The 2022 Florida Statutes (including 2022 Special Session A and 2023 Special Session B)

Title XXXI
LABOR

Chapter 440
WORKERS' COMPENSATION

View Entire Chapter

F.S. 440.09

440.09 Coverage.—

(1) The employer must pay compensation or furnish benefits required by this chapter if the employee suffers an accidental compensable injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment. The injury, its occupational cause, and any resulting manifestations or disability must be established to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, based on objective relevant medical findings, and the accidental compensable injury must be the major contributing cause of any resulting injuries. For purposes of this section, “major contributing cause” means the cause which is more than 50 percent responsible for the injury as compared to all other causes combined for which treatment or benefits are sought. In cases involving occupational disease or repetitive exposure, both causation and sufficient exposure to support causation must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Pain or other subjective complaints alone, in the absence of objective relevant medical findings, are not compensable. For purposes of this section, “objective relevant medical findings” are those objective findings that correlate to the subjective complaints of the injured employee and are confirmed by physical examination findings or diagnostic testing. Establishment of the causal relationship between a compensable accident and injuries for conditions that are not readily observable must be by medical evidence only, as demonstrated by physical examination findings or diagnostic testing. Major contributing cause must be demonstrated by medical evidence only.

(a) This chapter does not require any compensation or benefits for any subsequent injury the employee suffers as a result of an original injury arising out of and in the course of employment unless the original injury is the major contributing cause of the subsequent injury. Major contributing cause must be demonstrated by medical evidence only.

(b) If an injury arising out of and in the course of employment combines with a preexisting disease or condition to cause or prolong disability or need for treatment, the employer must pay compensation or benefits required by this chapter only to the extent that the injury arising out of and in the course of employment is and remains more than 50 percent responsible for the injury as compared to all other causes combined and thereafter remains the major contributing cause of the disability or need for treatment. Major contributing cause must be demonstrated by medical evidence only.

(c) Death resulting from an operation by a surgeon furnished by the employer for the cure of hernia as required in s. 440.15(6) [F.S. 1981] shall for the purpose of this chapter be considered to be a death resulting from the accident causing the hernia.

(d) If an accident happens while the employee is employed elsewhere than in this state, which would entitle the employee or his or her dependents to compensation if it had happened in this state, the employee or his or her dependents are entitled to compensation if the contract of employment was made in this state, or the employment was principally localized in this state. However, if an employee receives compensation or damages under the laws of any other state, the total compensation for the injury may not be greater than is provided in this chapter.

(2) Benefits are not payable in respect of the disability or death of any employee covered by the Federal Employer’s Liability Act, the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act, the Defense Base Act, or the Jones Act.

(3) Compensation is not payable if the injury was occasioned primarily by the intoxication of the employee; by the influence of any drugs, barbiturates, or other stimulants not prescribed by a physician; or by the willful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself, herself, or another.

(4)(a) An employee shall not be entitled to compensation or benefits under this chapter if any judge of compensation claims, administrative law judge, court, or jury convened in this state determines that the employee has knowingly or intentionally engaged in any of the acts described in s. 440.105 or any criminal act for the purpose of securing workers’ compensation benefits. For purposes of this section, the term “intentional” shall include, but is not limited to, pleas of guilty or nolo contendere in criminal matters. This section shall apply to accidents, regardless of the date of the accident. For injuries occurring prior to January 1, 1994, this section shall pertain to the acts of the employee described in s. 440.105 or criminal activities occurring subsequent to January 1, 1994.

(b) A judge of compensation claims, administrative law judge, or court of this state shall take judicial notice of a finding of insurance fraud by a court of competent jurisdiction and terminate or otherwise disallow benefits.

(c) Upon the denial of benefits in accordance with this section, a judge of compensation claims shall have the jurisdiction to order any benefits payable to the employee to be paid into the court registry or an escrow account during the pendency of an appeal or until such time as the time in which to file an appeal has expired.

(5) If injury is caused by the knowing refusal of the employee to use a safety appliance or observe a safety rule required by statute or lawfully adopted by the department, and brought prior to the accident to the employee’s knowledge, or if injury is caused by the knowing refusal of the employee to use a safety appliance provided by the employer, the compensation as provided in this chapter shall be reduced 25 percent.

(6) Except as provided in this chapter, a construction design professional who is retained to perform professional services on a construction project, or an employee of a construction design professional in the performance of professional services on the site of the construction project, is not liable for any injuries resulting from the employer’s failure to comply with safety standards on the construction project for which compensation is recoverable under this chapter, unless responsibility for safety practices is specifically assumed by contracts. The immunity provided by this subsection to a construction design professional does not apply to the negligent preparation of design plans or specifications.

(7)(a) To ensure that the workplace is a drug-free environment and to deter the use of drugs and alcohol at the workplace, if the employer has reason to suspect that the injury was occasioned primarily by the intoxication of the employee or by the use of any drug, as defined in this chapter, which affected the employee to the extent that the employee’s normal faculties were impaired, and the employer has not implemented a drug-free workplace pursuant to ss. 440.101 and 440.102, the employer may require the employee to submit to a test for the presence of any or all drugs or alcohol in his or her system.

(b) If the employee has, at the time of the injury, a blood alcohol level equal to or greater than the level specified in s. 316.193, or if the employee has a positive confirmation of a drug as defined in this act, it is presumed that the injury was occasioned primarily by the intoxication of, or by the influence of the drug upon, the employee. If the employer has implemented a drug-free workplace, this presumption may be rebutted only by evidence that there is no reasonable hypothesis that the intoxication or drug influence contributed to the injury. In the absence of a drug-free workplace program, this presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that the intoxication or influence of the drug did not contribute to the injury. Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood must be based upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood. If the results are positive, the testing facility must maintain the specimen for a minimum of 90 days. Blood serum may be used for testing purposes under this chapter; however, if this test is used, the presumptions under this section do not arise unless the blood alcohol level is proved to be medically and scientifically equivalent to or greater than the comparable blood alcohol level that would have been obtained if the test were based on percent by weight of alcohol in the blood. However, if, before the accident, the employer had actual knowledge of and expressly acquiesced in the employee’s presence at the workplace while under the influence of such alcohol or drug, the presumptions specified in this subsection do not apply.

(c) If the injured worker refuses to submit to a drug test, it shall be presumed in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary that the injury was occasioned primarily by the influence of drugs.

(d) The agency shall provide by rule for the authorization and regulation of drug-testing policies, procedures, and methods. Testing of injured employees shall not commence until such rules are adopted.

(e) As a part of rebutting any presumptions under paragraph (b), the injured worker must prove the actual quantitative amounts of the drug or its metabolites as measured on the initial and confirmation post-accident drug tests of the injured worker’s urine sample and provide additional evidence regarding the absence of drug influence other than the worker’s denial of being under the influence of a drug. No drug test conducted on a urine sample shall be rejected as to its results or the presumption imposed under paragraph (b) on the basis of the urine being bodily fluid tested.

(8) If, by operation of s. 440.04, benefits become payable to a professional athlete under this chapter, such benefits shall be reduced or setoff in the total amount of injury benefits or wages payable during the period of disability by the employer under a collective bargaining agreement or contract for hire.

History.—s. 9, ch. 17481, 1935; CGL 1936 Supp. 5966(9); s. 3, ch. 18413, 1937; s. 1, ch. 28236, 1953; s. 1, ch. 57-293; s. 2, ch. 73-127; s. 5, ch. 74-197; s. 3, ch. 75-209; s. 2, ch. 77-290; s. 23, ch. 78-300; s. 124, ch. 79-40; s. 21, ch. 79-312; s. 7, ch. 86-171; ss. 4, 5, 6, 43, ch. 89-289; ss. 11, 56, ch. 90-201; ss. 9, 52, ch. 91-1; ss. 5, 55, ch. 93-415; s. 101, ch. 97-103; s. 1, ch. 98-161; s. 3, ch. 98-174; s. 8, ch. 2001-91; s. 14, ch. 2002-194; s. 469, ch. 2003-261; s. 6, ch. 2003-412.

F.S. 440.09 on Google Scholar

F.S. 440.09 on Casetext

Amendments to 440.09

Arrestable Offenses / Crimes under Fla. Stat. 440.09

Level: Degree
Misdemeanor/Felony: First/Second/Third

Current data shows no reason an arrest or criminal charge should have occurred directly under Florida Statute 440.09.

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

10 Cases from Casetext:Date Descending

U.S. Supreme Court

11th Cir. - Ct. App.11th Cir. - MD FL11th Cir. - ND FL11th Cir. - SD FLFed. Reg.Secondary Sources - All

Doe v. Willis
8:21-cv-1576-VMC-CPT (M.D. Fla. Apr. 5, 2023)
Motion for summary judgment
6 more...
Similarly, Florida's worker's compensation scheme provides that an “employer must pay compensation or furnish benefits required by this chapter if the employee suffers an accidental compensable injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment.” Fla. Stat. § 440.09. Florida law provides that an employer that fails to secure worker's compensation “may not plead as a defense that the injury was caused by negligence of a fellow employee, that the employee assumed the risk of the employment, or that the injury was due to the comparative negligence of the employee.” Fla. Stat. § 440.11(1)(a).
PAGE 45
City of Hallandale Beach/Preferred Gov't.al Claims Servs. v. Casey
No. 1D21-2138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2022)
To the extent that Wyatt's claim for medical benefits and indemnity relies on her PTSD being an occupational disease as provided by sections 112.1815(5) and 440.151, she correctly identifies [the date she took a leave of absence] as the accident date. Notwithstanding any other provision in chapter 440, "the disablement . . . of an employee resulting from an occupational disease . . . shall be treated as the happening of an injury by accident." § 440.151(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (emphasis supplied); cf. § 440.09( 1), Fla. Stat. (requiring an employer to pay compensation and furnish benefits for an "accidental compensable injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment"). Neither the employee's exposure to a cause of the disease nor her suffering of symptoms counts toward the accident date; her disablement (read: her "disability") does, if it occurs at all. § 440.151(1)(a), (3), Fla. Stat. (2018); cf. City of Port Orange v. Sedacca, 953 So.2d 727, 732 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) ("Realistically, it is possible that a permanent disease may never result in disability."). At least with respect to wage indemnity, then, an employee, does not suffer a…
Wyatt v. Polk Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs & Commercial Risk Mgmt.
No. 1D19-4601 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2022)
We start with the date of the accident. To the extent that Wyatt's claim for medical benefits and indemnity relies on her PTSD being an occupational disease as provided by sections 112.1815(5) and 440.151, she correctly identifies November 27, 2018, as the accident date. Notwithstanding any other provision in chapter 440, "the disablement . . . of an employee resulting from an occupational disease . . . shall be treated as the happening of an injury by accident." § 440.151(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (emphasis supplied); cf. § 440.09( 1), Fla. Stat. (requiring an employer to pay compensation and furnish benefits for an "accidental compensable injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment"). Neither the employee's exposure to a cause of the disease nor her suffering of symptoms counts toward the accident date; her disablement (read: her "disability") does, if it occurs at all. § 440.151(1)(a), (3), Fla. Stat. (2018); cf. City of Port Orange v. Sedacca, 953 So.2d 727, 732 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) ("Realistically, it is possible that a permanent disease may never result in disability."). At least with respect to wage indemnity, then, an employee…
Weaver v. Volusia Cnty.
No. 5D21-1620 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2022)
Motion for summary judgment
Prior to the enactment of section 112.1816, a firefighter who was diagnosed with cancer and believed the disease was caused by his or her employment as a firefighter could only seek benefits from their employer by filing a workers' compensation claim. See § 112.1816(2), Fla. Stat. (2019) (stating the statute is an "alternative to pursuing workers' compensation benefits under chapter 440"). To be eligible to receive benefits under chapter 440, the firefighter had to make several showings, including a showing that the cancer was caused by their work. § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (2019). If causation was established, the firefighter would receive, among other things, a percentage of their average weekly wages while they remained disabled. See generally § 440.15, Fla. Stat. (2019).
PAGE 4
Kelly Air Sys. v. Kohlun
337 So. 3d 883 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2022)
This Court reviews statutory interpretation questions de novo. Generally, Florida's workers’ compensation system compensates employees for injuries resulting from their work. That is, injuries "arising out of and in the course of employment." § 440.02(19), Fla. Stat.; see also § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. The going-and-coming provision statutorily defines out of workers’ compensation coverage injuries that occur while an employee is traveling to and from work:
PAGE 885
Soya v. Health First, Inc.
337 So. 3d 388 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2022) Cited 2 times
It should also be recognized that Valcourt-Williams cited with approval Sentry Insurance Company v. Hamlin , 69 So. 3d 1065 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). Valcourt-Williams , 271 So. 3d at 1134. In Hamlin we stated, "Work connection determines coverage under chapter 440, not fault." Id. at 1069 ; see also Taylor v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard Cnty. , 888 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2004). So the majority here correctly holds that the Employer/Carrier's attempt to inject fault must fail. See § 440.10(2), Fla. Stat. Fault should be a consideration only in limited cases when a claimant was injured while under the influence of drugs or alcohol or when a claimant was injured while engaging in a willful act with the intent to injure or kill. See § 440.09(3), Fla. Stat. To hold otherwise would violate the statutory system created by the Legislature and impair "the quick and efficient delivery of disability and medical benefits to an injured worker" as well as delaying "the worker's return to gainful reemployment at a reasonable cost to the employer." § 440.015, Fla. Stat.
PAGE 392
Silberberg v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sch. Bd.
335 So. 3d 148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2022) Cited 4 times
An employee's injury is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act if it stems from an accident that "aris[es] out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment." § 440.09( 1), Fla. Stat.; see also § 440.02(19), Fla. Stat. (defining "injury" in terms of an accident "arising out of and in the course of employment"); § 440.02(1), Fla. Stat. (defining an "accident" in the context of chapter 440 as "only an unexpected or unusual event or result that happens suddenly"). "The phrases ‘arising out of’ and ‘in the course of employment’ are used conjunctively. The words ‘arising out of’ refer to the origin of the cause of the accident, while the words ‘in the course of employment’ refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident occurs." Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Richardson , 148 Fla. 323, 4 So. 2d 378, 379 (1941) (citing reference omitted). For decades the supreme court has been telling us that this means an employee must "show that the accident or injury happened not only in the course of [his] employment but arose out of it. There must have been a causal connection between the employment and the injury." Gen. Properties Co. v. Greening …
Cabrera v. Kablelink Commc'ns
328 So. 3d 1011 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021) Cited 1 times
The parties don't dispute the underlying facts here. Cabrera was working to install a residential cable line for Kablelink in 2016, when he fell from a ladder and was severely injured. He filed a petition seeking workers' compensation benefits from Kablelink. But Kablelink disputed that Cabrera was eligible under its plan because he was an independent contractor. See § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (2016) (making benefits available only to "employees"). A prior agreement between Cabrera and Kablelink recognized him to be "an independent contractor and not an employee." Notwithstanding the agreement, Cabrera asserted that he is considered a Kablelink employee under Florida law because independent contractors are "employees" if they are working and engaged "in the construction industry." § 440.02(15)(c) 3., (d)1., Fla. Stat. Cabrera believes that the law's "construction industry" definition includes the cable-laying work he was doing for Kablelink. See § 440.02(8), Fla. Stat.
PAGE 1013
Sullivan v. Nuc02, LLC
308 So. 3d 659 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020) Cited 1 times
Under section 440.09(1), the "accidental compensable injury must be the major contributing cause [MCC] of any resulting injuries." Paragraph (b) of this section further provides that when a work-related injury combines with a preexisting disease or condition to cause or prolong disability or the need for treatment, the E/C must pay benefits "only to the extent that the injury arising out of and in the course of employment is and remains more than 50 percent responsible for the injury as compared to all other causes combined and thereafter remains the [MCC] of the disability or need for treatment." § 440.09(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2016). This court has previously recognized that section 440.09(1)(b) applies when the need for treatment or benefits is caused by the combination of an employment accident with a preexisting injury or condition that is unrelated to the accident. E.g., Pizza Hut v. Proctor , 955 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).
PAGE 662
Noland v. City of Deerfield Beach
308 So. 3d 222 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2020)
See generally § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (2018) (defining MCC as "the cause which is more than 50 percent responsible for the injury as compared to all other causes combined for which treatment or benefits are sought").
PAGE 225
Cases from cite.case.law:
SEDGWICK CMS CMS, v. VALCOURT- WILLIAMS,, 271 So. 3d 1133 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . ." § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (2016). . . . Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2016), states in part, "The employer must pay compensation or furnish . . . However, to satisfy the "arising out of work" requirement of section 440.09(1), the personal comfort . . .
RENTE, v. ORANGE COUNTY BOCC, 263 So. 3d 294 (Fla. App. Ct. 2019)

. . . We would note that the E/C neither pled nor pursued a fraud defense pursuant to sections 440.09(4) and . . .
UNITED STATES FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY v. HACKETT,, 260 So. 3d 532 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Phillips , 656 So.2d 1386, 1387 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (holding that term "compensation" as used in § 440.09 . . . The fraud defense under section 440.09(4) is not available for accidents that occurred before the statute's . . .
HANSEN AND ADKINS AUTO TRANSPORT v. MARTIN,, 259 So. 3d 994 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . the workplace injury is the major contributing cause of the need for surgery as required by section 440.09 . . .
CROWN DIVERSIFIED INDUSTRIES CORP. v. PRENDIVILLE,, 263 So. 3d 103 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . Powers's testimony stem from the evidentiary requirements set forth in sections 90.704 and 440.09(1). . . . Section 440.09(1) requires that "[t]he injury, its occupational cause, and any resulting manifestations . . .
BRINSON, v. HOSPITAL HOUSEKEEPING SERVICES, LLC,, 263 So. 3d 106 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . See § 440.09(3), Fla. Stat. (2017). Ms. Brinson challenged the denial of benefits. . . . to rebut the statutory presumption attributing her injury primarily to the influence of drugs, see § 440.09 . . . And it does not compensate for the injury. § 440.09(3), Fla. Stat. . . . ." § 440.09(7)(b), Fla. Stat. Ms. . . . Test results have long been used in workers' compensation cases (and § 440.09(7)(b)'s presumption has . . . . § 440.09(7)(b), Fla. Stat. (2018). . . . to the extent that the employee's normal faculties were impaired" as to the accident in question. § 440.09 . . . on the statutory presumption of intoxication in section 440.09(7)(b) (discussed further below). . . . An employer without a program, of course, may conduct drug testing under state law, as section 440.09 . . . Hall , 692 So.2d 153 (Fla. 1997) (section 440.09(3)'s then-existing conclusive presumption that injury . . .
INMON, v. CONVERGENCE EMPLOYEE LEASING III, INC., 243 So. 3d 1046 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . In the order, the JCC found that no benefits were payable in accordance with subsection 440.09(3), Florida . . . Under subsection 440.09(3), compensation is not payable if the injury was occasioned primarily by the . . . Although section 440.09(7)(b) also provides that evidence of a certain blood alcohol level creates a . . . comply with the Florida Administrative Code to establish the intoxication presumption under section 440.09 . . . "When the presumption in section 440.09(7)(b) does not apply, employer/carriers must 'establish, by the . . .
PARADISE, v. NEPTUNE FISH MARKET RETAILFIRST INSURANCE COMPANY,, 238 So. 3d 901 (Fla. App. Ct. 2018)

. . . In the notice of denial, the E/C asserted that, by operation of subsection 440.09(3), Florida Statutes . . .
TECO ENERGY, INC. v. K. WILLIAMS,, 234 So. 3d 816 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . Section 440.09(1) does not enumerate “all other causes” for MCC analysis, but subsections (a) and (b) . . . As this Court summarized in Cespedes, “under the text of section 440.09(1)(a)-(b), MCC analysis cannot . . . The JCC assumed that, for purposes of 440.09(l)(b), a preexisting condition “must have produced the need . . . Claimant’s preexisting osteoarthritis is a qualifying preexisting condition under section 440.09(l)(b . . . Code R. 60Q-6.113(2)(h) requires, ”[a]ny defense raised pursuant to Sections 440.09(4)(a) and 440.105 . . .
CAL- MAINE FOODS BROADSPIRE, v. HOWARD,, 225 So. 3d 898 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . Sectioris 440.09(4) and 440.105, Florida Statutes, are often referred to as the mechanisms that created . . . Accordingly, per section 440.09(4), the commission of “any” act of an employee prohibited by section . . . However, this formal dismissal of claims does not shield the Claimant from the reach of section 440.09 . . . The JCC erroneously required that for benefit denial under section 440.09(4), the E/C had to link the . . . Pursuant to section 440.09(4)(a), and having violated section 440.105, the Claimant is not entitled to . . .
LEVY COUNTY TRANSIT GALLAGHER BASSETT SERVICES, v. KOKENZIE,, 220 So. 3d 1251 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . partial disability benefits and rejecting the affirmative defense of misrepresentation under paragraphs 440.09 . . . Under subsection 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2014), an employer/carrier is responsible for providing . . . the injury, when compared to all other causes combined for which treatment or benefits are sought. § 440.09 . . .
CITY OF JACKSONVILLE v. RATLIFF,, 217 So. 3d 183 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . .” § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. . . . Section 440.09(1) must be read in conjunction with section 440.02(1), which provides as follows: ... . . . Following qualification for the presumption, the claimant’s burden of proving MCC under section 440.09 . . . MCC is not revived as a required standard of proof for the claimant under sections 440.09(1) and 440.161 . . .
CITY OF HIALEAH CMS, v. BONO,, 207 So.3d 1030 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2017)

. . . of Compensation Claims (JCC) rejecting their affirmative defense of misrepresentation under sections 440.09 . . . intentionally engaged in” such acts “for the purpose of securing workers’ compensation benefits.” § 440.09 . . .
LETT, v. WELLS FARGO BANK, N. A., 233 F. Supp. 3d 1330 (S.D. Fla. 2017)

. . . See §§ 440.09(1); 440.11, Fla. Stat. . . .
GIL, v. TENET HEALTHSYSTEM NORTH SHORE, INC. d b a FMC d b a, 204 So.3d 125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . The medical causation defense appears in section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes: [T]he accidental compensable . . .
WERT a FCCI Co. v. CAMACHO, 200 So. 3d 787 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . See §§ 440.09, .10. . . .
THG RENTALS SALES OF CLEARWATER, INC. v. C. ARNOLD,, 196 So. 3d 485 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . subsequently described in the joint pretrial stipulation as: “ ‘Misrepresentation,’ in violation of §§ 440.09 . . . And section 440.09(4)(a), Florida Statutes, bars benefits for an employee found to have “knowingly dr . . . misrepresentation defense under • rule 60Q-6.113(2)(h), which provides: Any defense 'raised pursuant to Sections 440.09 . . . with instructions to the JCC to determine whether Cláimant made “any” statements afoul of subsection 440.09 . . .
WESTPHAL, v. CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG, St. v., 194 So. 3d 311 (Fla. 2016)

. . . See §§ 440.09(1), 440.13(14)(c), Fla. Stat. (2009). . . .
CASTELLANOS, v. NEXT DOOR COMPANY,, 192 So. 3d 431 (Fla. 2016)

. . . The E/C filed a response to the petition, denying the claim based on sections 440.09(4) (intentional . . . in a majority of cases rather than the less stringent "proximate cause” standard in civil cases, § 440.09 . . . heightened burden of proof of “clear and convincing evidence” in some types of cases, §§ 440.02(1), 440.09 . . .
MBM CORPORATION v. WILSON,, 186 So. 3d 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)

. . . Subsection 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2010), provides: The employer must pay compensation or furnish . . . Claimant’s subjective complaints, standing alone, however, will not meet the requirements of subsection 440.09 . . .
PAYNE, v. J. B. HUNT TRANSPORT, INC., 154 F. Supp. 3d 1310 (M.D. Fla. 2016)

. . . . § 440.09(1)). . . .
CERTISTAFF, INC. v. OWEN,, 181 So. 3d 1218 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . See § 440.09(1)(b), Fla. . . . Proctor, 955 So.2d 637, 638 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (“[Section 440.09(l)(b) applies when a claimant’s need . . .
BABAHMETOVIC, v. SCAN DESIGN FLORIDA INC., 176 So. 3d 1006 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . Compare § 440.09(1), Fla. . . . performed in the course and scope of employment is the major contributing cause of the injury”), with § 440.09 . . .
O. SIERRA, v. METROPOLITAN PROTECTIVE SERVICES, 188 So. 3d 863 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . between the original work accident of 4/1/12 and claimant’s current need for psychiatric treatment, per § 440.09 . . . the burden to show that the April 1, 2012, Compensable workplace accident is the MCC for his PTSD. §§ 440.09 . . . See §§ 440.09, 440.13, Fla. Stat. (2011). . . .
STATE v. FLORIDA WORKERS ADVOCATES,, 167 So. 3d 500 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . including new allegations and an additional (fourth) count seeking a declaratory judgment that sections 440.09 . . . Section 440.09 addresses the scope of coverage for on-job injuries. . . . .
LEGGETT, v. BARNETT MARINE, INC. U. S., 167 So. 3d 480 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . TTD) benefits on the grounds that Claimant made misrepresentations forfeiting benefits under sections 440.09 . . . Section 440.09(4) bars benefits for an em ployee found to have “knowingly or intentionally engaged in . . . Notwithstanding these facts, Claimant argues that in every instance where section 440.09(4) is applied . . . But the plain text of section 440.09(4) suggests something different: “An employee shall not be entitled . . . At the time of Lessard, section 440.09(4) did not allow JCCs to make determinations of fraud (instead . . .
BROADSPIRE, A v. E. JONES,, 164 So. 3d 708 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . Jones’s 1981 workplace injury, rather than the standard in section 440.09, Florida Statutes (2013), was . . . We reject the E/C’s argument that a selected portion of current version of section 440.09, relating to . . . Here, we conclude that the amendment to section 440.09 in 1994 affected Mr. . . . The JCC, therefore, properly declined to apply the current version of section 440.09 as to the causation . . .
PEREZ, v. SOUTHEASTERN FREIGHT LINES, INC., 159 So. 3d 412 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015)

. . . Claimant had not produced evidence of “objective relevant medical findings” as required by section 440.09 . . . this test at the insistence of the Employer/Servicing Agent (E/SA), based on the wording of section 440.09 . . . But Claimant argues the JCC used the wrong legal standard, because section 440.09 governs compensability . . . standard of causation in 1994, see chapter 93-415, section 5, at 76, Laws of Florida (amending section 440.09 . . . of the injured employee and are confirmed by physical examination findings or diagnostic testing.” § 440.09 . . .
R. CLARK, v. R L CARRIERS, 151 So. 3d 1291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . appeals a final order denying his claims for medical and indemnity benefits as barred under section 440.09 . . . Section 440.09(4)(a) provides that an employee who knowingly or intentionally violates subsections 440.105 . . . Accordingly, I concur that the JCC’s order denying Claimant’s claims as barred under section 440.09(4 . . . require the following in the parties' pretrial stipulation: Any defense raised pursuant to Sections 440.09 . . .
OSCEOLA COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD v. PABELLON- NIEVES,, 152 So. 3d 733 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . We write, however, to clarify application of section 440.09(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2009). . . . Section 440.09(l)(b) provides: If an injury arising out of and in the course of employment combines with . . . See § 440.09(l)(b), Fla. . . . (amending section 440.09(l)(b) as of October 1, 2003, to require that major contributing cause be proven . . .
VEGA, v. FRS ENVIRONMENTAL REMEDIATORS,, 145 So. 3d 895 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) that concludes Claimant is disqualified, under section 440.09 . . . has, therefore, forfeited his entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits as directed by section 440.09 . . .
LEVY COUNTY SHERIFF S OFFICE v. ALLEN,, 140 So. 3d 1150 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . employer had no agreement providing for workers’ compensation coverage for that private employment^] § 440.09 . . .
SANTIZO- PEREZ v. GENARO S CORPORATION d b a s, 138 So. 3d 1148 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . .” § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (2010). . . .
STATE v. BROCK,, 138 So. 3d 1060 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . District analyzed section 440.105(4)(b)9 only as it applied to the denial of coverage under section 440.09 . . .
ENERGY AIR AND AMERISURE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. LALONDE,, 135 So. 3d 1090 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . Legislature’s adoption of the “major contributing cause” standard effective January 1, 1994, see sections 440.09 . . .
E. McINTOSH, v. CVS PHARMACY CVS, LLC, 135 So. 3d 1157 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . See § 440.09, Fla. Stat. (2007). . . . physical injury, the mental or ner vous injury would be compensable because it would meet the section 440.09 . . .
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES v. ANDERSON,, 132 So. 3d 900 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . wherein the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) rejected its partial affirmative defense under section 440.09 . . .
JOSE, v. GOODWILL INDUSTRIES, 132 So. 3d 1189 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014)

. . . .” § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . . established to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, based on objective relevant medical findings [.] ” § 440.09 . . .
CESPEDES, Jr. v. YELLOW TRANSPORTATION, INC. URC GALLAGHER BASSETT SERVICES, INC., 130 So. 3d 243 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . Section 440.09(l)(a)-(b) sets forth the textual basis for coverage of injuries under chapter 440. . . . . § 440.09(1), Fla: Stat. (2005). . . . See § 440.09(l)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. (2005). . . . In short, under the text of section 440.09(1)(a)-(b), MCC analysis cannot be performed in a vacuum or . . . Under the dictates of section 440.09(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2005), and this court’s relevant case law . . .
PICON, v. GALLAGHER BASSETT SERVICES, INC. a, 548 F. App'x 561 (11th Cir. 2013)

. . . . § 440.09(1). . . .
BRANDYWINE CONVALESCENT v. RAGOOBIR,, 124 So. 3d 344 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . Under section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes, as amended in 1994, pain is com-pensable only with objective . . .
WESTPHAL, v. CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG CITY OF ST. PETERSBURG RISK MANAGEMENT,, 122 So. 3d 440 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . Paradise Ford, 951 So.2d 12, 16 (Fla, 1st DCA 2007) (recognizing that the 2003 amendments to section 440.09 . . .
CARROSO, v. STATE, 129 So. 3d 374 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . offense with the monetary amount of the noncriminal, administrative sanction available under section 440.09 . . . Section 440.09(4)(a) provides for a noncriminal, administrative sanction in the event that a claimant . . . Section 440.09(4)(a) states: An employee shall not be entitled to compensation or benefits under this . . . Escobar, 729 So.2d 1014, 1015 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (“[S]ection 440.09(4) ... does not limit a claimant . . . The First District has interpreted the sanction in section 440.09(4)(a) to result in the cessation of . . .
VALLEJOS, v. LAN CARGO S. A., 116 So. 3d 545 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . . § 440.09 (2003). Thus, there is a need for a determination as to the injured party's status. . . . .
WOOD, v. SOUTHERN CRANE SERVICE, INC. a, 117 So. 3d 65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2007), provides: “The employer must pay compensation or furnish . . .
MILLER ELECTRIC COMPANY v. OURSLER,, 113 So. 3d 1004 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . to that EMA, and by doing so had forfeited all workers’ compensation benefits, as stated in sections 440.09 . . .
MORALES, Jr. SM RM, III v. ZENITH INSURANCE COMPANY,, 714 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2013)

. . . . § 440.09(1). . . .
CHURCH S CHICKEN v. ANDERSON,, 112 So. 3d 545 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013)

. . . .” § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (2010). See also Orange County MIS Dep’t v. . . .
JENKS, v. BYNUM TRANSPORT, INC., 104 So. 3d 1217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . receives remuneration under employment contract, whether express or implied, oral or written); see also § 440.09 . . .
L. ROSS, v. CHARLOTTE COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS, 100 So. 3d 781 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . Claimant’s accidental injuries, Claimant satisfied the major contributing cause requirement of sections 440.09 . . .
GOMEZ LAWN SERVICE, INC. v. THE HARTFORD,, 98 So. 3d 212 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . /C or its attorney for violating section 440.105, it could have easily done so as it did in section 440.09 . . .
CATLIN SYNDICATE v. L. RINKUS,, 43 F. Supp. 3d 1255 (S.D. Fla. 2012)

. . . . § 440.09(1) (“An employer must pay compensation or furnish benefits required by this chapter if the . . .
ROSE, v. GEICO, 90 So. 3d 886 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2009), requires that causation be established by clear and convincing . . . established to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, based on objective relevant medical findings.” § 440.09 . . . Accordingly, because claimant met her burden, as required by section 440.09(1), to prove that “[t]he . . .
NEWICK, v. WEBSTER TRAINING CENTER, 78 So. 3d 108 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . On appeal, the claimant argued that section 440.09(1)(b) did not apply because his injuries were caused . . . We determined that section 440.09(l)(b) was intended to apply only when a claimant’s need for treatment . . . Proctor, 955 So.2d 637, 638 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (holding that the E/C could not rely upon section 440.09 . . . See § 440.09(1), Fla. . . . Section 440.09(1 )(b) provides in part that "[i]f an injury arising out of and in the course of employment . . .
FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION CMS, v. LUPO,, 77 So. 3d 899 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)

. . . treatment, I find that the major contributing cause standard and the criteria for compensability under F.S. 440.09 . . . resulting aggravation of the pre-exist-ing condition was the MCC of his need for treatment under section 440.09 . . . of employment is and remains the major contributing cause of the disability or need for treatment. § 440.09 . . . Farthing, 905 So.2d 925, 928 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (holding the MCC requirement of section 440.09(1)(b) . . . Oweis, 733 So.2d 1149, 1150 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (holding the MCC requirement in section 440.09(l)(b) . . .
LUCAS, v. ADT SECURITY INC. SEDGWICK CMS,, 72 So. 3d 270 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . . § 440.09(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2006). . . .
SENTRY INSURANCE COMPANY v. HAMLIN,, 69 So. 3d 1065 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . on the first part of the coverage formula, “arising out of work performed,” as set forth in section 440.09 . . . doing an activity implicitly permitted by the Employer, the “arising out of’ requirement of section 440.09 . . . COURSE AND SCOPE INSUFFICIENT The coverage formula found in section 440.09(1) reads: “The employer must . . .
LUCAS, v. ADT SECURITY INC. SEDGWICK CMS,, 65 So. 3d 616 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . . § 440.09(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2006). . . . this court found could not serve as the predicate for disqualification from benefits under sections 440.09 . . .
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION v. K. RIPPY,, 67 So. 3d 1122 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . grounds Claimant violated section 440.105(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2006), and thus, pursuant to section 440.09 . . . Stat. 440.09(4) whether the Employee/Claimant had knowingly made false, fraudulent or misleading oral . . .
HDV CONSTRUCTION SYSTEMS, INC. v. E. ARAGON,, 66 So. 3d 331 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . See § 440.09(1), Fla. . . .
RAMOS, v. CONTINENTAL FLORIDA MATERIALS AND TRAVELERS,, 62 So. 3d 1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . a sufficient causal relationship between his accident and his injury, findings relevant to section 440.09 . . .
STOKES, v. SCHINDLER ELEVATOR CORP. BROADSPIRE,, 60 So. 3d 1110 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . provider, an IME, or an expert medical advisor is admissible in proceedings before the JCC); see also § 440.09 . . . See § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (2005); see generally Castillo v. E.I. . . .
SCOTTSDALE INSURANCE COMPANY, v. GFM OPERATIONS, INC., 789 F. Supp. 2d 1278 (S.D. Fla. 2011)

. . . . § 440.09(1) (providing employer must pay compensation where employee suffers injury “arising out of . . .
OWENS, v. CCJ AUTO TRANSPORT, 59 So. 3d 179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . Section 440.09(l)(d), Florida Statutes (2007), provides that the Florida Workers’ Compensation Law covers . . . See § 440.09(l)(d), Fla. Stat. (2007). . . .
RUSH, v. BELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC. d b a AT T, 773 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (N.D. Fla. 2011)

. . . Stat. 440.09(l)(b)), rev. denied, 980 So.2d 490 (Fla.2008). . . .
CARRILLO, v. CASE ENGINEERING, INC., 53 So. 3d 1214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011)

. . . of claimant’s attorney’s fees because, in defeating the affirmative defense contemplated by sections 440.09 . . . benefits are still payable because he prevailed in resisting the affirmative defense based on sections 440.09 . . . Section 440.09(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2009), located within the “coverage” provisions of chapter 440 . . . Stat.; and § 440.09(a), Fla. . . . Setting up the fraud defense under sections 440.09 and 440.105 put com-pensability at issue — and did . . .
GENERAL DYNAMICS CORPORATION, v. BROTTEM,, 53 So. 3d 334 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . See §§ 440.09, 440.10(2), Fla. Stat. (2008). . . .
BYSCZYNSKI, v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICES, INC., 53 So. 3d 328 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . occupational injuries and, thus, the JCC erred in applying the major contributing cause standard in section 440.09 . . . Here, the JCC, by application of the major contributing cause standard in section 440.09(l)(b) denied . . . Ford, 951 So.2d 12, 17 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (stating “it seems evident that the legislature intended [440.09 . . .
CANNINO, v. PROGRESSIVE EXPRESS INSURANCE CO., 58 So. 3d 275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . . § 440.09. . . .
HARMAN, v. GADSDEN CORRECTIONAL FACILITY AIG, 46 So. 3d 1140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . The Judge of Compensation Claims initially denied the claim on the ground that section 440.09(1), Florida . . . provide an evaluation on the ground that there were no objective relevant medical findings under section 440.09 . . . Statutes (2007), and its test of whether the requested benefit is medically necessary, and not section 440.09 . . .
STEEL DYNAMICS INC. NEW MILLENNIUM LLC, v. MARKHAM,, 46 So. 3d 641 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . concluding Claimant is not disqualified from receiving all compensation under the provisions of section 440.09 . . . The E/C fails to appreciate that the applicability of section 440.09(4)(a) (the provision of the Workers . . . established that claimant made criminal misrepresentation for purpose of securing employment, section 440.09 . . . , 929 So.2d 563 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (reversing for lack of CSE JCC’s disqualification under section 440.09 . . . Conclusion In essence, the E/C has interpreted section 440.09(4)(a) as a means of disqualifying a claimant . . .
WITHAM, v. SHEEHAN PIPELINE CONSTRUCTION CO. Co., 45 So. 3d 105 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . Analysis Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2007), provides in relevant part: The injury, its occupational . . . See §§ 440.09(1) & 440.13(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (2007). . . .
STAFFMARK v. MERRELL,, 43 So. 3d 792 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . defined, however, and later applied in the context of the “major contributing cause” provision of section 440.09 . . . In Pearson, this court defined “preexisting condition,” for purposes of section 440.09(1)(b), to mean . . . This definition was subsequently adopted and applied in Proctor, wherein the court held that “section 440.09 . . .
CHARLOTTE COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS v. E. GARY,, 41 So. 3d 395 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . See § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (2007). . . .
McKENZIE, v. MENTAL HEALTH CARE, INC. SUMMIT CLAIMS CENTER,, 43 So. 3d 767 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . See § 440.09, Fla. Stat. (2007). . . . physical injury, the mental or nervous injury would be compensable because it would meet the section 440.09 . . .
HUNT, v. CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA,, 38 So. 3d 173 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2004), provides that “[t]he employer shall pay compensation or furnish . . .
McARTHUR, v. MENTAL HEALTH CARE, INC. SUMMIT CLAIMS CENTER,, 35 So. 3d 105 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . final order denying all of her claims for benefits pursuant to the so-called “fraud defense” in section 440.09 . . . See § 440.09(4)(a), 440.105(4)®, 440.106, Fla. Stat. . . . process by which an employee may be sanctioned for violating section 440.105 is set forth in section 440.09 . . . See § 440.09(4)(a), Fla. Stat. . . . Thus, not only does section 440.09(4) specifically authorize the JCC to determine whether an employee . . .
FARRY, a v. CITY OF PAWTUCKET,, 725 F. Supp. 2d 286 (D.R.I. 2010)

. . . The Pawtucket Police Manual of Procedures 440.09 provides that a supervisor is to be sent in addition . . .
FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION SEDGWICK CLAIMS MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. v. BOYNTON,, 38 So. 3d 167 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . Claimant’s injuries to be a compensable aggravation of a preexisting condition pursuant to section 440.09 . . . Pursuant to section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2001), Claimant was required to prove the existence . . . Thus, pursuant to section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2001), Claimant was further required to prove . . .
RENE STONE WORK CORPORATION USIS, v. GONZALEZ,, 25 So. 3d 1272 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)

. . . 440.105(4)(b), and thus required a forfeiture of all workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to section 440.09 . . .
BROADSPIRE, A v. ROSE,, 24 So. 3d 694 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . Analysis Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2008), requires: The injury, its occupational cause, and . . .
J. SINNI, v. SCOTTSDALE INSURANCE COMPANY,, 676 F. Supp. 2d 1319 (M.D. Fla. 2009)

. . . . § 440.09(1). . . .
XL INSURANCE AMERICA, INC. a v. ORTIZ, d b a a a, 673 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (S.D. Fla. 2009)

. . . . § 440.09(1). . . .
ROJAS, v. MEDLEY HARDWOODS, INC., 23 So. 3d 188 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . found to have committed fraud with respect to those (different) benefits, in violation of sections 440.09 . . .
SCHROEDER v. PEOPLEASE CORPORATION L S, 18 So. 3d 1165 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . condition, which is a recognized defense to a claim for workers’ compensation benefits under section 440.09 . . . compensable injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment.” § 440.09 . . .
ARREOLA, v. ADMINISTRATIVE CONCEPTS, 17 So. 3d 792 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) accepted the E/C’s position and denied all claims under section 440.09 . . . prohibited acts is not entitled to compensation or benefits under the workers’ compensation statute. § 440.09 . . .
THOMAS, v. BIRCHEAT ACE- USA,, 16 So. 3d 198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . by the influence of any drugs, barbiturates, or other stimulants not prescribed by a physician-” § 440.09 . . . See § 440.09(7)(b), Fla. . . . When the presumption under section 440.09(7)(b), Florida Statutes, does not apply, employer/carriers . . . DSK Group, 821 So.2d 455, 456 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (quoting section 440.09(3)); see also Sterling, 580 . . .
L. MORROW, v. SAM S CLUB CMS,, 17 So. 3d 763 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . there were no objective relevant medical findings justifying the evaluation as required by section 440.09 . . . Section 440.09 is entitled “Coverage.” . . .
CHANDLER, v. CENTEX ROONEY CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 15 So. 3d 837 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . includ-ing the allegation that Claimant is no longer entitled to benefits because he violated sections 440.09 . . .
M. DEREN, v. STATE, 15 So. 3d 723 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . Section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes (2007), provides that “[c]ompensation is not payable if the injux-y . . .
DIEUJUSTE, v. J. DODD PLUMBING, INC., 3 So. 3d 1275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)

. . . See §§ 440.09(4), 440.105(4)(b)l-3, Fla. Stat. (2005). . . . See §§ 440.09(4), 440.105(4)(b)l-3, Fla. Stat. . . .
G. SILVA, v. GENERAL LABOR STAFFING SERVICES, INC. AIG, 995 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . injury occurred in the course and scope of employment, as required for compensability under section 440.09 . . .
RUIZ, v. BELLSOUTH CREDIT AND COLLECTIONS, 994 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . The JCC concluded that the objective medical evidence requirement found in section 440.09(1), Florida . . .
BATISTA, v. PUBLIX SUPERMARKETS, INC., 993 So. 2d 570 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . .” § 440.09(2), Fla. Stat. (1986). See also Escambia County Transit v. . . .
GALLAGHER BASSETT SERVICES- ORLANDO d b a v. MATHIS,, 990 So. 2d 1214 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . See § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (2006). . . . See § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (2006); Mitchell v. . . . In pertinent part, this provision states: 440.09 Coverage.— (1) The employer must pay compensation or . . .
B. TALPESH, v. VILLAGE OF ROYAL PALM BEACH, 994 So. 2d 353 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . State, Dep’t of Corr., 890 So.2d 1238, 1238 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); see also § 440.09(1), Fla. . . .
SPEED, v. SECURITAS USA, 989 So. 2d 710 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . argued that this section did not apply to his claim, but, rather, the JCC should have applied section 440.09 . . . Section 440.09(1) requires a claimant establish a workplace accident was more than 50% responsible for . . . ” dictated Claimant had in fact suffered a mental or nervous injury, can substitute for the section 440.09 . . .
W. D. CHILDERS, v. STATE DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT SERVICES, DIVISION OF RETIREMENT,, 989 So. 2d 716 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . for Indus., 772 So.2d 560, 561 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (rejecting an excessive fines challenge to section 440.09 . . .
BUTLER, v. CITY OF JACKSONVILLE,, 980 So. 2d 1250 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . State, Dep’t of Corr., 890 So.2d 1238, 1238 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); see also § 440.09(1), Fla. . . .
MATRIX EMPLOYEE LEASING FCIC v. HERNANDEZ,, 975 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)

. . . The E/C argues that the JCC erred in its application of sections 440.105(4)(b)(9) and 440.09(4)(a), Florida . . . by claimant pursuant to section 440'.105(4)(b)(9) is sufficient to trigger the provisions of section 440.09 . . . Section 440.09(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2005), provides: An employee shall not be entitled to compensation . . . The E/C, on one hand, asserts that section 440.09(4)(a) should be read to mean that an employee shall . . . Claimant, on the other hand, interprets section 440.09(4)(a) differently. . . .

The 2022 Florida Statutes (including 2022 Special Session A and 2023 Special Session B)

Annotations, Discussions, Cases:

10 Cases from Casetext:Date Descending

Cases from cite.case.law: