best interests of the corporation" as envisioned by the rule. [2] Although additional steps might have been taken by Brown to alert others in the corporation of section 106.08, the Bar has failed to demonstrate that the referee's recommendation of not guilty is not supported by competent substantial evidence and we approve the referee's recommendation concerning rule 4-1.13(b)....

...WELLS, C.J., dissenting. I do not join in the majority opinion as to either guilt or discipline. I specifically do not agree with the referee's factual finding that Brown did not realize that his solicitation of these contributions was in violation of section 106.08....

...Therefore, I would suspend Brown for ninety-one days, which would then require proof of rehabilitation in order to end the suspension. QUINCE, J., concurs. NOTES [1] The statute provides that any person who "knowingly and willfully" makes a contribution to a candidate in excess of $500 commits a first-degree misdemeanor. § 106.08(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1993). In this instance, the "person" is the corporation, Riscorp, because by reimbursing the contributions, it was in essence making contributions to candidates in excess of $500. Section 106.08(6) further provides that any " attorney or other representative of a corporation ......

...who aids, abets, advises, or participates in a violation of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor in the first degree." (emphasis added.) Because Brown, an attorney, "participated" in Riscorp's violation of the statute by soliciting the checks and participating in the reimbursement process, under section 106.08(6) Brown may have committed a criminal act, regardless of his lack of knowledge of the statute....

responsibilities under [Title IX].” 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(a). But, if the pertinent employee in Bibb County

...BACKGROUND The JQC filed charges against Judge Colodny, alleging that during her 2008 judicial campaign, Judge Colodny listed contributions to her campaign fund totaling $125,000 as loans made by her, when those funds were in fact loans from her father made in violation of the contribution limits set by section 106.08, Florida Statutes (2007)....

...The plaintiffs also assert, and the defendants seem to concede, that Florida law would prohibit the plaintiffs from airing anonymous advertisements, see § 106.071(2), or advertisements (for a given election) that are paid for with contributions received during the last five days before that election. See § 106.08(4)....

...are factors that cut against a preliminary injunction on this issue. VI. Contributions Received in the Last Five Days Finally, the plaintiffs challenge the limitation on spending contributions received in the last five days before the election. See § 106.08(4), Fla....

...Gene "Hal" Johnson, Gen. Counsel, Gainesville, Florida Police Benev. Ass'n, Inc., for appellants. John J. Rimes, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee. WENTWORTH, Judge. In this appeal from final agency action, appellants challenge the constitutionality of § 106.08(1)(f), Florida Statutes, a provision of the Florida Campaign Financing Act, as applied in the circumstances of this case....

...The State Police Charter made a $5,000 contribution which was accepted by the Florida PBA-PAC; appellee Florida Elections Commission initiated administrative proceedings which resulted in a final order *484 finding appellants to be in violation of §§ 106.19(1)(a) and 106.08(1)(f), Florida Statutes, respectively, for accepting and making contributions in excess of the maximum amount permitted by § 106.08, Florida Statutes. Section 106.08, Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part, that: 1) No person or political committee shall make contributions to any candidate or political committee in this state, for any election, in excess of the following amounts: ........

...butions to political candidates or affiliated committees. While somewhat less compelling in the circumstances of the present case, [3] this asserted interest is nevertheless reasonably related to, and a sufficient justification for, the enactment of § 106.08(1)(f), Florida Statutes....

...articipation in the context of a ballot measure, the Court did suggest that such interests may be more compelling in the context of a political election. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 790, 98 S.Ct. at 1423 (footnote 29). We conclude in the present case that § 106.08(1)(f) is reasonably related to these legitimate governmental interests, so as to survive the constitutional challenge presented for our adjudication. Because § 106.08(1)(f), Florida Statutes, may in this context be regarded as inhibiting circumvention of the Florida Campaign Financing Act's direct contribution limitations, and preserving the integrity of the electoral process by encouraging the active, a...

...The present case involves no annual aggregate contribution limitation nor any disparity between individuals and political committees as to the maximum permissible direct contribution. However, the Florida Campaign Financing Act does limit the permissible amount of direct individual contributions, and § 106.08(1)(f) inhibits circumvention of such direct contribution limitations by precluding large individual contributions to numerous political committees, each of which may support and contribute to the same candidate or candidates.

...ve sufficient funds to cover those expenses, and after the campaign he loaned funds to his campaign and deposited such funds into his campaign account after the deadline for doing so had passed. This conduct violated Florida Statutes §§ 106.11 and 106.08 and Canons 1, 2, 6 B and 7....

...Florida Statutes, in violation of Canons 1, 2, 6 B and 7. 2. After the campaign, you loaned to your campaign substantial sums and deposited such funds in your campaign account after the deadline for depositing money into that account in violation of § 106.08, Florida Statutes, in violation of Canons 1, 2, 6 B and 7....

...The second charge suffers from the same problem. Judge Gooding admitted that he personally loaned his campaign "substantial sums and deposited such funds" in his campaign account after the statutory deadline for depositing money into that account. This conduct is clearly prohibited under section 106.08(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...easurer of such a candidate on the day of that election or less than 5 days prior to the day of that election must be returned by him or her to the person or committee contributing it and may not be used or expended by or on behalf of the candidate. § 106.08(3)(a), Fla....

...political committee, or committee of continuous existence may, in any election, make contributions in excess of $500 to any candidate for election to or retention in office or to any political committee supporting or opposing one or more candidates. § 106.08(l)(a), Fla....

...Moreover, any contribution received by the candidate for election “on the day of that election or less than 5 days prior to the day of that election must be returned by him or her to the person or committee contributing it and may not be used or expended by or on behalf of the candidate.” § 106.08(3)(a), Fla....

...During the JQC investigation, Judge Turner admitted that the money he loaned to his campaign came from the funds that his mother loaned him. The Panel concluded that the $30,000 that Judge Turner’s campaign received from his mother was in excess of the $500 limit on individual campaign contributions established in section 106.08(l)(a), Florida Statutes, and that the loan was received after the cut-off date established in section 106.08(3)(a), Florida Statutes....

...ndation. Judge Turner committed a serious campaign finance violation by accepting and failing to report the $30,000 campaign loan from his mother. Under Florida’s Campaign Finance Law, contributions to any candidate are limited to $500 per person. § 106.08(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008). Moreover, a candidate is not permitted to accept campaign donations on the day of the election or less than five days prior to the election. § 106.08(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2008). Judge Turner’s conduct is a clear violation of sections 106.08(l)(a) and 106.08(3)(a) and could not plausibly have been an innocent mistake given the plain language of these provisions....

complaint alleged to be a prima facie violation of section 106.08(1)(a)1., Florida Statutes (2017). The complaint

transitional rules, we apply the provisions of former INA § 106, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (1996), except for subsection

...The alleged violations of Bar Rules 3-4.3 and 4-8.4(b) arose from Grieco pleading no contest to accepting a campaign contribution donated by an individual in the name of another -2- individual—a first-degree misdemeanor in violation of section 106.08(7)(a), Florida Statutes (2017)....

...But Grieco is not being accused of perjury, and whether he could lawfully deny an arrest has never been an issue in this case. Given that the evidence of Grieco’s criminal history was admissible at the disciplinary proceeding, we find that the criminal information charging Grieco with violating section 106.08(7)(a) by willfully accepting a contribution from one individual in the name of another; the letter to the Bar from Grieco’s counsel reporting his no-contest plea admitting to the criminal charge; and the testimony of Ross, who pa...

...He argues that because the charged offense did not involve the practice of law, the crime of conviction was not one that reflects adversely on his fitness as a lawyer. He also argues that because fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation are not essential elements of section 106.08(7)(a), the crime of conviction is not a crime of dishonesty for purposes of Bar Rule 4-8.4(b). We find Grieco’s arguments unpersuasive....

...ve sufficient funds to cover those expenses, and after the campaign he loaned funds to his campaign and deposited such funds into his campaign account after the deadline for doing so had passed. This conduct violated Florida Statutes §§ 106.11 and 106.08 and Canons 1, 2, 6 B and 7....

...Florida Statutes, in violation of Canons 1, 2, 6 B and 7. 2. After the campaign, you loaned to your campaign substantial sums and deposited such funds in your campaign account after the deadline for depositing money into that account in violation of § 106.08, Florida Statutes, in violation of Canons 1, 2, 6 B and 7....

...The second charge suffers from the same problem. Judge Gooding admitted that he personally loaned his campaign “substantial sums and deposited such funds” in his campaign account after the statutory deadline for depositing money into that account. This conduct is clearly prohibited under section 106.08(3)(a), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...easurer of such a candidate on the day of that election or less than 5 days prior to the day of that election must be returned by him or her to the person or committee contributing it and may not be used or expended by or on behalf of the candidate. § 106.08(3)(a), Fla....

...oneering communication organizations, and political parties. Id. §§ 106.011–106.36. A candidate may not accept a contribution in excess of $500 from any person, political committee, or committee of continuous existence during an election. Id. § 106.08(1)(a)....

...business trust, syndicate, or other combination of individuals having collective capacity.” Id. § 106.011(8). For the purpose of contribution limits, the statute considers primary and general elections separate elections for all opposed candidates. Id. § 106.08(1)(c). By law, a candidate for statewide office may not accept contributions that exceed $250,000 in the aggregate from national, state, or county executive committees of a political party. Id. § 106.08(2)(b). Florida law does not limit the amount that a candidate may contribute personally to his campaign. Id. § 106.08(1)(b)(1)....

...as eligible to participate in the system, the candidate is entitled to receive matching funds for certain qualifying contributions. Id. § 106.35. Participating candidates remain subject to the $500 cap on campaign contributions from persons or committees, id. § 106.08(1)(a), but become eligible as participants in the public financing system to receive matching state funds, up to $250, for each contribution 12 made by a Florida resident after September 1 of the calendar year before the election, id....

...than their 30 nonparticipating peers. As we have explained, in Florida, every candidate for public office, whether participating or not, is subject to a $500 limit on campaign contributions. Fla. Stat. § 106.08(1)(a)....

responsibilities under [Title IX].” 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(a). But, if the pertinent employee in Bibb County

QUESTIONS: 1. Does the term "public office" as defined in s. 106.011 (9), F. S., include the offices of United States Senator and Representative to Congress? 2. Does s. 106.08 , F.S., limit the amount of contributions to candidates for the offices of United States Senator and Representative to Congress or to political committees organized in support of such candidates? 3....

...candidates? SUMMARY: The term "public office" as defined in s. 106.011 (9), F.S., includes the offices of United States Senator and Representative to Congress. Unless and until otherwise clarified by the courts or the legislature, the provisions of ss. 106.08 (1) and 106.10, F....

...99.161(2)(a), F.S., 1971 (now repealed). Section 99.161(2)(a) specified four separate classifications of candidates for which contribution limits were established, the last of which was "a candidate for congressional office, two thousand dollars." Section 106.08 (1), supra, which contains the present limitations on the amount of contributions to candidates or political committees, specifies — in language which in pertinent part is substantially identical to the language used in former s....

...substitute any specific reference to candidates for the offices of United States Senator or Representative to Congress, it was the intent of the legislature to exclude candidates for those offices from the limitations on contributions established by s. 106.08 (1)....

...andidates for the offices of United States Senator and Representative to Congress, as well as political committees organized solely for the support of such candidates, are not subject to the limitations on the amounts of contributions established by s. 106.08 (1), supra....

...Plaintiffs, both of whom were un-emancipated minors at the time they filed suit, 2 allege that their rights were violated when Plaintiffs, having identified candidates in state and local elections that they wished to support, were prevented from doing so by the fear that they would violate Fla. Stat. § 106.08 (l)(b)(2) — which proscribes contributions by minors in excess of $100 to political candidates — and in so doing would face criminal prosecution and/or fines. Plaintiffs contend that, but for § 106.08(l)(b)(2), they would have made their desired contributions....

...of state law, including election laws, that occur in Palm Beach County, or for investigating and determining whether campaign finance violations have occurred. 4 Plaintiffs allege that, while Defendants had the opportunity to advise Plaintiffs that § 106.08(l)(b)(2) would not be enforced against them if Plaintiffs contributed more than $100 to a political candidate, they did not, and, accordingly, curtailed Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights to make contributions in excess of $100 to political candidates or committees....

...er cautioned that such disclosure would likely “reveal the identities of the investigators during an ongoing investigation, the identities of witnesses and the tactics and strategy of the investigation.” Defendants also argued that violations of § 106.08 are crimes, and that investigations of any such violations should be considered documents that are part of an ongoing criminal investigation until such investigation is closed....

...rohibition against revealing information related to an investigation. Finally, Plaintiffs contend that any claim by Defendants that the documents cannot be produced because discovery could disclose information related to an ongoing investigations of § 106.08(l)(b)(2) — the statute at issue — is moot. Plaintiffs argue that since Defendants have been enjoined from giving any force or effect to § 106.08(l)(b)(2), this precludes them from investigating violations of that statute as well. Plaintiffs argue that, given the injunction, Defendants cannot have a compelling interest in maintaining the confidentiality of investigations into violations of § 106.08(l)(b)(2). Plaintiffs further contend that, to the extent Defendants might argue that the documents relate to investigations of violations of Fla. Stat. § 106.08 (5), which prohibits political donations in the name of others, such arguments only bolster Plaintiffs’ claim that the state lacks a compelling interest in enforcing a $100 maximum on campaign contributions of unemancipated minors....

...Presutti. Plaintiff Towbin turned 18 in September 2012; Plaintiff Stillman is 14. . Plaintiffs sue Defendants in their official capacities. . Plaintiffs contend that the FEC Defendants "regularly investigate and administratively prosecute violations of § 106.08.” ....

...¶ 9.) As a former Page in the United States House of Representatives, Ms. Towbin professes a keen and abiding interest in polities. (Compl. ¶ 7.) However, at an entry price of $150 and being only seventeen at the time, Ms. Towbin was concerned that her purchase of a ticket to attend the event would violate Section 106.08 of the Florida Statutes, which prohibits political contributions by minors of more than $100 to individual candidates or political organizations. More specifically, the statute provides that “an unemancipated child under the age of 18 years of age may not make a contribution in excess of $100 to any candidate or to any political committee supporting one or more candidates.” Fla. Stat. § 106.08 (l)(a)-(b). The limit for others, including adults, is $500. Id. § 106.08(l)(a) (“Except for political parties or affiliated party committees, no person, political committee, or committee of continuous existence may, in any election, make contributions in excess of $500 to any candidate for election to or reten...

...office or to any political committee supporting or opposing one or more candidates.”). A single unlawful contribution is classified as a first degree misdemeanor, while making multiple such contributions is punishable as a third degree felony. Id. § 106.08(7)(a)-(b)....

...Third, and presumably the source of the violations recognized in the grand jury report, the State points to consent decrees from actions brought by the Florida Elections Commission to show that individuals and companies in Florida conceded making contributions in the name of others in violation of Section 106.08(5)....

...In one case, for instance, a computer component distributor reimbursed several employees for contributions made in the 1996 mayoral race in Miami, Florida. (DE 12 at 81.) The distributor stipulated to making excess contributions and to making contributions through another (in violation of Sections 106.08(1) and (5) of the Florida Statutes)....

...at 85.) In another case, a consent decree recognized that a non-partisan committee called the Florida Leadership Coalition funneled money sent *1279 by U.S. Sugar, a Florida company, to the Republican Party of Florida in 1994. ■ (Id. at 70.) The Coalition acknowledged violating Section 106.08 and agreed to pay a civil fíne of $2,500....

...In sum, because Plaintiff is able to show that the statute credibly threatens her with prosecution; that she is “chilled” from engaging in protected expression; and that such chilling results in an immediate injury, Plaintiff may proceed on her claim. B. Constitutionality of Section 106.08(l)(b) The heart of Plaintiffs challenge is the constitutionality of Section 106.08(l)(b) of the Florida Statutes....

...Similarly, on review, the Supreme Court added that a possible cause for the lack of evidence might have been the successful deterrence of a complimentary law that acted to criminalize the use of another to make a political contribution — a law that is similar in substance to Section 106.08(5) of the Florida Statutes....

...onable bond, the Court will not require Plaintiff to provide such a security. III. CONCLUSION In accordance with the foregoing, the Court will accordingly issue the least re *1296 strietive injunctive relief by enjoining Defendants’ enforcement of Section 106.08(l)(b)(2) of the Florida Statutes....

...ourt’s concurrently-issued findings of facts and conclusions of law, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: (1) Plaintiff has demonstrated entitlement to injunctive relief, insofar as Plaintiff has demonstrated a substantial likelihood that Section 106.08(l)(b)(2) unconstitutionally curtails her First Amendment rights of free speech and association, as well as those of others similarly-situated; Plaintiff has demonstrated irreparable injury will result in the absence of an injunction; P...

...yees, and attorneys, and all those in concert or participation with them and their successors, are ENJOINED, until further order from this Court, from enforcing, applying, implementing, requiring compliance with, or otherwise giving lawful effect to Section 106.08(l)(b)(2) of the Florida Statutes, which provides, to wit: “Notwithstanding the limits provided in this subsection, an unemancipated child under the age of 18 years of age may not make a contribution in excess of $100 to any candidate or to any political committee supporting one or more candidates.” Fla. Stat. § 106.08 (l)(b)(2)....

...ed primarily for the public good” save for three limited exceptions, effectively prohibited political candidates from making "almost all spontaneous acts of charitable giving” from their campaign or personal funds. Id. at 1321 , 1325-26 (quoting Section 106.08 of the Florida Statutes)....

...daughter, it did not suggest that she was a minor. Indeed, the fact that numerous other individuals involved in the scheme were unrelated to the respondent and apparently of age suggests that minors are not a common intermediary. . Florida, through Section 106.08(5)(a), already prohibits "makfing] any contribution through or in the name of another, directly or indirectly, in any election.” The State nevertheless insists that the legislation at issue is meant to prevent further funneling through children....