Florida Statute 112.18 - Full Text and Legal Analysis

The 2025 Florida Statutes

Title X
PUBLIC OFFICERS, EMPLOYEES, AND RECORDS

Chapter 112
PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES: GENERAL PROVISIONS

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F.S. 112.18

112.18 Firefighters and law enforcement or correctional officers; special provisions relative to disability.—

(1)(a) Any condition or impairment of health of any Florida state, municipal, county, port authority, special tax district, or fire control district firefighter or any law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer as defined in s. 943.10(1), (2), or (3) caused by tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension resulting in total or partial disability or death shall be presumed to have been accidental and to have been suffered in the line of duty unless the contrary be shown by competent evidence. However, any such firefighter, law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer must have successfully passed a physical examination upon entering into any such service as a firefighter, law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer, which examination failed to reveal any evidence of any such condition. Such presumption does not apply to benefits payable under or granted in a policy of life insurance or disability insurance, unless the insurer and insured have negotiated for such additional benefits to be included in the policy contract.

(b)1. If a firefighter did not undergo a preemployment physical examination, the medical examination required by s. 633.412(5) shall be deemed to satisfy the physical examination requirement under paragraph (a), if the medical examination completed pursuant to s. 633.412(5) failed to reveal any evidence of tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension.

2. If a firefighter underwent a preemployment physical examination, the employing fire service provider, as defined in s. 633.102, must maintain records of the physical examination for at least 5 years after the employee’s separation from the employing fire service provider. If the employing fire service provider fails to maintain the records of the physical examination for the 5-year period after the employee’s separation, it is presumed that the employee has met the requirements of paragraph (a).

(c)1. For any workers’ compensation claim filed under this section and chapter 440 occurring on or after July 1, 2010, a law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer as defined in s. 943.10(1), (2), or (3) suffering from tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension is presumed not to have incurred such disease in the line of duty as provided in this section if the law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer:

a. Departed in a material fashion from the prescribed course of treatment of his or her personal physician and the departure is demonstrated to have resulted in a significant aggravation of the tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension resulting in disability or increasing the disability or need for medical treatment; or

b. Was previously compensated pursuant to this section and chapter 440 for tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension and thereafter sustains and reports a new compensable workers’ compensation claim under this section and chapter 440, and the law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer has departed in a material fashion from the prescribed course of treatment of an authorized physician for the preexisting workers’ compensation claim and the departure is demonstrated to have resulted in a significant aggravation of the tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension resulting in disability or increasing the disability or need for medical treatment.

2. As used in this paragraph, “prescribed course of treatment” means prescribed medical courses of action and prescribed medicines for the specific disease or diseases claimed and as documented in the prescribing physician’s medical records.

3. If there is a dispute as to the appropriateness of the course of treatment prescribed by a physician under sub-subparagraph 1.a. or sub-subparagraph 1.b. or whether a departure in a material fashion from the prescribed course of treatment is demonstrated to have resulted in a significant aggravation of the tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension resulting in disability or increasing the disability or need for medical treatment, the law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer is entitled to seek an independent medical examination pursuant to s. 440.13(5).

4. A law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer is not entitled to the presumption provided in this section unless a claim for benefits is made prior to or within 180 days after leaving the employment of the employing agency.

(2) This section authorizes each governmental entity specified in subsection (1) to negotiate policy contracts for life and disability insurance to include accidental death benefits or double indemnity coverage which shall include the presumption that any condition or impairment of health of any firefighter, law enforcement officer, or correctional officer caused by tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension resulting in total or partial disability or death was accidental and suffered in the line of duty, unless the contrary be shown by competent evidence.

(3)(a) Notwithstanding s. 440.13(2)(c), a firefighter, law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer requiring medical treatment for a compensable presumptive condition listed in subsection (1) may be treated by a medical specialist. Except in emergency situations, a firefighter, law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer entitled to access a medical specialist under this subsection must provide written notice of his or her selection of a medical specialist to the firefighter’s or officer’s workers’ compensation carrier, self-insured employer, or third-party administrator, and the carrier, self-insured employer, or third-party administrator must authorize the selected medical specialist or authorize an alternative medical specialist with the same or greater qualifications. Within 5 business days after receipt of the written notice, the workers’ compensation carrier, self-insured employer, or third-party administrator must authorize treatment and schedule an appointment, which must be held within 30 days after receipt of the written notice, with the selected medical specialist or the alternative medical specialist. If the workers’ compensation carrier, self-insured employer, or third-party administrator fails to authorize an alternative medical specialist within 5 business days after receipt of the written notice, the medical specialist selected by the firefighter or officer is authorized. The continuing care and treatment by a medical specialist must be reasonable, necessary, and related to tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension; be reimbursed at no more than 200 percent of the Medicare rate for a selected medical specialist; and be authorized by the firefighter’s or officer’s workers’ compensation carrier, self-insured employer, or third-party administrator.

(b) For purposes of this subsection, the term “medical specialist” means a physician licensed under chapter 458 or chapter 459 who has board certification in a medical specialty inclusive of care and treatment of tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension.

History.—s. 1, ch. 65-480; s. 1, ch. 73-125; s. 32, ch. 77-104; s. 692, ch. 95-147; s. 21, ch. 99-392; s. 3, ch. 2002-236; s. 2, ch. 2010-175; s. 1, ch. 2022-114; s. 1, ch. 2024-209.

F.S. 112.18 on Google Scholar

F.S. 112.18 on CourtListener

Amendments to 112.18

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases Citing Statute 112.18

Total Results: 79

Caldwell v. DIVISION OF RETIREMENT, ETC.

372 So. 2d 438

Supreme Court of Florida | Filed: Jun 14, 1979 | Docket: 1325280

Cited 35 times | Published

that the Commission erred in refusing to apply section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1975), which provided

Universal Insurance Co. of North America v. Warfel

82 So. 3d 47, 37 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 50, 2012 WL 224104, 2012 Fla. LEXIS 195

Supreme Court of Florida | Filed: Jan 26, 2012 | Docket: 60306224

Cited 15 times | Published

the Court held: The presumption contained in section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1975), affects the burden

Sledge v. City of Fort Lauderdale

497 So. 2d 1231, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 1506

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jul 10, 1986 | Docket: 1239008

Cited 11 times | Published

entitled to the statutory presumption afforded by section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1985). After a hearing

Miami-Dade County v. Thomasena Mitchell

159 So. 3d 172, 2015 WL 468980

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Feb 4, 2015 | Docket: 2631635

Cited 7 times | Published

Claimant, a law enforcement officer, under section 112.18(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2012). The Employer

Punsky v. Clay County Sheriff's Office

18 So. 3d 577, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 1996, 2009 WL 564953

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Mar 6, 2009 | Docket: 1640358

Cited 6 times | Published

2d 438 (Fla.1979), or the Legislature amends section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes, we are bound to follow

City of Port Orange v. Sedacca

953 So. 2d 727, 2007 Fla. App. LEXIS 5196, 2007 WL 1047397

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Apr 10, 2007 | Docket: 1712798

Cited 6 times | Published

the applicability of the presumption under section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes. However, Claimant must

City of Tarpon Springs v. Vaporis

953 So. 2d 597, 2007 WL 713199

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Mar 12, 2007 | Docket: 1338482

Cited 6 times | Published

application of the "firefighter's presumption," section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2005). We reverse, and address

Bivens v. City of Lakeland

993 So. 2d 1100, 2008 WL 4425474

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Oct 2, 2008 | Docket: 1516041

Cited 5 times | Published

Claimant argued that the statutory presumption of section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes, was applicable for both

City of Mary Esther v. McArtor

902 So. 2d 942, 2005 WL 1330047

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jun 7, 2005 | Docket: 1256943

Cited 5 times | Published

compensability for coronary artery disease provided by section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes. Coronary artery disease

Talpesh v. Village of Royal Palm Beach

994 So. 2d 353, 2008 WL 4190656

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Sep 15, 2008 | Docket: 1218982

Cited 4 times | Published

occupation as a firefighter. We agree and reverse. Section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2005), also referred

City of Miami v. Thomas

657 So. 2d 927, 1995 Fla. App. LEXIS 7287, 1995 WL 387176

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jul 3, 1995 | Docket: 463923

Cited 4 times | Published

operation of the rebuttable presumption in section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1991), that for a firefighter

City of Temple Terrace v. Bailey

481 So. 2d 49, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 4

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Dec 18, 1985 | Docket: 2365413

Cited 4 times | Published

deputy misapplied the presumption established by § 112.18(1), Fla. Stat. We agree and reverse. Claimant

City of Tavares v. Harper

230 So. 3d 918

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Oct 24, 2017 | Docket: 60294208

Cited 3 times | Published

statutory presumption in the Heart-Lung Statute, section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2015). According to the

State of Florida Department of Corr. v. Andrew Junod

217 So. 3d 200, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 5231

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Apr 13, 2017 | Docket: 4685702

Cited 3 times | Published

entitled to benefits under the heart-lung statute, section 112.18 of the Florida Statutes. We reverse. Claimant’s

City of Pembroke Pines v. Ortagus

50 So. 3d 31, 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 16608, 2010 WL 4292823

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Nov 2, 2010 | Docket: 2396445

Cited 3 times | Published

years, terminated benefits claiming that under section 112.18, Florida Statutes, he became ineligible for

Miami-Dade County v. Davis

26 So. 3d 13, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 17544, 2009 WL 4030782

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Nov 24, 2009 | Docket: 1117090

Cited 3 times | Published

heart disease, on the purported authority of section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2001). On the facts of

MOBILE MEDICAL INDUSTRIES v. Quinn

985 So. 2d 33, 2008 WL 2228706

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jun 2, 2008 | Docket: 1674098

Cited 3 times | Published

ventricular ectopy, as compensable pursuant to section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2001) (creating a statutory

Saldana v. Miami-Dade County

978 So. 2d 823, 2008 WL 623244

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Mar 10, 2008 | Docket: 195212

Cited 3 times | Published

2d 597, 599 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) ("All that [section 112.18, Florida Statutes] requires to overcome the

Seminole County Sheriff's Office v. Johnson

901 So. 2d 342, 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 6522, 2005 WL 1028250

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: May 4, 2005 | Docket: 1666371

Cited 3 times | Published

Compensation Claims (the "JCC") erred by interpreting section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1999), providing a rebuttable

City of West Palm Beach v. Burbaum

632 So. 2d 145, 1994 WL 37023

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Feb 11, 1994 | Docket: 462552

Cited 3 times | Published

relative to the disability of fire fighters under section 112.18, Florida Statutes (1991). We reject the E/SA's

South Trail Fire Control District v. Johnson

449 So. 2d 947

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: May 3, 1984 | Docket: 374233

Cited 3 times | Published

Petersburg, for appellee. PER CURIAM. We hold that section 112.18, Florida Statutes (1981), applies to chapter

Williams v. City of Orlando

89 So. 3d 302, 2012 WL 2122639, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 9591

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jun 13, 2012 | Docket: 60308765

Cited 2 times | Published

presumption of occupational causation available via section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2010). We reverse. The E/C

Punsky v. Clay County Board of County Commissioners

60 So. 3d 1088, 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 4410, 2011 WL 1167205

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Mar 31, 2011 | Docket: 60300049

Cited 2 times | Published

the presumption of compensability found in section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2004), and certifying

Warfel v. Universal Insurance Co. of North America

36 So. 3d 136, 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 6572, 2010 WL 1874367

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: May 12, 2010 | Docket: 1639037

Cited 2 times | Published

burden-shifting presumption. The ease involved section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1975), which provided

Fuller v. Okaloosa Correctional Institution

22 So. 3d 803, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 17537, 2009 WL 4030845

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Nov 24, 2009 | Docket: 60267112

Cited 2 times | Published

presumption of compensability provided for in section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2007), by showing a non-occupational

Butler v. City of Jacksonville

980 So. 2d 1250, 2008 Fla. App. LEXIS 6937, 2008 WL 1968312

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: May 8, 2008 | Docket: 1735583

Cited 2 times | Published

impairment. We agree and reverse. Presumption Section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1996), also referred

Lentini v. City of West Palm Beach

980 So. 2d 1232, 2008 WL 1930070

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: May 5, 2008 | Docket: 468488

Cited 2 times | Published

rebutted the "firefighter's presumption" of section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2006). This provision

Martin v. STATE, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

890 So. 2d 1238, 2005 WL 94506

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jan 19, 2005 | Docket: 1117099

Cited 2 times | Published

compensability of his heart disease afforded by section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2002). Our conclusion

City of Pensacola v. Winchester

560 So. 2d 1273, 1990 WL 48642

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Apr 18, 1990 | Docket: 1477696

Cited 2 times | Published

in-line-of-duty disability retirement benefits. See § 112.18(1), Fla. Stat. (1987). Article VI of the Pensacola

Cumbie v. City of Milton

496 So. 2d 923, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 2264

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Oct 28, 1986 | Docket: 428063

Cited 2 times | Published

to the statutory presumption of § 112.18, Fla. Stat. Section 112.18 provides that any condition or impairment

Caldwell v. DIV. OF RET., FLA. DEPT. OF AD.

344 So. 2d 923

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Apr 7, 1977 | Docket: 474767

Cited 2 times | Published

presumption of in line of duty set forth in Section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1975), 2. by applying

St. Lucie FCRD and PGCS v. FMIT, Florida Municipal etc.

259 So. 3d 992

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Dec 10, 2018 | Docket: 8379697

Cited 1 times | Published

presumption of occupational causation set forth in section 112.18, Florida Statutes, which does not apply if

City of Jacksonville v. Ratliff

217 So. 3d 183, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 5201

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Apr 13, 2017 | Docket: 60265664

Cited 1 times | Published

medical treatment under the “heart-lung” statute, section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2014). The Claimant did

Scherer v. Volusia County Department of Corrections

171 So. 3d 135

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jul 7, 2015 | Docket: 2671917

Cited 1 times | Published

compensation claims ruling him ineligible under section 112.18(1)(b)4., Florida Statutes (2013), for the presumption

Orange County & Alternative Service Concepts v. Wilder

107 So. 3d 480, 2013 WL 264625, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 995

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jan 24, 2013 | Docket: 60228667

Cited 1 times | Published

presumption of occupational causation available in section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2010). The E/C acknowledges

Walters v. State-DOC/Division of Risk Management

100 So. 3d 1173, 2012 WL 4872654, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 17887

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Oct 16, 2012 | Docket: 60225544

Cited 1 times | Published

entitled to on account of his heart disease. Section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2009) — variously known

Rocha v. City of Tampa

100 So. 3d 138, 2012 WL 4800990, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 17309

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Oct 10, 2012 | Docket: 60225642

Cited 1 times | Published

the presumption of occupational causation in section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2009). The JCC found, and

Martz v. Volusia County Fire Services

30 So. 3d 635, 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 3353, 2010 WL 935561

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Mar 17, 2010 | Docket: 60289446

Cited 1 times | Published

failed to satisfy the disability requirement of section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2008), with respect to

Volusia County Fire Services v. Taaffe

27 So. 3d 81, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 19494, 2009 WL 4782373

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Dec 15, 2009 | Docket: 159689

Cited 1 times | Published

compensable under the presumption created by section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2005). We agree and reverse

Crystal v. State, Department of Management Services, Division of Retirement

21 So. 3d 134, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 16541, 2009 WL 3645182

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Nov 5, 2009 | Docket: 2533975

Cited 1 times | Published

by accident suffered in-line-of-duty under section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2006). Because the Commission

Orange County Fire Rescue v. Jones

959 So. 2d 785, 2007 WL 1792328

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jun 21, 2007 | Docket: 528268

Cited 1 times | Published

compensable because of the statutory presumption in section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes, presuming that coronary

Potter v. City of Ormond Beach

913 So. 2d 710, 2005 WL 2736739

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Oct 25, 2005 | Docket: 1331199

Cited 1 times | Published

accepted the condition as compensable pursuant to section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes. We agree and, therefore

State v. Reese

911 So. 2d 1291, 30 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 2387

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Oct 11, 2005 | Docket: 1501200

Cited 1 times | Published

presumption specified in the "Heart-Lung" statute, section 112.18, Florida Statutes, in determining that the

Heric v. City of Ormond Beach

728 So. 2d 1247, 1999 WL 202300

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Apr 13, 1999 | Docket: 1254408

Cited 1 times | Published

the claimant's heart condition pursuant to section 112.18, Florida Statutes, and began paying medical

City of Clearwater v. Carpentieri

659 So. 2d 357, 1995 Fla. App. LEXIS 7119, 1995 WL 363242

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jun 20, 1995 | Docket: 64758328

Cited 1 times | Published

presumption of compensability set forth in section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1991)1. We affirm. The

Smith v. City of Miami

552 So. 2d 245, 14 Fla. L. Weekly 2540, 1989 Fla. App. LEXIS 6271, 1989 WL 132528

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Nov 2, 1989 | Docket: 64646332

Cited 1 times | Published

extend the firefighter’s presumption statute, section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1987), to his claim.

Daniels v. Division of Retirement

389 So. 2d 340, 1980 Fla. App. LEXIS 17862

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Oct 27, 1980 | Docket: 1282023

Cited 1 times | Published

heart disease was suffered in the line of duty. Section 112.18(1). It was not shown that "the disease causing

Michael Guglielmo v. State of Florida-DOC Zephyrhills C I/Division of Risk Management

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jul 30, 2025 | Docket: 70962102

Published

to an accident accepted as compensable under section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2021), also known as the

Sudano v. Collier County Sheriff's Office

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Oct 30, 2024 | Docket: 69324007

Published

DCA 2019) (holding that the presumption in section 112.18, Florida Statutes, only applies if a preemployment

Seminole County, Florida and Johns Eastern Company, Inc. v. Braden

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Dec 13, 2023 | Docket: 68084179

Published

attack and subsequent heart transplant 1 § 112.18, Fla. Stat. (2021). which occurred after his diagnosis

Joshua Holcombe v. City of Naples/Johns Eastern Company, Inc.

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Sep 15, 2021 | Docket: 60386696

Published

presumption of occupational causation provided by section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2018). For the foregoing

City of Jacksonville and City of Jacksonville etc. v. Adrian O'Neal

240 So. 3d 861

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Mar 15, 2018 | Docket: 6335108

Published

correctional officer since 1995, relied on section 112.18, Florida Statutes, which provides a presumption

Ruben Rodriguez v. Tallahassee Fire Department/ City of Tallahassee

240 So. 3d 788

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Mar 15, 2018 | Docket: 6335105

Published

compensable by his Employer/Carrier (E/C) under section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2013) (providing rebuttable

City of Homestead/Preferred Gov't Claims Solutions v. Foust

242 So. 3d 1169

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jan 26, 2018 | Docket: 64678201

Published

heart disease and hypertension by operation of section 112.18, Florida Statutes. For the following reasons

City of Tavares and Gallagher Bassett etc. v. Billy Harper

230 So. 3d 918

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Oct 30, 2017 | Docket: 6182921

Published

statutory presumption in the Heart-Lung Statute, section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2015). According to

Gonzalez v. St. Lucie County-Fire District/Florida Municipal Insurance Trust-Florida League of Cities, Inc.

186 So. 3d 1106, 2016 WL 878822

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Mar 20, 2016 | Docket: 3046135

Published

the contrary be shown by competent evidence." § 112.18(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013);

Thomasena Mitchell v. Miami Dade County aka MDPD (Intracoastal) etc.

186 So. 3d 65

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Feb 28, 2016 | Docket: 3039863

Published

of the presumption afforded Claimant under section 112.18 and how it is applied to the facts in this

City of Jacksonville Fire and Rescue etc. v. Johnny Battle

148 So. 3d 795, 2014 WL 4656586

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Sep 22, 2014 | Docket: 1311516

Published

have found Claimant was entitled to rely on section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2012), which reads:

Leon Smith v. City of Daytona Beach Police Dept./City of etc.

143 So. 3d 436, 2014 WL 3466907

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jul 30, 2014 | Docket: 371178

Published

compensability afforded law enforcement officers under section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes. Claimant appealed the

Johns Eastern Co. v. Bellamy

137 So. 3d 1058, 2014 WL 953622, 2014 Fla. App. LEXIS 3501

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Mar 12, 2014 | Docket: 60240149

Published

firefighters, and certain other employees, set out in section 112.18(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2011). Nevertheless

City of North Bay Village v. Guevara

129 So. 3d 1100, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 17728, 2013 WL 5932296

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Nov 6, 2013 | Docket: 60237290

Published

causation afforded law enforcement officers under section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2006). The JCC also noted

Pasco County Sheriff's Office v. Shaffer

125 So. 3d 1051, 2013 WL 5744441, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 16979

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Oct 23, 2013 | Docket: 60235649

Published

duties, can be considered disabled pursuant to section 112.18, Florida Statutes. It is argued that because

Johns Eastern Co. v. Schraw

115 So. 3d 428, 2013 WL 2395080, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 8753

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jun 3, 2013 | Docket: 60232181

Published

pre-ventri-cular contraction condition, pursuant to section 112.18, Florida Statutes. The E/C raises two points

Johns v. City of Sanford

96 So. 3d 949, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 11877, 2012 WL 3013533

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jul 24, 2012 | Docket: 60311600

Published

evidence to rebut the statutory presumption [in section 112.18, Florida Statutes,] and establish non-industrial

LeBlanc v. City of West Palm Beach

72 So. 3d 181, 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 13241, 2011 WL 3677039

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Aug 23, 2011 | Docket: 60303211

Published

for the operation of the presumption found in section 112.18(1), rendering his cardiac arrhythmia work-related

Clay County Board of County Commissioners/Scibal Associates v. Bramlitt

61 So. 3d 1239, 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 8416, 2011 WL 1938235

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: May 23, 2011 | Docket: 2364797

Published

condition and hypertension were compensable under § 112.18, Fla. Stat.” (emphasis added). On this issue,

City of Venice v. Van Dyke

46 So. 3d 115, 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 15065, 2010 WL 3909577

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Oct 7, 2010 | Docket: 60296143

Published

Claimant’s thoracic aortic disease compensable under section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2007), because the condition

Carney v. SARASOTA COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE

26 So. 3d 683, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 19500, 2009 WL 4800293

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Dec 15, 2009 | Docket: 1638583

Published

not entitled to the presumption afforded by section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2007), because his overnight

JACKSONVILLE SHERIFF'S OFFICE v. Shacklett

15 So. 3d 859, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 10368, 2009 WL 2244437

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jul 29, 2009 | Docket: 1660796

Published

was entitled to the presumption afforded by section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2007). The Employer alleges

Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office v. Bair

965 So. 2d 1210, 2007 Fla. App. LEXIS 14678, 2007 WL 2733825

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Sep 21, 2007 | Docket: 64852624

Published

applying the statutory presumption provided by section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2002), and entered a final

City of Delray Beach v. Wells

957 So. 2d 694, 2007 Fla. App. LEXIS 7493, 2007 WL 1434950

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: May 17, 2007 | Docket: 64850938

Published

of the firefighter’s presumption pursuant to section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2005). We also find no merit

Gray v. Department of Corrections

918 So. 2d 322, 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 17527, 2005 WL 2921959

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Nov 7, 2005 | Docket: 64841745

Published

physical revealed evidence of heart disease. See § 112.18(1), Fla. Stat. (2002). This court has recently

Unisource Administrators v. Bridges

914 So. 2d 457, 2005 Fla. App. LEXIS 16465, 2005 WL 2649191

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Oct 18, 2005 | Docket: 64840883

Published

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See § 112.18(1), Fla. Stat. (2002) (“Any condition ... of any ... law enforcement

Ago

Florida Attorney General Reports | Filed: Jan 26, 1993 | Docket: 3258770

Published

firefighter for another governmental entity. Section 112.18(1), F.S., provides: Any condition or impairment

State, Department of Corrections v. Clark

593 So. 2d 585, 1992 Fla. App. LEXIS 910, 1992 WL 21079

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Feb 7, 1992 | Docket: 64665267

Published

compensation order by which the presumption in section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes, was applied and the claimant

Lansford v. Broward County Board of County Commissioners

485 So. 2d 845, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 613, 1986 Fla. App. LEXIS 6871

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Mar 11, 1986 | Docket: 64618276

Published

not entitled to the presumption set forth in Section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1983). We affirm. Lansford

City of Gainesville v. Beck

450 So. 2d 309, 1984 Fla. App. LEXIS 13344

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: May 18, 1984 | Docket: 64604858

Published

arising out of his employment, relying upon section 112.18, Florida Statutes. Claimant, a twenty-six-year

South Trail Fire Control District v. Johnson

449 So. 2d 947, 1984 Fla. App. LEXIS 13015

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: May 3, 1984 | Docket: 64604555

Published

PER CURIAM. We hold that section 112.18, Florida Statutes (1981), applies to chapter 440, Florida Statutes

Cundy v. Division of Retirement, Florida Department of Administration

353 So. 2d 967

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jan 16, 1978 | Docket: 64562142

Published

appropriate effect to the presumption accorded by Section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1975). Caldwell v. Division