Florida Statute 163.3215 | Lawyer Caselaw & Research

The 2024 Florida Statutes

Title XI
COUNTY ORGANIZATION AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

Chapter 163
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PROGRAMS

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F.S. 163.3215

163.3215 Standing to enforce local comprehensive plans through development orders.—

(1) Subsections (3) and (4) provide the exclusive methods for an aggrieved or adversely affected party to appeal and challenge the consistency of a development order with a comprehensive plan adopted under this part. The local government that issues the development order is to be named as a respondent in all proceedings under this section. Subsection (3) shall not apply to development orders for which a local government has established a process consistent with the requirements of subsection (4). A local government may decide which types of development orders will proceed under subsection (4). Subsection (3) shall apply to all other development orders that are not subject to subsection (4).

(2) As used in this section, the term “aggrieved or adversely affected party” means any person or local government that will suffer an adverse effect to an interest protected or furthered by the local government comprehensive plan, including interests related to health and safety, police and fire protection service systems, densities or intensities of development, transportation facilities, health care facilities, equipment or services, and environmental or natural resources. The alleged adverse interest may be shared in common with other members of the community at large but must exceed in degree the general interest in community good shared by all persons. The term includes the owner, developer, or applicant for a development order.

(3) Any aggrieved or adversely affected party may maintain a de novo action for declaratory, injunctive, or other relief against any local government to challenge any decision of such local government granting or denying an application for, or to prevent such local government from taking any action on, a development order, as defined in s. 163.3164, on the basis that the development order materially alters the use or density or intensity of use on a particular piece of property, rendering it not consistent with the comprehensive plan adopted under this part. The de novo action must be filed no later than 30 days following rendition of a development order or other written decision, or when all local administrative appeals, if any, are exhausted, whichever occurs later.

(4) If a local government elects to adopt or has adopted an ordinance establishing, at a minimum, the requirements listed in this subsection, the sole method by which an aggrieved and adversely affected party may challenge any decision of local government granting or denying an application for a development order, as defined in s. 163.3164, which materially alters the use or density or intensity of use on a particular piece of property, is by an appeal filed by a petition for writ of certiorari filed in circuit court no later than 30 days following rendition of a development order or other written decision of the local government, or when all local administrative appeals, if any, are exhausted, whichever occurs later. An action for injunctive or other relief may be joined with the petition for certiorari. Principles of judicial or administrative res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to these proceedings. Minimum components of the local process are as follows:

(a) The local process must make provision for notice of an application for a development order that materially alters the use or density or intensity of use on a particular piece of property, including notice by publication or mailed notice consistent with the provisions of ss. 125.66(5)(b)2. and 3. and 166.041(3)(c)2.b. and c., and must require prominent posting at the job site. The notice must be given within 10 days after the filing of an application for a development order; however, notice under this subsection is not required for an application for a building permit or any other official action of local government which does not materially alter the use or density or intensity of use on a particular piece of property. The notice must clearly delineate that an aggrieved or adversely affected person has the right to request a quasi-judicial hearing before the local government for which the application is made, must explain the conditions precedent to the appeal of any development order ultimately rendered upon the application, and must specify the location where written procedures can be obtained that describe the process, including how to initiate the quasi-judicial process, the timeframes for initiating the process, and the location of the hearing. The process may include an opportunity for an alternative dispute resolution.

(b) The local process must provide a clear point of entry consisting of a written preliminary decision, at a time and in a manner to be established in the local ordinance, with the time to request a quasi-judicial hearing running from the issuance of the written preliminary decision; the local government, however, is not bound by the preliminary decision. A party may request a hearing to challenge or support a preliminary decision.

(c) The local process must provide an opportunity for participation in the process by an aggrieved or adversely affected party, allowing a reasonable time for the party to prepare and present a case for the quasi-judicial hearing.

(d) The local process must provide, at a minimum, an opportunity for the disclosure of witnesses and exhibits prior to hearing and an opportunity for the depositions of witnesses to be taken.

(e) The local process may not require that a party be represented by an attorney in order to participate in a hearing.

(f) The local process must provide for a quasi-judicial hearing before an impartial special master who is an attorney who has at least 5 years’ experience and who shall, at the conclusion of the hearing, recommend written findings of fact and conclusions of law. The special master shall have the power to swear witnesses and take their testimony under oath, to issue subpoenas and other orders regarding the conduct of the proceedings, and to compel entry upon the land. The standard of review applied by the special master in determining whether a proposed development order is consistent with the comprehensive plan shall be strict scrutiny in accordance with Florida law.

(g) At the quasi-judicial hearing, all parties must have the opportunity to respond, to present evidence and argument on all issues involved which are related to the development order, and to conduct cross-examination and submit rebuttal evidence. Public testimony must be allowed.

(h) The local process must provide for a duly noticed public hearing before the local government at which public testimony is allowed. At the quasi-judicial hearing, the local government is bound by the special master’s findings of fact unless the findings of fact are not supported by competent substantial evidence. The governing body may modify the conclusions of law if it finds that the special master’s application or interpretation of law is erroneous. The governing body may make reasonable legal interpretations of its comprehensive plan and land development regulations without regard to whether the special master’s interpretation is labeled as a finding of fact or a conclusion of law. The local government’s final decision must be reduced to writing, including the findings of fact and conclusions of law, and is not considered rendered or final until officially date-stamped by the city or county clerk.

(i) An ex parte communication relating to the merits of the matter under review may not be made to the special master. An ex parte communication relating to the merits of the matter under review may not be made to the governing body after a time to be established by the local ordinance, which time must be no later than receipt of the special master’s recommended order by the governing body.

(j) At the option of the local government, the process may require actions to challenge the consistency of a development order with land development regulations to be brought in the same proceeding.

(5) Venue in any cases brought under this section shall lie in the county or counties where the actions or inactions giving rise to the cause of action are alleged to have occurred.

(6) The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate that he or she has read the pleading, motion, or other paper and that, to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or for economic advantage, competitive reasons or frivolous purposes or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of these requirements, the court, upon motion or its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.

(7) In any proceeding under subsection (3) or subsection (4), no settlement shall be entered into by the local government unless the terms of the settlement have been the subject of a public hearing after notice as required by this part.

(8)(a) In any proceeding under subsection (3), either party is entitled to the summary procedure provided in s. 51.011, and the court shall advance the cause on the calendar, subject to paragraph (b).

(b) Upon a showing by either party by clear and convincing evidence that summary procedure is inappropriate, the court may determine that summary procedure does not apply.

(c) The prevailing party in a challenge to a development order filed under subsection (3) is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in challenging or defending the order, including reasonable appellate attorney fees and costs.

(9) Neither subsection (3) nor subsection (4) relieves the local government of its obligations to hold public hearings as required by law.

History.—s. 18, ch. 85-55; s. 901, ch. 95-147; s. 10, ch. 2002-296; s. 7, ch. 2019-165; s. 4, ch. 2023-115; s. 10, ch. 2023-309.

F.S. 163.3215 on Google Scholar

F.S. 163.3215 on Casetext

Amendments to 163.3215

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 163.3215

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 163.3215.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases Citing Statute 163.3215

Total Results: 20

Manny Seafood Corporation v. The City of Miami

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2023-11-22T00:00:00-08:00

Snippet: adversely affected party” contained in section 163.3215 of the Florida Statutes,2 Manny Seafood 1 … third party.” 2 In relevant part, section 163.3215 reads as follows: [T]he term “aggrieved…violation of the Settlement Agreement. Section 163.3215, though, provides the exclusive mechanism for…with a municipality’s comprehensive plan. See § 163.3215(1), Fla. Stat. (2023). For the purposes of invoking…“development order” so as to implicate section 163.3215; therefore, this statute provides no basis for

CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT, INC. and HERBERT SIMPSON v. THE CITY OF DANIA BEACH, FLORIDA, BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA, and DANIA ENTERTAINMENT CENTER, LLC

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2022-07-13T00:53:00-07:00

Snippet: 1993) (quoting § 163.3215(2), Fla. Stat. (1985)). Standing under section 163.3215 differs from standing…by all persons.” § 163.3215(2), Fla. Stat. (2019) (emphasis added). Section 163.3215(2) also requires a…adversely affected person as defined in s. 163.3215(2) may file an action for injunctive relief . …agreement with ss. 163.3220-163.3243. Section 163.3215(2), Florida Statutes, in turn, defines “aggrieved…, 276 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). “Under section 163.3215 citizen enforcement is the primary tool for insuring

Judah Imhof, Richard Bullard, Beach To Bay Connection, Inc., and South Walton Community Council, Inc. v. Walton County, Florida, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, and Ashwood Holdings Florida, LLC, a Florida limited liability company

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2021-09-15T00:53:00-07:00

Snippet: other development orders. § 163.3215(1), Fla. Stat. Within section 163.3215, the two subsections provide…review in an action, brought pursuant to section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2018), challenging whether…affected party,” as that term is defined in section 163.3215(2). Because the trial court reached the opposite…sued the county and Ashwood pursuant to section 163.3215(3). In the suit, they asserted that the development…cognizable under the statute. By their reading, section 163.3215(3) limits the type of inconsistency claims that

CITIZENS FOR THOUGHTFUL GROWTH - WEST PALM BEACH, INC. and NANCY PULLUM v. THE CITY OF WEST PALM BEACH and FLAGLER RESIDENTIAL, LLC

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2020-03-11T00:53:00-07:00

Snippet: plaintiff’s standing to sue pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (2019). The petitioners contended

Mdxq v. Miami-Dade County

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2019-02-05T23:53:00-08:00

Snippet: review of that determination pursuant to section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2017). We affirm …language of the County’s Master Plan and section 163.3215(3), we hold that the trial court properly determined…development order, a cause of action under section 163.3215(3)3 was not yet ripe. See, e.g., 3 Subsection

Little Club Condo. Ass'n v. Martin Cnty.

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2018-11-21T00:00:00-08:00

Citation: 259 So. 3d 864

Snippet: evidence. At the same time, they brought a section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2016) action in the trial…court had they not filed the petition. Section 163.3215(3) permits only a challenge to a county board … So.2d 1029, 1032 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). Section 163.3215(3) provides the right to a de novo "action

LITTLE CLUB CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION v. MARTIN COUNTY

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2018-11-20T23:53:00-08:00

Snippet: evidence. At the same time, they brought a section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2016) action in the trial…So. 2d 1029, 1032 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). Section 163.3215(3) provides the right to a de novo “action” before…court had they not filed the petition. Section 163.3215(3) permits only a challenge to a county board

MINTO PBLH, LLC v. 1000 FRIENDS OF FLORIDA, INC.

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2017-10-18T00:00:00-07:00

Citation: 228 So. 3d 147, 2017 WL 4679605

Snippet: attorney’s fees under both section 57.105 and section 163.3215(6), Florida Statutes, as to one of the plaintiffs…denied sanctions against 1000 Friends under section 163.3215(6), Florida Statutes, as Minto did not make a

Heine v. Lee County

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2017-06-30T00:00:00-07:00

Citation: 221 So. 3d 1254, 2017 WL 2821553, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 9484

Snippet: , in the Heines’ lawsuit brought under section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2015) (the Consistency Statute…government granting ... a development order.” § 163.3215(3); see also Pinecrest Lakes, Inc. v. Shidel, …Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (“[W]e observed that section 163.3215 had liberalized standing requirements and demonstrated…not consistent with the comprehensive plan.” § 163.3215(3). A plain reading of this text compels us to…the Fourth District recognized that “[sjection 163.3215 enlarged the class of persons with standing to

Herbits v. City of Miami

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2016-10-26T00:00:00-07:00

Citation: 207 So. 3d 274, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 15891

Snippet: Management Act of 1985 and a separate statute, section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (2014); see Pinecrest

The Realty Associates Fund Ix, L.P. v. Town of Cutler Bay

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2016-09-21T00:00:00-07:00

Citation: 208 So. 3d 735, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 14132

Snippet: included a consistency challenge pursuant to section 163.3215(3) of the Florida Statutes. RAF alleged that Resolution

City of Miami v. Village of Key Biscayne and Miami-Dade County

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2016-05-11T00:00:00-07:00

Citation: 197 So. 3d 580, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 7150

Snippet: Village’s lawsuit alleged, pursuant to - section 163.3215 of the Florida Statutes, that *582

Shawn Ahearn, on behalf of himself and all etc. v. Mayo Clinic, a Florida Corporation Mayo etc.

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2015-11-05T00:00:00-08:00

Citation: 180 So. 3d 165

Snippet: development orders,” which is contained in section 163.3215(2), Florida Statutes. This statute provides in…1st DCA 2010j, we found standing under section 163.3215(2) where a party’s 'interest exceeded the

Howell v. Pasco County

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2015-03-27T00:00:00-07:00

Citation: 165 So. 3d 12, 2015 WL 1381680

Snippet: consistency action brought pursuant to section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2012). In the action below… could not bring an action pursuant to section 163.3215(3). . Outlaw was successful in obtaining an

Haines O'Neil, ind. and O'Neil Transportation etc v. Walton County, a political etc.

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2014-09-22T00:00:00-07:00

Citation: 149 So. 3d 699

Snippet: property at Inlet Beach in Walton County. Citing § 163.3215, Florida Statutes (2013), they assert that the…the Comp Plan. And nobody challenged it. See § 163.3215(3), Fla. Stat. (requiring consistency challenges…follow-up, detailed plan in 2013. But because § 163.3215 is predicated upon showing a material alteration…2013 order fails to meet the requirements of § 163.3215. I. …in 2013, Appellants challenged the PUD under § 163.3215.2 The Complaint alleged that the 2013 Order conflicted

Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Hendry County

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2013-06-12T00:00:00-07:00

Citation: 114 So. 3d 1073, 2013 WL 2494708, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 9265

Snippet: reverse. This case involves the interplay of section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (2011), and sections 403.501…complaint for declaratory relief pursuant to section 163.3215(3) to challenge the County’s enactment of the …power plants, the procedures set forth in section 163.3215 were thereby preempted or superseded by the PPSA…arguing that the PPSA completely preempted section 163.3215 as a method for challenging the County’s decision… they do here, that the PPSA preempted section 163.3215(3) and that the Tribe was asking the trial court

Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Hendry County

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2013-01-23T00:00:00-08:00

Citation: 106 So. 3d 19, 2013 WL 238231, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 781

Snippet: The circuit court properly found that section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (2011), would preclude the Seminole…development order with a comprehensive plan. § 163.3215(1). It provides that an adversely affected party…other relief to challenge a development order. § 163.3215(3). The Seminole Tribe filed a separate action…along with its certiorari petition. Though section 163.3215(4) provides that an adversely affected party may

W.A.R., Inc. v. Levy County

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2012-08-10T00:00:00-07:00

Citation: 93 So. 3d 1244, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 13317, 2012 WL 3239930

Snippet: relief in appellant’s action pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (2010), which challenged the

Pruitt v. Sands

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2012-04-18T00:00:00-07:00

Citation: 84 So. 3d 1267, 2012 WL 1317228, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 6044

Snippet: development order and the comprehensive plan. See § 163.3215(1), Fla. Stat. (2000). That required the judge

Graves v. City of Pompano Beach ex rel. City Commission

Court: Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | Date Filed: 2011-11-23T00:00:00-08:00

Citation: 74 So. 3d 595, 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 18739

Snippet: development order” subject to challenge under section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (2009). Id. We based our conclusion…challenged as a development order under section 163.3215. Accordingly, the trial court’s order dismissing…constitutes a “development order” under section 163.3215. The appellants base their argument not upon the…development permit” also is inapplicable. Section 163.3215 specifically provides that a “development order…appellants’ motion for rehearing ignores section 163.3215’s use of the phrase “as defined in s. 163.3164