The 2022 Florida Statutes (including 2022 Special Session A and 2023 Special Session B)
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• Count 9: Violation of Florida Statute § 125.66
local self-government not inconsistent with general law, or with special law approved by vote of the electors." Art. VIII, § 1(f)-(g), Fla. Const. Article VIII, section 1(i) provides that "Each county ordinance shall be filed with the custodian of state records and shall become effective at such time thereafter as is provided by general law ." (Emphasis added). And in fact, every zoning decision made by local governments carries the imprimatur of state law: "In exercising the ordinance-making powers conferred by s.1, Art. VIII, of the state constitution, counties shall adhere to the procedures prescribed herein." § 125.66(1), Fla. Stat. (2019) (emphasis added). Any reader who simply searches the term "zoning" in the Florida Statutes in the Florida Legislature's excellent "Online Sunshine" website will receive 176 returns. See Online Sunshine, http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm (last visited May 28, 2020).
Judge Wolf's concurrence correctly notes that the constitutional amendment adopted in the last election abolishing deference to administrative actions refers to "a state statute or rule[,]" but the concurring opinion incorrectly asserts that article V, section 21 of the Florida Constitution "has nothing to do with local government decision making, nor does it affect the scope of the second level review of local zoning decisions by the appellate courts of this state." Concurring opinion , page 2 . Quite the contrary, the organic law now prohibits deference to local zoning decisions because the constitution itself provides that all zoning decisions must be compliant with general law . "The board of county commissioners of a county not operating under a charter may enact, in a manner prescribed by general law, county ordinances not inconsistent with general or special law ... Counties operating under county charters shall have all powers of local self-government not inconsistent with general law, or with special law approved by vote of the electors." Art. VIII, § 1(f)-(g), Fla. Const. Article VIII, section 1 (i) provides that "Each county ordinance shall be filed with the custodian…
The remainder of section 125.66(4) includes provisions for public hearings before the Board and the requirements for providing notice. Section 125.66(2)(a) also provides for a public hearing with notice when the Board amends any ordinance.
Plaintiff seeks declaratory judgment that Citrus County Ordinance 2012-06, which contains the most current definition of gross floor area, is void because the County did not enact the ordinance in accordance with the procedures established by Florida Statute § 125.66(4)(b)(2), which provides the language that should be used in publishing notices of hearings regarding amendments to ordinances. (Doc. 1 at 29-31). Specifically, § 125.66(4)(b)(2) states that the title of the notice should read "NOTICE OF (TYPE OF) CHANGE." Here, the heading of the notice regarding the change to the ordinance defining gross floor area stated, "Notice of Intent to Consider an Ordinance Regulating Land Development in Citrus County to be Known as the Citrus County Land Development Code." (Doc. 1, Ex. T). According to Plaintiff, because this heading did not indicate that it reflected a change, it was not in substantial compliance with § 125.66(4)(b)(2). (Id. at 29).
Plaintiffs contend that even if Defendant followed Florida law, Plaintiffs did not have "adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard as a matter of federal law." Plaintiffs raised no constitutional attack on the pertinent Florida statute, and so the constitutionality of Florida Statutes § 125.66 — setting out procedures under which a county is empowered to enact an ordinance — is not properly before us. By the way, this court has addressed the constitutionality of this statute before in a due process context and concluded it was not contrary to the Federal Constitution. First Assembly of God of Naples, Fla., Inc. v. Collier County, Fla., 20 F.3d 419, 421-22 (11th Cir. 1994).
Read in light of the referenced statutory provisions, section 163.346 is clear and unambiguous. Section 163.346 specifies that the governing body of a municipality or county must give public notice and mail a timely notice to each relevant taxing authority before adopting resolutions pursuant to the Community Redevelopment Act. This public notice is subject to the standards set forth in section 166.041(3)(a) or 125.66( 2). Although sections 166.041(3)(a) and 125.66( 2) include additional procedures for enacting municipal and county ordinances respectively, they contain the identical public notice requirements. Both require (1) that at least ten days' notice be given; (2) that notice be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the pertinent county or municipality; (3) that a copy of the published notice be available for inspection by the public; (4) that the notice state the date, time, and place of the meeting; the title or titles of the proposed ordinance; and the place or places where the proposed ordinance may be inspected by the public; and (5) that the notice advise that interested parties may appear and be heard at the meeting. §§ 166.041(3)(a)…
Article VIII, section 1 of the Florida Constitution authorizes counties to enact local ordinances: "The board of county commissioners of a county . . . may enact, in a manner prescribed by general law, county ordinances." Section 125.66, Florida Statutes (1995), establishes the procedures by which ordinances may be enacted: "In exercising the ordinance-making powers conferred by s. 1, Art. VIII of the State Constitution, counties shall adhere to the procedures prescribed herein." § 125.66( 1), Fla. Stat. (1995). Section 125.66 imposes detailed notice and hearing requirements depending on the type of ordinance proposed. Three subsections are particularly relevant here: (1) section 125.66( 2), governing the "regular enactment procedure" for ordinances that do not involve land use districts; (2) section 125.66( 4)(a), governing ordinances that change the zoning map designation for parcels of fewer than ten acres; and (3) section 125.66( 4)(b), governing ordinances that change the zoning map designation of parcels larger than ten acres, or which change the list of permitted, conditional, or prohibited uses within a zoning…
Plaintiffs argue that the Ordinance should be void ab initio because Monroe amended the Ordinance during the enactment process in a manner that violated section 125.66. The district court concluded that Monroe did not violate section 125.66.
Defendant contends that it complied with Section 125.66 in enacting the Ordinance; Plaintiffs contend that defendant did not comply with Section 125.66. At the hearing, plaintiffs categorized their arguments as "Technical Requirements of 125.66 Regarding Advertised Notice" and "Notice and Hearing Violations." The court will address its analysis in such terminology, turning first to plaintiffs' contention that defendant violated the notice and hearing provisions of Section 125.66.
. . . Fourteenth Amendments, (4) the Ordinance is void because it was enacted in violation of Florida Statutes § 125.66 . . . certified this question to the Florida Supreme Court: Whether, for purposes of Florida Statutes section 125.66 . . . constitutional attack on the pertinent Florida statute, and so the constitutionality of Florida Statutes § 125.66 . . .
. . . Because section 163.346 incorporates only the public notice requirements of sections 166.041(3)(a) and 125.66 . . . Finally, section 125.66(2), which applies to counties, provides in relevant part: (a) ... . . . This public notice is subject to the standards set forth in section 166.041(3)(a) or 125.66(2). . . . Although sections 166.041(3)(a) and 125.66(2) include additional procedures for enacting municipal and . . . the notice advise that interested parties may appear and be heard at the meeting. §§ 166.041(3)(a); 125.66 . . .
. . . VIII of the State Constitution, counties shall adhere to the procedures prescribed herein.” § 125.66( . . . Section 125.66(2): the Regular Enactment Procedure Section 125.66(2) governs the enactment process for . . . Section 125.66(4)(b) contains several important provisions. . . . They derive this standard from the language of section 125.66(4)(b). . . . They are required only for regular ordinances, which are governed by section 125.66(2). . . .
. . . Among their claims, Plaintiffs contend that Monroe violated Florida Statutes section 125.66 when it made . . . Florida Statutes section 125.66 sets out the procedures under which a county is empowered to enact an . . . because Monroe amended the Ordinance during the enactment process in a manner that violated section 125.66 . . . The district court concluded that Monroe did not violate section 125.66. . . . Section 125.66(4)(b) states, in part: In cases in which the proposed ordinance or resolution changes . . .
. . . Section 125.66, Fla. . . . Stat. § 125.66(4)(b). . . . that defendant did not comply with Section 125.66. . . . Fla Stat. § 125.66(4)(b)(2). . . . Rather, defendant complied with all notice and hearing requirements of § 125.66. . . . .
. . . Judgment as to whether Ordinance is void ab initio because enacted in violation of Florida Statutes § 125.66 . . . Florida Statutes § 125.66 governs the procedures by which a county is empowered to enact ordinances. . . . Prior to enacting the Ordinance, and pursuant to the requirements of § 125.66, Defendant advertised and . . . Plaintiffs argue that Defendant did not comply with § 125.66 because it failed to properly notice public . . . Stat. §§ 125.66 and 125.68). . . .
. . . the public health, safety, and general welfare of the community under proceedings as provided in s. 125.66 . . .
. . . Count VIII); and the ordinances were enacted improperly and in violation of Florida Statutes section 125.66 . . .
. . . 163.3184(15)(c) for such plan amendments if the local government complies with the provisions in s. 125.66 . . . notice by publication of a public hearing are required to all affected property owners under section 125.66 . . .
. . . interior structure of a btdlding an ordinance that “affects the use of land” within the meaning of Section 125.66 . . .
. . . In accordance with Section 125.66(2), Florida Statutes, a certified copy of this ordinance shall be filed . . .
. . . to procedures established in section 166.041, Florida Statutes (1991), and not pursuant to section 125.66 . . . Section 125.66(1) enumerates the procedures a county must follow when enacting an ordinance. . . . Section 125.66(1) specifically states that “in exei’cising the ordinance-making powers conferred by s . . . We find that the County properly enacted the ordinance pursuant to procedures established in section 125.66 . . .
. . . Section 125.66, Flori da Statutes (1993), does not provide clear guidance for county governments in determining . . . INTERIOR STRUCTURE OF A BUILDING AN ORDINANCE THAT “AFFECTS THE USE OF LAND” WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 125.66 . . . argue that the ordinance was either a zoning law or a land-use ordinance within the meaning of section 125.66 . . . relatively minor changes in the interior of the building makes the ordinance a “land-use regulation.” § 125.66 . . . indicates that the conduct portions of the Broward County ordinance can stand even though the section 125.66 . . . governs the enactment of municipal zoning ordinances, not county ordinances which are governed by section 125.66 . . . Chapter 90-152 amends only section 125.66 which covers county ordinances. . In A.B.T. Corp. v. . . .
. . . . § 125.66 Fla.Stat.; § 125.68 Fla.Stat. . . . Section 125.66 Fla.Stat. provides in pertinent part: (1) In exercising the ordinance-making powers conferred . . .
. . . Sections 125.66(6) and 163.3194(2) specify procedures that a county board of commissioners must observe . . . First, section 125.66(6) does not require that an ordinance qualify as a zoning ordinance in order to . . . Fla.Stat.Ann. § 125.66(6) (“Ordinances ... initiated by the board of county commissioners ... which do . . . They thus appear to “affect the use of land” within the meaning of section 125.66(6). . . . Defendants rely on then-arguments made in connection with section 125.66(6). . . .
. . . erred in ruling that Ordinance 91-5 did not affect the use of land within the meaning of subsection 125.66 . . . Florida Statutes (1991), did not create a de facto change in zoning within the meaning of subsection 125.66 . . . (5) or (6), and was properly enacted as a general ordinance in accordance with subsections 125.66(1) . . . Recognizing there is no reported case law construing this operative language in subsection 125.66(6), . . . There is nothing so mysterious about the phrase “affects the use of land” as used in subsection 125.66 . . .
. . . remaining claims are that the zoning ordinances are void for failure to comply with Florida Statutes §§ 125.66 . . .
. . . this Court’s resolution is whether Ordinance 88-10 is a zoning ordinance within the meaning of section 125.66 . . . hearing held on February 16, 1988 did not conform to the form advertisement as required by section 125.66 . . . for the second public hearing again did not conform to the form advertisement as required by section 125.66 . . . (App 32) (emphasis supplied) In that under section 125.66 the only time two public hearings are mandated . . . Section 125.66(6), Fla. Stat. (1990). . . .
. . . . § 125.66(2). . . . Section 125.66(2) does not in any way require that the Board make a determination as to the legitimacy . . . Section 125.66(2), Florida Statutes, states: The regular enactment procedure shall be as follows: The . . .
. . . . — Contrary to the Board’s suggestion, §125.66, Fla. . . .
. . . project as defined in s. 125.011, either within or without the territorial boundaries of the county. 125.66 . . . enacted the ordinance on November 1,1977, pursuant to the emergency procedure contained in Section 125.66 . . .
. . . were as follows (1958 and 1959 figures): Sales — 51.8 and 60.4 mcf/customer; Revenues — $112.59 and $125.66 . . .
. . . to you, members of the jury, would the newspapers have reported $1,175 if the actual theft was $1,-125.66 . . .