Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...ralluzzo. In 1988, however, the legislature amended section 455.241(2), ch. 88-208, § 2, Laws *151 of Fla., to provide for a physician-patient privilege of confidentiality by adding the following emphasized language: Except as otherwise provided in s. 440.13(2), such [medical] records may not be furnished to, and the medical condition of a patient may not be discussed with, any person other than the patient or the patient's legal representative or other health care providers involved in the car...

...United States, 508 U.S. 223, 233, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 2056, 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993) ("Just as a single word cannot be read in isolation, nor can a single provision of a statute.") The first sentence of section 455.241(2) states: Except as otherwise provided in s. 440.13(2), such records[ [4] ] may not be furnished to, and the medical condition of a patient may not be discussed with, any person other than the patient or the patient's legal representative or other health care providers involved in the care and treatment of the patient, except upon written authorization of the patient....

...We did not specifically discuss section 455.241(2). [4] The reference to "such records" relates back to section 455.241(1) which discusses the records relating to a physical or mental examination or treatment made by a licensed health care practitioner. [5] Initially, section 440.13(2) is excepted from the scope of section 455.241 because that statutory provision already creates an exception to patient records confidentiality in workers' compensation cases. Section 440.13(2)(f) states in relevant part: Notwithstanding the limitations in s....

...ituations where the employer or carrier has reason to believe there is a probable basis for filing a claim against the Special Disability Trust Fund as a result of such injury and the employee or his attorney has been furnished a copy of such claim. § 440.13(2)(f), Fla.Stat. (1993) (footnote omitted). This provision is no longer found in section 440.13(2). In fact, the language has been somewhat altered. See Ch. 93-415, § 17, Laws of Fla. (codified at section 440.13(4)(c), Florida Statutes (1995))....

...Section 440.15(3) does not bar a claimant who is either permanently, totally disabled or temporarily, totally impaired from such benefits. Nor does it bar one who is permanently, partially impaired from remedial medical treatment, as authorized under section 440.13(1), Florida Statutes....

...cal reports of authorized treating health care providers relating to the claimant and subject accident shall be received into evidence by the [JCC]." Finally, Henson submits that Frye testing is unnecessary to assure evidentiary reliability, because section 440.13(9)(c) provides for the appointment of expert medical advisors to assist the JCC with issues of medical causation and requires that the EMA [expert medical advisor] opinion "is presumed to be correct unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary." Henson, 787 So.2d at 10....

...This statutory provision only ensures the admission into evidence of the written records of the claimant's treating physicians, and does not address the content of expert opinion testimony. See § 440.29(4), Fla. Stat. (2001). Thus, section 440.29 has no bearing on the question before us. Section 440.13(9), Florida Statutes (2001), defines the role and appointment of expert medical advisors (EMA's) in workers' compensation proceedings. While the statutory framework certainly allows the JCC to rely upon an EMA's expert opinion, see § 440.13(9)(c) ("The opinion of the [EMA] is presumed to be correct unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary as determined by the [JCC]."), none of the provisions of chapter 440 preclude or conflict with use of the Frye criteria to test and ensure the reliability of novel scientific methods utilized by any expert witness. See § 440.13(9), Fla....

...Concluding that the judge of compensation claims had a statutory duty to order evaluation by an expert medical advisor before ruling on the merits of the petition for benefits, we reverse the final order and remand for the designation of an expert medical advisor, as contemplated by section 440.13(9)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 38F-54.005, and for such further proceedings before a judge of compensation claims as may be required....

...His psychiatric condition had become the only basis on which he might qualify for permanent total disability benefits when, a week before the final hearing began, his employer filed a motion for appointment of an expert medical (psychiatric) advisor, on the authority of section 440.13(9)(c), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...on. The concern for timeliness the final order manifests is unquestionably legitimate. It is for the judge of compensation claims—not for the parties—to set hearings, to continue them, if need be, and generally to control the docket. To the extent section 440.13(9)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), permits a party to insist in effect on a continuance—even after an evidentiary hearing on the merits has begun—it carries with it possibilities for unwarranted disruption and delay....

...Farm Stores, Inc. v. Fletcher, 621 So.2d 706, 708 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)(holding employer lost statutory right to independent examination where it "waited more than a year to attempt to schedule the independent dental examination"). On the other hand, sections 440.13(9)(c) and 440.25(4)(d), Florida Statutes (1995), contemplate resort to an expert medical advisor, even if disagreement between medical providers becomes apparent only after the merits hearing has begun. At such hearing, the claimant and employer may each present evidence in respect of such claim.... When there is a conflict in the medical evidence submitted at the hearing, the provisions of s. 440.13 shall apply....

...Comp. P. 4.045. Even without a party's requesting it, the judge of compensation claims "shall" appoint an expert medical advisor, if the requisite disagreement in the opinions of health care providers is apparent at the time of the pretrial hearing. § 440.13(9)(c), Fla....

...pursuit of any discovery designed to reveal conflict in the medical evidence. Fla. R. Work. Comp. P. 4.045(m) and 4.055. Material Disagreement The final order denied the employer's motion for appointment of an expert medical advisor, characterizing section 440.13(9)(c) Florida Statutes (1995), as "directive in nature permitting [but not requiring] a judge to invoke additional assistance in decision-making in some settings," and awarded permanent total disability benefits....

...he judge of compensation claims necessarily accepted only one of these opposing views. Reaching the merits of appellants' motion, the judge of compensation claims declined to "order the injured employee to be evaluated by an expert medical advisor," § 440.13(9)(c), Fla....

..."[P]rocedure within administrative agencies is subject to statutory regulation." Life Care Ctrs. of Am., Inc. v. Sawgrass Care Ctr., Inc., 683 So.2d 609, 612 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)(quoting Gator Freightways, Inc. v. Mayo, 328 So.2d 444, 446 (Fla.1976)). Section 440.13(9)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), provides: If there is disagreement in the opinions of the health care providers, if two health care providers disagree on medical evidence supporting the employee's complaints or the need for additional...

...ee to be evaluated by an expert medical advisor. The opinion of the expert medical advisor is presumed to be correct unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary as determined by the judge of compensation claims. The requirements of section 440.13(9)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), are mandatory and binding on the judge of compensation claims....

...In our view, the statute leaves intact the distinction between witnesses and adjudicators, virtual or otherwise. In any event, such arguments should be addressed to the Legislature, and are a wholly insufficient basis for a judge of compensation claims to disregard the clear expression of legislative policy that section 440.13(9)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), embodies....

...I find that this motion initially filed by the Employer/Carrier [sic] was untimely and late-filed. Although I heard argument on the motion and held the motion in abeyance without prejudice to renew consideration.... [2] The judge of compensation claims has fifteen days in which to act on a party's written request. § 440.13(9)(c), Fla. Stat. (1995). "[T]he Division shall, within 10 days, assign an expert medical advisor." Fla. Admin. Code R. 38F-54.005(2). Section 440.13(9)(d), Florida Statutes (1995), provides: The expert medical advisor must complete his evaluation and issue his report to the division or to the judge of compensation claims within 45 days after receipt of all medical records....

...Once an appointment is scheduled, however, a claimant who is receiving benefits has an important incentive to show up: "An employee who fails to report to and cooperate with such evaluation forfeits entitlement to compensation during the period of failure to report or cooperate." § 440.13(9)(c), Fla....

...penses." Claimant has taken this appeal and argues that the JCC misinterpreted the EMA's testimony in this case. ANALYSIS An EMA's opinion is presumptively correct unless the JCC finds and articulates "clear and convincing evidence to the contrary." § 440.13(9)(c), Fla....

...s automatically in a victory for the claimant is not correct. Instead, remand is appropriate. The EMA, as envisaged by the Legislature, is tasked "to assist the agency and the judge [ ] of compensation claims within the advisor's area of expertise." § 440.13(9)(a), Fla....

...December 5, 1996. Rehearing Denied January 10, 1997. *837 Barbara L. Richard, Ocala, for appellant. Betty D. Marion, Ocala, for appellees. KAHN, Judge. In this workers' compensation appeal, the claimant, Benjamin Rucker, challenges the constitutionality of section 440.13(5)(e), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994)....

...This case turns on whether Dr. Bennett, who treated Rucker but was never authorized by the E/SA, should have been allowed to testify on Rucker's behalf. II Proceedings Before the JCC Before the merits hearing, the E/SA sought an order excluding Dr. Bennett's testimony. Citing section 440.13(5)(e), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), [1] the E/SA argued that *839 because they had never authorized Dr. Bennett, his testimony was prohibited. In response, Rucker filed a Motion to Designate Dr. Bennett as Medical Advisor. In this motion, Rucker argued that the E/SA had not authorized Dr. Bennett, nor had he performed an IME; therefore, pursuant to section 440.13(5)(e), Dr....

...Rucker further asserted that refusal to admit Dr. Bennett's testimony into evidence would amount to a denial of his right to a fair hearing and due process of law. The JCC granted the E/SA's request to exclude Dr. Bennett's testimony. The JCC also denied Rucker's Motion to Designate, citing section 440.13(4) and Florida Administrative Code Rule 38F-54.002(10)....

...to agree that the Claimant could return to work, provided he did not have to lift over 50 pounds." Rucker has appealed and raises four points. Specifically, Rucker asserts that the JCC erred in interpreting the term "authorized treating provider" in section 440.13(5)(e) to mean treating providers authorized by the E/SA, thereby rendering the statute unconstitutional. Rucker also asserts that the JCC erred in applying section 440.13(5)(e) to exclude Dr....

...on of equal protection as guaranteed by article I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution. III "Authorized Treating Provider" As to the first point on appeal, we find that the JCC did not err in interpreting the term "authorized treating provider" in section 440.13(5)(e) to mean treating providers authorized by the E/SA....

...94), provides in pertinent part: "All medical reports of authorized treating health care providers relating to the claimant and subject accident shall be received into evidence by the judge of compensation claims upon proper motion...." In addition, section 440.13(3)(a) provides in pertinent part: (3) PROVIDER ELIGIBILITY; AUTHORIZATION.— (a) As a condition to eligibility for payment under this chapter, a health care provider who renders services must be a certified health care provider and must receive authorization from the carrier before providing treatment. This paragraph does not apply to emergency care.... See also § 440.13(14)(a), Fla.Stat. (Supp. 1994) (payment of medical fees). Further, section 440.13(3)(c) prohibits a health care provider from referring an employee without prior authorization from the carrier, except when emergency care is rendered....

...Finally, Rule 38F-7.516(2), Florida Administrative Code, defines "authorization" as "[a]pproval from the carrier to render or order the provision of health care services." Read in conjunction with the foregoing provisions, the term "authorized treating provider" in section 440.13(5)(e) means a treating provider authorized by the E/SA, as determined by the JCC in this case. IV Procedural Due Process Next, appellant challenges section 440.13(5)(e) as an unconstitutional denial of procedural due process in violation of article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution. [2] Section 440.13(5)(e), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...In addition, the JCC denied Rucker's Motion to Designate Dr. Bennett as Medical Advisor. Accordingly, pursuant to the statute, the JCC determined that Dr. Bennett's opinions were not admissible. Appellant asserts that Dr. Bennett's testimony was essential to his claim and that its exclusion, pursuant to section 440.13(5)(e), constituted a denial of a full and fair opportunity to be heard....

...of the courts.' The judicial model of an evidentiary hearing is neither a required, nor even the most effective, method of decisionmaking in all circumstances." (citation omitted)). No procedural due process violation occurred by the application of section 440.13(5)(e) in this case....

...alternative methods of obtaining and introducing medical opinions under the statute and case law. [4] For example, Rucker could have selected Dr. Bennett, or another chiropractor, as an IME physician rather than Dr. Jones, an orthopedic surgeon. See § 440.13(5), Fla....

...Further, Dr. Jones, as an orthopedic surgeon, could have been questioned regarding Rucker's need for chiropractic care if he had the requisite knowledge and qualifications. See Clair v. Glades County Bd. of Comm'rs, 649 So.2d 224, 225 (Fla.1995) ("[S]ection 440.13, Florida Statutes (1983), does not preclude physicians licensed under one statute from testifying regarding reasonableness and necessity of treatment by a physician licensed under another statute, provided the testifying physician is, based on...

...actic care Rucker received or his qualifications to render such an opinion. Moreover, if Dr. Jones could not qualify to render an opinion concerning chiropractic care, Rucker could have requested appointment of an alternate IME physician pursuant to section 440.13(5)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994)....

...by article I, section 21 of the Florida Constitution. [5] He argues that although the exclusive remedy provided by the workers' compensation system itself has been found to be a reasonable alternative to an injured worker's common law tort remedies, section 440.13(5)(e), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), as applied within that system, is an unreasonable burden on the employee's constitutional right of access to courts....

...ously recognized cause of action and, as such, does not offend article I, Section 21, of the Florida Constitution." (citations omitted; emphasis added)), decision approved, 440 So.2d 1285 (Fla.1983). VI Equal Protection Finally, Rucker contends that section 440.13(5)(e) is unconstitutional as a violation of his equal protection rights guaranteed by article I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution....

...498, 83 L.Ed.2d 391 (1984). Therefore, this argument must fail. See Peoples Bank, 395 So.2d at 524 (statute is presumed constitutional and party challenging statute has burden of establishing its invalidity). VII Conclusion The limitation on testimony contained in section 440.13(5)(e) does not in and of itself frustrate the claimant seeking to introduce helpful medical testimony....

...We do not, therefore, preclude a future challenge to the statute as applied. See Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Fla., 678 So.2d 1239 (Fla. 1996); Martinez v. Scanlan, 582 So.2d 1167, 1176 (Fla.1991). AFFIRMED. BARFIELD, C.J., and ERVIN, J., concur. NOTES [1] Section 440.13(5), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, or be compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness against himself." [3] In Southern Bakeries v. Cooper, this court held that section 440.13(5)(e), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...She asserts Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, permits the employer and insurance carrier one IME, and thus, given Dr. Ciano's evaluation, respondents are no longer entitled to have petitioner examined by Dr. Brown. In contrast, respondents argue Dr. Ciano's evaluation is a "peer review," pursuant to section 440.13, Florida Statutes, and not an IME....

...Sherwin, 829 So.2d 961 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (same). Petitioner argues that an IME had already been performed by Dr. Ciano and an IME by Dr. Brown would be the second IME. A second IME may only be ordered under more stringent circumstances than the first. See § 440.13(5)(b), Fla....

...1st DCA 1993). Therefore, the JCC's second order authorizing the IME was a material change from the first, contrary to the majority's opinion. Turning to the merits, I agree with petitioner that the JCC erred in finding Dr. Ciano performed a peer review. Section 440.13(1), Florida Statutes, defines a "peer review" as "an evaluation by two or more physicians licensed under the same authority and with the same or similar specialty as the physician under review, of the appropriateness, quality, and cost of health care and health services provided to a patient, based on medically accepted standards." § 440.13(1)(q), Fla....

...Accordingly, we held that section 766.316 requires that health care providers give patients pre-delivery notice of their participation in NICA as a condition precedent to invoking NICA immunity. Id. Notably, the term "health care provider" includes a health care facility. See § 440.13(1)(i), Fla. Stat. (1997); § 766.202(4), Fla. Stat. (2009). And "health care facility" includes a hospital. See §§ 408.032(7), 440.13(1)(h), Fla....

...Empire Drilling Co. v. Dunaway, IRC Order 2-3453 (June 6, 1978). Although the E/C can be ordered to furnish or provide a vehicle, the Workers' Compensation Act does not authorize a deputy to order that title to such vehicle vest in the claimant. Id. Section 440.13(2), Fla....

...Rehearing Denied January 14, 2005. David Rickey, Orlando and Bill McCabe, Longwood, for Appellant. Doreen E. Lasch of Conroy, Simberg, Ganon, Krevans & Abel, P.A., Hollywood, for Appellees. KAHN, J. May a claimant entitled to workers' compensation benefits under section 440.13, Florida Statutes (2001), receive a second medical opinion at the expense of the employer/carrier (E/C)? We hold that such an opinion may be required, contingent, however, upon an evidentiary showing that such is both reasonable and medically necessary....

...In response, the E/C filed a motion for summary order asserting that claimant was not entitled to a second opinion at the E/C's expense because the E/C *1129 did not participate in a managed care arrangement at the time of claimant's accident. The E/C argued a second opinion is authorized only under section 440.134, Florida Statutes, which governs the provision of benefits under a managed care arrangement. The E/C sought dismissal because section 440.13, Florida Statutes, which controls medical benefits outside managed care arrangements, authorizes only the provision of an independent medical examination (IME). The JCC agreed with the E/C's argument and dismissed claimant's petition concluding, as a matter of law, that a claimant can never obtain a second opinion at E/C expense under section 440.13....

...The question presented is one of statutory interpretation. Thus, we apply the de novo standard of review. See Socolow v. Flanigans Enters., 877 So.2d 742, 743 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). We reject the E/C's contention that a claimant seeking a second medical opinion is limited to obtaining an IME under section 440.13(5), Florida Statutes. We reach this conclusion because we cannot categorically rule out instances where a second medical opinion would constitute "medically necessary remedial treatment, care, and attendance" under section 440.13(2)(a)....

...inion. We have long recognized that an IME is a means of obtaining expert medical testimony. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 643 So.2d 1180, 1182 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) ("By granting the party seeking the IME the choice of selecting the examining physicians, [section 440.13] effectively recognizes that such physicians are essentially expert witnesses of the party requesting the examinations."); Adelman Steel Corp....

...t witness for the party requesting the examination."). Although an IME may ultimately assist a claimant in securing necessary medical treatment, it is not, in and of itself, a form of medical treatment. Our conclusion is bolstered by the language of section 440.13(5)(a), Florida Statutes (2001), which authorizes the selection of an independent medical examiner to assist in the resolution of "any dispute concerning overutilization, medical benefits, compensability, or disability." Thus, while an IME is useful in resolving disputes, it does not fall under the "medically necessary remedial treatment, care, and attendance" that an E/C must furnish under section 440.13(2)(a). On the other hand, occasions may arise where the "nature of the injury or the process of recovery" renders a second medical opinion medically necessary as contemplated by section 440.13(2)(a). Section 440.13(1)(m) defines "medically necessary" as: [A]ny medical service or medical supply which is used to identify or treat an illness or injury, is appropriate to the patient's diagnosis and status of recovery, and is consistent with the location of service, the level of care provided, and applicable practice parameters. We do not read section 440.13 as evincing a legislative intent to deny a claimant the opportunity to demonstrate the medical necessity of a second opinion....

...We are unable to define in advance the universe of possible situations where a second opinion would be medically necessary. We do, however, conclude that the claimant's request for a second opinion presents a question of fact, similar to any other request under section 440.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes....

...1st DCA 1993) (finding that it is "incumbent upon claimant to establish" the medical necessity of treatment denied by the E/C); Polk County Bd. of Comm'rs v. Varnado, 576 So.2d 833, 837 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) ("The initial inquiry in determining the validity of an award of benefits pursuant to section 440.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes, is the employee's medical need for the benefit.")....

...nc., and carrier, Humana Workers' Compensation Services (respectively, the E/C), to schedule an ex parte conference with an expert medical advisor (EMA). We have jurisdiction. Adelman Steel Corp. v. Winter, 610 So.2d 494 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Because section 440.13(4)(c), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), authorizes ex parte conferences with health care providers and not with EMAs, we grant the petition and quash the order. This is a case of first impression. Section 440.13(4)(c) provides: It is the policy for the administration of the workers' compensation system that there be reasonable access to medical information by all parties to facilitate the self-executing features of the law....

...ction, shall be subject by the division to one or more of the penalties set forth in paragraph (8)(b). (Emphasis added) (footnotes added). The JCC concluded that Dr. Robert Butler, an EMA appointed by the JCC, was a "health care provider" subject to section 440.13(4)(c), and granted the E/C's request for an ex parte conference. This was error. In reaching our decision, we note that the language in subsection (4)(c), permitting ex parte discussions between health care providers and the respective parties, was but one of several subsections added to section 440.13 at the special session of the 1993 Florida Legislature. See Ch. 93-415, § 17, at 98-111, Laws of Fla. In addition to the above subsection, the legislature amended section 440.13 by including within it subsections (5),(6),(7), (8) and (9), all of which in should be read in pari materia....

...See § 1.04, Fla. Stat. (1993). In applying this rule to the amended statute, we conclude that the legislature intended the added subsections to address chronologically the progression of a worker's injury from its initial occurrence through subsequent disputes. Section 440.13, as amended, addresses the roles of three separate categories of physicians or practitioners placed within the amended act: health care providers, independent medical examiners (IMEs), and EMAs....

...s injuries in the event of disagreement between health care providers on the medical evidence, the claimant's need for additional treatment, or the claimant's ability to return to work. A presumption of correctness attaches to the EMA's opinion. See § 440.13(9)(c)....

...e requires that the EMA selected not only be qualified to render the opinion, but also be impartial, a fact alluded to by this court's recent decision in Johns Eastern Co. v. Matta, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D1846, 717 So.2d 91 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). See also § 440.13(9)(a)....

...olution of medical disputes, and the experts so chosen should not be subject to even the "appearance of impropriety," which would result from private meetings with either party. As we earlier observed, the disputed language at issue is found only in section 440.13(4)(c), generally pertaining to the requirement that health care providers inform E/Cs of treatment furnished to injured employees on forms furnished by the division. Such language was not repeated in any other subsection of section 440.13....

...[2] Chapter 381 governs public health, and section 381.004 addresses HIV testing and the confidentiality thereof. [3] We do not mean to suggest by the above enumeration that IMEs and EMAs do not fall within the general definition of health care providers. Clearly they do. See § 440.13(1)(i). It is rather our position, for the reasons stated infra, that the pertinent language of 440.13(4)(c) was not intended to extend to health care providers who are also selected as EMAs. [4] This presumption was carried over from section 440.13(2)(j)3 a, Florida Statutes (1993)....

...That finding was not appealed. The order appealed herein was entered on December 13, 1990, and addressed, inter alia, Varnadoe's claims for benefits and attendant care. The first issues raised by the appellant in this appeal involve benefits awarded pursuant to section 440.13(2)(a), *837 Florida Statutes....

...." We will examine the propriety of the award of each benefit individually, following a brief discussion of the general state of the law concerning medical benefits. The initial inquiry in determining the validity of an award of benefits pursuant to section 440.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes, is the employee's medical need for the benefit....

...ith relieving the effect of the injury. While we sympathize with the plight of the appellee, we feel that the evidence does not support the award of an interior decorator or home furnishings. The final dispute concerning benefits awarded pursuant to section 440.13(2)(a) involves the award of one-half of the gasoline for the handicap-equipped van. [4] The JCC stated that the E/C should provide one-half of the gasoline, but expresses no justification or reason for making such an award. Section 440.13(5), Florida Statutes (1988), outlines the responsibility of the E/C for transportation costs. [5] While case law interpreting section 440.13(5) indicates that the E/C may be held responsible for insurance and major maintenance which directly relate to the availability of the vehicle itself, there is no *841 showing that one-half of the gasoline is being used for medically n...

...nt to be able to personally select the person to provide his attendant care in the event that such care could not be provided by his wife. In Robinson v. Howard Hall Co., 219 So.2d 688 (Fla. 1969), the Florida Supreme Court dealt with a provision of section 440.13, Florida Statutes, which requires an employer to furnish to an employee "such remedial treatment, care, and attendant care under the direction and supervision of a qualified physician or surgeon ......

...Frey's bills from December 19, 1985, through August 20, 1986. It is well-established that the employer and carrier are responsible for unauthorized medical care in those instances where the claimant has requested a specific type of medical treatment by one of the types of physicians described in section 440.13(1)(f), if it appears that such treatment is reasonably and medically necessary, and the employer and carrier have *1325 refused to authorize that type of treatment. Section 440.13(2), Florida Statutes (1985); Fuchs Baking Co....

...cal reports of authorized treating health care providers relating to the claimant and subject accident shall be received into evidence by the [JCC]." Finally, Henson submits that Frye testing is unnecessary to assure evidentiary reliability, because section 440.13(9)(c) provides for the appointment of expert medical advisors to assist the JCC with issues of medical causation and requires that the EMA opinion "is presumed to be correct unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary...

...a was not causally related to the accident of May 8, 1974; (3) claimant had not sustained permanent physical impairment or a loss of wage-earning capacity as a result of the accident; (4) the outstanding medical bills were not authorized pursuant to Section 440.13, Florida Statutes (1973)....

...by the claimant nor reported by various doctors and hospitals. In this respect, the Deputy found that this medical treatment was "reasonable and necessary," and he ordered that the appellants pay for such treatment. This ruling was erroneous. Under § 440.13(1), Fla....

...ment. See Atlantic Cold Storage v. Hernandez, IRC Order 2-3071 (Nov. 22, 1976). We remand this matter to the Deputy for appropriate findings as to whether there was a legally acceptable excuse for the claimant's failure to request medical treatment. Section 440.13(1), Fla....

...imely submit the required reports, id., nor does the fact that a claim is being contested constitute such good cause. See Hood's Dairy v. Severino, 178 So.2d 588, 591 (Fla. 1965). Here, the record does not indicate that the reporting requirements of § 440.13(1), Fla....

...Further, section 440.192, Florida Statutes (2000), provides a procedure for resolving any benefit disputes between a carrier and a claimant and sets strict deadlines for dispute resolution. A carrier is entitled to request an independent medical examination concerning compensability or medical benefits. See § 440.13, Fla....

...She testified that he sleeps approximately 6 hours per night. Earlier cases stand for the proposition that ordinary household chores which would have been provided anyway are not compensable. See, e.g., City of Leesburg v. Balliet, 413 So.2d 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). The 1983 legislature amended Fla. Stat. § 440.13(2)(d) to make clear that this is its legislative intent....

...pellants. Dean Burnetti of Smith & Burnetti, P.A., Lakeland, and Bill McCabe of Shepherd, McCabe & Cooley, Longwood, for appellee. ALLEN, Judge. The employer/carrier appeal a workers' compensation order, contending that the judge should have applied section 440.13(5)(e), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994), so as to exclude certain medical testimony. We conclude that the application of this enactment depends on a new independent medical examination process under section 440.13(5), which alters the parties' substantive rights. Section 440.13(5)(e) therefore does not apply in this case, where the claimant was injured prior to the effective date of the new statute....

...The employer/carrier sent the claimant to a doctor whom they chose for a medical evaluation. The claimant was also seen by several doctors whom he chose for medical evaluations. A merits hearing was scheduled, and these doctors were identified in a pretrial list of witnesses. Section 440.13(5), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...1994), subsequently became effective, creating a new independent medical examination process. Under this statute the carrier and the employee may each select an independent medical examiner, but they are then generally bound by their selection. See § 440.13(5)(a) and (b). Other rights and obligations pertaining to the independent medical examination process are also addressed, and section 440.13(5)(e) provides that: *340 No medical opinion other than the opinion of a medical advisor appointed by the judge of compensation claims or division, an independent medical examiner or an authorized treating provider is admissible in proceedings before the judges of compensation claims. After these new provisions became effective the claimant saw another doctor whom he chose for a further medical evaluation, and the case proceeded to a hearing. The employer/carrier invoked section 440.13(5)(e), and thereby sought to exclude the testimony of all of the claimant's chosen doctors....

...Lucie County Sheriff's Department, 599 So.2d 1353 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. denied, 613 So.2d 6 (Fla. 1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2350, 124 L.Ed.2d 258 (1993). Although procedural amendments which merely affect the method of proof are not similarly constrained, e.g., Litvin, and section 440.13(5)(e) would appear to have such limited procedural import if read solely unto itself, this enactment does not apply in isolation. Rather, it depends on other statutory processes relating to medical advisors, authorized treating providers, and independent medical examiners. And while the independent medical examination process under section 440.13(5) may have some procedural aspects, it also effects a change in the parties' substantive rights. When the claimant was injured section 440.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1991), allowed the employer/carrier to schedule an independent medical examination with a health care provider of their choice....

...uthority was somewhat altered with regard to the consequences of a conflict in the medical evidence. See § 440.25(4)(d), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1994). [1] Carriers could conduct independent medical evaluations in connection with utilization review under section 440.13(6), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994), and an independent medical examination process was adopted for maximum medical improvement and permanent impairment disputes. Section 440.1925, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1994). A new process was also created at section 440.13(5), broadly addressing the parties' general rights to independent medical examinations. Like the prior law, section 440.13(5)(c) allows the carrier to schedule an independent medical examination. But while the claimant may also select an independent medical examiner, the claimant's attorney may not schedule such a medical evaluation. [2] Section 440.13(5)(c). Should the claimant fail to appear for an independent medical examination, section 440.13(5)(d), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994), specifies the circumstances in which *341 the claimant may be required to reimburse the carrier for a portion of the doctor's cancellation fee. Section 440.13(5) does not otherwise address the source of payment for independent medical examinations, but section 440.13(3)(g), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994), indicates that in the absence of an express statutory provision the claimant is not obligated to pay for medical services under this section. See also § 440.13(14)(a), Fla....

...ependent medical examination of his own choice without being obligated for the cost of the examination. In giving the claimant the right to select an independent medical examiner and obtain such an examination without having to pay for this service, section 440.13(5) departs from the prior law under which the claimant could not always avoid such costs....

...the source of payment therefor, as a matter of substance. See Clay Hyder Trucking v. Atherton, 450 So.2d 318 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Webb v. Hills Van Service, 414 So.2d 262 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Ship Shape v. Taylor, 397 So.2d 1199 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Section 440.13(5) is likewise properly viewed as effecting a substantive change in the law, insofar as it alters the parties' obligation to pay for the claimant's independent medical examination. Section 440.13(5) thus does not apply in the present case, as the claimant was injured before this statute became effective. See, e.g., Sullivan. Because section 440.13(5)(e) depends on this statutory process in restricting the medical testimony, this enactment also does not apply in the present case, as it would necessitate an underlying alteration of the parties' substantive rights. The appealed order is affirmed. DAVIS, J., and WENTWORTH, Senior Judge, concur. NOTES [1] See also § 440.13(9)(c), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1994); § 440.13(2)(j)3.a, Fla. Stat. (1991). [2] Independent medical examinations are defined with reference to objective evaluations of the injured employee's medical condition. Section 440.13(1)(k), Fla....

...rcentage of disability is of three hundred fifty weeks." [7] F.S. § 440.02(9), F.S.A. [8] Ball v. Mann, Fla. 1954, 75 So.2d 758; Rosier v. Roofing & Sheet Metal Supply Co., see note 2. [9] Allen v. Maxwell Co., 152 Fla. 340, 11 So.2d 572. [10] F.S. § 440.13, F.S.A....

...[1] We deny the petitions for certiorari in cases number 91-2306 and 91-2773, and we grant the petition for certiorari and quash the order in case number 91-2713. I. The issues presented are governed by the interrelated provisions in sections 455.241 and 440.13, Florida Statutes....

...cal records, reports, and information given by that person in connection with medical treatment or examination, and prohibits the disclosure thereof by the health care practitioner or entity providing such services other than as provided therein. Subsection 440.13(2) provides for limited disclosure of medical information in workers' compensation matters under specifically defined exceptions to the restrictions set forth in section 455.241, and thereby facilitates the self-executing concept for providing benefits under the Workers' Compensation Law....

...or treatment, including X rays and insurance information (emphasis added), with certain exceptions relating to psychotherapeutic records not involved in these cases. Subsection 455.241(2) reads in pertinent part: (2) Except as otherwise provided in s. 440.13(2), such records may not be furnished to, and the medical condition of the patient may not be discussed with, any person other than the patient or his legal representative or other health care providers involved in the care or treatment of the patient, except upon written authorization of the patient....

...the medical examination or treatment was procured or furnished by the requesting party with the patient's consent, (3) such disclosure is sought by an authorized court subpoena with appropriate notice, or (4) disclosure is otherwise provided for in section 440.13(2)(c). We now discuss this last exception. B. Section 455.241 explicitly limits disclosure of a person's medical records and information in all contexts, including workers' compensation proceedings, "except as otherwise provided in s. 440.13(2)(c)." [2] This latter phrase, being an exception to a general rule, must be strictly construed, e.g., Samara Development Corp. v. Marlow, 556 So.2d 1097, 1100 (Fla. 1990), in determining when it suspends or supersedes the provisions of section 455.241 in workers' compensation cases. Section 440.13(2)(f) provides in pertinent part: (f) Notwithstanding the limitations in s....

...loyee or his attorney has been furnished a copy of such claim." (Emphasis added.) The emphasized language refers to records and information pertaining only to the employee's medical condition causally related to the workplace injury. No provision in section 440.13 or any other section of chapter 440 indicates that "discussions" by the employer and carrier's attorney or rehabilitation provider, as stated in subsection 440.13(2)(f), may be held ex parte without first giving notice and affording counsel for the opposing party an opportunity to be present at such discussions. Perez v. Eastern Airlines, 569 So.2d 1290 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), rev. denied, 581 So.2d 1307 (Fla. 1991). In Perez *502 this court addressed whether subsection 440.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1989), which contains substantially the same language as the present subsection 440.13(2)(f), authorizes an employer and carrier's attorney to have ex parte communications with a claimant's treating physician in respect to medical information relating to the employee's injury....

...no objection to a deposition or a conference with the claimant's treating internist, provided the claimant's attorney could be present. Nevertheless, the employer attempted to have a private discussion with the claimant's internist and relied on subsection 440.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1989), as authority to do so. When the claimant's attorney objected to such ex parte communication as a violation of subsection 455.241(2), Florida Statutes (1989), the employer brought the issue before the judge of compensation claims. The judge ruled that section 440.13(2)(c) provided authority for the employer to conduct ex parte communications with the claimant's physician....

...s case, the judge's order allowing ex parte communications to take place between Eastern's counsel and Perez's physician was a departure from the essential requirements of law." Id. at 1291. Acknowledging that the judge had correctly recognized that section 440.13(2)(c) is an exception to the confidentiality constraints of section 455.241 and allows the employer to discuss the claimant's medical condition with the claimant's physician, we explained: However, nothing in Section 440.13(2)(c) requires that such discussion be had in the absence of Perez's counsel....

...n reaching a decision, thereby clearly indicating that this fact, i.e., whether the physician was authorized or not, was deliberately held to be immaterial to the court's decision in that case. Hence, that decision must be read as holding that while section 440.13(2)(f) authorizes discussions with the claimant's treating physician, it does not authorize ex parte discussions by the employer and carrier's attorney with a claimant's treating physician, regardless of whether that physician was authorized. C. Reading subsections 455.241 and 440.13(2)(f) in pari materia, as construed and applied in the cited decisions, we discern the following principles for application in workers' compensation cases in respect to disclosure of medical information by health care providers....

...e that section 455.241 prohibits disclosure of medical information by a health care provider other than in the manner and scope authorized therein, and that additional limited disclosure may occur in workers' compensation cases only as authorized by section 440.13(2)(f)....

...This conclusion is based on the express provisions in subsection 455.241(2) that such records "may not be furnished to, and the medical condition of a patient may not be discussed with, any person other than the patient or his legal representative " (emphasis added), and is also explicitly required in part by subsection 440.13(2)(e)....

...are practitioner will be permissible only with the consent of the claimant or claimant's attorney, or after the latter have been provided with notice and an opportunity to be present at such discussion. This conclusion is required by the language of section 440.13(2)(f) as construed and applied in Perez....

...ed" to the workplace injury as required by the statute cannot be effectively enforced if such discussions are ex parte. Of course, the employer and carrier remain entitled to request and receive written reports of injury and treatment required by subsection 440.13(2)(d) to be made on forms prescribed by the Division. Fifth, a physician performing an independent medical examination (IME) in workers' compensation cases pursuant to subsection 440.13(2)(b) is essentially an expert witness for the party requesting the examination....

...yer and servicing agent's representatives and attorneys from having any ex parte communication with authorized health care providers without making prior arrangement for claimant's counsel to be present. Nothing *506 in the self-executing concept of section 440.13, and particularly subsection 440.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1989) [now § 440.13(2)(d)-(f), Fla....

...This can be by requesting a report in writing, and by telephoning the medical provider to ask for a report or an updated report on the claimant's condition. Claimant's petition seeks to quash the provisions in paragraph 4 of this order, urging that these conditions violate subsections 455.241(2) and 440.13(2) and our decisions in Perez and Pic N' Save v....

...Petitioner contends that the order departs from the essential requirements of law because the limiting condition requiring that the attorney for the employer and carrier may be present during conversations between Claimant's attorney and Claimant's treating physicians is neither required by Perez nor section 440.13(2)(c) [now 440.13(2)(d)-(f)]....

...This provision precludes Petitioner's attorney from communicating with the claimant's physicians unless the employer and servicing agent's attorneys are notified and allowed to be present. This restriction is contrary to the spirit and intent of sections 455.241(2) and 440.13(2) to permit free disclosure and communication of medical information by the physician to the treated person and that person's attorney....

...Setting forth the Division's policy regarding such ex parte communications, that letter recited in pertinent part: The case that you cited Perez v. Eastern Airlines involved ex-parte communication between Eastern counsel and Perez's physician. This is a departure from the requirements of the law. However, pursuant to both Section 440.13(e) [sic], F.S....

...ied with regards to ex parte communications between anyone on behalf of the employer/carrier, attorney and rehabilitation provider and treating physicians and providers as defined by F.S. § 455.241(2). It is agreed that communications pursuant to F.S. 440.13(2)(c) do not apply to IME Physicians....

...uld be appropriate under that rule, we have elected to accord review by certiorari because the case was perfected under rule 9.100(c), Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, prior to the effective date of rule 4.160(b)(5). [2] This reference is to subsection 440.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1989). The relevant provisions in that subsection have been moved to subsection 440.13(2)(f), Florida Statutes (1991), and we refer to the latter citation hereafter in this opinion....

...ee for services performed in achieving the re-authorization of claimant's physician. While claimant was being treated for his work-related injury, the E/C, on October 10, 2003, forwarded a letter to claimant's counsel informing him that, pursuant to section 440.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes (2003), it was transferring the care of claimant from his authorized physician, Dr....

...Thereafter, on October 31, 2003, the E/C replied by letter that it did not intend to de-authorize Dr. Mangieri, who remained claimant's physician. Four days thereafter, the carrier filed a formal reply to the petition, again referring to its rights under section 440.13(2)(d), to transfer the care of an injured employee to a health-care provider, if the IME confirmed that the employee was not making adequate progress....

...ent it involved an interpretation of law, our standard is that of de novo. We cannot agree that the Pardo holding affects the outcome of the present case. The facts in Pardo, involving an injured employee's request for medical care, as authorized by section 440.13(2)(a), are far different from those at bar, involving, under section 440.13(2)(d), a carrier's attempt to transfer care from an attending health-care provider with whom the employee had expressed no dissatisfaction....

...ning the worker's life. In contrast, the transfer of care from an existing health-care provider to another at the carrier's direction is not ordinarily attended by the same dire consequences. We find nothing expressly stated or reasonably implied in section 440.13(2)(d) to require that the de-authorization of an attending physician shall occur simultaneously with the carrier's communication....

...o transfer care, regardless of the timing of the de-authorization. For example, in State Attorney v. Johnson, 770 So.2d 187 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), this court affirmed a JCC's refusal to approve an E/C's unilateral transfer of medical care, pursuant to section 440.13(2)(d), wherein the carrier advised claimant "that it intended to transfer her care from the authorized doctor with whom she had been receiving treatment." Id....

...REVERSED and REMANDED. PADOVANO and THOMAS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 440.34(3)(a), Florida Statutes, authorizes an award of fees to claimant if he or she prevails on a claim for medical benefits. [2] The language in the letter generally tracked that in section 440.13(2)(d), which provides: "The carrier has the right to transfer the care of an injured employee from the attending health care provider if an independent medical examination determines that the employee is not making appropriate progress...

...The exclusiveness of remedy provided by the Florida Workmen's Compensation Act is the quid pro quo accruing to the employer for his assumption of liability without fault. [6] The judgment appealed is affirmed. JOHNSON and McCORD, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Florida Statute 440.13 which states in part: "......

...nd deposited it into his trust account. When he refused to release the funds, CNS filed suit, with counts for breach of contract, open account and quantum meruit. The trial court granted Baker's motion to dismiss. CNS contends that language added to section 440.13(3) in 1983 permits it to enforce its contract with Baker and carve its "usual and customary" fee out of his settlement....

...delivery of disability and medical benefits to an injured worker at a reasonable cost to the employer." § 440.015, Fla. Stat. (1993). To achieve that end, the statute provides for a schedule of maximum reimbursement allowances for medical services. § 440.13(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (1993). A health care provider or physician is to be reimbursed the lesser of either (a) the usual and customary charge for the service or (b) the maximum reimbursement allowance in the schedule. §§ 440.13(4)(a) and (f), Fla. Stat. *671 (1993). [4] By implementing a fee schedule ceiling on charges, the statute seeks to "promote health care cost containment and efficiency with respect to the workers' compensation health care delivery system." § 440.13(4)(f), Fla....

...er fees for their services. See, e.g., Easter Elevator Co. v. Hedman, 290 So.2d 56, 58 (Fla. 1974). [5] In this case, having received the maximum reimbursement allowance for the services provided, CNS may not recover any fee exceeding that amount. §§ 440.13(4)(a) and (f), Fla....

...In addition to the limitation on charges, the workers' compensation law makes the employer and insurance carrier legally responsible for paying medical bills, while the employee is insulated from liability. See Long Grove Builders, Inc. v. Haun, 508 So.2d 476, 477 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); §§ 440.10(1)(a) and 440.13(3), Fla....

...he position of shopping for a reasonable fee, anticipating potential liability for an amount exceeding fee schedule limits. For this reason, too, CNS is precluded from recovering additional fees from Baker. In 1983, the legislature added language to section 440.13(3): The health care provider or health care facility providing services pursuant to this section shall be paid for the services solely by the employer or its insurance carrier, except for payments from third parties who have been determined to be liable for such payment. § 440.13(3), Fla....

...83-305, § 4, at 1783, Laws of Fla. It is this amendment, CNS argues, which authorizes its lawsuit against Baker. However, such an expansive reading does not harmonize with the purposes of the Act and is not supported by the legislative history and development of section 440.13(3)....

...[7] No reliable indicator of legislative purpose demonstrates an intent to abandon fee schedule limits or to impose liability on employees for chapter 440 medical treatment. The Florida senate staff analysis of chapter 83-305, Laws of Florida, describes the amendment to section 440.13(3) as "[p]roviding an express limitation that health care providers shall be paid solely by the employer/carrier." Staff of Fla.S.Comm....

...of Archives, ser. 18, carton 1283, Tallahassee, Fla.). Although not determinative of legislative intent, staff analyses are one touchstone of the collective legislative will. See In re Forfeiture of $7,750, 546 So.2d 1128, 1130 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). In 1987, section 440.13(3) was amended to clearly express the intent that the subsection not be read to impose liability on an employee except under limited circumstances....

...services provided pursuant to this section. Ch. 87-330, § 2, at 2136, Laws of Fla. Because it was intended to clarify the legislature's intention, the 1987 amendment may properly be considered in gauging the correct meaning of the 1983 amendment to section 440.13(3)....

...edule, then 80 percent of the usual and customary charge. Apparently some health care providers have been billing injured employees for the difference between what is normally charged and the amount allowed in the statute. This bill would clarify subsection 440.13(3), F.S., by reiterating the fact that the injured employee is not responsible for paying for authorized medical treatment and services. Staff of Fla.S.Comm. on Commerce, PCS/SB 821, Staff Analysis 2 (April 24, 1987) (available at Fla. Dep't of State, Div. of Archives, ser. 18, carton 1283, Tallahassee, Fla.) (emphasis supplied). Finally, the 1993 amendment to chapter 440 rewrote section 440.13 to eliminate the equivocal 1983 language. Ch. 93-415, § 17, at 2374-84, Laws of Fla. Section 440.13(3)(g) confirms that the employee "is not liable for payment for medical treatment or services provided pursuant to this section except as otherwise provided in this section." Id. at 2378. Most importantly, section 440.13(14), entitled "Payment of medical fees," now provides: (a) ......

...Such providers have recourse against the employer or carrier for payment for services rendered in accordance with this chapter. (b) Fees charged for remedial treatment, care, and attendance may not exceed the applicable fee schedules adopted under this chapter. Id. at 2383-84. Given the evolution of section 440.13(3) in the context of the system established by chapter 440, CNS was barred from suing Baker in this case....

...prompt, reasonable payment for services on behalf of many patients who could not otherwise afford them. Tipping the statutory balance to allow a health care provider to pursue a larger fee requires a clearer legislative expression than is evident in section 440.13(3)....

...A health care provider may not accept payments under the Act and also seek to avoid the statutory limits by contracting for a higher fee with the worker. To the extent that it sought compensation in excess of the fee schedule, CNS's contract contravened section 440.13 and was void....

...The issue to be decided by the fact-finder is the reasonableness of the fee schedule charge. Garrett v. Morris Kirschman & Co., 336 So.2d 566 (Fla. 1976); Irwin v. Blake, 589 So.2d 973 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). [9] Absent a different pronouncement from the legislature, we believe that section 440.13(3) should be narrowly construed....

...act implied at law, or any other legal theory. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed. GLICKSTEIN and KLEIN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Appellant Sun Bank/South Florida, N.A., now holds CNS's accounts receivable as a result of a foreclosure judgment. [2] § 440.13(4)(a), Fla....

...(1985). [3] For example, the fee schedule permitted a $2,020 charge for a combined discogram and chemonucleolysis. CNS's charge to Baker for this procedure was $5,200. [4] Under the 1993 amendment to chapter 440, these limitations are now contained in section 440.13(12)(a) and (c), Florida Statutes....

...1992), contains language indicating that a medical provider may accept workers' compensation benefits and still pursue the employee for that portion of a reasonable fee which exceeds the compensation payment. That case failed to consider the explicit language of section 440.13(3), Florida Statutes (1987). Moreover, it relied on Charter Oak Fire Insurance Co. v. Regalado, 339 So.2d 277 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), which was decided before the enactment of the limiting language similar to sections 440.13(4)(a) and (f) and 440.13(3), Florida Statutes (1993). See § 440.13(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (1979); Ch. 79-40, § 8, at 226, Laws of Fla; Ch. 93-415, § 17, at 2377, Laws of Fla. We therefore decline to follow Figueroa. [7] We note that even under CNS's reading of section 440.13(3), it was not entitled to bring suit, because there was no determination of liability or fixing of a reasonable fee by a judge or jury....

...The claimant paid for such modifications, and the judge of industrial claims ordered the employer/carrier to reimburse the claimant for these costs. We hold that such modifications were properly awarded as "other apparatus" which "the nature of the injury ... may require ..." § 440.13(1), Florida Statutes....

...Where an industrial injury necessitates the modification or substitution of an automobile in order to accommodate a wheelchair or artificial member and to restore in part a claimant's former ambulatory ability, such costs may be awarded as "other apparatus" pursuant to § 440.13(1). Walt Disney World v. Morgan, IRC Order 2-3818 (May 22, 1979). In Jordan v. Florida Industrial Commission, 183 So.2d 529 (Fla. 1966), the Court stated, in applying § 440.13(1), that "the employer should bear the cost of returning the employee to an employable status... ." While a § 440.13(1) award will usually require medical evidence as to necessity, see e.g., Goldsmith v....

...We conclude that the present case is controlled by the same considerations as those involved in Walt Disney World v. Morgan, supra, and that the modifications necessitated by the loss of claimant's left hand are "other apparatus" as that term is used in § 440.13(1)....

...There were two procedural issues before the JCC in this case: (1) Whether the E/C's authorization of Claimant's pain management physician was timely; (2) and if timely, whether Claimant may refuse treatment and immediately request a one-time change in her treating physician. See § 440.13(2)(c), (f), Fla....

...Jacobs, 782 So.2d 404, 405 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001). Whereas parties have vested rights in the substantive law, they do not have vested rights in the procedure. See id. As such, procedural or remedial changes to law apply without regard to the date of a claimant's accident. See id. Section 440.13, Florida Statutes (2005), establishes an E/C's duty to ensure an injured claimant receives medical treatment, and it prescribes the procedure for authorizing medical providers. See St. Augustine Marine Canvas & Upholstery, Inc. v. Lunsford, 917 So.2d 280, 283 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). Accordingly, the 2005 version of section 440.13, controls in this case. Under section 440.13, the E/C has the initial right and duty to authorize the physician who will treat the injured claimant....

...ysician of his or her choosing at the expense of the E/C, this procedural right attaches only after the E/C fails to provide initial treatment or care within a reasonable time after the claimant's specific request has been made known to the E/C. See § 440.13(2)(c), Fla....

...Here, the record contains competent, substantial evidence to support the JCC's finding of timeliness. Since the E/C timely offered medical care in response to Claimant's PFB, the JCC could not award the specific physician sought by Claimant. City Of Bartow v. Brewer, 896 So.2d 931, 933 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)("Section 440.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes, does not authorize the JCC to order treatment with a specific physician, where the E/C promptly offers qualified alternatives.")....

...Because the treatment was timely authorized, the JCC was required to determine whether Claimant could request a one-time change in her treating physician without first being treated by the authorized physician. A claimant may request "one change of physician during the course *573 of treatment for any one accident." § 440.13(2)(f), Fla....

...However, even if a claimant had received treatment, a claimant would only be entitled to see the physician of her choice if the E/C failed to provide another physician within five days of receiving her request for another authorized physician. See § 440.13(2)(f), Fla....

...For the reasons stated above, the Judge of Compensation Claims' order, denying Claimant's Petition for Benefits, is AFFIRMED. THOMAS, J., concurs. KAHN, J., dissents with opinion. KAHN, J., dissenting. I do not quarrel with the majority's construction of section 440.13(2)(f), Florida Statutes (2005)....

...I dissent, however, because I conclude that the statute in effect at the time of the injury controls the present issue. I would reverse. Interestingly, the parties, as well as the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) below, assumed that the 1985 version of section 440.13 would control this case....

...It is unlawful for any employer or representative of any insurance company or insurer to coerce or attempt to coerce a sick or injured employee in the selection of a physician, surgeon, or other attendant or remedial treatment, nursing or hospital care, or any other service that the sick or injured employee may require . . . § 440.13(3), Fla....

...lso Cal Kovens Constr. v. Lott, 473 So.2d 249, 254 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (noting claimant's right to veto E/C's selection of treating physician, and explaining claimant's right to veto E/C's selection vindicates guarantee against coercion contained in section 440.13(2), Florida Statutes)....

...ontrols. The specific issue in this case is, of course, whether the right to veto the E/C's choice of a physician is a substantive right or a procedural right. The majority finds the right procedural because, in their view, the applicable portion of section 440.13 merely "prescribes the procedure for authorizing medical providers." Op....

...deputy when it objected to his request for chiropractic care. The deputy commissioner agreed and held that once claimant objected to the services rendered by the authorized physicians and requested alternative care, it was the employer's duty, under section 440.13(2), Florida Statutes (1981), to either select a physician to provide such care to the claimant or to seek a ruling from the deputy commissioner that such change in medical attendance would not be in the best interest of the claimant. Failing in same the employer must pay for the requested treatment subject only to the reasonableness and necessity of same. The deputy's conclusion properly coordinates the legislative mandate contained in subsections (1) and (2) of section 440.13, [1] and is not inconsistent with our holdings in Commercial Carriers, Inc....

...Flanders . In Porter, the claimant was not seeking alternative treatment as such, but merely additional care. Therefore, he was first required to seek prior approval from the deputy commissioner for the unauthorized care, demonstrating good cause therefor. Section 440.13(2); see also Mt....

...In the instant case, the employer utterly failed in its duty by totally disregarding claimant's request, neither providing the alternative care nor seeking a deputy commissioner's determination that "a change in medical attendance is not for the best interests of the injured employee... ." Section 440.13(2)....

...e weekly wage to include the tips. The deputy's order in that regard is therefore affirmed. AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. ROBERT P. SMITH, Jr. and BOOTH, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 440.13 provides in relevant part: (1) ..., the employer shall furnish to the employee such remedial treatment, care, and attendance under the direction and supervision of a qualified physician or surgeon or other recognized practitioner, nurs...

...ppellant's request for attorney's fees. In all other respects, the order will be affirmed. Because appellant's parents were not employed, upon remand the judge should award payment for attendant care services from January 6, 1989, in accordance with Section 440.13(2)(e)(1), Florida Statutes....

...The E/C argued that the claimant was not entitled to receive IMEs outside the managed care plan, and that the JCC did not have jurisdiction over the matter until the claimant had exhausted the grievance process. The JCC ruled that when a managed care plan is in place, provision of medical services is governed by section 440.134....

...l witnesses (i.e., whether the JCC erred in her interpretation of the relevant statutes as limiting a claimant's choice of an IME physician to those within the carrier's managed care provider network). She argues that the exclusivity provision of subsection 440.134(16) is limited by its own terms to benefits provided under subsections 440.13(2)(a) and (b), necessarily excluding from the scope of managed care IMEs performed pursuant to subsection 440.13(5). The E/C argue that the managed care grievance provisions of 440.134(15) exclusively govern the provision of medical care and services....

...titutional safeguards. A straightforward reading of the statutes at issue indicates that the managed care provisions were intended to govern only the E/C's provision of "medically necessary remedial treatment, care, and attendance" under subsections 440.13(2)(a) and (b), and were not intended to govern the selection and use, in a dispute arising from the industrial accident, of medical expert witnesses pursuant to subsection 440.13(5). Under our interpretation of the statutes, if the claimant was requesting the IMEs to resolve a dispute regarding the medical treatment she was receiving for her work-related injury, the JCC's denial of her request was proper because section 440.134 and rule 4.028(5)(d) require the claimant, where medical treatment is at issue, to first exhaust the procedures provided in the carrier's managed care plan of operation....

...The petition is therefore DENIED, without prejudice to the claimant's right to renew her motion for an IME before *573 the JCC for purposes authorized by the statutes. The claimant's motion for appellate attorney fees is also DENIED. KAHN and DAVIS, JJ., and SMITH, LARRY G., Senior Judge, concur. NOTES [1] Section 440.134, Florida Statutes (1995), sets out the provisions regarding "managed care arrangements." Subsection 440.134(15) requires grievance procedures for complaints from injured workers. Subsection 440.134(16) provides: When a carrier enters into a managed care arrangement pursuant to this section the employees who are covered by the provisions of such arrangement shall be deemed to have received all the benefits to which they are entitled pursuant to s. 440.13(2)(a) and (b). In addition, the employer shall be deemed to have complied completely with the requirements of such provisions. The provisions governing managed care arrangements shall govern exclusively unless specifically stated otherwise in this section. Subsection 440.134(17) provides: Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, when a carrier provides medical care through a workers' compensation managed care arrangement, pursuant to this section, those workers who are subject to the arrangem...

...Treatment received outside the workers' compensation managed care arrangement is not compensable unless authorized by the carrier prior to the treatment date. When medical treatment is provided through managed care and the petition for benefits includes a claim for medical care under subsections 440.13(2)(a) and (b), Florida Workers' Compensation Rule of Procedure 4.028(5)(d) requires the petition to include a certificate that the grievance procedures required by 440.134(15) were exhausted before the petition was filed under 440.192(3). [2] Subsection 440.13(5), Florida Statutes (1995), provides that "[i]n any dispute concerning overutilization, medical benefits, compensability, or disability under this chapter, the carrier or the employee may select an independent medical examiner" to render an expert medical opinion upon an aspect of the employee's illness or injury which is material to the claim or petition for benefits and that this IME physician "may be a health care provider treating or providing other care to the employee." Subsection 440.13(1)(j) defines "independent medical examiner" as "a physician selected by either an employee or a carrier to render one or more independent medical examinations in connection with a dispute arising under this chapter." Subsection 440.13(1)(k) defines "independent medical examination" as "an objective evaluation of the injured employee's medical condition, including, but not limited to, impairment or work status, performed by a physician or an expert medical advisor at the request of a party, a judge of compensation claims, or the division to assist in the resolution of a dispute arising under this chapter." Subsection 440.13(5)(e) limits admissible medical opinions to those of the treating physician(s), the independent medical examiner(s), and a medical advisor appointed by the JCC....

...[4] Section 440.1925 provides a procedure for resolving maximum medical improvement (MMI) or permanent impairment (PI) disputes, and authorizes the employee or carrier to obtain one IME opinion on the issue of permanent impairment, notwithstanding the limitations on carrier IMEs in section 440.13. It also provides that a dispute as to MMI or PI "which is not subject to dispute resolution according to rules promulgated pursuant to s. 440.134 shall be resolved according to the procedures set out in this section." [5] Under subsection 440.134(10)(c), the claimant may request an alternate chiropractor and orthopedist from the carrier's medical care coordinator, who would refer her to alternate physicians in each specialty within the plan's provider network. She may also obtain a second opinion in each specialty within the provider network, see subsection 440.134(6)(c)9. In either case, if she is not satisfied with the medical treatment provided by the E/C after she has exhausted the grievance process, she may then file a petition for medical benefits. At that point she may, under subsection 440.13(5), seek IMEs by physicians outside the managed care provider network, for the purpose of resolving the dispute regarding her medical treatment.

...Rech for treatment after April 4, 1983, to the date of the order "because there was no determination by the Deputy Commissioner that a change in medical provider was in the claimant's best interest, particularly since the other technical requirements of § 440.13(2), Fla....

...rentially, that claimant could not be coerced by the employer and carrier to change from his authorized treating physician to new physicians unacceptable to him absent a showing of good cause sufficient to require a change in medical treatment under section 440.13(2)....

...agree among themselves as to a suitable physician to provide medical treatment to the claimant closer to his home in the future. Failing that, the parties are free to request a change of physician and apply for a hearing in a manner provided for in § 440.13(2), Fla....

...st. The deputy commissioner's ruling follows the proper procedure for accomplishing disputed changes in treating physicians, Bradley Construction v. White, 457 So.2d 547 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), and is perfectly consistent with previous constructions of section 440.13(2) by this court and the Industrial Relations Commission....

...ropractic care. The deputy commissioner agreed with claimant's position and, as the court noted, held that once claimant objected to the services rendered by the authorized physicians and requested alternative care, it was the employer's duty, under section 440.13(2), Florida Statutes (1981), "to either select a physician to provide such care to the claimant or to seek a ruling from the deputy commissioner that such change in medical attendance would not be in the best interest of the claimant....

...Failing in same the employer must pay for the requested treatment subject only to the reasonableness and necessity of same." 440 So.2d at 51. The court concluded that the deputy's holding properly coordinated the legislative mandate contained in sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 440.13....

...yer or carrier and the claimant disputes the change, the employer or carrier, being the party seeking to change the status quo, should obtain an order from the deputy commissioner or incur the risk of a ruling against good cause for the change under section 440.13....

...Those cases stand for the proposition that a claimant cannot be awarded payment of medical fees for treatment by an unauthorized physician unless that claimant shows good cause for the selection of that physician in lieu of the selection of physicians made by the employer and carrier. In Walling, it was stated: Section 440.13 reserves to the claimant the right to dispute the carrier's selection of a treating physician for good cause....

...il the question which doctor shall perform the treatment has been resolved by the Judge. 384 So.2d at 253 (emphasis supplied). In Robinson v. Howard Hall Co., 219 So.2d 688 *254 (Fla. 1969), the Supreme Court first construed the relevant language of section 440.13 to require that a claimant show good cause for not accepting a physician selected by the employer and obtaining unauthorized treatment in lieu of requesting new authorization, and explained its holding with the following comments: The...

...Industrial Claims. We analogize this limited right of a claimant as to the initial selection of a physician to be essentially similar to a situation where a claimant desires a change in medical attention already provided him. In the latter situation Section 440.13 provides: `The commission may at any time, for good cause, shown in its discretion order a change * * *.' We recognize that in certain instances it may be found to be in the best interest of an injured claimant to have the satisfaction of being treated by a physician of his own choosing....

...v. Howard Hall Co., 219 So.2d 688. In the former case claimant's right to veto the carrier's selection and compel the carrier to tender another physician is absolute and requires no good cause; otherwise, the guarantee against coercion contained in section 440.13(2) is made a mere sham....

...nized in his order that it would be in "the claimant's best interest in the future that he have medical care available to him, which is closer to his residence." The deputy, in ruling against the employer/carrier's deauthorization of Dr. Rech, found Section 440.13(2), Florida Statutes (1982 Supp.), controlling: (2) If an injured employee objects to the medical attendance furnished by the employer, it shall be the duty of the employer to select another physician to treat the injured employee unle...

...e record. We go then to the next question presented by the claimant. Claimant was treated by three doctors. The last to treat him, Dr. Reinherz, was not authorized by the employer-carrier to treat claimant, and failed to file the reports required by Section 440.13(1), F.S.A....

...Reinherz for his services. The Full Commission reversed this portion of the deputy's order on the double ground that (1) the services were not authorized by the employer-carrier, and (2) the doctor failed to submit the reports required by the statute. Section 440.13(1), F.S.A....

...Reinherz $146.50 on account, nor explains why this payment should not constitute an acceptance of the doctors services and a waiver of the reports required to be made under the statute. In Foster v. Cooper, supra, this Court stated that one of the purposes of the medical reports required by Section 440.13 (1) is protection of the employer from liability on unfounded or fraudulent claims....

...sation orders require their payment. It is true, as contended by cross-petitioners, that Chapter 440 does not specifically require or authorize payment of travel expenses incurred in obtaining medical treatment. Nevertheless, we are of the view that Section 440.13, which requires the employer to furnish to the employee "such remedial treatment, care and attendance" as the injury shall require, must be interpreted to include reasonable travel expenses incurred by the employee in presenting himself at the place where such treatment and care is provided....

...Other jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion. Huhn v. Foley Bros., 221 Minn. 279, 22 N.W.2d 3 (1946); Newberry v. Youngs, 163 Neb. 397, 80 N.W.2d 165 (1956); Scruggs Bros. & Bill Garage v. State Industrial Commission, 94 Okla. 187, 221 P. 470 (1923). Under this interpretation of Section 440.13, the part of said Rule 18, that requires the payment of the "reasonable actual cost" of travel expenses by the employer-carrier merely tracks the statute....

...mmission so as to make it invalid. We have greater difficulty, however, upholding the portion of the rule that establishes seven and one-half cents per mile as the sum to be paid for travel by private automobile. We have considered the provisions of Section 440.13(3) (a), which authorize the Commission to adopt a schedule of charges for medical treatment and services, but have concluded that the wording of the subsection authorizes the adoption of a schedule only for medical service and treatment rendered claimants by others....

...In June 1983 Daniel filed an amended claim for disability benefits and medical treatment, naming both Fidelity and American as parties. The deputy commissioner found that the 1982 volleyball injury would *1254 not have occurred except for the 1978 injury, but that the statute of limitations contained in sections 440.13(3)(b) and 440.19(1)(a), Florida Statutes (1977), barred any claim against Fidelity....

...h injury a claim may be filed within 2 years after the date of the last payment of compensation or after the date of the last remedial treatment furnished by the employer. Just as section 440.19(1)(a) deals with the right to disability compensation, section 440.13(3)(b) provides a parallel provision with the identical exceptions for recovery for remedial attention. [1] The parties agree that, under the express language of sections 440.13(3)(b) and 440.19(1)(a), a claim filed within two years of a compensation payment voluntarily made without an award would normally be timely....

...1978 and that once the two-year limitation period expired no subsequent payments or remedial attention could revive the period for filing a claim related to that injury. On the other hand, Daniel maintains that under the plain terms of both sections 440.13(3)(b) and 440.19(1)(a) the occurrence of a two-year time gap in compensation payments is irrelevant....

...Both the conflicting case law which the parties cite and the six-to-six vote in the district court reflect the judicial confusion as to the precise effect of voluntary compensation payments upon the two-year limitations period contained in sections 440.13(3)(b) and 440.19(1)(a)....

...As this Court held in Miller v. Brewer Co., 122 So.2d 565 (Fla. 1960), the fact an insurance carrier voluntarily complied with a claimant's request for subsequent remedial treatment once two years had passed did not revive the right of the claimant to remedial treatment under section 440.13(3)(b). In what may have been a response to the denial of relief in Miller, however, the Florida legislature in 1963 amended section 440.13(3)(b) and created the two-year extended statute of limitations, triggered by voluntary remedial treatment or compensation, that existed in 440.13(3)(b) at the time relevant to the case at bar. Watson v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 288 So.2d 193, 194 (Fla. 1973). Ten years after this amendment, we reconsidered the application of sections 440.13(3)(b) and 440.19(1)(a) to compensation claims....

...fore the claim was filed" and that the voluntary payment of benefits did not reactivate the filing period. 288 So.2d at 194. The Industrial Relations Commission (IRC) affirmed. In quashing the IRC order we observed that, due to the 1963 amendment to section 440.13(3)(b), Miller no longer applied....

...State Road Department, 171 So.2d 523 (Fla. 1965), also lends support to this position. As to Hodges, however, we find that it focused more on res judicata than the issue presently before us and we decline to read a binding pronouncement into Hodges when that opinion mentioned neither section 440.13(3)(b) nor 440.19(1)(a)....

...Petersburg Kennel Club, 396 So.2d 161 (Fla. 1981); Farrens Tree Surgeons v. Winkles, 334 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1976); Thomas Smith Farms v. Alday, 182 So.2d 405 (Fla. 1966); Topeka Inn Management v. Pate, 414 So.2d 1184 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Yet in the case of sections 440.13(3)(b) and 440.19(1)(a) no ambiguities exist. These statutes unequivocally state that so long as an employee files a claim within two years of the last voluntary compensation payment or dispensation of remedial treatment made without an award the claim is timely. §§ 440.13(3)(b) & 440.19(1)(a), Fla....

...Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, Inc., 434 So.2d 879 (Fla. 1983); Carson v. Miller, 370 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1979); Heredia v. Allstate Insurance Co., 358 So.2d 1353 (Fla. 1978); Phil's Yellow Taxi Co. v. Carter, 134 So.2d 230 (Fla. 1961). Therefore, given the unambiguous language of sections 440.19(1)(a) and 440.13(3)(b), it would be inappropriate for us to read into the statutes more obstacles for claimants than these provisions otherwise require....

...The Commission did not hear from claimant or his wife again until December 3, 1969, when it received a claim filed by claimant's second attorney. This claim came on for hearing on January 9, 1970. The paramount issue was whether the statute of limitations provided by Fla. Stat. § 440.19(1) (a), F.S.A. and Fla. Stat. § 440.13(3) (b), F.S.A....

...David Parrish of Hurt & Parrish, P.A., Orlando, and Bill McCabe of Shepherd, McCabe & Cooley, Longwood, for appellee. BOOTH, Judge. This cause is before us on appeal from an order awarding claimant 24-hour-per-day attendant care benefits to be paid for care provided by claimant's wife. We reverse based on Section 440.13(2)(e)2, Florida Statutes (1989). Section 440.13(2)(e)2 provides: 440.13 Medical services and supplies; penalty for violations; limitations....

...fective October 1, 1989, after the entry of the order (July 3, 1989) in this case. Ch. 89-289, §§ 10 and 45, Laws of Fla. In Williams v. Amax Chemical Corporation, 543 So.2d 277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989), this court applied the earlier 1988 amendment of Section 440.13(2)(e)2, Florida Statutes, to benefits awarded prior to, but paid after, the effective date of the amendment, holding: After October 1, 1988, payment for the wife's services must be governed by section 440.13(2)(e), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...E/C's request for a second IME. Specifically, the JCC improperly relied on Roberts v. Ben Hill Griffin, Inc., 629 So.2d 236 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), for the proposition that the Legislature restricted the scope of an IME to the four situations listed in section 440.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...ground and does not contain *264 any facts regarding the reasonableness of the request. Id.; see Reed v. Reed, 643 So.2d 1180, 1182 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). Further, this court has previously determined that the right to an IME is not without limits and section 440.13(2)(b) "seems to impose a `reasonableness' requirement subject to the scrutiny of the JCC." Farm Stores, Inc....

...ons for accepting opinion of IME physician over that of claimant's treating physician), review denied, 598 So.2d 79 (Fla. 1992). The JCC improperly denied the E/C's request for a second IME based on his erroneous construction of the Roberts case and section 440.13(2)(b)....

...Further, section 440.192, Florida Statutes (2000), provides a procedure for resolving any benefit disputes between a carrier and a claimant and sets strict deadlines for dispute resolution. A carrier is entitled to request an independent medical examination concerning compensibility or medical benefits. See § 440.13, Fla....

...With regard to future attendant care, testimony from Drs. Gonzalez and Malzone would support an award of $7.50 per hour for outside care which figure was provided by nurse Weiss for such companion care. After October 1, 1988, payment for the wife's services must be governed by section 440.13(2)(e), Florida Statutes, (Supp. 1988) She may wish to quit her job and receive her present hourly wage to the extent that it does not exceed "the per hour value of such care available in the community *281 at large." § 440.13(2)(e)(2), Fla....

...n outright denial or as an award of only 4 hours per day. Competent, substantial evidence requires that claimant be provided companion care on an around-the-clock basis. In entering an order consistent with this opinion, the dc is instructed to take section 440.13(2)(e) into account....

...iling fee of $100.00 (now $250.00). The letter from the EC in response to the request for the authorization of Dr. Preste, which was introduced into evidence by the claimant's attorney, clearly shows that the EC fully complied with the provisions of § 440.13, Fla....

...See, e.g., Montgomery Ward v. Lovell, 652 So.2d 509, 511 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Marlowe v. Dogs Only Grooming, 589 So.2d 990 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Sealey Mattress Co. v. Gause, 466 So.2d 399 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Care is compensable only if it is "medically necessary." § 440.13(2)(b), Fla....

...fore she married his son. The applicable statute for awarding compensation for attendant care is the statute in effect at the time the compensable care was given. Walt Disney World Co. v. McCrea, 754 So.2d 196, 197 n. 2 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). In 1988, section 440.13 specified that family members could not be compensated for attendant care services that would normally be provided by family members gratuitously. § 440.13(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1988). Kelli became Appellant's family member, as defined by section 440.13, only after her marriage to Sam. See § 440.13(2)(e), Fla....

...Thus, the JCC did not err in limiting the award to compensation for 61 hours per week of care since January 18, 2002, and we affirm that determination. Appellant also argues that the compensation awarded should not have been limited to the federal minimum wage. However, this was not error. In 2002, the relevant portion of section 440.13 required that compensation be paid to family members at this wage if the family member is not employed. § 440.13(2)(b), Fla....

...ed, and chooses to leave that employment to provide attendant care, will be entitled to compensation at "the per-hour value of the family member's former employment, not to exceed the per-hour value of such care available in the community at large." § 440.13(2)(b), Fla....

...Collier had prescribed an electric wheelchair or electric cart, and that the carrier was willing to provide one when Appellant made his selection. Then, Appellee's counsel affirmatively agreed to that statement on the record. Finally, Appellant argues that the JCC erred either in citing section 440.13(3)(d) in the order, or in failing to implement the provisions of that section. We disagree, as the reference to section 440.13(3)(d) is a typographical error. The JCC stated that "the statutory provision as set forth in F.S. 440.13(3)(d) must be followed to determine what qualifies as compensable attendant or custodial care," and recited case law to support the proposition that "[h]ousekeeping services, such as making the bed, cleaning the home, washing clothes, and shopping, are not the responsibility of the Employer/Carrier." The context of the citation indicates that the reference is to the statutes in effect at the times care was given. The relevant statute in 1988 is section 440.13(2)(d), Fla....

...and discovery provisions in the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure therein discussed are applicable both to civil cases and to workers' compensation cases. We stated in pertinent part in that case: There is no issue as to compliance with this statute [section 440.13(2)(b)] in the present case, and there is no other provision in chapter 440 by which employer/carrier's desired oral communication might be compelled....

...We are convinced that Section 440.54 must be read in connection with section 440.20, Florida Statutes 1941, which provides that the “total compensation payable under this Chapter for disability and death shall in no event exceed the sum of $5000.00 in addition to any benefits under Section 440.13 for medical services and treatment, and under subsection (1) of Section 440.16, for funeral expenses.” *212 The total award by the Industrial Commission in this case was $10,000.00, plus funeral expenses, medical treatment and attorn...

...The insurance policy provided only that the insurer would pay eighty percent of the "reasonable charges incurred for necessary... medical services." Since neither the statute nor the policy defines the term "necessary medical services," the trial court looked to the Workers Compensation Act, section 440.13, Florida Statutes (1983) and adopted three parts of the definition contained therein....

...Respondent was involved in an admittedly compensable accident which left him permanently and totally disabled. He now employs an unlicensed practical nurse full-time in the dual capacity of nurse and housekeeper. The sole issue in dispute is whether or not respondent's employer is required, under F.S. § 440.13(1), F.S.A., to assume the full cost of the attendant's services....

...The majority held, in pertinent part, as follows: "We believe the Judge of Industrial Claims erred in this respect and that he should have ordered the Carrier to pay the total amount of $40.00; with no part of the amount to be paid by the Claimant. The Claimant is permanently and totally disabled and cannot care for himself. Section 440.13(1), Florida Statutes, provides that the Employee shall be furnished with such remedial treatment, care, and attendance as the nature of the injury or process of recovery may require....

...The attendant also performs the functions usually carried out by a practical nurse, such as administering medicine to respondent when he is unable, and assisting with his bathing. In the Chizauskas case, this Court discussed the services that are compensable under F.S. § 440.13(1) and plainly stated the rule which is applicable in the instant case: "Housekeeping and related services are not required to be furnished." 172 So.2d at 444....

...March 10, 1993. *261 Jason J. Goldstone of Goodmark & Goodmark, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellant. Richard H. Gaunt, Jr. of Gaunt, Pratt & Radford, P.A., West Palm Beach, for appellees. ALLEN, Judge. The claimant appeals a workers' compensation order by which section 440.13(2)(k), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...a substantive right and may apply to services rendered after the effective date of the statutory limitation. See Mr. C's TV Rental v. Murray, 559 So.2d 452 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); accord, Williams v. Amax Chem. Corp., 543 So.2d 277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). Section 440.13(2)(k), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...s entitlement to such testimony. By limiting the amount which the health care provider may charge, the statute imposes no greater burden of payment than that which previously pertained. The claimant's substantive rights were thus not diminished, and section 440.13(2)(k), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...1986), which involved a different attorney's fee provision outside the ambit of the Workers' Compensation Law. The enactment addressed in L. Ross had a potential impact on the affected parties' concomitant burden which differed significantly from the impact of section 440.13(2)(k), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Ross in the context of a workers' compensation attorney's fee, we find no basis to extend those decisions to the context of the present case, insofar as the claimant's burden and entitlement with regard to the witness' services remained unaffected by section 440.13(2)(k), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990). We also find no impermissible conflict between section 440.13(2)(k), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990), and section 440.30, Florida Statutes, or section 440.31, Florida Statutes. While the latter enactments contain general provisions relating to the use of depositions and certain witness fees, section *262 440.13(2)(k), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990), is a more specific enactment relating to the narrower circumstances which the statute identifies. Section 440.13(2)(k), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...1990), was therefore properly applied upon the occurrence of these circumstances, without regard to the more general provisions in section 440.30 and section 440.31. See generally, DeConingh v. City of Daytona Beach, 103 So.2d 233 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958). We further find that section 440.13(2)(k), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...nt that such rules conflict with the provisions of this chapter." The due process and access to the courts issues which the claimant raises are likewise without merit, and we reject these constitutional challenges without further discussion. Because section 440.13(2)(k), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Florida Statutes. Application of Managed Care System The employer/carrier argue that Rudd's petition for worker's compensation benefits was required to be dismissed because the employer/carrier had entered into a managed care arrangement pursuant to section 440.134, Florida Statutes (1994), and Rudd failed to file a grievance under the managed care system. See § 440.134(15), Fla....

...tition for benefits, as sought by the employer/carrier, would not be appropriate. The existence of a managed care arrangement would be relevant to the claim for medical treatment, but would not be dispositive of the claim for indemnity benefits. See § 440.134(16), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994)(when a carrier enters into a managed care system, employees covered by such an arrangement are deemed to have received all benefits to which they are entitled pursuant to section 440.13(2)(a) and (b), which pertains to medical treatment and authorized providers), see also Wiggins v....

...The employer/carrier authorized an independent medical evaluation (IME) by an neurologist, William Malzone, M.D., which was conducted on November 21, 1995, but treatment by a neurologist was never authorized. Rudd is entitled, therefore, to seek treatment and recover the costs of that treatment, section 440.13(2)(c), and the JCC was not obliged to exclude the records and opinions of Dr....

...Kessler, an orthopedic surgeon, was not qualified to render opinions on the subject of the appropriateness of chiropractic treatment; therefore, Dr. Kirschner's testimony that chiropractic treatment was appropriate was uncontroverted. We are unable to accept claimant's argument. Section 440.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1991), requires the employer to "furnish to the employee such medically necessary remedial treatment, care, and attendance by a health care provider and for such period as the nature of the injury or the process of recovery may require ..." (emphasis added). Section 440.13(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1991), defines "medically necessary," in relevant part, as follows: "Medically necessary" means any service or supply used to identify or treat an illness or injury which is appropriate to the patient's diagnosis, consistent with the location of service and with the level of care provided....

...I would reverse the order denying appellant's claim seeking authorization of chiropractic treatment for the reason that the only evidence supporting the denial was the opinion testimony of Dr. Kessler, an orthopedic physician, which, in my judgment, is incompetent because of the unique provisions of Section 440.13, Florida Statutes (1987)....

...rted by competent, substantial evidence. The threshold question requiring *1384 decision, however, is whether Dr. Kessler, a physician not licensed within the practicing peer group whose care claimant requested, was qualified under the provisions of section 440.13 to express the opinion that chiropractic treatment was not reasonable and necessary. In our interpretations of section 440.13(3) pertaining to a claimant's specific request for chiropractic care, we have held that an employer's provision of an orthopedist did not satisfy the employer's statutory obligation, and that the employer was therefore required to pay...

...In no previous opinion, however, have we expressly decided whether a physician, not licensed within the same school of practice as that requested by an employee, is qualified to express an opinion as to the reasonableness and necessity of the practitioners' care, pursuant to the provisions of section 440.13, notwithstanding that the witness may satisfy the qualifications of an expert, as provided in Section 90.702, Florida Statutes, by reason of his knowledge and education. I am of the view that Dr. Kessler is not qualified by virtue of section 440.13 to give any such opinion, and it is therefore immaterial, for the reasons stated infra, that he may otherwise be qualified as an expert under section 90.702. In reaching this conclusion, I refer to section 440.13(1)(c), which defines "medically necessary" as any service or supply used to identify or treat an illness or injury which is appropriate to the patient's diagnosis, consistent with the location of service and with the level of care provided....

...mplation that physicians of one school of practice would be considered qualified to give opinions regarding the appropriateness of requested treatment by physicians of another licensed school or community of practice. Although peer is not defined in section 440.13, the dictionary defines it as "a person or thing of the same rank, value, quality, ability, etc." Webster's New World Dictionary 1048 (2d college ed. 1980). When comparing the statutory term, "practicing peer group," with the term "peer review committee," used in other portions of section 440.13, I think it reasonably clear, given the definition of peer, that the former term means simply the same licensed school of practice. In so saying, I note that section 440.13(1)(e) defines "peer review committee" to mean "a committee composed of physicians licensed under the same authority as the physician who rendered the services being reviewed." (Emphasis added.) While the term "peer review committee" is not used in regard to that portion of section 440.13(3) relating to a requested change in the health care provided an employee, but rather is specifically applied to review of overutilization of services rendered by health care providers, I consider that the manner in which the term is o...

...Akins, 547 So.2d 1001, 1002 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (to determine whether chiropractic physician over utilized services he rendered to the injured employee, the physician's records were submitted to the Chiropractic Peer Review Committee). My interpretation of section 440.13 is consistent with the general rule recognizing that physicians of one school are incompetent to testify in malpractice actions against physicians of other schools regarding whether such physicians' treatment conformed with the requisi...

...1st DCA 1983), as stating that the Evidence Code applies to the Workers' Compensation Law. Those cases hold only that the portion of the Evidence Code which precludes the admission of hearsay evidence applies to workers' compensation proceedings. Neither opinion supports the majority's conclusion that section 440.13 permits a physician outside the practicing peer group of another physician to testify that the requested treatment of a member of the different group is not reasonable or necessary. And I find nothing in section 440.13 evincing any legislative intent to incorporate the provisions of section 90.702 therein....

...Indeed, Section 90.103(1), Florida Statutes (1987), states that the Evidence Code applies to the same proceedings to which the general law of evidence applied before the effective date of the code, "[u]nless otherwise provided by statute." (Emphasis added.) It is axiomatic that a more specific statute (here section 440.13) dealing with a particular subject is controlling over a statute that covers the same subject more generally....

...not abuse his discretion in deciding that Dr. Kessler, an orthopedic surgeon, possesses the necessary knowledge, education, etc., to opine that chiropractic care was not reasonable and necessary. Because, however, the provisions of the more specific section 440.13 restrict such testimony to the same practicing peer group or discipline as that from which the treatment is sought, the opinion testimony of a physician from a different practicing peer group must be considered incompetent as to the reasonableness and necessity of such solicited care....

...1st DCA 1981), petition for review denied, 417 So.2d 328 (Fla. 1982); U.S. Home Corp. v. Parker, 404 So.2d 170 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). The deputy did, however, have jurisdiction to advise Feuer to pay the $78,759.82 to the unpaid medical care providers. Section 440.13(3) provides that "[t]he health care provider or health care facility providing services pursuant to this section shall be paid for the services solely by the employer or its insurance carrier." This section directs FIGA to pay the unpaid medical care providers directly....

...s to the medical opinions admissible in a proceeding before a JCC: No medical opinion other than the opinion of a medical advisor appointed by the [JCC], ... an [IME], or an authorized treating provider is admissible in proceedings before the [JCC]. § 440.13(5)(e), Fla....

...one of these categories. See, e.g., Seminole County Sch. Bd. v. Tweedie, 922 So.2d 1011 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). We have also held, however, when the E/C wrongfully denies medical care and the claimant is required to utilize the self-help provisions of section 440.13(2)(c), the JCC is not obliged to exclude the opinions of the doctors from whom Claimant was forced to obtain medical treatment....

...1st DCA 2006). When an employer abandons its obligation to provide appropriate care, however, it likewise *962 surrenders to the injured employee the right to select a physician and obtain treatment, provided the care is "compensable and medically necessary." § 440.13(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (2003). Under the self-help provision of section 440.13(2)(c)—a provision of the statute that theoretically, the employee should never need to use—the JCC can award past medical treatment at the "expense of the employer" only where care has been wrongfully denied and the employer or carrier has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to provide such care. See id. To the narrow extent this section allows a JCC to order payment to a physician, it also empowers the JCC to "authorize" the doctors for the past care provided. Cf. § 440.13(3)(a), Fla....

...Employer/carrier here argues that authorization of a physician can emanate only from the unassailable discretion of an employer or carrier, without regard to any breach of the obligation to provide appropriate care at the appropriate time. Logically, though, this would mean physicians who provide care pursuant to section 440.13(2)(c) may never be paid for their services, because of the limitations contained in section 440.13(3)(a)....

...of Education, and the Division of Administrative Hearings shall administer the Workers' Compensation Law in a manner which facilitates the self-execution of the system and the process of ensuring a prompt and cost-effective delivery of payments."). Section 440.13(2)(c) operates in the limited circumstances where the employer or carrier wrongfully denies medical care, contrary to the duty to provide necessary treatment. An essential piece of the workers' compensation statute remains the availability of appropriate treatment on a timely basis, so as to avoid public responsibility for such. Accordingly, we hold that, where section 440.13(2)(c) applies, the JCC has the statutory authority to authorize a doctor for care provided during the period of wrongful denial, and the doctor's medical opinion is admissible pursuant to section 440.13(5)(e). The employee retains the burden, however, to establish that he made a specific request for the care, allowed the employer or carrier a reasonable time to respond, and obtained care that was compensable, reasonable, and medically necessary. See § 440.13(2)(c), Fla....

...withholds benefits. For instance, if an E/C suspends benefits based on grounds of fraud or MCC that are warranted and later proven to be correct, the care obtained by Claimant (even if medically necessary) would not be compensable or awardable. See § 440.13(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (2003) (defining "compensable"); see also Alvarez v. Unicco, 958 So.2d 951 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). Here, because Dr. Benezette and Dr. Kirkpatrick were authorized by operation of section 440.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (2003), for the care provided during the E/C's wrongful denial of benefits, the JCC should not have excluded their medical opinions pursuant to section 440.13(5)(e)....

...e reached MMI on December 11, 1981, with a return to her pre-injury status. The order awarded her TTD benefits from October 27 through December 11, 1981, based on an AWW of $100.65, but found she was neither entitled to medical expenses, pursuant to section 440.13(1), Florida Statutes, nor to permanent and total disability....

...Rather, we remand for further proceedings, and direct the deputy to clarify his findings, upon which Reynolds' entitlement to benefits can be determined in accordance with the evidence, including claimant's age, education and physical limitations. We affirm the deputy's denial of future medical benefits pursuant to section 440.13(1), Florida Statutes, as it is supported by the evidence....

...Kimes cross-appeals, challenging (i) the denial of his request for surgery to his left ankle; and (ii) the admission into evidence of a letter summarizing the substance of a meeting between Kimes' treating physician and representatives of the employer/carrier's attorney held pursuant to section 440.13(4), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), arguing that section 440.13(4)(c) is facially unconstitutional as violative of the privacy provisions of Article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution....

...Thus, the cases cited by the employer/carrier, State, Div. Of Risk Management/Dep't of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles v. Martin, 690 So.2d 651 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), and Ullman v. City of Tampa Parks Dep't, 625 So.2d 868 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), are distinguishable. Constitutionality of Section 440.13(4)(c) Kimes argues that, by authorizing ex parte communications between his treating physician, Dr. Bernstein, and representatives of the employer/carrier, section 440.13(4)(c), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994), infringes upon the privacy rights of a petitioner for worker's compensation benefits. We find this argument to be without merit. Section 440.13(4)(c) provides: 440.13 Medical services and supplies; penalty for violations; limitations.......

...t to this subsection, shall be subject by the division to one or more of the penalties set forth in paragraph (8)(b). In Pierre v. Handi Van, Inc., 717 So.2d 1115, 1117 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), this court explained that, in enacting subsection (4)(c) to section 440.13, the legislature intended that the records and opinions of treating and examining *1041 physicians and other practitioners be freely available to E/Cs, and that claimants no longer enjoy the right to be present during discussions between E/Cs and those providers....

...We observed in Pierre that subsection (4)(c) "furthers the self-executing nature of the compensation system by ensuring that the E/C has ready access to medical information involving the claimant." Id. at 1116-1117. Reading subsection (4)(c) in pari materia with section 440.13 as a whole, we held that once a dispute has become sufficiently adversarial to require the appointment of an expert medical advisor (EMA) under section 440.13(9)(c), ex parte discussions may not be held between an expert and the employer/carrier....

...See § 440.015, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1994). [2] Even though the conference between Dr. Bernstein and representatives of the employer/carrier occurred after the filing of Kimes' claim, the statute contemplates "discussions ... held before or after the filing of a claim." § 440.13(4)(c), Fla. Stat. (Supp.1994). Here, there had been no EMA appointed at the time of the conference with Dr. Bernstein. Thus, the ex parte conference pursuant to section 440.13(4)(c) was permissible under Pierre. We also hold that section 440.13(4)(c) does not violate Florida's constitutional right to privacy....

...The very foundation of an employee's right to receive benefits under the self-executing system in Chapter 440 requires a healthcare provider to assess the injury, establish a causal connection to the workplace accident, and communicate that information to the employer's insurance carrier. See § 440.13, Fla....

...y and assessment of whether it is attributable to his employment, Kimes consented to the provider disclosing to the carrier medical information relating to the claim. See Acosta v. Cary, 365 So.2d 4, 5 (La.Ct.App.1978). The discussions authorized by section 440.13(4)(c) simply furthers that disclosure system....

...In this appeal and cross-appeal of an order of the judge of compensation claims (JCC) awarding temporary total disability benefits to claimant, Annette Bair, we affirm, in the main appeal, those portions of the order finding Bair's back injury compensable and awarding costs of transportation for medical treatment under section 440.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994)....

...bstantial evidence supporting the JCC's finding that claimant's compensable accident was the major contributing cause of her need for treatment for her back injury. We affirm as well the award of medical mileage. In 1964, the supreme court held that section 440.13, Florida Statutes, which requires the employer to furnish the claimant with "remedial treatment, care, and attendance" for as long as the injury requires, included costs of transportation for medical treatment....

...s provided by the Act are an incident of medical care and treatment. Therefore, the employer-carrier must either furnish such transportation or pay claimant the reasonable actual cost thereof. Id. at 47. In 1977, the legislature added a provision to section 440.13 expressly authorizing such medical mileage. Ch. 77-290, § 3, at 1287, Laws of Fla. When the legislature amended section 440.13 in 1993, it deleted this provision. [1] Ch. 93-415, § 17, at 98-111, Laws of Fla. We conclude that this omission did not abrogate the judicial construction in Mobley and its progeny that section 440.13(2)(a) implicitly authorizes such costs....

...construction of this language in Mobley to permit reimbursement of medical transportation. In the case at bar, there is no actual conflict between the amendment omitting the express authorization of transportation costs, and the retained language of section 440.13(2)(a) requiring remedial treatment, care, and attendance, and therefore the legislative acts can be harmonized....

...part of a claimant's remedial treatment, care, and attendance, as held in Mobley, else it would have stated the contrary. It was reasonable for the JCC to conclude that mere omission of subsection (6) did not abrogate prior judicial construction of section 440.13(2)(a)....

...AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, and REMANDED with directions to the JCC to determine whether the treatment Dr. Dumbadse provided after the E/C refused to authorize treatment for back pain was reasonable and necessary. KAHN and DAVIS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] The provision was first codified at section 440.13(4). When omitted in 1993, it was codified at section 440.13(6).

...loyee, ... and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages ... on account of such injury or death... ." (e.s.) Section 440.10 places on the employer the responsibility for furnishing compensation benefits to the employee, as provided under sections 440.13, 440.15 and 440.16 of the act. Section 440.13 generally describes the employer's liability for medical services to the injured employee, section 440.15, disability benefits, including permanent total, temporary total and wage-loss, while section 440.16 provides death compensation benefits to designated survivors....

...on of a pre-existing condition, no apportionment may be made"). The JCC also properly denied the E/C's motion for an IME by Dr. Witorsch, because Dr. McGregor had already performed an IME of Wise for the E/C. At issue is the proper interpretation of section 440.13(5)(b)(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), which provides: (b) Each party is bound by his selection of an independent medical examiner and is entitled to an alternate examiner only if: 1....

...e date of MMI and the degree of the permanent work restrictions. The JCC concluded that, because the EMA failed to render definitive opinions on these two issues, none of the EMA's opinions were afforded the presumption of correctness as provided in section 440.13(9)(c), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...In making his findings, and analyzing the evidence, the JCC relied on statements contained in the unauthenticated FCE report. This appeal followed. Rejection of the EMA's Opinions If there is a disagreement in the opinions of health care providers, the legislature has mandated that the JCC shall appoint an EMA. See § 440.13(9)(c), Fla....

...Further, the report or testimony of the EMA shall be admitted into evidence, see section 440.25(4)(e), Florida *832 Statutes (2004), and the opinion of the EMA is presumed to be correct unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary as determined by the JCC. See § 440.13(9)(c), Fla....

...f an EMA's unequivocal opinions relative to issues upon which the EMA's assistance was sought, without the JCC first making a finding as to the existence of clear and convincing evidence which contradicts the presumed correctness of the opinion. See § 440.13(9)(c), Fla....

...materially inconsistent in rendering his opinions. The JCC found the evidence opposing the EMA's opinion unclear, equivocal, and unreliable. Nevertheless, the JCC, instead of following the procedure for resolution of medical disputes as required by section 440.13(9)(a)-(f), disregarded the EMA's opinion (and the presumptive correctness attached thereto) based on an unwarranted expansion of this court's holding in Fitzgerald....

...eviate. The claimant became increasingly depressed and discouraged under the care of *1195 her authorized doctors, feeling more comfortable with her own physician. Upon consulting Dr. Hynick, she was hospitalized and given immediate attention. Under Section 440.13(3), Florida Statutes, a deputy may, at any time, for good cause shown, order a change in the claimant's remedial attention, care, or attendance....

...*741 Billy L. Rose, of Harrison, Greene, Mann, Rowe, Stanton & Mastry, St. Petersburg, for appellants. Edwin J. Bradley, of Lloyd & Henninger, P.A., St. Petersburg, for appellee. PER CURIAM. This case involves an unusual award of palliative care under § 440.13(1), Florida Statutes (1977)....

...conditional mandate for "vesting of title" under the statutory requirement to "furnish ... other apparatus." Thus, the vesting of title is not per se prohibited. The test is whether the furnishing of the apparatus, i.e., the pool, was required under § 440.13(1)....

...Appellants urge that the pool increases the value of the residence and is a monetary advantage to appellee to the detriment of appellants. On the other hand, Vaughn urges that there is no statutory authority to apportion the costs of furnishing apparatus under § 440.13(1) between the employer/carrier and employee....

...claimant's treating physicians, Dr. Barclay and Dr. Gonzalez. The JCC reasoned that because e/c knew of claimant's need for medical care and treatment and failed to provide the care, the JCC was entitled to admit the medical opinion testimony under section 440.13(5)(e), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994)....

...le medical opinions. The medical opinions admissible in a proceeding before a JCC are limited to the opinions of (1) a medical advisor appointed by the JCC or division; (2) an independent medical examiner; or (3) an authorized treating provider. See § 440.13(5)(e). In the present case, Drs. Gonzalez and Barclay did not fall into any of those categories. The claimant was under an affirmative obligation to request an IME under section 440.13(5)(a), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), by the physician of his choice, if he objected to the e/c's decision to controvert his request for benefits based upon the opinions rendered in the independent medical evaluations obtained by e/c....

...1st DCA 1981); Lake Highland Nursing Home v. Everett, 397 So.2d 380 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). We also affirm the portion of the award requiring the employer/carrier to pay the medical bills of Florida Hospital and Dr. Robert Boswell, even though no timely medical reports were filed pursuant to Section 440.13(1), Florida Statutes....

...atutory language. As examples, the Malu panel cited to the statutory scheme that provided benefits for birth-related neurological injuries, section 766.31(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2002), and a workers' compensation statute that was repealed in 1993, section 440.13(6), Florida Statutes (1993)....

...I am aware that the law, unfortunately, does not recognize such an unqualified privilege. See Coralluzzo v. Fass, 435 So.2d 262, 263 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (Jorgenson, J., dissenting), approved, 450 So.2d 858 (Fla. 1984), superseded in part by statute, section 440.13(2), Florida Statutes (1988); see also Acosta v....

...Rogner of Hurley, Rogner, Miller, Cox & Waranch, P.A., Winter Park, for Appellants. Basil A. Valdivia, Orlando, and Bill McCabe, Longwood, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. In this workers' compensation appeal, we address the issue of a claimant's entitlement to a one-time change in physician, which pursuant to section 440.13(2)(f), Florida Statutes (2005), must be sought during the course of treatment....

...to obtain additional treatment at the clinic approximately one year later, he was told that his case had been closed, and he was no longer entitled to care under workers' compensation. Claimant then sought a one-time change in physician pursuant to section 440.13(2)(f), Florida Statutes....

...Grant's office note, the compensable accident was no longer the major contributing cause (MCC) of Claimant's need for treatment of his back; and 2) Claimant was no longer in the "course of treatment" at the time he made his request, and thus failed to satisfy this statutory requirement. Ultimately, the JCC interpreted section 440.13(2)(f), Florida Statutes, as permitting a claimant an absolute right to a one-time change in treating physician, if the claimant's written request was made during the course of treatment. We agree. Analysis Section 440.13(2)(f), in relevant part, provides: Upon the written request of the employee, the carrier shall give the employee the opportunity for one change of physician during the course of treatment for any one accident.......

...s compensable and medically necessary. (Emphasis added). In construing a statute, courts must look to its plain language. See Fla. Dep't of Educ. v. Cooper, 858 So.2d 394, 395 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). The use of the word "shall" in the quoted portion of section 440.13(2)(f) means that this one-time change is mandatory, regardless of whether the initial authorized doctor opines that a compensable accident is no longer the MCC of a claimant's need for treatment....

...at the treatment recommended or provided is unnecessary, or is unrelated to the industrial accident, the E/C can deny authorization for such treatment pending resolution of the issue by the JCC. *1226 In interpreting a prior, but similar, version of section 440.13(2)(f), this court stated that, after an employer has authorized a medical provider to evaluate and treat a claimant, "the employee may request a one-time change of physician....

...ation, and rendered a diagnosis. This was sufficient to constitute "treatment," and because the neurosurgeon evaluated the claimant "during the course of treatment," the claimant was entitled, "as a matter of law," to the one-time change provided by section 440.13(2)(f)....

...Similarly, in the instant case, Claimant began treatment with an authorized physician, and that physician evaluated Claimant and rendered a diagnosis during the course of that treatment. Consequently, as a matter of law, Claimant was entitled to a one-time change in physician *1227 pursuant to section 440.13(2)(f)....

...ting physician or primary care physician. The award of benefits in Ms. Bell's life care plan are also unsupported. By adopting Ms. Bell's plan as a whole, the judge abdicated his responsibility for determining which benefits are medically necessary. Section 440.13(2), Florida Statutes, provides that an E/C must provide "medically necessary" benefits....

...limitation period in Section 440.28. See also Dean v. McLeod, 270 So.2d 726 (Fla. 1972). Mansell recognizes that only a claimant's last receipt of medical benefits within two years before the filing of a claim tolls the limitation period provided in Section 440.13(3)(b), stating that a claim may be filed within two years after the last remedial attention furnished by the e/c. Here, the claimant's petition to modify, as it relates to a requested change in compensation benefits, was governed by the provisions of Section 440.28 — not by Section 440.13(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1975)....

...sicians. Despite the E/C's responses to her requests, Ms. Brewer contended in the pre-trial stipulation that she was entitled to treat with the orthopedist of her choice, Dr. Simon, who did not appear on the lists the E/C provided to Ms. Brewer. [3] Section 440.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes, does not authorize the JCC to order treatment with a specific physician, where the E/C promptly offers qualified alternatives. See § 440.13(2)(c), Fla....

...within the 120-day period. § 440.20(4), Fla. Stat. (2000). [3] Ms. Brewer's knee injury occurred on May 13, 1998, and her requests for a change of physician were made between July 2002 and February 2003. At the time Ms. Brewer's requests were made section 440.13(2)(f), Florida Statutes (2002), provided that "the carrier shall give the employee the opportunity for one change of physician ... for any one accident. The employee shall be entitled to select ... from ... not fewer than three carrier-authorized physicians...." See ch.2001-91, § 12, at 773, Laws of Fla. (creating right to one-time change of physician by adopting section 440.13(2)(f), Florida Statutes). No statute granting a right to a one-time change of physician existed at the time Ms. Brewer injured her knee at work. Although section 440.13(2)(f) became effective prior to her change-of-physician requests, even under the 2002 statute, the E/C's responses to Ms....

...enefits. The attorneys' fee established by the Judge of Industrial Claims is inadequate, and should be increased upon remand. It is contended that the Industrial Claims Judge erred in failing to grant payment of medical bills of claimant. Fla. Stat. § 440.13(1), F.S.A., provides that an injured claimant may under certain circumstances, in essence not prejudicial to the employer, seek his own medical assistance....

...failure of the physician or other recognized practitioner to furnish any report within the period prescribed and may order the payment to him of such remuneration for treatment or service rendered as the *643 commission finds equitable." Fla. Stat. § 440.13(1), F.S.A....

...1st DCA 2004) (citation omitted). For purposes of this appeal then, a written prescription for attendant care was not required since physician testimony provided the required elements. See Rockette v. Space Gateway Support, 877 So.2d 852, 853 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004); see also § 440.13(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (1997)-(2002) (E/C must provide attendant care performed at the direction and control of a physician). Section 440.13(2)(b) was amended in 2003, and now includes greater specifications for claims for attendant care....

...The employer or carrier shall not be responsible for such care until the prescription is received by the employer and carrier, which shall specify the time periods for such care, the level of care required, and the type of assistance required. A prescription for attendant care shall not prescribe such care retroactively. § 440.13(2)(b), Fla....

...[2] Moreover, testimony was provided that Claimant was able to independently perform meal preparation, laundry, and other daily routine activities, and that attendant care services were needed mostly for bill paying, filing prescriptions, and transportation to doctor's appointments. [3] See generally § 440.13(10), Fla. Stat. (2001); Fla. Admin. Code R. 38F-7.020 (2001). We note that on July 1, 2002, section 440.13(14)(b), Florida Statutes, was amended to exclude IME's from the statutory fee cap....

...The hearing before the deputy followed shortly after the carrier controverted payment of the prescription. Under the circumstances presented we are unable to reverse the deputy's conclusion that the treatment was of such emergency character as not to violate the provisions of Section 440.13 with respect to authorization....

...best interest. See Bradley Construction v. White, 457 So.2d 547 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Viera, 440 So.2d 49 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). Employer/carrier's failure to comply with this obligation would render them responsible pursuant to section 440.13(2), Florida Statutes, for the unauthorized chiropractic treatment if it is determined to be reasonable and necessary....

...ry functions. Mrs. Gause performed all these services. Further, the number of hours she expended in providing attendance was conservatively estimated by the deputy, thereby eliminating the normal time spent by a spouse rendering gratuitous services. Section 440.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1983), provides that an employee shall not be entitled to recover any amount personally expended for remedial treatment, care or attendance unless the employee requested the employer to provide such treatment o...

...provide the claimant with further medical treatment by a different physician. I am aware of no law holding that a deputy commissioner must appoint a physician recommended by the employer/carrier over one sought by the claimant. As a matter of fact, Section 440.13(2), Florida Statutes (1979), authorizes a deputy commissioner at any time, for good cause shown in the deputy's discretion, to order a change in remedial attention, care, or attendance....

...We also find no error in the commissioner's finding that claimant's treatment by Drs. Stillman and Berntson was reasonable and necessary. However, we find an absence of a finding of "good cause" to excuse the failure to file timely medical reports as required by Section 440.13(2), Florida Statutes (1983)....

...commissioner's finding of orthopedic TTD. Appellants next assert that the commissioner erred in ordering the E/C to pay the medical bills of Drs. Stillman and Berntson. The E/C deny that psychiatric services were not provided by them, and claim that Section 440.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1983) and City of Ft....

...1st DCA 1982) dictate that claimant should have sought authorization of Dr. Stillman prior to beginning treatment by him. Further, the E/C argue that claimant's failure to submit timely medical reports from Drs. Stillman and Berntson renders the claim for medical care invalid. We disagree with appellants' argument. Section 440.13(2)(b) provides in pertinent part: (b) If the employer fails to provide such treatment, care, and attendance after request by the injured employee, the employee may do so at the expense of the employer, the reasonableness and the necessity to be approved by a deputy commissioner....

...This court has made it clear that a claimant may seek unauthorized medical treatment where authorization has been requested and refused by the E/C. Cedars of Lebanon Health Care Center, Inc. v. Summerset, 409 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Mayberry v. Sunland Training Center, 404 So.2d 810 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). Section 440.13(2)(b) further provides: Nor shall any claim for medical, surgical, or other remedial treatment be valid and enforceable unless, within 10 days following the first treatment ......

...d prescribed... . Although we find that claimant was justified in seeking treatment from Drs. Stillman and Berntson, we also note the absence of any consideration of "good cause" to excuse the failure to furnish timely medical reports as required by section 440.13(2)(b)....

...Speh and Burnis T. Coleman, Tallahassee, for respondents. ROBERTS, Justice. Petitioner-claimant has applied for review on certiorari of an order of the Florida Industrial Commission denying his claim for additional remedial treatment under the provisions of § 440.13, Fla....

...reatment furnished in 1957. The Commission held, however, that the claimant's right to additional remedial treatment had been barred since 1955 (two years after the date of the last compensation payment) under the provisions of Subsection (3) (b) of § 440.13, supra, providing that the right to remedial treatment "shall be barred unless claim therefor is filed * * * within two years after the date of the last remedial treatment furnished by the employer, or after the date of the last payment of...

...ability exaggeration. A functional capacity evaluation ordered by Dr. Gosselin reached the same conclusion. [3] An expert medical advisor's opinion is presumed to be correct and may only be rejected on the basis of clear and convincing evidence. See § 440.13(9)(c), Fla....

...Claimant is entitled as a matter of right, in the absence of a specific finding that he has reached maximum medical improvement, to have medical care provided by the employer. And if the authorized physician declines to see him further, claimant is entitled to have another physician authorized to provide such medical care. § 440.13, Fla....

...1st DCA 1989) (Absent medical testimony that the claimant has or has not reached MMI, the judge is unable to address the issue of permanent disability.). III. We affirm on the final issue raised by claimant, i.e., whether the judge erred in denying her claim for attendant care benefits. Section 440.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1989), authorizes attendant care benefits in the following language: [T]he employer shall furnish to the employee such medically necessary remedial *994 treatment, care, and attendance by a health care provider... . This court has interpreted section 440.13(2)(a) as authorizing compensation for attendant care services provided by a family member where such services go beyond ordinary household duties....

...und. Claimant next argues that she is entitled to attendant care benefits because her family must provide her with transportation. The record supports claimant's assertion that she is now unable to drive. [2] We do not, however, read the language in section 440.13(2)(a) that attendant care services must be medically necessary to mean that attendant care benefits are authorized to a claimant for transportation services for various and sundry purposes. Supportive services such as driving the claimant to the store and other places, other than transportation necessary for medical treatment pursuant to section 440.13(6), [3] constitute quality of life activities indemnified under disability compensation benefits rather than attendant care service that is medically necessary....

...1st DCA 1986), supports her claim for attendant care because it states that "[w]hen transportation is provided to a claimant beyond what would normally be provided by a family member on a gratuitous basis, attendant care benefits should be awarded." That case holds only that section 440.13(6) entitles a claimant to reimbursement of the reasonable actual cost of transportation for authorized medical treatment. Mills does not construe and apply the attendant care provision, section 440.13(2), and the language in the opinion that transportation expenses incurred transporting a claimant to obtain medical treatment are recoverable as an attendant care service, while admittedly ambiguous, must necessarily be read in context and limited to the transportation costs authorized for medical treatment pursuant to section 440.13(6) actually involved in the case....

...t when to start out into traffic. She has trouble judging the intervals between cars and the rate of speed that they are going. [3] The judge specifically awarded claimant transportation expenses incidental to her remedial treatment as authorized by section 440.13(6).

reports are not filed within ten days as required by § 440.13(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A. On the last series

on appeal without further comment. Because section 440.13(2)(f), Florida Statutes (2004), limits a claimant

treatment, care and attendance" as used in section 440.13, Florida Statutes (1981), and also would be

basis for an award of attendant care services. Section 440.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1983); B.G. Willis

Spangler, for a utilization review pursuant to section 440.13(6), Florida Statutes (2006). That statute requires

opinion and a second treating physician. Under section 440.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1985), "once the claimant

Commission's quoted order, we do not find F.S. Section 440.13, F.S.A. or any provision of Chapter 440 precludes

the originally authorized doctor" pursuant to section 440.13(2)(f), Florida Statutes (2016). Id. at 1278-79

appointment of an expert medical advisor (EMA) under section 440.13(9), Florida Statutes (1995). The JCC found

report for fact purposes only; and 3) whether section 440.13(5)(e), Florida Statutes, which excludes certain

obtain those services. Both parties urge that section 440.13(5), Florida Statutes (1985),[1] dealing with

motion for rehearing in which they argued that section 440.13(9)(c), Florida Statutes (1997), mandated the

employer still failed to provide such services. § 440.13(2)(a) and (d), Fla. Stat. (1991). In the present

his recovery," by treatment of his injury. Section 440.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes, authorizes the award

Robinson reimbursement for child care expenses. § 440.13, Fla. Stat. (1977). In view of the unusual nature

in compliance with the express provisions of Section 440.13(2), Florida Statutes (1979), requiring the

flying with a brace, for he prescribed it. Section 440.13(2)(a) Florida Statutes, provides that an employer

on the alleged overutilization of services. Section 440.13(4)(d)4 (Supp. 1988) provides: If it is determined

hospital ever filed medical reports as required by § 440.13, Florida Statutes (1979). On February 24, 1980

benefits furnished by him to the employee under Section 440.13, F.S. 1941, the amounts paid as compensation

furnished for an accident, but for an injury. See § 440.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes. Thus, it is not the accident

the bills were not timely claimed pursuant to section 440.13(2)(d) which requires submission to the E/C

services of which they were unaware. Pursuant to section 440.13(2), Florida Statutes (1987), the employer is

Division of Workers' Compensation pursuant to section 440.13, Florida Statutes. We hold he may not, and

appeal a compensation order, contending that section 440.13(5)(e), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), required

patient's diagnosis and status of recovery. See § 440.13(1)(m), Fla. Stat. (2003). This broad definition

this proceeding involves the construction of Section 440.13, Florida Statutes 1941, as amended by Chapter

Flanders, 416 So.2d 1234 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); § 440.13, Fla. Stat. Here, the deputy did not find, and

appointment of an expert medical advisor pursuant to section 440.13(9)(c), Florida Statutes (1995). We conclude

which are not compensable. Florida Statutes, Section 440.13, provides that an employee shall not be entitled

presumption of twenty cents per mile derived from section 440.13(4), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1980). Consequently

Security (Division). They base their argument upon Section 440.13(2)(i)1., Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990), which

failed to timely submit the reports required by Section 440.13, Florida Statutes (1975). The judge's order

overcome by clear and convincing evidence. See § 440.13(9)(c), Fla. Stat. (1997). As so phrased, claimant's

opinion on any issue, purportedly in contrast to section 440.13(5), which is said to allow each claimant an

appellate tribunal of this State. We must look to Section 440.13 for guidance inasmuch as the reimbursement

sought treatment from another physician. Under section 440.13(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1995), the E/C has

CSE supports this award. We agree and affirm. Section 440.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1983), provides that

of a modified vehicle with AT/PS pursuant to section 440.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1989); see Stables

chiropractic care "as long as necessary." We affirm. Section 440.13(1) requires the provision of medical care "as

employee. Medical benefits are provided for in section 440.13. Section 440.15(5)(a) reads: The fact that

his employees of the compensation payable under § 440.13 * * *. In case a contractor sublets any part or

which would preclude a finding of bad faith. Section 440.13(1) requires that hospital bills be forwarded

v. Akins, 547 So.2d 1001 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); § 440.13(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (1989) ("Reimbursement for all

family, was beyond deputy's authority under section 440.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes, governing medical

an expert medical advisor (EMA) pursuant to section 440.13(9), Florida Statutes (1997), and the employer/carrier

required to submit reports to the employer/carrier. § 440.13(4)(a), (c). For these reasons, the employer cannot

benefits for attendant care requested, pursuant to Section 440.13, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1978), are not compensable

claimant was beyond the deputy's authority under Section 440.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes.[2]Doctor's Hospital

Harrison, 443 So.2d 389 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). Section 440.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes, requires the employer

statute in the workers’ compensation arena. See § 440.13(4)(c), Fla. Stat. (2017). As with the amendments

Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) below held that § 440.13(2)(e)2, Fla. Stat. (1988), should not be retroactively

order is based on the judicial gloss given to Section 440.13(1), Florida Statutes (1981), which section

waiver of medical necessity and causation under section 440.13(3)(d), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994). That provision

Claimant's home to meet his medical needs under section 440.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2004). E/C sought

made." He relied upon the following provisions of § 440.13, Florida Statutes: (3) If an injured employee

dispositive of the attendant care issue under section 440.13(2)(d), Florida Statutes (1985). See Rodriguez

erred by refusing to apply the provisions of Section 440.13(2)(e), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988), in determining

the examining physicians as it conflicts with section 440.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1993), which gives

such services were properly awarded under section 440.13, Florida Statutes. See generally, Khawam v

and treatment within the time prescribed by Section 440.13(1), Florida Statutes. We find no error in the

thousand dollars in addition to any benefits under § 440.13 for medical services and treatment and under subsection

compensation claim for attendant care benefits under section 440.13, Florida Statutes. At the hearing, Lovell relied

injured employees or their attorneys, pursuant to Section 440.13(1), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., shall be without

selection and changes in authorized physicians. Section 440.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1985) provides: [T]he

review of the relevant statutory provisions. Section 440.13(9), Florida Statutes (2013), the provision

ERVIN and SHIVERS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See § 440.13(3)(a), Florida Statutes.

van is awardable as a medical benefit under section 440.13(2), Florida Statutes, upon an appropriate showing

needed. We are also aware of the provisions of section 440.13(3), Florida Statutes, where it is stated: "[i]t

authority supports the issuance of the IME order. Section 440.13(5)(a), Florida Statutes (2000), permits an

treating physician on the supposed authority of section 440.13(3)(d), Florida Statutes (2002). On that basis

evidence only. (Emphasis added.) Additionally, section 440.13(5)(e), Florida Statutes (2007), provides that

(total fee of $625.00) in contravention of Section 440.13(2)(k), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990), which

failure to file reports timely as required by Section 440.13(1), Florida Statutes (1981). We reverse. On

to someone who continued to treat claimant. Section 440.13(2), Florida Statutes (1985), requires the E/C

issue in this case falls within the purview of section 440.13, Florida Statutes, which provides in pertinent

reimbursement in an ordinary contract dispute. Compare § 440.13(12), Fla. Stat. (2001) (creating panels to set

the order denying the motion, contending that § 440.13, Florida Statutes, compels reversal because it

certified to be of great public importance: WHETHER SECTION 440.13, FLORIDA STATUTES, PERMITS A PHYSICIAN, PRACTICING

totally deny the claim for transportation costs. Section 440.13(4), Florida Statutes (1982) [now 440.13(5)]

and Employment Security. The provisions of section 440.13, Florida Statutes (1991), dealing with the

appropriately in seeking the appointment of an EMA. § 440.13(9)(c), Fla. Stat. (2002). The legislature has

the health, safety or welfare of an employee. Section 440.13(4)(c), another provision cited by the E/C as

trauma claim, she erred in denying the IME. Section 440.13(5), Florida Statutes, allows for an IME when