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Fla. Stat.Title XIV — Taxation and FinanceChapter 193 — Assessments

Fla. Stat. § 193.461 (2026)

Agricultural lands; classification and assessment; mandated eradication or quarantine program; natural disasters.

Edition and currency
2026 Florida Statutes: through the 2026 Regular Session. The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENT2026 Florida Statutes: through the 2026 Regular Session cited 1970–2026 90citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 90 opinions since 1970, 8 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (3)(b) (40 cases).

193.461 Agricultural lands; classification and assessment; mandated eradication or quarantine program; natural disasters.—
(1) The property appraiser shall, on an annual basis, classify for assessment purposes all lands within the county as either agricultural or nonagricultural.
(2) Any landowner whose land is denied agricultural classification by the property appraiser may appeal to the value adjustment board. The property appraiser shall notify the landowner in writing of the denial of agricultural classification on or before July 1 of the year for which the application was filed. The notification shall advise the landowner of his or her right to appeal to the value adjustment board and of the filing deadline. The property appraiser shall have available at his or her office a list by ownership of all applications received showing the acreage, the full valuation under s. 193.011, the valuation of the land under the provisions of this section, and whether or not the classification requested was granted.
(3)(a) Lands may not be classified as agricultural lands unless a return is filed on or before March 1 of each year. Before classifying such lands as agricultural lands, the property appraiser may require the taxpayer or the taxpayer’s representative to furnish the property appraiser such information as may reasonably be required to establish that such lands were actually used for a bona fide agricultural purpose. Failure to make timely application by March 1 constitutes a waiver for 1 year of the privilege granted in this section for agricultural assessment. However, an applicant who is qualified to receive an agricultural classification who fails to file an application by March 1 must file an application for the classification with the property appraiser on or before the 25th day after the mailing by the property appraiser of the notice required under s. 194.011(1). Upon receipt of sufficient evidence, as determined by the property appraiser, that demonstrates that the applicant was unable to apply for the classification in a timely manner or that otherwise demonstrates extenuating circumstances that warrant the granting of the classification, the property appraiser may grant the classification. If the applicant files an application for the classification and fails to provide sufficient evidence to the property appraiser as required, the applicant may file, pursuant to s. 194.011(3), a petition with the value adjustment board requesting that the classification be granted. The petition may be filed at any time during the taxable year on or before the 25th day following the mailing of the notice by the property appraiser as provided in s. 194.011(1). Notwithstanding s. 194.013, the applicant must pay a nonrefundable fee of $15 upon filing the petition. Upon reviewing the petition, if the person is qualified to receive the classification and demonstrates particular extenuating circumstances judged by the value adjustment board to warrant granting the classification, the value adjustment board may grant the classification for the current year. The owner of land that was classified agricultural in the previous year and whose ownership or use has not changed may reapply on a short form as provided by the department. The lessee of property may make original application or reapply using the short form if the lease, or an affidavit executed by the owner, provides that the lessee is empowered to make application for the agricultural classification on behalf of the owner and a copy of the lease or affidavit accompanies the application. A county may, at the request of the property appraiser and by a majority vote of its governing body, waive the requirement that an annual application or statement be made for classification of property within the county after an initial application is made and the classification granted by the property appraiser. Such waiver may be revoked by a majority vote of the governing body of the county.
(b) Subject to the restrictions specified in this section, only lands that are used primarily for bona fide agricultural purposes shall be classified agricultural. The term “bona fide agricultural purposes” means good faith commercial agricultural use of the land.
1. In determining whether the use of the land for agricultural purposes is bona fide, the following factors may be taken into consideration:
a. The length of time the land has been so used.
b. Whether the use has been continuous.
c. The purchase price paid.
d. Size, as it relates to specific agricultural use, but a minimum acreage may not be required for agricultural assessment.
e. Whether an indicated effort has been made to care sufficiently and adequately for the land in accordance with accepted commercial agricultural practices, including, without limitation, fertilizing, liming, tilling, mowing, reforesting, and other accepted agricultural practices.
f. Whether the land is under lease and, if so, the effective length, terms, and conditions of the lease.
g. Such other factors as may become applicable.
2. Offering property for sale does not constitute a primary use of land and may not be the basis for denying an agricultural classification if the land continues to be used primarily for bona fide agricultural purposes while it is being offered for sale.
(c) The maintenance of a dwelling on part of the lands used for agricultural purposes does not in itself preclude an agricultural classification.
(d) When property receiving an agricultural classification contains a residence under the same ownership, the portion of the property consisting of the residence and curtilage must be assessed separately, pursuant to s. 193.011, to qualify for the assessment limitation set forth in s. 193.155. The remaining property may be classified under the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b).
(e) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (a), land that has received an agricultural classification from the value adjustment board or a court of competent jurisdiction pursuant to this section is entitled to receive such classification in any subsequent year until such agricultural use of the land is abandoned or discontinued, the land is diverted to a nonagricultural use, or the land is reclassified as nonagricultural pursuant to subsection (4). The property appraiser must, no later than January 31 of each year, provide notice to the owner of land that was classified agricultural in the previous year informing the owner of the requirements of this paragraph and requiring the owner to certify that neither the ownership nor the use of the land has changed. The department shall, by administrative rule, prescribe the form of the notice to be used by the property appraiser under this paragraph. If a county has waived the requirement that an annual application or statement be made for classification of property pursuant to paragraph (a), the county may, by a majority vote of its governing body, waive the notice and certification requirements of this paragraph and shall provide the property owner with the same notification provided to owners of land granted an agricultural classification by the property appraiser. Such waiver may be revoked by a majority vote of the county’s governing body. This paragraph does not apply to any property if the agricultural classification of that property is the subject of current litigation.
(4) The property appraiser shall reclassify the following lands as nonagricultural:
(a) Land diverted from an agricultural to a nonagricultural use.
(b) Land no longer being utilized for agricultural purposes.
1(5) For the purpose of this section, the term “agricultural purposes” includes, but is not limited to, horticulture; floriculture; viticulture; forestry; dairy; livestock; poultry; bee; pisciculture, if the land is used principally for the production of tropical fish; aquaculture as defined in s. 597.0015; algaculture; sod farming; and all forms of farm products as defined in s. 823.14(3) and farm production. The term shall also include compost, as defined in s. 576.011, derived entirely from agricultural activity and regulated pursuant to s. 403.7043.
(6)(a) In years in which proper application for agricultural assessment has been made and granted pursuant to this section, the assessment of land shall be based solely on its agricultural use. The property appraiser shall consider the following use factors only:
1. The quantity and size of the property;
2. The condition of the property;
3. The present market value of the property as agricultural land;
4. The income produced by the property;
5. The productivity of land in its present use;
6. The economic merchantability of the agricultural product; and
7. Such other agricultural factors as may from time to time become applicable, which are reflective of the standard present practices of agricultural use and production.
(b) Notwithstanding any provision relating to annual assessment found in s. 192.042, the property appraiser shall rely on 5-year moving average data when utilizing the income methodology approach in an assessment of property used for agricultural purposes.
(c)1. For purposes of the income methodology approach to assessment of property used for agricultural purposes, irrigation systems, including pumps and motors, physically attached to the land shall be considered a part of the average yields per acre and shall have no separately assessable contributory value.
2. Litter containment structures located on producing poultry farms and animal waste nutrient containment structures located on producing dairy farms shall be assessed by the methodology described in subparagraph 1.
3. Structures or improvements used in horticultural production for frost or freeze protection, which are consistent with the interim measures or best management practices adopted by the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services pursuant to s. 570.93 or s. 403.067(7)(c), shall be assessed by the methodology described in subparagraph 1.
4. Screened enclosed structures used in horticultural production for protection from pests and diseases or to comply with state or federal eradication or compliance agreements shall be assessed by the methodology described in subparagraph 1.
(d) In years in which proper application for agricultural assessment has not been made, the land shall be assessed under the provisions of s. 193.011.
(7)(a) Lands classified for assessment purposes as agricultural lands which are taken out of production by a state or federal eradication or quarantine program, including the Citrus Health Response Program, shall continue to be classified as agricultural lands for 10 years after the date of execution of a compliance agreement between the landowner and the Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services or a federal agency, as applicable, pursuant to such program or successor programs. Lands under these programs which are converted to fallow or otherwise nonincome-producing uses shall continue to be classified as agricultural lands and shall be assessed at a de minimis value of up to $50 per acre on a single-year assessment methodology while fallow or otherwise used for nonincome-producing purposes pursuant to the requirements of the compliance agreement. Lands under these programs which are replanted in citrus pursuant to the requirements of the compliance agreement shall continue to be classified as agricultural lands and shall be assessed at a de minimis value of up to $50 per acre, on a single-year assessment methodology, for 10 years after the date of execution of a compliance agreement. However, lands converted to other income-producing agricultural uses permissible under such programs shall be assessed pursuant to this section. Land under a mandated eradication or quarantine program which is diverted from an agricultural to a nonagricultural use shall be assessed under s. 193.011.
(b) Lands classified for assessment purposes as agricultural lands that participate in a dispersed water storage program pursuant to a contract with the Department of Environmental Protection or a water management district which requires flooding of land shall continue to be classified as agricultural lands for the duration of the inclusion of the lands in such program or successor programs and shall be assessed as nonproductive agricultural lands. Land that participates in a dispersed water storage program that is diverted from an agricultural to a nonagricultural use shall be assessed under s. 193.011.
(c) Lands classified for assessment purposes as agricultural lands which are not being used for agricultural production as a result of a natural disaster for which a state of emergency is declared pursuant to s. 252.36, when such disaster results in the halting of agricultural production, must continue to be classified as agricultural lands for 5 years after termination of the emergency declaration. However, if such lands are diverted from agricultural use to nonagricultural use during or after the 5-year recovery period, such lands must be assessed under s. 193.011. This paragraph applies retroactively to natural disasters that occurred on or after July 1, 2017.
(8) Lands classified for assessment purposes as agricultural lands, which are not being used for agricultural production due to a hurricane that made landfall in this state during calendar year 2017, must continue to be classified as agricultural lands for assessment purposes through December 31, 2022, unless the lands are converted to a nonagricultural use. Lands converted to nonagricultural use are not covered by this subsection and must be assessed as otherwise provided by law.
History.—s. 1, ch. 59-226; s. 1, ch. 67-117; ss. 1, 2, ch. 69-55; s. 1, ch. 72-181; s. 4, ch. 74-234; s. 3, ch. 76-133; s. 15, ch. 82-208; ss. 10, 80, ch. 82-226; s. 1, ch. 85-77; s. 3, ch. 86-300; s. 23, ch. 90-217; ss. 132, 142, ch. 91-112; s. 63, ch. 94-353; s. 1468, ch. 95-147; s. 1, ch. 95-404; s. 1, ch. 98-313; s. 1, ch. 99-351; s. 3, ch. 2000-308; s. 4, ch. 2001-279; s. 15, ch. 2002-18; s. 2, ch. 2003-162; s. 43, ch. 2003-254; s. 1, ch. 2006-45; s. 2, ch. 2008-197; ss. 1, 11, ch. 2010-277; HJR 5-A, 2010 Special Session A; s. 2, ch. 2011-206; s. 15, ch. 2012-83; s. 6, ch. 2013-72; s. 1, ch. 2013-95; s. 2, ch. 2014-150; s. 1, ch. 2016-88; s. 1, ch. 2018-84; s. 12, ch. 2018-118; s. 5, ch. 2025-208; s. 5, ch. 2026-239.
1Note.—Section 6, ch. 2026-239, provides that “[t]he amendments made by this act to s. 193.461, Florida Statutes, first apply to the 2027 property tax roll.”
The 20 cases that cite Fla. Stat. § 193.461 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENBass v. Gen. Dev. Corp., 374 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1979).
cites § 193.461 50×subsections: (4)(a) 27× (4)(b) 9× (4)(c) 8× (3)(b) 4×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 193.461
“In 1972, Section 193.461 was substantially modified by Chapter 72-181, Laws of Florida (1972).”
The case’s holding
A statute creating an irrebuttable presumption that land is nonagricultural based solely on the recording of a subdivision plat violates due process and equal protection.
2
GREENStraughn v. K & K Land Mgmt., Inc., 326 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1976).
cites § 193.461 24×subsections: (3)(b) 12× (4)(c) 10× (4)(b) 2×cited by 31 cases
Where it cites § 193.461
“"Purchase price paid" is set forth by Section 193.461(3)(b), Florida Statutes, [1] as one of seven criteria to be considered by tax assessors in making their determination as to whether property qualifies as agricultural for purposes of the lower tax assessment.”
The case’s holding
A sale price at least three times the agricultural assessment creates a rebuttable presumption that the land is no longer used for bona fide agricultural purposes.
Later courts cite it for
“a sale for a purchase price which is three or more times the agricultural assessment placed on the land creates a red flag for the assessor to re-evaluate the classification of such land as agricultural....” · 1 citing court
3
GREENMarkham v. Fogg, 458 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 1984).
cites § 193.461 14×subsections: (4)(a) 6× (4)(c) 4× (3)(b) 2×cited by 36 cases
Where it cites § 193.461
“This is an agricultural classification case pertaining to the classification under section 193.461, Florida Statutes (1973) [1] of certain lands in Broward County for the years 1974 and 1975.”
The case’s holding
An appellate court should not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact if competent substantial evidence supports the finding.
Later courts cite it for
“as long as there is competent, substantial evidence to buttress this finding, an appeals court should not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact.” · 3 citing courts
4
GREENStraughn v. Tuck, 354 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1977).
cites § 193.461 10×subsections: (3) (3)(b)cited by 66 cases
Where it cites § 193.461
“Final judgment was entered in their favor, based on a finding that their land was denied agricultural classification pursuant to an unconstitutional statute, Section 193.461, Florida Statutes (1973) and was assessed without due regard to the dictates of Section 193.”
The case’s holding
A statute requiring commercial agricultural use for tax classification is constitutional, but assessors must consider present use and zoning rather than speculative future development when determining just valuation.
5
GREENRoden v. K & K Land Mgmt., Inc., 368 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1978).
cites § 193.461 13×subsections: (3) 5× (4)(c) 4× (3)(b) 3× (3)(a)cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 193.461
“1978), we reviewed the constitutionality of Section 193.461(3), Florida Statutes. The statute mandates that to gain "agricultural" classification land must be "actually used for a bona fide agricultural purpose," Section 193.”
The case’s holding
Commercial success is not a necessary circumstance for rebutting the presumption of nonagricultural use when land is sold for more than three times its agricultural assessment.
6
GREENBystrom v. Union Land Inv., Inc., 477 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
cites § 193.461 18×subsections: (3)(b) 13× (3)(a) 2× (3) (6)(a)cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 193.461
“Such other factors as may from time to time become applicable." [3] Prior to 1972, a bona fide agricultural use was all that was required in order to obtain assessment as agricultural land.”
The case’s holding
A property owner must prove actual agricultural use of the land as of the January 1 assessment date to qualify for agricultural tax classification.
7
GREENTilton v. Gardner, 52 So. 3d 771 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).
cites § 193.461 35×subsections: (3)(e) 16× (3)(b) 10× (4)(a)(2) 4× (3)(a)cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 193.461
“The pertinent portions of section 193.461, Florida Statutes (2006) are set forth below: 193.”
The case’s holding
A property appraiser may deny agricultural classification if the land use has materially changed, allowing consideration of bona fide agricultural factors to determine if the use was abandoned or discontinued.
8
GREENHarbor Ventures, Inc. v. Hutches, 366 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1979).
cites § 193.461 11×subsections: (4)(a) 5× (4)(a)(3) 4× (4)(c) 2×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 193.461
“We are asked to determine whether section 193.461(4)(a)3., Florida Statutes (1973), is unconstitutional because it sets up an irrebuttable presumption that land rezoned non-agricultural at the request of its owners will not be used for a bona fide agricultural purpose.”
The case’s holding
The statute requiring reclassification of land zoned non-agricultural at the owner's request applies only when the zoning change is from an agricultural use to a non-agricultural use.
9
GREENFisher v. Schooley, 371 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
cites § 193.461 10×subsections: (3)(b) 3× (4)(a)(3) 2× (4)(c) 2×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 193.461
“*499 The evidence conclusively establishes a "good faith commercial agricultural use of the land" pursuant to § 193.461, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1978). That statute provides in pertinent part: (3)(a) [The taxpayer must establish] [T]hat said lands were actually used for a bona fide…”
The case’s holding
Agricultural classification applies to land used for bona fide commercial agricultural purposes regardless of the owner's future development intentions or overall investment profitability.
10
GREENRobbins v. Yusem, 559 So. 2d 1185 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).
cites § 193.461 7×subsections: (3)(b)cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 193.461
“In 1987, the Property Appraiser denied the taxpayer's application for an agricultural classification on the grounds that the agricultural use was illegal under the zoning code and thus could not be considered a "good faith" use of the property within the meaning of the Greenbelt…”
The case’s holding
Agricultural use of property in violation of applicable zoning regulations cannot be considered good faith commercial agricultural use entitling the owner to an agricultural tax exemption.
11
GREENLove PGI Partners, LP v. Schultz, 706 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).
cites § 193.461 9×subsections: (3)(b) 4× (4)(a) 3×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 193.461
“The appellants in this case had the burden of proof at trial to show either no reasonable hypothesis supported the property appraiser's determination, or the appraiser did not consider the appropriate statutory factors under § 193.461. See Davis v. St. Joe Paper Co.”
The case’s holding
Agricultural classification is determined by the actual bona fide use of the land and cannot be denied solely because of local zoning or the recording of a subdivision plat.
12
GREENBlake v. RMS Holding Corp., 341 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
cites § 193.461 6×subsections: (2) 2× (3)(a) 2×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 193.461
“Subsection (2) made provision for a landowner who was denied agricultural assessment to apply to the Board of Tax Adjustment for review thereof. Subsection (3) provided that "No lands shall be classified as agricultural lands unless the return is filed on or before April 1 of…”
The case’s holding
A taxpayer must actually deliver an agricultural assessment application to the assessor and pay the admitted tax before filing a timely suit to contest the assessment.
13
GREENMarkham v. PPI, INC., 843 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).
cites § 193.461 7×subsections: (5) 2× (3)(b)cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 193.461
“The narrow issue in this appeal is whether land used for the boarding and training of horses constitutes a "bona fide agricultural purpose" within the meaning of section 193.461, Florida Statutes (2001).”
The case’s holding
Land used for the commercial boarding and training of horses constitutes a bona fide agricultural purpose under Florida law.
14
GREENStraughn v. K & K Mgmt., Inc., 347 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
cites § 193.461 6×subsections: (3)(b) 2× (4)(c) 2×cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 193.461
“[3] Section 193.461, Florida Statutes (1973) as amended in 1972.”
The case’s holding
A bona fide commercial agricultural use of land qualifies for an agricultural assessment even if the purchase price reflects speculative intent for future nonagricultural development.
15
GREENGianolio v. Markham, 564 So. 2d 1131 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).
cites § 193.461 9×subsections: (3)(b) 4× (3)cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 193.461
“Section 193.461, Florida Statutes (1989), deals with the agricultural classification and assessment of property.”
The case’s holding
The primary use of land for agricultural classification is determined by the most significant actual physical activity on the property, and the owner's future intent to sell the land is irrelevant.
16
GREENRH Resorts, Ltd. v. Donegan, 881 So. 2d 1152 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004).
cites § 193.461 8×subsections: (3)(b) 4× (4)(c) 3×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 193.461
“*1155 § 193.461(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2001). In applying these factors, a property appraiser cannot consider the property owner's future intended use of the property but instead must focus on the use of the property as of January 1st of the subject year.”
The case’s holding
Property purchased at a price significantly exceeding its agricultural assessment and used for development is not entitled to agricultural classification.
17
GREENDep't of Revenue v. Goembel, 382 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
cites § 193.461 3×subsections: (4)(c) 2× (3)(b)cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 193.461
“There was ample evidence in the record before the trial court upon which he could base his finding that the property was used for bona fide agricultural purposes in 1973, notwithstanding the minimal profit, and we will not disturb his ruling.”
The case’s holding
A high purchase price creates a rebuttable presumption against agricultural tax classification, which can be overcome by showing continued bona fide agricultural use without requiring commercial profitability.
18
GREENGlades, Inc. v. Colding, 422 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).
cites § 193.461 6×subsections: (3)(b) 4× (3)(a) 2×cited by 4 cases
Where it cites § 193.461
“In 1980, pursuant to section 193.461(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), the property owners filed a return and application for agricultural classification of lands with the Collier County property appraiser.”
The case’s holding
Once a court finds bona fide good faith agricultural use, prior or future land use and purchase price are irrelevant to the agricultural tax classification determination.
19
GREENMarkham v. June Rose, 495 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986).
cites § 193.461 4×subsections: (3)(b) 2×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 193.461
“It is established that the remainder of appellee's parcel was under cattle lease and qualified for agricultural treatment under section 193.461, Florida Statutes (1983).”
The case’s holding
A property appraiser's denial of agricultural classification enjoys a presumption of correctness that the taxpayer must overcome with proof excluding every reasonable hypothesis supporting the denial.
20
GREENRainey v. Nelson, 257 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1972).
cites § 193.461 6×subsections: (4)cited by 7 cases
Where it cites § 193.461
“This cause is before us on direct appeal from a final judgment of the Circuit Court of Pinellas County declaring Fla. Stat. § 193.461 , F.S.A. (formerly 193.”
The case’s holding
A statute authorizing the reclassification of agricultural land for tax purposes based on urban development and community expansion is a valid exercise of the state's police power.

Show all 90 citing cases (list view) →

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197019982026

One bar per year. Tallest: 10 cases in 1977. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.61Fla.15Fla. Cir. Ct.8Fla. Cir. Ct., Miami-Dade Cty.211th Cir.1Fla. Cir. Ct., Leon Cty.1N.C. Ct. App.1S.D.1
By subsection
(1)2 cases
McLendon v. Nikolits, 211 So. 3d 92 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017).
(2)2 cases
Blake v. RMS Holding Corp., 341 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).“Subsection (2) made provision for a landowner who was denied agricultural assessment to apply to the Board of Tax Adjustment for review thereof. Subsection (3) provided that "No lands shall be classified as agricultural lands unless the return is filed on or before April 1 of…”
McLendon v. Nikolits, 211 So. 3d 92 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017).
(3)11 cases
Roden v. K & K Land Mgmt., Inc., 368 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1978).“1978), we reviewed the constitutionality of Section 193.461(3), Florida Statutes. The statute mandates that to gain "agricultural" classification land must be "actually used for a bona fide agricultural purpose," Section 193.”
Straughn v. Tuck, 354 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1977).“Final judgment was entered in their favor, based on a finding that their land was denied agricultural classification pursuant to an unconstitutional statute, Section 193.461, Florida Statutes (1973) and was assessed without due regard to the dictates of Section 193.”
Bass v. Gen. Dev. Corp., 374 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1979).“In 1972, Section 193.461 was substantially modified by Chapter 72-181, Laws of Florida (1972).”
Smith v. Ring, 250 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971).
Bystrom v. Union Land Inv., Inc., 477 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).“Such other factors as may from time to time become applicable." [3] Prior to 1972, a bona fide agricultural use was all that was required in order to obtain assessment as agricultural land.”
Showing the top 5 of 11. More in the list view →
(3)(a)16 cases
Blake v. RMS Holding Corp., 341 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
Bystrom v. Union Land Inv., Inc., 477 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
Roden v. K & K Land Mgmt., Inc., 368 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1978).
Moses v. Bystrom, 489 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
Glades, Inc. v. Colding, 422 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).“In 1980, pursuant to section 193.461(3)(a), Florida Statutes (1979), the property owners filed a return and application for agricultural classification of lands with the Collier County property appraiser.”
Showing the top 5 of 16. More in the list view →
(3)(b)40 cases
Straughn v. K & K Land Mgmt., Inc., 326 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1976).“"Purchase price paid" is set forth by Section 193.461(3)(b), Florida Statutes, [1] as one of seven criteria to be considered by tax assessors in making their determination as to whether property qualifies as agricultural for purposes of the lower tax assessment.”
Bystrom v. Union Land Inv., Inc., 477 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
Bass v. Gen. Dev. Corp., 374 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1979).
Tilton v. Gardner, 52 So. 3d 771 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).“The pertinent portions of section 193.461, Florida Statutes (2006) are set forth below: 193.”
Roden v. K & K Land Mgmt., Inc., 368 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1978).
Showing the top 5 of 40. More in the list view →
(3)(c)1 case
Wilkinson v. Kirby, 654 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995).
(3)(e)4 cases
Tilton v. Gardner, 52 So. 3d 771 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).
Spencer Estates of Florida, LLC v. Havill, 125 So. 3d 795 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012).
Edward A. Crapo v. Academy for Five Element Acupuncture, Inc., No. 1D17-1895 (Fla. 1st DCA July 8, 2019).
(4)3 cases
Spencer Estates of Florida, LLC v. Havill, 125 So. 3d 795 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012).
Rainey v. Nelson, 257 So. 2d 538 (Fla. 1972).“This cause is before us on direct appeal from a final judgment of the Circuit Court of Pinellas County declaring Fla. Stat. § 193.461 , F.S.A. (formerly 193.”
Walden v. Fletcher Avenue Dev. Corp., 313 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975).
(4)(a)13 cases
Bass v. Gen. Dev. Corp., 374 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1979).
Markham v. Fogg, 458 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 1984).“This is an agricultural classification case pertaining to the classification under section 193.461, Florida Statutes (1973) [1] of certain lands in Broward County for the years 1974 and 1975.”
Harbor Ventures, Inc. v. Hutches, 366 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1979).“We are asked to determine whether section 193.461(4)(a)3., Florida Statutes (1973), is unconstitutional because it sets up an irrebuttable presumption that land rezoned non-agricultural at the request of its owners will not be used for a bona fide agricultural purpose.”
Love PGI Partners, LP v. Schultz, 706 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).“The appellants in this case had the burden of proof at trial to show either no reasonable hypothesis supported the property appraiser's determination, or the appraiser did not consider the appropriate statutory factors under § 193.461. See Davis v. St. Joe Paper Co.”
Lauderdale v. Blake, 351 So. 2d 742 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
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(4)(a)(2)1 case
Tilton v. Gardner, 52 So. 3d 771 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010).
(4)(a)(3)2 cases
Harbor Ventures, Inc. v. Hutches, 366 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1979).
Fisher v. Schooley, 371 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).“*499 The evidence conclusively establishes a "good faith commercial agricultural use of the land" pursuant to § 193.461, Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1978). That statute provides in pertinent part: (3)(a) [The taxpayer must establish] [T]hat said lands were actually used for a bona fide…”
(4)(b)2 cases
Bass v. Gen. Dev. Corp., 374 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1979).
Straughn v. K & K Land Mgmt., Inc., 326 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1976).
(4)(c)18 cases
Straughn v. K & K Land Mgmt., Inc., 326 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1976).
Bass v. Gen. Dev. Corp., 374 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 1979).
Markham v. Fogg, 458 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 1984).
Roden v. K & K Land Mgmt., Inc., 368 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1978).
Harbor Ventures, Inc. v. Hutches, 366 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. 1979).
Showing the top 5 of 18. More in the list view →
(5)5 cases
Markham v. PPI, INC., 843 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).“The narrow issue in this appeal is whether land used for the boarding and training of horses constitutes a "bona fide agricultural purpose" within the meaning of section 193.461, Florida Statutes (2001).”
McLendon v. Nikolits, 211 So. 3d 92 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017).
Hausman v. Rudkin, 268 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972).
Robbins v. Racetrack Training Ctr., Inc., 833 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003).
Lancelot Kollmann v. Jennifer Nicol Caudill, 377 So. 3d 184 (Fla. 2d DCA 2023).
(6)4 cases
Container Corp. of Am. v. Rutherford, 293 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973).
Cassady v. McKinney, 343 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).
Cassady v. McKinney, 296 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974).
Martin Cnty. v. Askew, 38 Fla. Supp. 50 (Fla. Cir. Ct., Leon Cty. 1972).
(6)(a)1 case
Bystrom v. Union Land Inv., Inc., 477 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985).
(8)(a)1 case
Daniel v. Lynn, 393 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).

Show all 90 citing cases (list view) →

Enactment and amendments
History.—s. 1, ch. 59-226; s. 1, ch. 67-117; ss. 1, 2, ch. 69-55; s. 1, ch. 72-181; s. 4, ch. 74-234; s. 3, ch. 76-133; s. 15, ch. 82-208; ss. 10, 80, ch. 82-226; s. 1, ch. 85-77; s. 3, ch. 86-300; s. 23, ch. 90-217; ss. 132, 142, ch. 91-112; s. 63, ch. 94-353; s. 1468, ch. 95-147; s. 1, ch. 95-404; s. 1, ch. 98-313; s. 1, ch. 99-351; s. 3, ch. 2000-308; s. 4, ch. 2001-279; s. 15, ch. 2002-18; s. 2, ch. 2003-162; s. 43, ch. 2003-254; s. 1, ch. 2006-45; s. 2, ch. 2008-197; ss. 1, 11, ch. 2010-277; HJR 5-A, 2010 Special Session A; s. 2, ch. 2011-206; s. 15, ch. 2012-83; s. 6, ch. 2013-72; s. 1, ch. 2013-95; s. 2, ch. 2014-150; s. 1, ch. 2016-88; s. 1, ch. 2018-84; s. 12, ch. 2018-118; s. 5, ch. 2025-208; s. 5, ch. 2026-239.
Versions

Edition shown: 2026 Florida Statutes: through the 2026 Regular Session. Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.

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