Florida Statutes
Fla. Stat. § 112.18 (2025)
Firefighters and law enforcement or correctional officers; special provisions relative to disability.
✓ 2025 Florida Statutes — current through the 2025 Regular Session
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112.18 Firefighters and law enforcement or correctional officers; special provisions relative to disability.—
(1)(a) Any condition or impairment of health of any Florida state, municipal, county, port authority, special tax district, or fire control district firefighter or any law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer as defined in s. 943.10(1), (2), or (3) caused by tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension resulting in total or partial disability or death shall be presumed to have been accidental and to have been suffered in the line of duty unless the contrary be shown by competent evidence. However, any such firefighter, law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer must have successfully passed a physical examination upon entering into any such service as a firefighter, law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer, which examination failed to reveal any evidence of any such condition. Such presumption does not apply to benefits payable under or granted in a policy of life insurance or disability insurance, unless the insurer and insured have negotiated for such additional benefits to be included in the policy contract.
(b)1. If a firefighter did not undergo a preemployment physical examination, the medical examination required by s. 633.412(5) shall be deemed to satisfy the physical examination requirement under paragraph (a), if the medical examination completed pursuant to s. 633.412(5) failed to reveal any evidence of tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension.
2. If a firefighter underwent a preemployment physical examination, the employing fire service provider, as defined in s. 633.102, must maintain records of the physical examination for at least 5 years after the employee’s separation from the employing fire service provider. If the employing fire service provider fails to maintain the records of the physical examination for the 5-year period after the employee’s separation, it is presumed that the employee has met the requirements of paragraph (a).
(c)1. For any workers’ compensation claim filed under this section and chapter 440 occurring on or after July 1, 2010, a law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer as defined in s. 943.10(1), (2), or (3) suffering from tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension is presumed not to have incurred such disease in the line of duty as provided in this section if the law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer:
a. Departed in a material fashion from the prescribed course of treatment of his or her personal physician and the departure is demonstrated to have resulted in a significant aggravation of the tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension resulting in disability or increasing the disability or need for medical treatment; or
b. Was previously compensated pursuant to this section and chapter 440 for tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension and thereafter sustains and reports a new compensable workers’ compensation claim under this section and chapter 440, and the law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer has departed in a material fashion from the prescribed course of treatment of an authorized physician for the preexisting workers’ compensation claim and the departure is demonstrated to have resulted in a significant aggravation of the tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension resulting in disability or increasing the disability or need for medical treatment.
2. As used in this paragraph, “prescribed course of treatment” means prescribed medical courses of action and prescribed medicines for the specific disease or diseases claimed and as documented in the prescribing physician’s medical records.
3. If there is a dispute as to the appropriateness of the course of treatment prescribed by a physician under sub-subparagraph 1.a. or sub-subparagraph 1.b. or whether a departure in a material fashion from the prescribed course of treatment is demonstrated to have resulted in a significant aggravation of the tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension resulting in disability or increasing the disability or need for medical treatment, the law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer is entitled to seek an independent medical examination pursuant to s. 440.13(5).
4. A law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer is not entitled to the presumption provided in this section unless a claim for benefits is made prior to or within 180 days after leaving the employment of the employing agency.
(2) This section authorizes each governmental entity specified in subsection (1) to negotiate policy contracts for life and disability insurance to include accidental death benefits or double indemnity coverage which shall include the presumption that any condition or impairment of health of any firefighter, law enforcement officer, or correctional officer caused by tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension resulting in total or partial disability or death was accidental and suffered in the line of duty, unless the contrary be shown by competent evidence.
(3)(a) Notwithstanding s. 440.13(2)(c), a firefighter, law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer requiring medical treatment for a compensable presumptive condition listed in subsection (1) may be treated by a medical specialist. Except in emergency situations, a firefighter, law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or correctional probation officer entitled to access a medical specialist under this subsection must provide written notice of his or her selection of a medical specialist to the firefighter’s or officer’s workers’ compensation carrier, self-insured employer, or third-party administrator, and the carrier, self-insured employer, or third-party administrator must authorize the selected medical specialist or authorize an alternative medical specialist with the same or greater qualifications. Within 5 business days after receipt of the written notice, the workers’ compensation carrier, self-insured employer, or third-party administrator must authorize treatment and schedule an appointment, which must be held within 30 days after receipt of the written notice, with the selected medical specialist or the alternative medical specialist. If the workers’ compensation carrier, self-insured employer, or third-party administrator fails to authorize an alternative medical specialist within 5 business days after receipt of the written notice, the medical specialist selected by the firefighter or officer is authorized. The continuing care and treatment by a medical specialist must be reasonable, necessary, and related to tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension; be reimbursed at no more than 200 percent of the Medicare rate for a selected medical specialist; and be authorized by the firefighter’s or officer’s workers’ compensation carrier, self-insured employer, or third-party administrator.
(b) For purposes of this subsection, the term “medical specialist” means a physician licensed under chapter 458 or chapter 459 who has board certification in a medical specialty inclusive of care and treatment of tuberculosis, heart disease, or hypertension.
History.—s. 1, ch. 65-480; s. 1, ch. 73-125; s. 32, ch. 77-104; s. 692, ch. 95-147; s. 21, ch. 99-392; s. 3, ch. 2002-236; s. 2, ch. 2010-175; s. 1, ch. 2022-114; s. 1, ch. 2024-209.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 81
cases (6 in the last 5 years), 1971–2026 · leading case: Punsky v. Clay Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 18 So. 3d 577 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).
Punsky v. Clay Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 18 So. 3d 577 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). “See § 112.18(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). The record does not support such a finding.”
Scherer v. Volusia Cnty. Dep't of Corr., 171 So. 3d 135 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). ““Section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2009)—variously known as the ‘Firefighter’s Presumption,’ the ‘Heart and Lung Bill’ or the ‘Heart– Lung Statute,’ see 9 Patrick John McGinley, Fla.”
Caldwell v. Div. of Ret., Etc., 372 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 1979). “1971)), so did the legislature establish a general rule for firemen in section 112.18, Florida Statutes (1975). The statutory presumption relieved Caldwell from the necessity of proving an occupational causation of heart disease.”
Fuller v. Okaloosa Corr. Inst., 22 So. 3d 803 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). “Claimant argues competent substantial evidence (CSE) does not support the JCC’s finding that the Employer rebutted the presumption of compensability provided for in section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2007), by showing a non-occupational cause of the condition.”
Walters v. State-DOC/Div. of Risk Mgmt., 100 So. 3d 1173 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). “Section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2009) — variously known as the “Firefighter’s Presumption,” the “Heart and Lung Bill” or the “Heart-Lung Statute,” see 9 Patrick John McGinley, Fla.”
Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Davis, 26 So. 3d 13 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). “35 3 , Florida Statutes, should be read in pari materia so that the only physical examination a firefighter needs to take and pass, for purposes of determining whether the presumption set forth in section 112.18 applies, is the initial medical examination described in section…”
Bivens v. City of Lakeland, 993 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). “Claimant argued that the statutory presumption of section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes, was applicable for both conditions.”
City of Homestead/Preferred Gov't Claims Solutions v. Foust, 242 So. 3d 1169 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). “*1170 The City of Homestead and Preferred Government Claims Solutions (E/C) appeal an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) finding compensability of, and awarding benefits for, Claimant Harley Foust's heart disease and hypertension by operation of section 112.18,…”
Universal Ins. Co. of North Am. v. Warfel, 82 So. 3d 47 (Fla. 2012). “Applying this standard to a statute that governed a presumption in favor of firefighters, the Court held: The presumption contained in section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1975), affects the burden of persuasion.”
City of Jacksonville v. Ratliff, 217 So. 3d 183 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). “In this workers’ compensation appeal, the Employer/Carrier (E/C) challenges an order awarding the Claimant, a firefighter, entitlement to compensability of his heart condition and related medical treatment under the “heart-lung” statute, section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2014).…”
City of Pembroke Pines v. Ortagus, 50 So. 3d 31 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). “He filed a petition for benefits in January 2009 when the employer/carrier (“E/C”), after paying medical benefits for three years, terminated benefits claiming that under section 112.18, Florida Statutes, he became ineligible for workers’ compensation benefits once he returned…”
State of Florida Dep't of Corr. v. Andrew Junod, 217 So. 3d 200 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). “An earlier Florida Supreme Court decision held that medical incidents such as heart attacks could be compensable events even without the occurrence of a literal “accident,” if they resulted from unusual work-related exertion.”
— 112.18(1) — 57 cases
Punsky v. Clay Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 18 So. 3d 577 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). “See § 112.18(1), Fla. Stat. (2005). The record does not support such a finding.”
Bivens v. City of Lakeland, 993 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). “Claimant argued that the statutory presumption of section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes, was applicable for both conditions.”
Fuller v. Okaloosa Corr. Inst., 22 So. 3d 803 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). “Claimant argues competent substantial evidence (CSE) does not support the JCC’s finding that the Employer rebutted the presumption of compensability provided for in section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2007), by showing a non-occupational cause of the condition.”
Caldwell v. Div. of Ret., Etc., 372 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 1979). “1971)), so did the legislature establish a general rule for firemen in section 112.18, Florida Statutes (1975). The statutory presumption relieved Caldwell from the necessity of proving an occupational causation of heart disease.”
Universal Ins. Co. of North Am. v. Warfel, 82 So. 3d 47 (Fla. 2012). “Applying this standard to a statute that governed a presumption in favor of firefighters, the Court held: The presumption contained in section 112.18(1), Florida Statutes (1975), affects the burden of persuasion.”
— 112.18(1)(2007) — 1 case
Fuller v. Okaloosa Corr. Inst., 22 So. 3d 803 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). “Claimant argues competent substantial evidence (CSE) does not support the JCC’s finding that the Employer rebutted the presumption of compensability provided for in section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2007), by showing a non-occupational cause of the condition.”
— 112.18(1)(a) — 5 cases
City of Homestead/Preferred Gov't Claims Solutions v. Foust, 242 So. 3d 1169 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). “*1170 The City of Homestead and Preferred Government Claims Solutions (E/C) appeal an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) finding compensability of, and awarding benefits for, Claimant Harley Foust's heart disease and hypertension by operation of section 112.18,…”
Scherer v. Volusia Cnty. Dep't of Corr., 171 So. 3d 135 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). ““Section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2009)—variously known as the ‘Firefighter’s Presumption,’ the ‘Heart and Lung Bill’ or the ‘Heart– Lung Statute,’ see 9 Patrick John McGinley, Fla.”
Joshua Holcombe v. City of Naples/Johns E. Co., Inc. (Fla. 1st DCA 2021).
Michael Guglielmo v. State of Florida-DOC Zephyrhills C I/Div. of Risk Mgmt. (Fla. 1st DCA 2025).
Kenneth Lakatis v. Citrus Cnty. Sheriff's Off./Florida Sheriff's Risk Mgmt. Fund (FSRMF) (Fla. 1st DCA 2026).
— 112.18(1)(b) — 3 cases
Scherer v. Volusia Cnty. Dep't of Corr., 171 So. 3d 135 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). ““Section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2009)—variously known as the ‘Firefighter’s Presumption,’ the ‘Heart and Lung Bill’ or the ‘Heart– Lung Statute,’ see 9 Patrick John McGinley, Fla.”
State of Florida Dep't of Corr. v. Andrew Junod, 217 So. 3d 200 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). “An earlier Florida Supreme Court decision held that medical incidents such as heart attacks could be compensable events even without the occurrence of a literal “accident,” if they resulted from unusual work-related exertion.”
Michael Guglielmo v. State of Florida-DOC Zephyrhills C I/Div. of Risk Mgmt. (Fla. 1st DCA 2025).
— 112.18(1)(c) — 1 case
Michael Guglielmo v. State of Florida-DOC Zephyrhills C I/Div. of Risk Mgmt. (Fla. 1st DCA 2025).
— 112.18(2) — 1 case
Walters v. State-DOC/Div. of Risk Mgmt., 100 So. 3d 1173 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). “Section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2009) — variously known as the “Firefighter’s Presumption,” the “Heart and Lung Bill” or the “Heart-Lung Statute,” see 9 Patrick John McGinley, Fla.”
— 112.18(l)(a) — 8 cases
City of Tavares v. Harper, 230 So. 3d 918 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017).
State of Florida Dep't of Corr. v. Andrew Junod, 217 So. 3d 200 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017). “An earlier Florida Supreme Court decision held that medical incidents such as heart attacks could be compensable events even without the occurrence of a literal “accident,” if they resulted from unusual work-related exertion.”
Gonzalez v. St. Lucie Cnty.-Fire Dist./Florida Mun. Ins. Trust-Florida League of Cities, Inc., 186 So. 3d 1106 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).
Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Thomasena Mitchell, 159 So. 3d 172 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).
Johns E. Co. v. Bellamy, 137 So. 3d 1058 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).
— 112.18(l)(b) — 1 case
Scherer v. Volusia Cnty. Dep't of Corr., 171 So. 3d 135 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015). ““Section 112.18, Florida Statutes (2009)—variously known as the ‘Firefighter’s Presumption,’ the ‘Heart and Lung Bill’ or the ‘Heart– Lung Statute,’ see 9 Patrick John McGinley, Fla.”
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