Florida Statute 163.3215 - Full Text and Legal Analysis

The 2025 Florida Statutes

Title XI
COUNTY ORGANIZATION AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS

Chapter 163
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PROGRAMS

View Entire Chapter

F.S. 163.3215

163.3215 Standing to enforce local comprehensive plans through development orders.—

(1) Subsections (3) and (4) provide the exclusive methods for an aggrieved or adversely affected party to appeal and challenge the consistency of a development order with a comprehensive plan adopted under this part. The local government that issues the development order is to be named as a respondent in all proceedings under this section. Subsection (3) shall not apply to development orders for which a local government has established a process consistent with the requirements of subsection (4). A local government may decide which types of development orders will proceed under subsection (4). Subsection (3) shall apply to all other development orders that are not subject to subsection (4).

(2) As used in this section, the term “aggrieved or adversely affected party” means any person or local government that will suffer an adverse effect to an interest protected or furthered by the local government comprehensive plan, including interests related to health and safety, police and fire protection service systems, densities or intensities of development, transportation facilities, health care facilities, equipment or services, and environmental or natural resources. The alleged adverse interest may be shared in common with other members of the community at large but must exceed in degree the general interest in community good shared by all persons. The term includes the owner, developer, or applicant for a development order.

(3) Any aggrieved or adversely affected party may maintain a de novo action for declaratory, injunctive, or other relief against any local government to challenge any decision of such local government granting or denying an application for, or to prevent such local government from taking any action on, a development order, as defined in s. 163.3164, on the basis that the development order materially alters the use or density or intensity of use on a particular piece of property, rendering it not consistent with the comprehensive plan adopted under this part. The de novo action must be filed no later than 30 days following rendition of a development order or other written decision, or when all local administrative appeals, if any, are exhausted, whichever occurs later.

(4) If a local government elects to adopt or has adopted an ordinance establishing, at a minimum, the requirements listed in this subsection, the sole method by which an aggrieved and adversely affected party may challenge any decision of local government granting or denying an application for a development order, as defined in s. 163.3164, which materially alters the use or density or intensity of use on a particular piece of property, is by an appeal filed by a petition for writ of certiorari filed in circuit court no later than 30 days following rendition of a development order or other written decision of the local government, or when all local administrative appeals, if any, are exhausted, whichever occurs later. An action for injunctive or other relief may be joined with the petition for certiorari. Principles of judicial or administrative res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to these proceedings. Minimum components of the local process are as follows:

(a) The local process must make provision for notice of an application for a development order that materially alters the use or density or intensity of use on a particular piece of property, including notice by publication or mailed notice consistent with the provisions of ss. 125.66(5)(b)2. and 3. and 166.041(3)(c)2.b. and c., and must require prominent posting at the job site. The notice must be given within 10 days after the filing of an application for a development order; however, notice under this subsection is not required for an application for a building permit or any other official action of local government which does not materially alter the use or density or intensity of use on a particular piece of property. The notice must clearly delineate that an aggrieved or adversely affected person has the right to request a quasi-judicial hearing before the local government for which the application is made, must explain the conditions precedent to the appeal of any development order ultimately rendered upon the application, and must specify the location where written procedures can be obtained that describe the process, including how to initiate the quasi-judicial process, the timeframes for initiating the process, and the location of the hearing. The process may include an opportunity for an alternative dispute resolution.

(b) The local process must provide a clear point of entry consisting of a written preliminary decision, at a time and in a manner to be established in the local ordinance, with the time to request a quasi-judicial hearing running from the issuance of the written preliminary decision; the local government, however, is not bound by the preliminary decision. A party may request a hearing to challenge or support a preliminary decision.

(c) The local process must provide an opportunity for participation in the process by an aggrieved or adversely affected party, allowing a reasonable time for the party to prepare and present a case for the quasi-judicial hearing.

(d) The local process must provide, at a minimum, an opportunity for the disclosure of witnesses and exhibits prior to hearing and an opportunity for the depositions of witnesses to be taken.

(e) The local process may not require that a party be represented by an attorney in order to participate in a hearing.

(f) The local process must provide for a quasi-judicial hearing before an impartial special master who is an attorney who has at least 5 years’ experience and who shall, at the conclusion of the hearing, recommend written findings of fact and conclusions of law. The special master shall have the power to swear witnesses and take their testimony under oath, to issue subpoenas and other orders regarding the conduct of the proceedings, and to compel entry upon the land. The standard of review applied by the special master in determining whether a proposed development order is consistent with the comprehensive plan shall be strict scrutiny in accordance with Florida law.

(g) At the quasi-judicial hearing, all parties must have the opportunity to respond, to present evidence and argument on all issues involved which are related to the development order, and to conduct cross-examination and submit rebuttal evidence. Public testimony must be allowed.

(h) The local process must provide for a duly noticed public hearing before the local government at which public testimony is allowed. At the quasi-judicial hearing, the local government is bound by the special master’s findings of fact unless the findings of fact are not supported by competent substantial evidence. The governing body may modify the conclusions of law if it finds that the special master’s application or interpretation of law is erroneous. The governing body may make reasonable legal interpretations of its comprehensive plan and land development regulations without regard to whether the special master’s interpretation is labeled as a finding of fact or a conclusion of law. The local government’s final decision must be reduced to writing, including the findings of fact and conclusions of law, and is not considered rendered or final until officially date-stamped by the city or county clerk.

(i) An ex parte communication relating to the merits of the matter under review may not be made to the special master. An ex parte communication relating to the merits of the matter under review may not be made to the governing body after a time to be established by the local ordinance, which time must be no later than receipt of the special master’s recommended order by the governing body.

(j) At the option of the local government, the process may require actions to challenge the consistency of a development order with land development regulations to be brought in the same proceeding.

(5) Venue in any cases brought under this section shall lie in the county or counties where the actions or inactions giving rise to the cause of action are alleged to have occurred.

(6) The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate that he or she has read the pleading, motion, or other paper and that, to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or for economic advantage, competitive reasons or frivolous purposes or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of these requirements, the court, upon motion or its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.

(7) In any proceeding under subsection (3) or subsection (4), no settlement shall be entered into by the local government unless the terms of the settlement have been the subject of a public hearing after notice as required by this part.

(8)(a) In any proceeding under subsection (3), either party is entitled to the summary procedure provided in s. 51.011, and the court shall advance the cause on the calendar, subject to paragraph (b).

(b) Upon a showing by either party by clear and convincing evidence that summary procedure is inappropriate, the court may determine that summary procedure does not apply.

(c) The prevailing party in a challenge to a development order filed under subsection (3) is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in challenging or defending the order, including reasonable appellate attorney fees and costs.

(9) Neither subsection (3) nor subsection (4) relieves the local government of its obligations to hold public hearings as required by law.

History.—s. 18, ch. 85-55; s. 901, ch. 95-147; s. 10, ch. 2002-296; s. 7, ch. 2019-165; s. 4, ch. 2023-115; s. 10, ch. 2023-309.

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Amendments to 163.3215

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

Cases Citing Statute 163.3215

Total Results: 104

BD. OF CTY. COM'RS OF BREVARD v. Snyder

627 So. 2d 469, 1993 WL 391610

Supreme Court of Florida | Filed: Oct 7, 1993 | Docket: 1752944

Cited 93 times | Published

de novo action in circuit court pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1991). However, in Parker

Southwest Ranches Homeowners Ass'n v. Broward County

502 So. 2d 931, 12 Fla. L. Weekly 357

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jan 14, 1987 | Docket: 1657789

Cited 31 times | Published

legislature as manifested by the recent addition of Section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1985) to the statutory

Snyder v. BOARD OF COUNTY COM'RS

595 So. 2d 65, 1991 WL 259950

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Dec 12, 1991 | Docket: 1299524

Cited 20 times | Published

basis for certiorari review.[40] Moreover, section 163.3215(1), Florida Statutes (1987) now authorizes

Lee County v. Sunbelt Equities

619 So. 2d 996, 1993 WL 154000

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: May 14, 1993 | Docket: 1382341

Cited 18 times | Published

Sunbelt filed an original action pursuant to § 163.3215, Fla. Stat. (1991). The county claims that certain

Dixon v. City of Jacksonville

774 So. 2d 763, 2000 WL 1742050

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Nov 28, 2000 | Docket: 1698127

Cited 17 times | Published

plan and sought injunctive relief pursuant to section 163.3215(1), Florida Statutes (1999). A preliminary

Pinecrest Lakes, Inc. v. Shidel

795 So. 2d 191, 2001 WL 1130885

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Sep 26, 2001 | Docket: 462204

Cited 15 times | Published

DCA 1997). Specifically, we concluded that section 163.3215 required de novo consideration in the trial

Parker v. Leon County

627 So. 2d 476, 1993 WL 391612

Supreme Court of Florida | Filed: Dec 23, 1993 | Docket: 1553812

Cited 15 times | Published

COMPREHENSIVE PLAN INCONSISTENCY, NOTWITHSTANDING SECTION 163.3215, FLORIDA STATUTES (1989)? Emerald Acres, 601

Battaglia Fruit Co. v. City of Maitland

530 So. 2d 940, 13 Fla. L. Weekly 1733, 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 3174, 1988 WL 73928

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jul 21, 1988 | Docket: 1267913

Cited 15 times | Published

This language is similar to the provisions in section 163.3215(1), Florida Statutes (1985). However, the

White v. Metropolitan Dade County

563 So. 2d 117, 1990 WL 67338

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: May 22, 1990 | Docket: 1682855

Cited 14 times | Published

Inc., 450 So.2d 204, 208 (Fla. 1984); see also, § 163.3215(1), Fla. Stat. (1989) ("[a]ny aggrieved or adversely

Putnam Cty. Environ. Council, Inc. v. Bd. of Cty. Com'rs of Putnam Cty.

757 So. 2d 590, 2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 5703, 2000 WL 569908

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: May 12, 2000 | Docket: 1698296

Cited 10 times | Published

possess standing to challenge the order under section 163.3215 of the Florida Statutes (1999). We reverse

Chung v. Sarasota County

686 So. 2d 1358, 1996 WL 736592

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Dec 27, 1996 | Docket: 302834

Cited 10 times | Published

be inconsistent with the comprehensive plan. § 163.3215(1). "In any action under this section, no settlement

Payne v. City of Miami

927 So. 2d 904, 2005 WL 3054601

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Nov 16, 2005 | Docket: 1765035

Cited 9 times | Published

County, 757 So.2d 590, 594 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). Section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (2004), sets forth the standing

Nassau County v. Willis

41 So. 3d 270, 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 7662, 2010 WL 2196459

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jun 3, 2010 | Docket: 2398876

Cited 8 times | Published

challenge the development order in the first place. § 163.3215 Whether a party has standing to enforce a local

Education Dev. Center, Inc. v. Palm Beach Cty.

751 So. 2d 621, 1999 WL 1076787

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Dec 1, 1999 | Docket: 1712518

Cited 8 times | Published

complaint with Palm Beach County pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, alleging that the development

Florida Rock Properties v. Keyser

709 So. 2d 175, 1998 Fla. App. LEXIS 3418, 1998 WL 150434

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Apr 3, 1998 | Docket: 1681952

Cited 8 times | Published

judgment, is not an aggrieved party pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes. Therefore, he had no standing

City of Coconut Creek v. City of Deerfield Beach

840 So. 2d 389, 2003 WL 1239986

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Mar 19, 2003 | Docket: 1463952

Cited 7 times | Published

issuance of the site plan approval, under section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (2001).[1] Counts II and

Edgewater Beach Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Walton County

833 So. 2d 215, 2002 WL 31833708

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Dec 19, 2002 | Docket: 1675506

Cited 7 times | Published

Walton County, Grand Dunes and KPM, pursuant to section 163.3215 seeking to enjoin any development under Resolution

Coastal Development of North Florida, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville Beach

788 So. 2d 204, 26 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 224, 2001 Fla. LEXIS 743, 2001 WL 360443

Supreme Court of Florida | Filed: Apr 12, 2001 | Docket: 1286560

Cited 7 times | Published

an affected person must allege an injury. See § 163.3215, Fla. Stat. (1995).

Lutz Lake Fern Road Neighborhood Groups, Inc. v. Hillsborough County

779 So. 2d 380, 2000 WL 783366

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jun 21, 2000 | Docket: 1176480

Cited 7 times | Published

Road site. Count IV was an action pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1997),[1] in which the

City of Ft. Myers v. Splitt

988 So. 2d 28, 2008 WL 2554400

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jun 27, 2008 | Docket: 1384736

Cited 6 times | Published

the Renard standard but by the provisions of section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (2006), regarding challenges

Thomas v. Suwannee County

734 So. 2d 492, 1999 WL 303403

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: May 14, 1999 | Docket: 1731085

Cited 6 times | Published

neighbors sought relief under, inter alia, section 163.3215(1), Florida Statutes (1993). See Parker v

Bal Harbour Village v. City of North Miami

678 So. 2d 356, 1996 WL 180069

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Apr 17, 1996 | Docket: 1470729

Cited 6 times | Published

generally §§ 163.3161-.3215, Fla.Stat. (1993). Section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, authorizes certain litigants

Florida Institute of Tech. v. MARTIN CTY.

641 So. 2d 898, 1994 WL 275381

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jun 22, 1994 | Docket: 1152132

Cited 6 times | Published

the staff. FIT filed a complaint pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes. Those proceedings were

Board of Trustees v. SEMINOLE CTY. COM'RS

623 So. 2d 593, 1993 WL 322966

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Aug 27, 1993 | Docket: 1658438

Cited 6 times | Published

lack of jurisdiction. The court noted that section 163.3215(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1991) provides that

Leon County v. Parker

566 So. 2d 1315, 1990 WL 110282

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Sep 18, 1990 | Docket: 547965

Cited 6 times | Published

respondents to comply with the provisions of Section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1989). That section provides

Save the Homosassa River Alliance, Inc. v. Citrus County

2 So. 3d 329, 2008 Fla. App. LEXIS 16449, 2008 WL 4681167

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Oct 24, 2008 | Docket: 1138727

Cited 5 times | Published

this suit against the County, pursuant to section 163.3215, challenging the County’s approval of Resort’s

Stranahan House v. City of Fort Lauderdale

967 So. 2d 427, 2007 WL 3170186

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Oct 31, 2007 | Docket: 1733436

Cited 5 times | Published

against the City and Coolidge pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (2006). The complaint challenged

Emerald Acres Inv. v. BD. OF CTY. COM'RS

601 So. 2d 577

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jul 9, 1992 | Docket: 1305318

Cited 5 times | Published

appellant did not comply with the provisions of section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1989). We agree and affirm

BB McCormick & Sons, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville

559 So. 2d 252, 1990 WL 32984

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Mar 20, 1990 | Docket: 1525109

Cited 5 times | Published

may be amended. Sections 163.3184, 163.3187. Section 163.3215 provides for injunctive and other relief for

Rinker Materials Corp. v. Town of Lake Park

494 So. 2d 1123, 11 Fla. L. Weekly 437

Supreme Court of Florida | Filed: Aug 21, 1986 | Docket: 452293

Cited 5 times | Published

challenge can only be brought pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1985); that Rinker waived

Herbits v. City of Miami

207 So. 3d 274, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 15891

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Oct 26, 2016 | Docket: 4482645

Cited 4 times | Published

Management Act of 1985 and a separate statute, section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (2014); see Pinecrest

Presidents' Council of SD, Inc. v. Walton County

36 So. 3d 764, 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 6226, 2010 WL 1793878

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: May 6, 2010 | Docket: 1315139

Cited 4 times | Published

relief was untimely under section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes. Section 163.3215(3) provides that an action

Britt v. City of Jacksonville

874 So. 2d 1196, 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 6476, 29 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D 1123

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: May 10, 2004 | Docket: 1738145

Cited 4 times | Published

required 30 day period for actions brought under section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2002), but served appellee

Education Development Center, Inc. v. Palm Beach County

721 So. 2d 1240, 1998 WL 889524

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Dec 23, 1998 | Docket: 1694552

Cited 4 times | Published

basis that it lacked jurisdiction pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1995), citing Poulos v

Shawn Ahearn, on behalf of himself and all etc. v. Mayo Clinic, a Florida Corporation Mayo etc.

180 So. 3d 165

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Nov 5, 2015 | Docket: 3010532

Cited 3 times | Published

development orders,” which is contained in section 163.3215(2), Florida Statutes. This statute provides

Martin County Conservation Alliance v. Martin County

73 So. 3d 856, 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 17513, 2011 WL 5299370

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Nov 4, 2011 | Docket: 60303495

Cited 3 times | Published

276-78 *864(Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (explaining section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, created broad and liberal

STRANAHAN HOUSE v. City of Fort Lauderdale

967 So. 2d 1121, 2007 WL 3355459

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Nov 14, 2007 | Docket: 1454336

Cited 3 times | Published

a declaratory judgment action pursuant to section 163.3215(3), seeking a declaration that the plan was

5220 BISCAYNE BOULEVARD, LLC v. Stebbins

937 So. 2d 1189, 2006 WL 2612845

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Sep 13, 2006 | Docket: 1513075

Cited 3 times | Published

proceeding with a de novo action filed pursuant to section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2005), challenging the

Combs v. City of Naples

834 So. 2d 194, 2002 WL 2005927

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Aug 30, 2002 | Docket: 1328886

Cited 3 times | Published

with the condition precedent provision in section 163.3215(4) of the Local Government Comprehensive Planning

City of Tallahassee v. Kovach

733 So. 2d 576, 1999 WL 312242

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: May 19, 1999 | Docket: 1659871

Cited 3 times | Published

utilize the 30-day procedure set forth in section 163.3215."). In contrast, the Kovachs have made no

Poulos v. Martin County

700 So. 2d 163, 1997 WL 632047

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Oct 15, 1997 | Docket: 1373631

Cited 3 times | Published

pursuant to, section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1995). We conclude that section 163.3215 provides for

Das v. Osceola County

685 So. 2d 990, 1997 WL 1699

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jan 3, 1997 | Docket: 1415534

Cited 3 times | Published

against Osceola County in that an action under section 163.3215 "is the only proceeding for challenging a

Pichette v. City of North Miami

642 So. 2d 1165, 1994 WL 523627

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Sep 28, 1994 | Docket: 549304

Cited 3 times | Published

Dade County, 261 So.2d 832 (Fla. 1972); see § 163.3215(2), Fla. Stat. (1993); Citizens Growth Management

Gregory v. City of Alachua

553 So. 2d 206, 1989 WL 128068

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Oct 30, 1989 | Docket: 1259213

Cited 3 times | Published

and declaratory relief, was brought under Section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1985),[1] and alleged that

MINTO PBLH, LLC v. 1000 FRIENDS OF FLORIDA, INC.

228 So. 3d 147, 2017 WL 4679605

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Oct 18, 2017 | Docket: 6171806

Cited 2 times | Published

attorney’s fees under both section 57.105 and section 163.3215(6), Florida Statutes, as to one of the plaintiffs

Payne v. City of Miami

52 So. 3d 707, 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 18759, 2010 WL 4962859

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Dec 8, 2010 | Docket: 60297840

Cited 2 times | Published

Marine Group) who had filed a challenge under Section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, alleging that the City’s

Dunlap v. Orange County

971 So. 2d 171, 2007 WL 4545897

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Dec 28, 2007 | Docket: 1445396

Cited 2 times | Published

lawsuit under section 163.3215 of the Florida Statutes (2004). We agree. Section 163.3215(2) of the Florida

Palazzo v. City of Fort Lauderdale

966 So. 2d 497, 2007 WL 3007986

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Oct 17, 2007 | Docket: 1679367

Cited 2 times | Published

declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, which precludes local governments

Florida Wildlife Federation v. Collier County (In Re Section 20 Land Group, Ltd.)

252 B.R. 812, 13 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 322, 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 990, 2000 WL 1254218

United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida | Filed: Aug 4, 2000 | Docket: 1429553

Cited 2 times | Published

CORPORATION, MOTION FOR COSTS AND FEES PURSUANT TO SECTION 163.3215(6), FLORIDA STATUTES (DOC. NO. 106) ALEXANDER

Buck Lake Alliance, Inc. v. BD. OF COUNTY COM'RS OF LEON CTY.

765 So. 2d 124, 2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 7518, 2000 WL 775571

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jun 19, 2000 | Docket: 1522931

Cited 2 times | Published

it on its action challenging, pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1997), a development order

Key Biscayne v. Tesaurus Holdings, Inc.

761 So. 2d 397, 2000 WL 561000

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: May 10, 2000 | Docket: 1709357

Cited 2 times | Published

that the Council's sole remedy was found in section 163.3215, Florida Statutes. The Village now seeks review

Cook v. City of Lynn Haven

729 So. 2d 545, 1999 WL 225950

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Apr 20, 1999 | Docket: 340881

Cited 2 times | Published

limited to the injunctive remedy provided in section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, to any person aggrieved

Cook v. City of Lynn Haven

729 So. 2d 545, 1999 WL 225950

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Apr 20, 1999 | Docket: 340881

Cited 2 times | Published

limited to the injunctive remedy provided in section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, to any person aggrieved

Turner v. SUMTER COUNTY, BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS

649 So. 2d 276, 1995 WL 10505

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Feb 17, 1995 | Docket: 1693864

Cited 2 times | Published

remedy for this claim was an action under section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1991), Board of County

Jensen Beach v. Citizens for Resp. Growth

608 So. 2d 509

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Oct 21, 1992 | Docket: 1449665

Cited 2 times | Published

County's comprehensive plan. We understand Section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1991), to require that

Parker v. Leon County

601 So. 2d 1223

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jul 15, 1992 | Docket: 206052

Cited 2 times | Published

COMPREHENSIVE PLAN INCONSISTENCY, NOTWITHSTANDING SECTION 163.3215, FLORIDA STATUTES (1989)? The motion is otherwise

Palm Beach County v. Allen Morris Co.

547 So. 2d 690, 1989 WL 81812

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jul 26, 1989 | Docket: 1738748

Cited 2 times | Published

and Realty brought this action pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1985) and challenged the

Howell v. Pasco County

165 So. 3d 12, 2015 WL 1381680

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Mar 27, 2015 | Docket: 60248143

Cited 1 times | Published

parties’ consistency action brought pursuant to section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2012). In the action

Graves v. POMPANO BEACH EX REL. CITY COM'N

74 So. 3d 595

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Nov 23, 2011 | Docket: 2358148

Cited 1 times | Published

with the City's comprehensive plan. Under section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2009), an aggrieved

Rehman v. Lake County

56 So. 3d 852, 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 1085, 2011 WL 335262

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Feb 4, 2011 | Docket: 60298665

Cited 1 times | Published

and injunctive relief brought pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes. Rehman challenged Lake

Arbor Properties, Inc. v. Lake Jackson Protection Alliance, Inc.

51 So. 3d 502, 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 18620, 2010 WL 4967715

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Dec 8, 2010 | Docket: 2406317

Cited 1 times | Published

filed a complaint against the County under section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, seeking to invalidate the

Johnson v. Gulf County

26 So. 3d 33, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 19943, 2009 WL 4912595

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Dec 22, 2009 | Docket: 2410890

Cited 1 times | Published

wetlands. The neighbors alleged standing under section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2006).[2] The trial

Bay County v. Harrison

13 So. 3d 115, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 6610, 2009 WL 1492652

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: May 29, 2009 | Docket: 1186910

Cited 1 times | Published

filing a consistency challenge in circuit court. § 163.3215(3), Fla. Stat. (2005). In a chapter 163 consistency

Johnson v. Gulf County

965 So. 2d 298, 2007 WL 2700180

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Sep 18, 2007 | Docket: 1509272

Cited 1 times | Published

Joseph Rish, Jr. for injunctive relief under section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (2006). Because the trial

St. Johns County v. Department of Community Affairs

836 So. 2d 1034, 2002 WL 31875008

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Dec 27, 2002 | Docket: 1500232

Cited 1 times | Published

Friends conceded that they lacked standing under section 163.3215(1), Florida Statutes, they asserted that they

Lee v. St. Johns County Board of County Commissioners

776 So. 2d 1110, 2001 Fla. App. LEXIS 1230, 2001 WL 109132

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Feb 9, 2001 | Docket: 64803414

Cited 1 times | Published

of County Commissioners, filed pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, challenging a “development

Florida Wildlife Federation v. Collier County (In Re Section 20 Land Group, Ltd.)

252 B.R. 819, 13 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. B 321, 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 989, 2000 WL 1254201

United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Florida | Filed: Aug 4, 2000 | Docket: 1429607

Cited 1 times | Published

Complaint alleged a cause of action under Fla. Stat. § 163.3215, which authorizes adversely affected persons

1000 FRIENDS OF FLA., INC. v. St. Johns County

765 So. 2d 216, 2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 9233, 2000 WL 1004643

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jul 21, 2000 | Docket: 428600

Cited 1 times | Published

concede that they do not have standing under section 163.3215(1), Florida Statutes. Under this subsection

Das v. Osceola County

715 So. 2d 1105, 1998 WL 472853

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Aug 14, 1998 | Docket: 1366209

Cited 1 times | Published

jurisdiction to hear the cross-claim because section 163.3215 of the Growth Management Act, was the sole

Robbins v. City of Miami Beach

664 So. 2d 1150, 1995 Fla. App. LEXIS 13002, 1995 WL 749907

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Dec 20, 1995 | Docket: 1656030

Cited 1 times | Published

prejudice of his complaint filed pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1993) wherein he challenges

BD. OF COUNTY COMM'RS v. Monticello Drug Co.

619 So. 2d 361, 1993 WL 169168

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: May 21, 1993 | Docket: 1721714

Cited 1 times | Published

decision in Parker, Monticello asserted that section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, was not applicable or that

Gilmore v. Hernando County

584 So. 2d 27, 1991 WL 111478

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jun 27, 1991 | Docket: 466806

Cited 1 times | Published

whether the challenged rezoning pursuant to section 163.3215(1), Florida Statutes (1989) was inconsistent

Samuel A. Osborne v. Walton County, Florida, a Political Subdivision of the State of Florida

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Feb 12, 2025 | Docket: 69632236

Published

that the amended Sandestin DRI DO violates section 163.3215, Florida Statutes. SOA alleged that the terms

Manny Seafood Corporation v. The City of Miami

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Nov 22, 2023 | Docket: 68029155

Published

and adversely affected party” contained in section 163.3215 of the Florida Statutes,2 Manny Seafood

CITIZENS FOR RESPONSIBLE DEVELOPMENT, INC. and HERBERT SIMPSON v. THE CITY OF DANIA BEACH, FLORIDA, BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA, and DANIA ENTERTAINMENT CENTER, LLC

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jul 13, 2022 | Docket: 63588210

Published

agreement with ss. 163.3220-163.3243. Section 163.3215(2), Florida Statutes, in turn, defines “aggrieved

Judah Imhof, Richard Bullard, Beach To Bay Connection, Inc., and South Walton Community Council, Inc. v. Walton County, Florida, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, and Ashwood Holdings Florida, LLC, a Florida limited liability company

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Sep 15, 2021 | Docket: 60386695

Published

novo review in an action, brought pursuant to section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2018), challenging whether

CITIZENS FOR THOUGHTFUL GROWTH - WEST PALM BEACH, INC. and NANCY PULLUM v. THE CITY OF WEST PALM BEACH and FLAGLER RESIDENTIAL, LLC

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Mar 11, 2020 | Docket: 16955846

Published

the plaintiff’s standing to sue pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (2019). The petitioners

Mdxq v. Miami-Dade County

271 So. 3d 68

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Feb 6, 2019 | Docket: 14536983

Published

review of that determination pursuant to section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2017). We affirm

Little Club Condo. Ass'n v. Martin Cnty.

259 So. 3d 864

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Nov 21, 2018 | Docket: 64699462

Published

evidence. At the same time, they brought a section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2016) action in the

LITTLE CLUB CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION v. MARTIN COUNTY

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Nov 21, 2018 | Docket: 8221308

Published

evidence. At the same time, they brought a section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2016) action in the

Heine v. Lee County

221 So. 3d 1254, 2017 WL 2821553, 2017 Fla. App. LEXIS 9484

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jun 30, 2017 | Docket: 6082859

Published

County, in the Heines’ lawsuit brought under section 163.3215(3), Florida Statutes (2015) (the Consistency

The Realty Associates Fund Ix, L.P. v. Town of Cutler Bay

208 So. 3d 735, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 14132

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Sep 21, 2016 | Docket: 4423915

Published

included a consistency challenge pursuant to section 163.3215(3) of the Florida Statutes. RAF alleged that

City of Miami v. Village of Key Biscayne and Miami-Dade County

197 So. 3d 580, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 7150

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: May 11, 2016 | Docket: 3062981

Published

the Village’s lawsuit alleged, pursuant to - section 163.3215 of the Florida Statutes, that *582

Haines O'Neil, ind. and O'Neil Transportation etc v. Walton County, a political etc.

149 So. 3d 699

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Sep 22, 2014 | Docket: 1310798

Published

the Comp Plan. And nobody challenged it. See § 163.3215(3), Fla. Stat. (requiring consistency challenges

Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Hendry County

114 So. 3d 1073, 2013 WL 2494708, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 9265

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jun 12, 2013 | Docket: 60231740

Published

reverse. This case involves the interplay of section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (2011), and sections 403

Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Hendry County

106 So. 3d 19, 2013 WL 238231, 2013 Fla. App. LEXIS 781

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jan 23, 2013 | Docket: 60228149

Published

PUD.” The circuit court properly found that section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (2011), would preclude the

W.A.R., Inc. v. Levy County

93 So. 3d 1244, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 13317, 2012 WL 3239930

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Aug 10, 2012 | Docket: 60310508

Published

injunctive relief in appellant’s action pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (2010), which challenged

Pruitt v. Sands

84 So. 3d 1267, 2012 WL 1317228, 2012 Fla. App. LEXIS 6044

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Apr 18, 2012 | Docket: 60306649

Published

development order and the comprehensive plan. See § 163.3215(1), Fla. Stat. (2000). That required the judge

Graves v. City of Pompano Beach ex rel. City Commission

74 So. 3d 595, 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 18739

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Nov 23, 2011 | Docket: 60303536

Published

“development order” subject to challenge under section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (2009). Id. We based our

Bush v. City of Mexico Beach

71 So. 3d 147, 2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 13799, 2011 WL 4345169

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Aug 31, 2011 | Docket: 60302906

Published

must be raised in an action filed pursuant to section 163.3215 and cannot be brought in a petition for writ

Martin County Conservation Alliance v. Martin County

134 So. 3d 966, 2010 WL 2472197, 2010 Fla. App. LEXIS 8939

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jun 21, 2010 | Docket: 60239362

Published

court proceeding pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes. Section 163.3215 is a remedial statute designed

Keene v. Zoning Board of Adjustment

22 So. 3d 665, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 16130, 2009 WL 3485968

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Oct 30, 2009 | Docket: 1639885

Published

whether Keene is entitled to a judgment under section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, that Putnam County’s issuance

McNamara v. City of Lake Worth

956 So. 2d 509, 2007 WL 1201823

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Apr 25, 2007 | Docket: 1481175

Published

City of Lake Worth under Florida Statutes section 163.3215, challenging the adoption of ordinance 2004-12

Lake Rosa v. BOARD OF COUNTY COM'RS

911 So. 2d 206, 2005 WL 2318982

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Sep 23, 2005 | Docket: 1501009

Published

for injunctive and declaratory relief under section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, challenging the issuance

Ago

Florida Attorney General Reports | Filed: Jul 12, 2005 | Docket: 3258955

Published

a citizen who sued the county pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes, and prevailed? According

Veal v. Escambia County

773 So. 2d 625, 2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 16143, 2000 WL 1819525

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Dec 12, 2000 | Docket: 64802437

Published

2d 621, 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (construing section 163.3215, Florida Statutes). See also Thomas v. Suwannee

Baker v. Metropolitan Dade County

774 So. 2d 14, 2000 WL 1055505

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Aug 2, 2000 | Docket: 1330566

Published

sole method available is that provided by section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1999). This section provides

Brady v. City of Jacksonville

764 So. 2d 715, 2000 Fla. App. LEXIS 7595, 2000 WL 795289

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jun 22, 2000 | Docket: 64799408

Published

to comply with a condition precedent under section 163.3215(4), Florida Statutes (1997), before filing

Friends of Matanzas, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Protection

729 So. 2d 437, 1999 Fla. App. LEXIS 2452, 1999 WL 110806

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Mar 5, 1999 | Docket: 64787154

Published

“development orders” subject to challenge under section 163.3215, Matan-zas argues it has no effective remedy

Shahan v. Listle

703 So. 2d 1090, 1997 Fla. App. LEXIS 11857, 1997 WL 637614

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Oct 17, 1997 | Docket: 64777896

Published

not entirely devoid of merit. Pursuant to section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1995), Jeff and Laura Johnson

Beach v. Village North Palm Beach City Council

682 So. 2d 164, 1996 Fla. App. LEXIS 9756, 1996 WL 525515

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Sep 18, 1996 | Docket: 64768655

Published

the project. On June 9, 1995, as required by section 163.3215(4), Florida Statutes (1993), as a condition

Moore v. City of Punta Gorda

627 So. 2d 1313, 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 12156, 1993 WL 504578

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Dec 10, 1993 | Docket: 64744681

Published

comply with a condition precedent contained in section 163.3215, Florida Statutes (1991). We reverse. The

Gilmore v. Hernando County

584 So. 2d 27, 1991 Fla. App. LEXIS 6088

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Jun 27, 1991 | Docket: 64660803

Published

is not only authorized by the new statute, section 163.3215(1)) but it appears to be the sole or exclusive

Venture v. Board of County Commissioners

529 So. 2d 710, 1988 Fla. App. LEXIS 667, 1988 WL 13716

District Court of Appeal of Florida | Filed: Feb 26, 1988 | Docket: 64636365

Published

As to count II of the same complaint, see section 163.3215(3)(b), Florida Statutes (1987). RYDER, A.C