222.25
Other individual property of natural persons exempt from legal process.
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222.25 Other individual property of natural persons exempt from legal process.—The following property is exempt from attachment, garnishment, or other legal process:
(1) A debtor’s interest, not to exceed $5,000 in value, in a single motor vehicle as defined in s. 320.01(1).
(2) A debtor’s interest in any professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.
(3) A debtor’s interest in a refund or a credit received or to be received, or the traceable deposits in a financial institution of a debtor’s interest in a refund or credit, pursuant to s. 32 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. This exemption does not apply to a debt owed for child support or spousal support.
(4) A debtor’s interest in personal property, not to exceed $4,000, if the debtor does not claim or receive the benefits of a homestead exemption under s. 4, Art. X of the State Constitution. This exemption does not apply to a debt owed for child support or spousal support.
History.—s. 3, ch. 93-256; s. 1, ch. 2001-129; s. 1, ch. 2007-185; s. 43, ch. 2008-4; s. 1, ch. 2024-110.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 83
cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1994–2026 · leading case: Osborne v. Dumoulin
Osborne v. Dumoulin (2011)
“h contains the personal property exemption — that is determinative of an issue in a bankruptcy case pending in that court and for which there appears to be no controlling precedent from this Court: Whether a debtor who elects not to claim a homestead exemption and indicates an…”
In Re Franzese (2008)
“Section 222.25 (“PPE Proposal”) (August 7, 2006) (on file with Professor Jeffrey Davis, University of Florida College of Law).”
In Re Magelitz (2008)
“The Debtor did not claim the home as exempt in Schedule C, instead electing to claim an exemption in ,000 worth of personal property pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 222.25 (4). The Debtor did not indicate whether the home will be surrendered, reaffirmed, or redeemed in his Statement…”
In Re Gatto (2008)
“” Fla. Stat. § 222.25 (4) (2007). In interpreting the words of this second exclusion, the Court must begin with the basic proposition that exemptions are to be construed liberally in favor of providing the benefits of the exemptions to debtors.”
In Re Hafner (2008)
“The issue is whether the Debtor may “stack” her exemptions under Fla. Stat. §§ 222.25 (1) and 222.25(4) toward a single motor vehicle.”
In Re Abbott (2009)
“Bakst’s (“Trustee”) Objection to Claimed Exemption and Application for Turnover (“Objection”), wherein the Trustee objects to Robert; Anton Abbott and Stacy Edith Abbott’s (collectively, the “Debtors”) claim of exemption for personal property pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 222.25 (4),…”
In Re Kent (2009)
“The scheduled value of the exemptions claimed pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 222.25 (4) is ,614.06. The Debtors did not claim the Home as exempt.”
In Re Rogers (2008)
“See Proposed Amendment to Personal Property Exemption Statute Fla. Stat. § 222.25 , Bankruptcy/UCC Comm.”
In Re Orozco (2011)
“Fla. Stat. § 222.25 (4) (2010). Courts had agreed that only those debtors who do not benefit directly or indirectly from Florida’s constitutional homestead provision may use § 222.”
In Re Morales (2008)
“00 is claimed exempt pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 222.25 (4).[D.E. 1]. The Debtor’s original statement of intention shows that the mortgages on the real property are to be reaffirmed.”
In Re Bennett (2008)
“Fla. Stat. § 222.25 (4) (2007) (“Statutory Exemption”).”
In Re Rodale (2011)
“Fla. Stat. § 222.25 (4) (Emphasis supplied).”
— 222.25(1) — 15 cases
In Re Hafner (2008)
“The issue is whether the Debtor may “stack” her exemptions under Fla. Stat. §§ 222.25 (1) and 222.25(4) toward a single motor vehicle.”
In Re Mootosammy (2008)
In Re Watford (2010)
Furr v. Lordy (In Re Lordy) (1997)
— 222.25(2) — 4 cases
In Re Dowell (2011)
In Re Kirby (1998)
In Re Coltellaro (1997)
— 222.25(3) — 1 case
In Re Abbott (2009)
“Bakst’s (“Trustee”) Objection to Claimed Exemption and Application for Turnover (“Objection”), wherein the Trustee objects to Robert; Anton Abbott and Stacy Edith Abbott’s (collectively, the “Debtors”) claim of exemption for personal property pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 222.25 (4),…”
— 222.25(4) — 41 cases
Osborne v. Dumoulin (2011)
“h contains the personal property exemption — that is determinative of an issue in a bankruptcy case pending in that court and for which there appears to be no controlling precedent from this Court: Whether a debtor who elects not to claim a homestead exemption and indicates an…”
In Re Franzese (2008)
“Section 222.25 (“PPE Proposal”) (August 7, 2006) (on file with Professor Jeffrey Davis, University of Florida College of Law).”
In Re Kent (2009)
“The scheduled value of the exemptions claimed pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 222.25 (4) is ,614.06. The Debtors did not claim the Home as exempt.”
In Re Orozco (2011)
“Fla. Stat. § 222.25 (4) (2010). Courts had agreed that only those debtors who do not benefit directly or indirectly from Florida’s constitutional homestead provision may use § 222.”
In Re Rogers (2008)
“See Proposed Amendment to Personal Property Exemption Statute Fla. Stat. § 222.25 , Bankruptcy/UCC Comm.”
— 222.25(4)(2007) — 2 cases
In Re Fyock (2008)
In Re Sanon (2009)
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