Florida Statute 112.18 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research

The 2024 Florida Statutes

Title X
PUBLIC OFFICERS, EMPLOYEES, AND RECORDS

Chapter 112
PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES: GENERAL PROVISIONS

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F.S. 112.18

112.18 Firefighters and law enforcement or correctional officers; special provisions relative to disability.—

(1)(a) Any condition or impairment of health of any Florida state, municipal, county, port authority, special tax district, or fire control district firefighter or any law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer as defined in s. 943.10(1), (2), or (3) caused by tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension resulting in total or partial disability or death shall be presumed to have been accidental and to have been suffered in the line of duty unless the contrary be shown by competent evidence. However, any such firefighter, law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer must have successfully passed a physical examination upon entering into any such service as a firefighter, law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer, which examination failed to reveal any evidence of any such condition. Such presumption does not apply to benefits payable under or granted in a policy of life insurance or disability insurance, unless the insurer and insured have negotiated for such additional benefits to be included in the policy contract.

(b)1. If a firefighter did not undergo a preemployment physical examination, the medical examination required by s. 633.412(5) shall be deemed to satisfy the physical examination requirement under paragraph (a), if the medical examination completed pursuant to s. 633.412(5) failed to reveal any evidence of tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension.

2. If a firefighter underwent a preemployment physical examination, the employing fire service provider, as defined in s. 633.102, must maintain records of the physical examination for at least 5 years after the employee’s separation from the employing fire service provider. If the employing fire service provider fails to maintain the records of the physical examination for the 5-year period after the employee’s separation, it is presumed that the employee has met the requirements of paragraph (a).

(c)1. For any workers’ compensation claim filed under this section and chapter 440 occurring on or after July 1, 2010, a law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer as defined in s. 943.10(1), (2), or (3) suffering from tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension is presumed not to have incurred such disease in the line of duty as provided in this section if the law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer:

a. Departed in a material fashion from the prescribed course of treatment of his or her personal physician and the departure is demonstrated to have resulted in a significant aggravation of the tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension resulting in disability or increasing the disability or need for medical treatment; or

b. Was previously compensated pursuant to this section and chapter 440 for tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension and thereafter sustains and reports a new compensable workers’ compensation claim under this section and chapter 440, and the law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer has departed in a material fashion from the prescribed course of treatment of an authorized physician for the preexisting workers’ compensation claim and the departure is demonstrated to have resulted in a significant aggravation of the tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension resulting in disability or increasing the disability or need for medical treatment.

2. As used in this paragraph, “prescribed course of treatment” means prescribed medical courses of action and prescribed medicines for the specific disease or diseases claimed and as documented in the prescribing physician’s medical records.

3. If there is a dispute as to the appropriateness of the course of treatment prescribed by a physician under sub-subparagraph 1.a. or sub-subparagraph 1.b. or whether a departure in a material fashion from the prescribed course of treatment is demonstrated to have resulted in a significant aggravation of the tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension resulting in disability or increasing the disability or need for medical treatment, the law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer is entitled to seek an independent medical examination pursuant to s. 440.13(5).

4. A law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer is not entitled to the presumption provided in this section unless a claim for benefits is made prior to or within 180 days after leaving the employment of the employing agency.

(2) This section authorizes each governmental entity specified in subsection (1) to negotiate policy contracts for life and disability insurance to include accidental death benefits or double indemnity coverage which shall include the presumption that any condition or impairment of health of any firefighter, law enforcement officer, or correctional officer caused by tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension resulting in total or partial disability or death was accidental and suffered in the line of duty, unless the contrary be shown by competent evidence.

(3)(a) Notwithstanding s. 440.13(2)(c), a firefighter, law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer requiring medical treatment for a compensable presumptive condition listed in subsection (1) may be treated by a medical specialist. Except in emergency situations, a firefighter, law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer entitled to access a medical specialist under this subsection must provide written notice of his or her selection of a medical specialist to the firefighter’s or officer’s workers’ compensation carrier, self-insured employer, or third-party administrator, and the carrier, self-insured employer, or third-party administrator must authorize the selected medical specialist or authorize an alternative medical specialist with the same or greater qualifications. Within 5 business days after receipt of the written notice, the workers’ compensation carrier, self-insured employer, or third-party administrator must authorize treatment and schedule an appointment, which must be held within 30 days after receipt of the written notice, with the selected medical specialist or the alternative medical specialist. If the workers’ compensation carrier, self-insured employer, or third-party administrator fails to authorize an alternative medical specialist within 5 business days after receipt of the written notice, the medical specialist selected by the firefighter or officer is authorized. The continuing care and treatment by a medical specialist must be reasonable, necessary, and related to tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension; be reimbursed at no more than 200 percent of the Medicare rate for a selected medical specialist; and be authorized by the firefighter’s or officer’s workers’ compensation carrier, self-insured employer, or third-party administrator.

(b) For purposes of this subsection, the term “medical specialist” means a physician licensed under chapter 458 or chapter 459 who has board certification in a medical specialty inclusive of care and treatment of tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension.

History.—s. 1, ch. 65-480; s. 1, ch. 73-125; s. 32, ch. 77-104; s. 692, ch. 95-147; s. 21, ch. 99-392; s. 3, ch. 2002-236; s. 2, ch. 2010-175; s. 1, ch. 2022-114; s. 1, ch. 2024-209.

F.S. 112.18 on Google Scholar

F.S. 112.18 on Casetext

Amendments to 112.18

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 112.18

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 112.18.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases Citing Statute 112.18

Total Results: 20

Seminole County, Florida and Johns Eastern Company, Inc. v. Braden

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2023-12-13T00:00:00-08:00

Snippet: in section 112.18, was meant to include “any kind of hypertension”). Section 112.18 covers any …attack and subsequent heart transplant 1 § 112.18, Fla. Stat. (2021). which occurred after his diagnosis…statutory presumption of work causation under section 112.18 applied. He asserted a date of accident of January…Stipulation. Braden sought compensability under section 112.18. 2 Seminole County asserted as a defense, among…withdrew the defense and stipulated that section 112.18 applied and that Braden was entitled to the statutory

Joshua Holcombe v. City of Naples/Johns Eastern Company, Inc.

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2021-09-15T00:53:00-07:00

Snippet: under section 112.18, its past existence could not preclude the presumption of section 112.18 regarding essential…presumption of occupational causation provided by section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2018). For the foregoing reasons…fifteen days after he began working satisfied section 112.18); see also City of Homestead v. Foust, 242 So. …asserted entitlement to the presumption in section 112.18 that hypertension is occupationally caused. The…on the [PEP] prevents application of Section 112.18, F.S. to essential hypertension. Claimant

St. Lucie FCRD and PGCS v. FMIT, Florida Municipal etc.

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2018-12-09T23:53:00-08:00

Snippet: of occupational causation set forth in section 112.18, Florida Statutes, which does not apply if the …qualify as a firefighter for purposes of section 112.18 because he was not on “active duty status” on the

Ruben Rodriguez v. Tallahassee Fire Department/ City of Tallahassee

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2018-03-15T00:53:00-07:00

Snippet: compensable by his Employer/Carrier (E/C) under section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2013) (providing rebuttable

City of Jacksonville and City of Jacksonville etc. v. Adrian O'Neal

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2018-03-15T00:53:00-07:00

Snippet: correctional officer since 1995, relied on section 112.18, Florida Statutes, which provides a presumption…causation for heart disease in correctional officers. § 112.18, Fla. Stat. (2002). The E/C argued that Claimant

City of Homestead/Preferred Gov't Claims Solutions v. Foust

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2018-01-26T00:00:00-08:00

Citation: 242 So. 3d 1169

Snippet: LEO, and section 112.18 does not include auxiliary LEOs. Specifically, section 112.18 refers to subsection… section 112.18 on three alternative grounds: 1) the statutory presumption of section 112.18 did not apply…reject that interpretation of section 112.18 because section 112.18 has included all of its prerequisites…disease and hypertension by operation of section 112.18, Florida Statutes. For the following reasons, we…and hypertension for LEOs available under section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes.1 The E/C responded that Claimant

City of Tavares and Gallagher Bassett etc. v. Billy Harper

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2017-10-30T00:53:00-07:00

Snippet: presumption in the Heart-Lung Statute, section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2015). According to the…workplace injury in accordance with the section 112.18(1) statutory presumption. This statute provides… be shown by competent evidence.” § 112.18(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015). But to qualify for the…of compensability of hypertension under section 112.18(1)); Miami-Dade Cty. v. Davis, 26 So. 3d 13, 17…- 18 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (holding that section 112.18(1) presumption was precluded where relevant pre-employment

City of Tavares v. Harper

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2017-10-24T00:00:00-07:00

Citation: 230 So. 3d 918

Snippet: presumption in the Heart-Lung Statute, section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2015). According to the E…workplace injury in accordance'with the section 112.18(1) statutory presumption. This statute provides…the contrary be,shown by competent evidence.” § 112.18(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015). But to qualify for the…of compensability of hypertension under section 112.18(1)); Miami-Dade Cty. v. Davis, 26 So.3d 13, 17-…17-18 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) (holding that section 112.18(1) presumption was precluded where relevant pre-

City of Jacksonville v. Ratliff

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2017-04-13T00:00:00-07:00

Citation: 217 So. 3d 183

Snippet: treatment under the “heart-lung” statute, section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2014). The Claimant did not …respect, but write to clarify application of section 112.18(1) regarding the shifting burdens of proof and … for the “heart-lung” presumption under section 112.18(1), having no evidence of heart disease on his …unknown.2 II. Firefighter’s Presumption Section 112.18(1), also known as the “firefighter’s presumption…facts or inference alone. The enactment of section 112.18 offered a claim option that allowed qualifying

State of Florida Department of Corr. v. Andrew Junod

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2017-04-13T00:00:00-07:00

Citation: 217 So. 3d 200

Snippet: benefits under the heart-lung statute, section 112.18 of the Florida Statutes. We reverse. Claimant…statute was enacted in 1965, covering firemen only. § 112.18, Fla. Stat. (1965) (codifying Ch. 65-480, Laws …benefits to be included in the policy contract. § 112.18(1), Fla. Stat. (2009). Rebutting the Statutory… described the presumption created in section 112.18 as an expression of social policy, and thus held…successfully rebutted the statutory presumption of section 112.18, and the EMA’s opinion was not competent, substantial

Gonzalez v. St. Lucie County-Fire District/Florida Municipal Insurance Trust-Florida League of Cities, Inc.

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2016-03-20T00:00:00-07:00

Citation: 186 So. 3d 1106

Snippet: determination of compensable heart disease under paragraph 112.18, Florida Statutes (2013). * In the final…the rebuttal of the presumption under paragraph 112.18(1)(a) is to determine whether CSE supports whatever…contrary be shown by competent evidence." § 112.18(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (2013); 1D15-3185

Thomasena Mitchell v. Miami Dade County aka MDPD (Intracoastal) etc.

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2016-02-28T00:00:00-08:00

Citation: 186 So. 3d 65

Snippet: enforcement officer, was entitled under paragraph 112.18(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2012). See Miami-Dade…the presumption afforded Claimant under section 112.18 and how it is applied to the facts in this case…the nature of the presumption provided by section 112.18. Id. In Warfel, the supreme…presumption because Claimant relied solely on the section 112.18 presumption to establish compensability.

Scherer v. Volusia County Department of Corrections

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2015-07-07T00:00:00-07:00

Citation: 171 So. 3d 135

Snippet: dissenting. Because I conclude that subparagraph 112.18(l)(b)4 renders Appellant ineligible for the presumption…presumption of occupational causation in paragraph 112.18(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2013), which provides …duty, a claimant * is required under subparagraph 112.18(l)(b)4 to “make” a claim for benefits prior to …agrees, that the date reference in subparagraph 112.18(l)(b)l qualifies subparagraph (b)4, such that the…2005), we held that a 2002 amendment to subsection 112.18(1), which expanded the class of workers entitled

Miami-Dade County v. Thomasena Mitchell

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2015-02-04T00:00:00-08:00

Citation: 159 So. 3d 172, 2015 WL 468980

Snippet: Claimant, a law enforcement officer, under section 112.18(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2012). The Employer argues… met where the presumption contained in section 112.18(1) is applied, the Employer, in rebutting the presumption

City of Jacksonville Fire and Rescue etc. v. Johnny Battle

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2014-09-22T00:00:00-07:00

Citation: 148 So. 3d 795

Snippet: found Claimant was entitled to rely on section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2012), which reads: (1)…evidence of any such condition. ... Section 112.18 creates a presumption of occupational causation…constitutes disability for the purposes of section 112.18. The JCC analogized this case to Rocha v.…disability— and thus no entitlement to the section 112.18 presumption — despite “that [Mr. Bivens] missed…case comports with the plain language of section 112.18, which is evidence of legislative intent to include

Leon Smith v. City of Daytona Beach Police Dept./City of etc.

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2014-07-30T00:00:00-07:00

Citation: 143 So. 3d 436

Snippet: afforded law enforcement officers under section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes. Claimant appealed the JCC… as occupational disease in cases where section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes, applies). An essential element…the happening of an injury by accident ....”); § 112.18(1), Fla. Stat. (2012) (requiring employees seeking

Johns Eastern Co. v. Bellamy

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2014-03-12T00:00:00-07:00

Citation: 137 So. 3d 1058

Snippet: and certain other employees, set out in section 112.18(l)(a), Florida Statutes (2011). Nevertheless, because…seeks to rebut the presumption afforded by section 112.18. Two circumstances were identified and this Court

City of North Bay Village v. Guevara

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2013-11-06T00:00:00-08:00

Citation: 129 So. 3d 1100

Snippet: afforded law enforcement officers under section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (2006). The JCC also noted…statute of limitations defense. Neither section 112.18(1) nor section 440.185(4), nor any other portion…details regarding the presumption found in section 112.18(1). Here, the claim packet sent to Claimant included

Pasco County Sheriff's Office v. Shaffer

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2013-10-23T00:00:00-07:00

Citation: 125 So. 3d 1051, 2013 WL 5744441, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 16979

Snippet: pursuant to section 112.18, Florida Statutes. In pertinent part, section 112.18(l)(a), Florida Statutes… can be considered disabled pursuant to section 112.18, Florida Statutes. It is argued that because Claimant… may be considered disabled pursuant to section 112.18, Florida Statutes. See Rocha v. City of Tampa, … that in cases involving application of section 112.18, Florida Statutes, the inquiry has focused on the

Johns Eastern Co. v. Schraw

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2013-06-03T00:00:00-07:00

Citation: 115 So. 3d 428

Snippet: pre-ventri-cular contraction condition, pursuant to section 112.18, Florida Statutes. The E/C raises two points on