Florida/Georgia Personal Injury & Workers Compensation

...ion and benefits, such authority must be exercised only "in respect to such claims." § 440.25(1). A section 440.205 wrongful discharge is not a claim for compensation or benefits as those terms are used in Chapter 440. See §§ 440.02(11) and (12); § 440.09, Fla....

...Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation § 65.10 (Desk ed.1999). For employees within the statute's reach, workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for "accidental injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment." § 440.09(1), Fla....

...alternative test for liability set out in Fisher, [5] we conclude that adoption of an objective standard is more in accord with the policy of the alternative test we adopted in Fisher. We also note, as did Justice Adkins' dissent in Fisher, [6] that section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1991) provides compensation for injury by accident: "Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee if the disability or death results from an injury arising out...

...His exposure to this gas ultimately led to his death and the personal representatives of his estate brought suit against Shenandoah. The Florida Workers' Compensation Act provides for the payment of compensation benefits whenever disability or death results from an injury arising out of and in the course of employment. § 440.09(1), Fla....

...f the act itself. This presents a stark contrast to the district court's decision which merely presumes that the legislature considered intentional torts under the ambit of the Workers' Compensation Act because of an alleged omission in the statute. Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1983) provides in pertinent part: Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee if the disability or death results from an injury arising out of and in the course of employment....

...Travelers finds support for this argument in the reasoning we employed in Turner. We noted in Turner that "workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for ` accidental injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment.'" 754 So.2d at 686 (quoting § 440.09(1), Fla....

...A plain language construction of the insurance policy cannot avoid what we said in Turner about whether death and injuries are caused by accident: We also note, as did Justice Adkins' dissent in [ Fisher v. Shenandoah General Construction Co., 498 So.2d 882 (Fla.1986),] that section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1991) provides compensation for injury by accident: "Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee if the disability or death results from an injury arising out...

...The district court affirmed the summary judgment on the authority of its opinion in Fisher. As we stated in Fisher, the Florida Workers' Compensation Act provides for the payment of compensation benefits whenever disability or death results from an injury arising out of and in the course of employment. § 440.09(1), Fla....

...1962), the Court held that where an employee of the City of Miami had received pension benefits in excess of the amount of workers' compensation benefits to which he would have otherwise been entitled, the city was not obligated to pay him any workers' compensation benefits. The Court based its holding on section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (1957), which provided that any workers' compensation benefits payable to injured public employees should be reduced by the amount of pension benefits which were also payable. In 1973, the legislature repealed section 440.09(4)....

...In Hoffkins v. City of Miami, 339 So.2d 1145 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), the district court of appeal upheld the deduction of workers' compensation benefits from the pension check of a City of Miami employee based on this ordinance. The court reasoned that if section 440.09(4) was valid before its repeal, the ordinance which was enacted under the city's home rule power must also be valid....

...EHRLICH, C.J., concurs in result only, with an opinion. McDONALD, J., dissents with an opinion. KOGAN, J., did not participate in this case. EHRLICH, Chief Justice, concurring in result only. The ordinance in question seeks to accomplish the results permitted by section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (1957) which was repealed by the legislature in 1973....

compensation could be allowed under the provisions of Section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes, 1941, F.S.A., that "No

..., next of kin, and everyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on account of such injury... . This exclusive remedy provision applies to accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. § 440.09(1), Fla....

...Gonzalez eventually joined—that formed the basis for the award of permanent total disability benefits. Espousing a contrary view, Dr. Castiello attributed most of Mr. Cabrera's psychological impairment to a preexisting personality disorder. In awarding permanent disability benefits, in keeping with section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), the judge of compensation claims necessarily accepted only one of these opposing views....

...Additionally, as stated in the opinion of the court below, " Frye 's application in workers' compensation cases has been implicitly recognized by the Florida Supreme Court." Henson, 787 So.2d at 11. In Domino's Pizza v. Gibson, 668 So.2d 593 (Fla.1996), we addressed whether section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes (1991), precluded the admission of expert testimony "converting blood alcohol content from a percentage of blood serum to a percentage of whole blood." Id....

...at 596. The question arose from a workers' compensation claim in which the employer had defended the claim on the basis that the employee was intoxicated at the time of his injury. See id. at 594. Pertinent to the instant case, in determining that section 440.09(3) did not preclude the admission of the employer's proffered expert testimony, this Court stated: Serum blood alcohol tests meet the Frye standard of general scientific acceptance and have been accepted by other courts to establish blood alcohol levels....

...dy available to an employee who was a victim of sexual harassment. We can infer from this holding that because workers' compensation is an available remedy, the incident of harassment is deemed to arise out of the course and scope of employment. See § 440.09(1), Fla....

...theory is not an election of remedies, but an estoppel based on the Plaintiff’s representation that he was an employee of Seacoast. R. Vol. I at 211. 4 . The district court found estoppel especially applicable in this case because Florida Statute § 440.09(2) (1977) provides that: No compensation shall be payable in respect of the disability or death of any employee covered by the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, or the Jones Act....

...25 Moreover, Florida has a significant interest in maintaining compliance with its worker's compensation laws. Florida intended its worker's compensation system to strike a balance between compensating injured workers and limiting the liability of employers for accidents. Section 440.09 of the Florida Statutes provides in pertinent part that: 26 Where an accident happens while the employee is employed elsewhere than in this state, which would entitle him or his dependents to compensation if it had happened in this state, the employee or his dependents shall be entitled to compensation.......

...However, if an employee shall receive compensation or damages under the laws of any other state, nothing herein contained shall be construed so as to permit a total compensation for the same injury greater than is provided herein. 27 Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 440.09 (West 1981)....

...As the district court noted, "[Garcia] is barred from seeking a tort recovery when he has already availed himself of the benefits obtainable under Spanish worker's compensation law. The fact that Spanish law would permit such a double recovery is of no significance...." See Fla.Stat.Ann. Secs. 440.09 and 440.11 (West 1981); Urda, 211 F.2d at 715 ....

...We grant Appellee's motion for clarification and substitute this revised opinion for the opinion filed February 13, 1996. Carol Mangold, the Appellant, seeks review of a workers' compensation order finding that her husband's heart attack following his work-related injury was not compensable under section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994)....

...case law interpreting the statute in effect prior to January 1, 1994, the effective date of those amendments. The plain language of the amended act and case law interpreting chapter 440 prior to the 1993 amendments belie the Appellant's contention. Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...e of a subsequent heart attack was too burdensome, and that compensability depends merely upon a showing of a causal connection. Wallen v. Salon *642 of Music, Inc., 418 So.2d 421 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Thus, the "major contributing cause" standard of section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994) is entirely new....

...Under the 1993 amendments, a claimant has the burden of proving that his initial work-related accident and resulting injury is compensable and, in cases of subsequent injuries and aggravations of preexisting conditions, that the work-related injury is the major contributing cause of his subsequent injury or aggravation. Section 440.09(1)(a) & (b), Florida Statute (Supp....

...and resulting death. Based upon the medical testimony presented, the JCC determined that the Appellant failed to satisfy the burden of proving that the work-related injury was the major contributing cause of Mangold's heart attack as required under section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994)....

...ble for and shall secure the payment of compensation to all such employees, except to employees of a subcontractor who has secured such payment. (2) Compensation shall be payable irrespective of fault as a cause for the injury, except as provided in § 440.09(3)....

...The parties have cited no Florida case delineating the employer's tort liability for the conduct of an off-duty traveling employee. Rather, LIBERTY MUTUAL and ESI rely upon cases decided under the Workers' Compensation Law, which provides coverage for injuries "arising out of and in the course of employment." Fla. Stat. § 440.09 (1991)....

and within the scope of the said employment. Section 440.09, Fla. Stats. 1941, provides that compensation

...These circumstances appearing, the task of this Court as a reviewing authority is completed. There is another plain and indisputable reason why this claimant is not entitled to compensation on the record presented here. Compensation coverage is confined to an injury "arising out of and in the course of employment." Section 440.09(1), F.S....

...One of the many results of the extensive changes to Florida's Workers' Compensation Act effective January 1, 1994, is that for compensable events on or after that date, "[m]ental or nervous injuries occurring as a manifestation of (a compensable injury) shall be demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence." § 440.09(1), Fla....

...The legislature has sought to create an efficient, self-executing workers' compensation system, see section 440.015, Florida Statutes (1995), where the occupational cause of a workers' compensation injury is proven by "objective medical findings," "established to a reasonable degree of medical certainty." Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1995)(emphasis supplied)....

...Sykes temporary partial disability benefits from December 31, 1996 until the future date of his maximum medical improvement. Closet *381 Maid and Crawford and Company then filed a timely notice of appeal to review the final order in this court. We begin by examining section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), which defines the coverage that is available to an injured worker if medical treatment is required by the combination of a compensable workplace accident and a pre-existing disease or condition....

...treatment, the employer must pay compensation or benefits required by this chapter only to the extent that the injury arising out of and in the course of employment is and remains the major contributing cause of the disability or need for treatment. § 440.09(1)(b), Fla....

...State, 721 So.2d 1170 (Fla.1998); Rhodes v. State, 704 So.2d 1080 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997). Although the phrase "major contributing cause" is not defined in the Workers' Compensation Law, the meaning of this phrase is sufficiently clear from the language of section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994)....

...State, 700 So.2d 370 (Fla.1997)(noting that the courts may refer to dictionary definitions to ascertain the plain meaning of a term used in a statute). It follows that if there are two causes for a disability or the need for treatment, the workplace accident must be the "greater" of the two causes. Section 440.09(1)(b) employs the definite article "the" to modify the phrase "major contributing cause." Hence, the statute is not satisfied merely by showing that the workplace accident is among the major causes....

...The use of the term "the" plainly signifies that the workplace accident must be greater than any other cause contributing to the disability or need for treatment. See Orange County MIS Department v. Hak, 710 So.2d 998 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). Given this interpretation of the phrase "major contributing cause" in section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...ute. *382 The courts have judicial power to interpret statutes, but that power cannot be used as a license to assume the prerogative of the legislature. See Hancock v. Board of Public Instruction, 158 So.2d 519 (Fla.1963). Hence, we do not read into section 440.09(1)(b) a requirement that the industrial accident must account for more than fifty percent of the need for benefits. Instead, by the terms of the statute, the workplace accident must be greater in significance than any other single cause. Although the major contributing cause standard in section 440.09(1)(b) requires the judge of compensation claims to determine relative degrees of causation, the method of proving causation has not changed. Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), states that "[t]he injury, its occupational cause, and any resulting manifestations or disability shall be established to a reasonable degree of medical certainty and by objective medical findings." This language was not contained in the previous version of section 440.09, but it accords with and confirms the existing law on the subject of causation. Before the enactment of section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), the case law held that causation must be proven to a reasonable degree of medical probability....

...ame concept. Consistent with the long-standing usage of this terminology, we conclude that the statutory use of the phrase "reasonable medical certainty" does not reflect any departure from the established standard of proof. We further conclude that section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), does not invariably require medical evidence to show that a workplace accident is the major contributing cause of a disability or need for treatment....

...d understanding. This distinction, between situations where medical expertise is essential, and other situations where facts established through lay testimony may establish causation, necessarily depends on the particular circumstances of each case. Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...In order to be certain whether the judge would have awarded benefits under the *384 major contributing cause standard as it is now defined, we remand the case in light of this opinion. In summary, we conclude that the term major contributing cause in section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), refers to a cause that contributes more to the claimant's disability or need for treatment than any other single cause....

...KAHN, J., concurring. It appears to me that the critical issue in this case is whether a judge of compensation claims may consider non-medical evidence in order to ultimately disagree with a medical expert's attempt to quantify major contributing cause for purposes of section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp. 1994). I agree with the majority that the JCC may properly do so. I do not join, however, with the majority's discussion following its assertion that section 440.09(1) "does not invariably require medical evidence to show that a workplace accident is the major contributing cause of a disability or need for treatment." Op....

...tfully spin language. In sum, I would conclude that the statute requires medical evidence of causation as a threshold in virtually every case. The further determination of major contributing cause under the particularized circumstances envisioned by section 440.09(1)(b) is one to be made by the JCC in consideration of all the evidence, but remains sequential to the underlying determination of causation required by section 440.09(1)....

...he workplace accident was not the major contributing cause on the basis of things like an employee's "exemplary work history." Ante at 383. Today's ruling departs dramatically from principles deeply embedded in precedent and forcefully reiterated in section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...An important difference between the present case and Arand is that *387 the question of causation is much more intricate here because the major contributing cause standard applies in the present case. This difference calls for more, not less, deference to expert medical testimony. Before section 440.09(1) required proof to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, our cases required claimants to prove industrial causation to a reasonable degree of medical probability....

...See, e.g., Arand, 592 So.2d at 281; Peters v. Armellini Exp. Lines, 527 So.2d 266, 268-69 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). Such testimony is clearly insufficient under the new major contributing cause provisions. By requiring proof to "a reasonable degree of medical certainty," § 440.09(1), Fla....

...1995) (holding that which cause was the major contributing cause of a back condition *388 "must be resolved on the basis of expert medical evidence"). Mr. Sykes did not meet that more exacting standard here. The Industrial Accident Not Proven To Be The Major Contributing Cause Modeled on an Oregon statute, [11] section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1995), provides that workers' compensation benefits are payable only when the injury, its occupational cause, and any resulting manifestations or disability shall be established to a reasonable degree of medical certainty and by objective medical findings. Specifically addressing injuries that employees with preexisting conditions sustain, section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1995), provides: If an injury arising out of and in the course of employment combines with a preexisting disease or condition to cause or prolong disability or need for treatment, the employer must pay compensa...

...concurring in part and dissenting in part. I agree with this court's decision that the award of benefits to Mr. Sykes was proper, but I disagree that remand is appropriate. Also, I disagree with the court's decision that the "major contributing cause" as per the provisions of section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), refers to a cause that contributes more to the claimant's disability or need for treatment than any other single cause....

...Further, I disagree with the court's opinion that "major contributing cause" means a cause that contributes more to a claimant's disability or need for treatment than any other single cause when there is more than one non-industrial cause. I believe that the legislature intended by enacting the provisions of section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), to bar a claimant from recovering when an industrial injury does not constitute more than fifty percent of the cause of a disability or need for treatment....

...t? A I think eventually he would have, yes sir. Q But you can't say when? A I cannot say when. [8] The Workers' Compensation Law's "major contributing cause" provisions took effect on January 1, 1994. See Ch. 93-415, § 112, at 215, Laws of Fla. [9] Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1995), requires that a claimant prove his or her injury, its occupational cause, and any resulting manifestations or disability ......

...Dyer, 592 So.2d 276, 280-81 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Vero Beach Care Ctr. v. Ricks, 476 So.2d 262, 264 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985). Whenever a preexisting condition combines with a work injury, so that it is necessary to determine which is the greater or major contributing cause, see § 440.09(1)(b), Fla....

...Jeffrey D. Kottkamp, of Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, P.A., Ft. Myers, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. In this appeal appellant raises several constitutional claims against the order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) below determining under section 440.09, Florida Statutes, that as a result of appellant's commission of a fraudulent act she is no longer entitled to workers' compensation benefits....

...The JCC found appellant's testimony to be not credible and that claimant altered the prescription form. The JCC determined that appellant committed workers' compensation fraud under subparagraphs 440.105(4)(b)1. and 2., Florida Statutes. As a result, the JCC concluded under subsection 440.09(4) that appellant was no longer entitled to receive workers' compensation benefits for the injuries she sustained in the workplace accident. Although subsection (1) of section 440.09, Florida Statutes, provides that "[t]he employer shall pay compensation or furnish benefits required by this chapter if *1020 the employee suffers an accidental injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment," an injured worker's right to receive benefits is not absolute....

...ng determined that appellant committed workers' compensation fraud in violation of section 440.105, the JCC determined under the above provision that appellant was no longer entitled to receive workers' compensation benefits. Appellant challenges subsection 440.09(4) on several constitutional grounds: that it violates due process; that it violates appellant's right to jury trial and right of access to the courts; and that it violates the constitutional provision for separation of powers....

...ered to determine an injured worker's entitlement to benefits. By making the factual determination of whether a claimant committed fraud to obtain benefits, a JCC does no more than make the determination of the worker's entitlement to benefits under section 440.09, Florida Statutes....

...When injury is suffered in the course and scope of employment, workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for recovery against the employer. § 440.11, Fla. Stat. (1989). That remedy is not available where an injury is suffered outside the course of employment. § 440.09(1)....

...As we noted in Mullins , the term “preexisting condition” is not specifically defined in the apportionment statute. Id. at 38 . The phrase has been defined, however, and later applied in the context of the “major contributing cause” provision of section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes. See Pearson v. Paradise Ford, 951 So.2d 12 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); Pizza Hut v. Proctor, 955 So.2d 637 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). In Pearson , this court defined “preexisting condition,” for purposes of section 440.09(1)(b), to mean “a preexisting injury or condition that is unrelated to an employment accident.” 951 So.2d at 17 . This definition was subsequently adopted and applied in Proctor , wherein the court held that “section 440.09(1)(b) applies when a claimant’s need for treatment or benefits is caused by the impact of an industrial accident combining with a preexisting injury or condition which is unrelated to an industrial accident.” 955 So.2d at 637 ....

...Where an injury is suffered in the course and scope of employment, the Workers' Compensation Law, Chapter 440, Florida Statutes (1983), is the exclusive remedy for recovery against the employer. See § 440.11. That remedy is not available, however, where an injury is suffered outside the course of employment. See § 440.09(1)....

...and immunity which applies to all forms of conduct committed by employers and insurance carriers. To the contrary, the immunity extends only to "an accidental injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment." § 440.09(1), Fla....

...This Court reviews excusable neglect decisions for abuse of discretion. See Riney, 77 F.3d at 1325. 5 arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment.” Fla. Stat. Ann. § 440.09 (2001).3 As a general matter, the workers’ compensation liability of an employer “shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer ....

...e claimant's accident or injury. If both elements are present, then the accident or injury arose out of the claimant's employment, referring, as the new statutory definition indicates, to occupational causation. See § 440.02(32) Fla.Stat.; see also § 440.09(1), Fla.Stat....

...William Thomas Edwards, Jr. of the Law Office of William T. Lassiter, Jr., Jacksonville, for appellees. ERVIN, Judge. McKenzie and its servicing agent appeal from an order of the deputy commissioner which refused to exact the 25% penalty required by Section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (1979), to be placed upon compensation benefits awarded to injured claimants who willfully refuse to use safety appliances. Explication of the requirements of Section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes, a workers' compensation statute that has existed in a basically unaltered form since 1935, will be of benefit to both bench and bar....

...that McCauley was instructed to wear safety goggles, as required by a U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) mandate. 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.; see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.132, 1910.133, 1910.262. Specifically, the e/c relies on Section 440.09(4), providing: Where injury is caused by the willful refusal of the employee to use a safety appliance or observe a safety rule required by statute or lawfully promulgated by the division, and brought prior to the accident to his or he...

...see out of them. Notwithstanding the obvious factual conflict in the live testimony presented to the deputy commissioner, the deputy's order did not directly resolve the conflict on the evidence before him. Instead his order included a finding that Section 440.09(4) was not applicable to this case as a matter of law....

...The second category — the "willful refusal" to observe a safety rule required by statute — turns on the construction of the word "statute." We think the plain meaning of the word "statute" encompasses either a state or federal statute, such as the OSHA legislation. We do so bearing in mind that one of the purposes of Section 440.09(4) is obviously to act upon the employee and employer in a "carrot and stick" approach. Section 440.09(4), as gleaned from its terms, is intended to induce the employer into providing for a safe environment for the worker, as well as requiring that workers follow safe practices on the job....

...On the other hand, the employer who fails to demand such practices from workers receives the "stick", or burden of paying out full compensation benefits to the injured worker. With this designed purpose in mind, we see no reason why the legislature should not have intended for the word "statute" in Section 440.09(4) to include the OSHA provisions of 29 U.S.C....

...icant harm to the worker. Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 611, 100 S.Ct. 2844, 2849, 65 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1980). Because we perceive error in the deputy's determinations caused by his interpretation of Section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes, a remand to the deputy is required for the purpose of entering additional factual findings....

...We point out that in so doing, the parties are taking steps to preserve the issue for any future appellate review as noted in our recent opinion in Sunland Hospital, State of Florida v. Garrett, 415 So.2d 783 (Fla. 1st DCA, 1982). Turning to the requirements of Section 440.09(4), it is apparent that the statute can only be defensively invoked when there is a causal relationship between a violation of the statute and the injury....

...[3] Inextricably intertwined with the requirement of a willful refusal is the necessity of determining that an employee had prior notice of the order to use a safety appliance or observe a safety rule. See generally, Larson, supra, at § 33.20. This is supported by the statutory language in Section 440.09(4), requiring that an order to use a safety appliance or observe a safety rule be "brought prior to the accident to his or her [the claimant's] knowledge, ......

...er to wear them for safety reasons. *1182 Since we determine the term "statute" refers to either a federal or state enactment, the question of whether federal law has preempted the field is immaterial to a determination of the issue at hand: whether Section 440.09(4)'s penalty should be exacted under the circumstances presented....

...orming. Victor Wine & Liquor, Inc. v. Beasley, 141 So.2d 581, 588-589 (Fla. 1962). This constitutes the test for legal causation. Proof of this point is geared toward satisfying the requirement that the injury is one "arising out of the employment." § 440.09(1) Fla....

...n furtherance of the employer's business but were not "assigned primarily to unrelated works." Because the workers' compensation immunity provisions are not applicable to an employer unless the injury arises "out of and in the course of employment," section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1993), the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of A & K implicitly held that Dzafic, traveling in the van from work, was acting "in the course of employment" when he was injured....

...rdance with the basic principles of statutory construction and not liberally in favor of either employee or employer. It is the intent of the Legislature to ensure the prompt delivery of benefits to the injured worker. § 440.015, Fla. Stat. (2001). Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2001), provides that "[t]he employer shall pay compensation or furnish benefits ......

...There is no dispute that the accident resulting in the injuries occurred in the course and scope of Claimant's employment. The question we address focuses only on the first part of the coverage formula, "arising out of work performed," as set forth in section 440.09, Florida Statutes (2008)....

...primarily a legal matter. CLAIMANT'S ARGUMENTS Claimant maintains that because the injury occurred on the Employer's premises, while he was on a paid break, doing an activity implicitly permitted by the Employer, the "arising out of" requirement of section 440.09, Florida Statutes (2008) was satisfied....

...not remove him from the course and scope of his employment. • Fourth, his injury is compensable because retrieval of his schoolbooks was an emergency and injuries sustained as a result of an emergency designed to save property are compensable under section 440.092(3), Florida Statutes (2008)....

...Harms from risks peculiar to employment are universally compensable. Id. Harm caused by personal risks are universally noncompensable. Id. It is within the third category (neutral risks) that most controversy in modern compensation law occurs. Id. COURSE AND SCOPE INSUFFICIENT The coverage formula found in section 440.09(1) reads: "The employer must pay compensation or furnish benefits required by this chapter if the employee suffers an accidental compensable injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment." (emphasis added)....

...Claimant was carrying out a mission that was purely personal and not related to work, incidentally or otherwise. EMERGENCY As an alternative basis to affirm the JCC, Claimant argues the tipsy coachman rule, asking this Court to construe his actions as an emergency undertaking covered under section 440.092(3)....

...d from the recovery effort, even if the property belonged to the claimant, would be included within the section's scope. The significance of the Deutsch holding was that the ownership of the property was not the determinative factor in deciding when section 440.092(3) applies....

...y or people, such as an attempted theft or an assault, the "ordinary standards of humanity" may motivate the individual to take action. If injury results from the action, then the statute deems the injury would "arise from work performed" because of section 440.092(3)....

...Later, while working for the employer in Alabama, the claimant received the injury for which compensation is sought. As stated in the district court's opinion the claimant contends that he is entitled to compensation under the Florida Act because the facts of this case meet the requirements of F.S. § 440.09, F.S.A....

...tate, and (b) the employer's place of business or the employee's residence is in this state, and *253 (c) the employment was not for services to be rendered exclusively outside this state. The deputy commissioner held that all of the requirements of § 440.09 were met by the evidence and held the claimant entitled to compensation....

...The first issue with which we are presented arises out of the fact that the deputy based his award of compensation on a combination of the earnings of the deceased from both the petitioner, Jaquette Motor Company, and the Florida East Coast Railway. Petitioner relies on Section 440.09(2), viz.: "No compensation shall be payable in respect of the disability or death of an employee of a common carrier by railroad or express company engaged in intrastate, interstate or foreign commerce." It is petitioner's contention t...

...1st DCA 1994); Varnes v. Dawkins, 624 So.2d 349 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). The Workers' Compensation Act (Act) provides compensation for an employee who "suffers an accidental injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment." § 440.09, Fla.Stat....

...Where an injury is suffered in the course and scope of employment, worker's compensation is the exclusive remedy for recovery against the employer. § 440.11, Fla. Stat. (1989). That remedy is not available where an injury is suffered outside the course of employment. § 440.09(1)....

...After work on Thursday, December 3, 1981, at about 7:30 p.m., Dennis and his wife accompanied Leonard to dinner in his rented Budget automobile. The accident occurred while the parties were traveling to a restaurant located two to four miles from the motel where they were staying. Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1981), provides workers' compensation for injuries "arising out of and in the course of employment." To be compensable, an injury must arise out of employment in the sense of causation and be in the course of employment in the sense of continuity of time, space, and circumstances....

...nd that the industrial injuries are no longer the MCC of any continuing need for treatment or surgery. These findings of the JCC are supported by competent, substantial evidence. Therefore, the claimant is no longer entitled to medical benefits. See § 440.09(1)(b), Fla....

...a claim for death benefits on her own behalf and on behalf of her minor children. Respondent contested the claim and took the position that the death was not causally related to the injury of November 10, 1972, and that the claim should be barred by Section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes, which provides in pertinent part that no compensation shall be payable if the injury was primarily occasioned by the willful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself. The judge of industrial claims, after conducting a hearing and carefully evaluating the evidence, determined that Section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes, was not applicable. The Industrial Relations *271 Commission found that Section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes, did bar the claim and accordingly reversed and dismissed the claim....

...oes so because of injuries sustained in an accident, and as a direct and proximate result thereof, undoubtedly accounts for the diversity of opinion on this question among the courts of this country. And, clearly, in a proper case, the provisions of Section 440.09(3), supra, should be given full force and effect so that industry should not have to carry the burden of compensating for a death for which it was in no wise responsible....

...utes (1999), and therefore not entitled to any past or future benefits from appellees Green Iguana, Inc., d/b/a Medical Billing Group, and Associated Industries Insurance Company, the employer and carrier respectively (employer/carrier), pursuant to section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...Claimant does not challenge the JCC's decision to deny the past benefits claimed, which decision is based upon competent substantial evidence other than the alleged fraud. She argues that it was a violation of due process for the JCC to consider a denial of benefits under section 440.09(4) without giving her prior notice and an adequate opportunity to defend the charge....

...She continued to collect workers' compensation benefits for two months while so employed. These facts were known by the employer/carrier at least eight months before the final merits hearing and at the time of the pre-trial conference; yet, the employer/carrier failed to raise a defense based upon sections 440.09(4) and 440.105(4)(b) prior to the merits hearing....

...nds for denial of Claimant's claim, the Court finds an independent ground exists as per § 440.105(4)(b), that Claimant knowingly engaged in prohibited activity for the purposes of obtaining payment of indemnity benefits. Therefore, pursuant to F.S. § 440.09(4) she is not entitled to compensation or benefits under chapter 440, and the Claimant's claim is DENIED IN ITS ENTIRETY. Section 440.09(4) provides that an employee will not be allowed compensation benefits if the JCC "determines that the employee has knowingly or intentionally engaged in any of the acts described in s....

...t two days before trial, when the employer/carrier failed to raise that defense at the pre-trial conference). *1007 In an opinion of this court issued subsequent to the final order in this case, we explained the requirements which must be met before section 440.09(4) can be invoked. See Village Apartments v. Hernandez, 856 So.2d 1140, 1141-42 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). Section 440.09(4) contemplates that, before benefits may be denied pursuant to the statute, there must be a showing that the claimant made "oral or written statements concerning facts material to [her] claim that [she] knew were false, misleading or incomplete at the time the statements were made." Id. at 1142. Before the statute may be employed to deny benefits, a section 440.09(4) defense either must be raised by the employer/carrier pursuant to the applicable rules of procedure, if the facts supporting the defense are known by the employer/carrier; or must be raised by the JCC, if the actions violating section 440.105 occur before the JCC....

...ecure the payment of compensation to all such employees, except to employees of a subcontractor who has secured such payment. "(2) Compensation shall be payable irrespective of fault as a cause for the injury, except as provided in subsection (3) of § 440.09."

...Ditch, 547 So.2d 276 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). In 1994, the Florida legislature substantially amended the workers' compensation laws. One of these amendments included a new burden of proof standard for a claimant to prove compensability: major contributing cause. See § 440.09, Fla....

...As the legislature did not substantially change section 440.42 in its 1994 amendments, we assume that it approved this Court's previous *1143 construction of the applicable standard for reimbursement and contribution between multiple carriers. Furthermore, the major contributing cause language in section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1995) applies only to determining whether an injury is covered under workers' compensation....

...Brown, 697 So.2d 1228 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997) (to establish coverage after 1994 under major contributing cause, a claimant has a higher burden of proof). Thus, the first step is determining whether the injury is compensable under the major contributing cause standard in section 440.09(1)....

...To the extent the court today holds otherwise, I respectfully dissent. I. Inasmuch as Mr. Guzman began work for the first employer in February of 1994, the statutory provisions requiring proof of "the major contributing cause" apply here. Since January 1, 1994, section 440.09, Florida Statutes, has provided: (1) The employer shall pay compensation or furnish benefits required by this chapter if the employee suffers an accidental injury ......

...ection (1)(b) relieves the second employer of responsibility. If Mr. Guzman had sought benefits directly from the second employer in a separate proceeding, he would have recovered nothing. The same result should obtain here. "Significantly, sections 440.09(1) and 440.02(32) use the definite article `the,' and not `a,' before the term `major contributing cause.'" Orange County MIS Dep't....

...tute from another state, we should adopt that state's judicial construction of the statute."). The Oregon Supreme Court has held "that `the major contributing cause' limitation found in ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) [1990 (which is substantially identical to section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1995)) ] was meant to apply to employer-responsibility determinations." SAIF Corp....

...Shova, 630 So.2d 537, 539 (Fla.1993); Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Smith, 359 So.2d 427, 429 (Fla.1978). Under the statute, an employer is obligated to compensate an employee for injuries "arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment." FLA. STAT. § 440.09(1)....

...dy was worker's compensation. The short answer to this is that Kent could and should have litigated the defense of pre-existing injury/illness in the comp action. A pre-existing injury or illness is a recognized defense to a claim for comp benefits, section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes, and should have been litigated in the comp action....

...t the trial court's ruling in this case creates a huge exception to the Worker's Compensation Act where an employer raises a pre-existing condition defense. Indeed, the Worker's Compensation Act itself recognizes numerous defenses to a comp claim at section 440.09, including pre-existing condition, horseplay, intoxication, self inflicted injury and misrepresentation of a pre-existing condition....

...Her employer's insurance carrier supplied claimant with workers' compensation claim forms in order for her to obtain benefits in Florida. At the time of the hearing claimant had been receiving compensation benefits under the Florida statute for each week that she had not worked since her injury. Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes, provides: Where an accident happens while the employee is employed elsewhere than in this state, which would entitle him or his dependents to compensation if it had happened in this state, the employee or his depe...

...United assigns claimant exclusively to flights which originate and terminate at her home base. We conclude that the cited facts demonstrate that claimant's employment was "principally localized" in the state of Florida at the time of her accident, and she is therefore entitled to compensation under the statute. Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes....

...on under these circumstances. [1] The deputy commissioner accordingly erred in dismissing the claim for lack of jurisdiction. The order is reversed and the claim remanded for further consistent proceedings. NIMMONS and ZEHMER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 440.09(1) also provides: "However, if an employee shall receive compensation or damages under the laws of any other state, nothing herein contained shall be construed so as to permit a total compensation for the same injury greater than is pr...

...*1141 Cord Byrd, Rigell, Ring & Ardman, P.A., West Palm Beach, for Appellants. Sandra L. McAuley, Findler & Findler, P.A., and Helene Hvizd Morris, West Palm Beach, for Appellee. HAWKES, J. In this workers' compensation appeal, Appellants, Employer/Carrier (E/C), argue the claimant should be denied benefits pursuant to section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998)....

...laimant, in seeking benefits, knowingly provides any false, misleading, fraudulent or incomplete information as set forth in section 440.105, Florida Statutes (Supp.1998). Because the JCC appears to have misunderstood the law, we reverse and remand. Section 440.09(4), has frequently been referred to as the "fraud defense." This misnomer appears to have narrowed the application of the sanction beyond that intended by the legislature. In interpreting any statute, full effect must be given to the language chosen by the legislature. Section 440.09(4), provides that the commission of any act prohibited by section 440.105, results in the sanction....

...sanction if the claimant, in support of his claim for benefits, makes an oral statement concerning a material fact that he knows is false, incomplete or misleading. [1] However, at the merits hearing, when the E/C sought to invoke the provisions of section 440.09(4), the JCC asked "Well, where's the written representation that you feel was false?" By focusing only on written misrepresentations, the JCC clearly misconstrued the requirements necessary to invoke the sanctions provided by section 440.09(4)....

...incomplete. Regardless of whether the claimant was under oath, if, at the time he made any of these statements, he knew they were false, incomplete or misleading, then the statements fall within the scope of section 440.105(4)(b)2., and, pursuant to section 440.09(4), result in the loss of workers' compensation benefits....

...ct or thing material to such claim. [2] The E/C stated at the hearing that the evidence of the accidents was discovered too late to include in the pre-trial stipulation. This late discovery illustrates the problem that the sanctions provided through section 440.09(4), attempts to deter.

...He was carrying his daily record book and some other papers in a folder. While descending the stairs, he slipped and fell, sustaining a fractured shoulder and other injuries. The sole question here is whether the appellant's injury arose "out of and in the course of employment", within the meaning of Section 440.09, Florida Statutes....

...He thereupon found the claim to be compensable. Appellants concede that appellee was injured by accident "in the course of" her employment, but they assert on appeal that the injury did not "arise out of" her employment, and, therefore, is not compensable, pursuant to § 440.09, Florida Statutes....

...In October 1980, while lifting the heavy fork of his employer's forklift in the course of his employment, this claimant, then aged 62, injured his back. The employer and carrier recognized that claimant's back injury arose out of and in the course of his employment, § 440.09(1), Fla....

...Indian River Cmty. Coll., 867 So.2d 1257, 1258 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). [4] Because the IME never actually collected his fee, this is not a situation in which the IME would be permanently prohibited from testifying. See DeCuba, 867 So.2d at 1258. [5] See § 440.09(1), Fla....

...Weiss of Conroy, Simberg & Lewis, P.A., West Palm Beach, for Wausau Insurance Company, amicus curiae. HARDING, Justice. We have for review Domino's Pizza v. Gibson, 654 So.2d 638 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995), in which the First District Court of Appeal certified the following question to be of great public importance: Does section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes, preclude expert testimony converting blood alcohol content from a percentage of blood serum to a percentage of whole blood? Id....

...At the hospital, Gibson's serum blood alcohol content measured 0.293 milligrams of alcohol per deciliter of blood serum. Gibson filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. His employer, Domino's Pizza, and the insurance carrier, Alexis, Inc., defended the claim on the grounds that section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes (1991), [1] precluded Gibson from receiving workers' compensation benefits for his injuries....

...nt on the ground that the test was performed on blood serum rather than whole blood. Gibson cited the decision in Florida Tile Industries v. Dozier, 561 So.2d 654 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), as authority that blood serum test results are inadmissible under section 440.09(3)....

...The judge subsequently issued a final order ruling that Gibson's accident was compensable and that *595 the employer and carrier were liable for the payment of benefits. On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal stated that it was constrained by its previous opinion in Florida Tile, which construed section 440.09(3) as making no provision for the testing of blood serum to determine blood alcohol content....

...A blood alcohol test conducted at the emergency room reflected that the employee's serum alcohol level was 0.16. Id. at 655. The judge of compensation claims refused to apply the statutory presumption of causation by intoxication because he found that section 440.09(3) requires a test for alcohol in the employee's whole blood, not blood serum. Id. On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that the statute makes no provision for a determination of blood alcohol content based upon blood serum. Id. We disagree with Florida Tile 's narrow construction of section 440.09(3)....

...des that "[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as provided by law." § 90.402, Fla.Stat. (1991). Clearly, an employee's blood alcohol content is relevant to an intoxication defense against a claim for workers' compensation benefits. Because section 440.09(3) does not specifically exclude blood serum test results, those results are relevant to a claim that an employee had a blood alcohol content of 0.10 percent or more at the time of an injury....

...an injury was caused by the employee's intoxication. Thus, serum blood test results and their conversion to whole blood equivalents are admissible to prove that an "injury was occasioned primarily by the intoxication of the employee" as provided in section 440.09(3)....

...ngs consistent with this opinion. We also disapprove the opinion in Florida Tile to the extent that it is inconsistent with our holding in this case. It is so ordered. GRIMES, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, KOGAN, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes (1991), creates a statutory presumption of causation by intoxication which precludes compensation....

...However, if, prior to the accident, the employer had actual knowledge of and expressly acquiesced in the employee's presence at the workplace while under the influence of such alcohol or drug, the presumption specified in this subsection shall not apply. [2] Although the legislature amended section 440.09 in 1994 to specifically permit the use of blood serum to test for blood alcohol level, see § 440.09(7)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), we decide the instant case based upon the language of the 1991 statute, the general rules regarding the admissibility of evidence, and the intent of the statute....

...ohol level must be proven to be equivalent to or greater than the comparable whole blood alcohol level that would have been obtained if a whole blood test had been used. The legislature specifically included this requirement in the 1994 amendment of section 440.09. See § 440.09(7)(b).

...acceleration or aggravation of disability reasonably attributable to the accident shall be compensable." As pointed out in the footnote one, supra, the words "or result" were inserted in the above statutory provision by act of the 1953 Legislature. Section 440.09(1) provides in part: "Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee if the disability or death results from an injury arising out of and in the course of employment." A study of these...

...eseeable consequence of fulfilling the duties of his employment, and that the acts of a good samaritan are not compensable in Florida. We note at the outset that we agree with the judge's determination regarding compensability of the accident. Under section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1987), workers' compensation coverage is provided for injuries "arising out of and in the course of employment." The phrase "arising out of" refers to the origin of the cause of the accident, while the phrase "in...

...In its first point on appeal, appellant asserts the court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee/Asplundh. In order for an injury to be covered by the workers' compensation law, the injury must arise "out of and in the course of employment." Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes....

...y, and not within the exceptions of § 90.803(6), Florida Statutes. *367 Despite counsel's objection the deputy commissioner permitted evidence of the blood alcohol test result. The deputy then applied the statutory presumption of intoxication which § 440.09(3), Florida Statutes, predicates upon a blood alcohol level of 0.10 percent, [3] and denied the claim for benefits....

...lity under § 90.803(6). Accordingly, the order appealed is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings. MILLS and BARFIELD, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] See § 316.1933(2)(a), Florida Statutes. [2] See § 316.1933(2)(b), Florida Statutes. [3] Section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes, provides that: No compensation shall be payable if the injury was occasioned primarily by the intoxication of the employee......

...Following his conviction on two counts of workers' compensation fraud in violation of section 440.105(4)(b)1, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), the claimant in this workers' compensation case filed a petition seeking various benefits. The employer and carrier responded that all benefits were barred by section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), which states that "[a]n employee shall not be entitled to compensation or benefits under this chapter if any administrative hearing officer, court, or jury convened in this state determines that the employee has knowingly or intentionally engaged in any of the acts described in s....

...440.105 for the purpose of securing workers' compensation benefits." The judge of compensation claims held that the claimant was barred from seeking any benefits, relying on the decision in Rustic Lodge v. Escobar, 729 So.2d 1014, 1015 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), where we said that "section 440.09(4) ......

...mandates that a claimant forfeit all compensation or benefits once there has been a finding of knowing or intentional fraud, and does not limit a claimant's forfeiture to those benefits that may have been obtained by virtue of the claimant's unlawful conduct." On appeal, the claimant argues that, because section 440.09(4), Florida *561 Statutes (Supp.1994), does not limit a claimant's forfeiture to benefits obtained by virtue of the unlawful conduct, it violates the double jeopardy and excessive fines clauses of the state and federal constitutions. Applying the test set out in Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 118 S.Ct. 488, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997), to section 440.09(4), we conclude that the statute does not offend either the federal or the state double jeopardy clause....

...unishment for some offense.'" United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 327-28, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 141 L.Ed.2d 314 (1998) (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 265, 109 S.Ct. 2909, 106 L.Ed.2d 219 (1989)). Section 440.09(4) does not contemplate any payment to a sovereign....

...law or any similar law." Under Florida law, an employer is required to pay workers' compensation to an employee who "suffers an accidental compensable injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment." Fla. Stat. § 440.09(1)....

...A city ordinance authorized the City of Miami (City) to reduce disability pension benefits for its retired employees in an amount equal to the workers' compensation benefits they were entitled to receive for the disabling event. This Court held the ordinance invalid based upon the legislature's 1973 repeal of section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes *165 (1971)....

...ween 1973 and 1989. All were awarded reimbursement for their pension offsets with interest, a ten-percent penalty, costs and attorneys' fees, and the awards were affirmed on appeal. As noted above, this Court held in Barragan that the 1973 repeal of section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (1971), had the effect of invalidating the City ordinance....

...To the extent it is inconsistent with our present opinion, we quash Bell and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. [4] It is so ordered. OVERTON, McDONALD, SHAW, GRIMES, KOGAN and HARDING, JJ., concur. BARKETT, C.J., recused. NOTES [1] Section 440.09(4) provided that any workers' compensation benefits payable to injured public employees should be reduced by the amount of pension benefits that were also payable....

...NOTES [1] An action against the employer pursuant to FELA is the employee's sole remedy for a job related injury in a railroad case. The employee is not entitled to compensation under the Florida Workers' Compensation Law, chapter 440, Florida Statutes (1985). § 440.09(2), Fla....

...n of the City's birthday. It was played at a city-owned park in December, 1981. Florida Worker's Compensation law requires compensation to be payable "if the disability or death results from an injury arising out of and in the course of employment." § 440.09(1), Florida Statutes....

...Appellant, Astley Hall, appeals an order of the judge of compensation claims (JCC) denying his workers' compensation claim solely on the basis that he had a positive drug test shortly after his accident at the employer's drug-free workplace. The JCC based the denial of benefits upon the conclusive presumption of section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes (1991), that an injury in a drug-free workplace to an employee who has positive confirmation of a drug shall be presumed to have been occasioned primarily by the intoxication of the employee. The JCC did not find, however, that marijuana ingestion by appellant primarily caused the injury. Because section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes (1991), establishes an irrebuttable or conclusive presumption which violates the constitutional right to due process, we reverse. Recchi America established its drug and alcohol policy on April 1, 1991, nine months after the effective date of the workers' compensation drug-free workplace statutes, and three months after passage of the enabling division rules. See §§ 440.09(3), 440.09(7), 440.101, 440.102, Fla.Stat....

...ns that the workers' compensation drug-free workplace statutes facially violate the Federal and Florida Constitutions by encouraging indiscriminate, suspicionless searches. He further argues that the irrebuttable presumption of causation provided in section 440.09(3), which results in forfeiture of workers' compensation benefits, violates due process and equal protection. We hold that section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes (1991), establishes an irrebuttable or conclusive presumption which violates the constitutional right to due process. Section 440.09(3), provides, in pertinent part: No compensation shall be payable if the injury was occasioned primarily by the intoxication of the employee ......

...Section 440.101 provides that it is "the intent of the Legislature that drug abuse be discouraged and that employees who choose to engage in drug abuse face the risk of unemployment and the forfeiture of workers' compensation benefits." The conclusive presumption contained in section 440.09(3) fails, however, to satisfy the third prong of the due process test. Because of the high potential for inaccuracy of the conclusive presumption set forth in section 440.09(3), and the feasibility of individualized determinations, fact finding on an individualized basis must be required to afford the employee due process....

...ours following ingestion of the marijuana. The JCC relied upon Dr. Poupko's testimony in concluding that it was probable that the claimant was not impaired from the ingestion of marijuana at the time of the industrial accident. Nevertheless, because section 440.09(3) creates an irrebuttable presumption that the industrial injury was occasioned primarily by the intoxication of, or by the influence of the drug upon, the employee when the employee has a positive confirmation of a drug as defined in section 440.102, the JCC concluded that the claimant's claim was not compensable. These findings and conclusions clearly support our conclusion that the presumption contained in section 440.09(3) must be rebuttable to survive due process analysis. Because section 440.09(3) fails to allow rebuttal of the presumption that the industrial accident was causally related to the intoxication or influence of a drug upon the employee if the employer has a drug-free workplace program in effect, the conclusive presumption set forth in section 440.09(3) results in a denial of due process....

...age drug abuse. It is also clear that requiring a causal nexus between the drug abuse and the work-related accident will do nothing to detract from the legislative goal of eliminating such accidents attributable to such cause. We therefore hold that section 440.09(3) is severable from the remainder of the law....

...NOTES [1] Prior to the 1990 legislation promoting the creation of drug-free workplace programs, it was presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, that the injury was occasioned primarily by the intoxication of the employee. See § 440.09(3), Fla.Stat....

...Petersburg, for American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Florida, Inc., Amicus Curiae. GRIMES, Justice. We have on appeal Hall v. Recchi America Inc., 671 So.2d 197 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), in which the district court of appeal expressly declared invalid the irrebuttable presumption provision of section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...uries. However, the judge of compensation claims (JCC) denied Hall workers' compensation benefits because a urine test administered shortly after the accident revealed the presence of inactive marijuana metabolites in his system. The JCC relied upon section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes (1991), which states: No [workers'] compensation shall be payable if the injury was occasioned primarily by the intoxication of the employee.......

...In the absence of a drug-free workplace program, this presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that the intoxication or influence of the drug did not contribute to the injury. (Emphasis added.) The district court of appeal held that the underlined portion of section 440.09(3) creates an irrebuttable (or conclusive) presumption that violates the constitutional right to due process....

...er tripped and jabbed a long steel apparatus into the back of his head. The court below also noted the feasibility of individualized determinations of causation. We find the appropriate remedy is to excise the irrebuttable presumption provision from section 440.09(3) by removing the words "[i]n the absence of a drug-free workplace program." Absent that clause, the statute permits an injured worker to rebut the presumption by presenting clear and convincing evidence that the intoxication or influence of the drug did not contribute to the injury....

...For those who fall within the statute's purview, "workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for `accident[al] injury or *1205 death arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of the employment.'" Turner, 754 So.2d at 686 ( quoting Fla. Stat. § 440.09(1) (1997))....

...ponsibility for paying FECA benefits for nutritional *622 aides generally; and that the claimant had not received FECA benefits. [1] The entitlement of being covered by FECA does not preclude jurisdiction under the Florida Workers' Compensation Law, Section 440.09(2), Florida Statutes (1977). Section 440.09(2) only bars compensation to "any employee covered by the Federal Employer's Liability Act, the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, or the Jones Act." The Act applies to all employment unless specifically excluded. Street v. Safway Steel Scaffold Company, 148 So.2d 38 (Fla. 1st DCA 1962). Employees covered by FECA are not specifically excluded by Section 440.09(2)....

...Additionally, the rule of statutory construction, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, applies here. If the legislature intended to exclude employees covered by FECA, presumably it would have included that Act among the other federal acts listed in Section 440.09(2)....

...There we held that a highway patrolman who was injured in the course of his duties at a two-week National Guard summer camp was not entitled to Florida workers' compensation benefits. The key to our holding in Atkins was that the claimant was not acting as an employee of the State of Florida when he was injured. [3] Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes, provides a similar scheme: [I]f an employee shall receive compensation or damages under the laws of any other state, nothing herein contained shall be construed so as to permit a total compensation for the same in...

...It cannot be gainsaid that the Insurance Company has claim for at least the amount of the Advanced Deductible Payments actually paid out on behalf of the Debtor as they fall within definition of the term "claim" in § 101(5)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. Florida Statute § 440.09, a Workers' Compensation Statute which governs the rights of workers who are injured on the job, provides that if the injured party is an employee and suffers an injury arising in the course of his employment, the employee has a compensable claim. FLA. STAT. ch. 440.09 (1995)....

...THE MAJOR CONTRIBUTING CAUSE STANDARD Claimant argues he was not required to prove his workplace injury was the major contributing cause of his ulcer, because the ulcer is a "resulting manifestation" of his original workplace injury, as provided by section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2001)....

...In Drewno, we did deem it unnecessary for claimants to prove that their original workplace injury was the major contributing cause of a "manifestation." See id. at 398. The E/C in Drewno conceded the psychiatric injury at issue was a "manifestation" contested under section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes, and limited their argument to that section....

...No competent, substantial evidence exists that Claimant's stomach ulcer was the natural or unavoidable result from his shoulder injury, nor did the JCC make such a finding. [3] If manifestation were to be defined as broadly as the JCC did here, as merely a synergistic relationship, it would render section 440.09(1)(a), relating to subsequent injuries, and section 440.09(1)(b), relating to pre-existing conditions, meaningless....

...l workplace injury could be shown. Therefore, it would have never been necessary for a claimant to prove the original workplace injury was the major contributing cause of any related injury, until the "major contributing cause" language was added to section 440.09(1), effective October 1, 2003....

...Compensability Under Some Other Provision Since Claimant's ulcer is not a manifestation, it can only be compensable if it qualifies under some other provision of Chapter 440. The only other provisions that would provide compensation are if the ulcer qualified as a "subsequent injury" under section 440.09(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2001), or if the ulcer qualified for treatment as a pre-existing condition under section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2001). Both of these sections require medical evidence that the original workplace injury is the major contributing cause of the need for treatment or entitlement to benefits for the related injury or disease. See §§ 440.09(1)(a) & (b), Fla....

...Claimant's IME physician could not testify, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, as to the major contributing cause of Claimant's ulcer. Because no competent, substantial evidence supports a finding that the shoulder injury is the "major contributing cause" of the perforated ulcer as required by either section 440.09(1)(a) or section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes, the JCC's compensability determination is reversed....

...AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion. WEBSTER and PADOVANO, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Claimant admitted to being a smoker for thirty years, and an occasional drinker for the past twenty years. [2] The relevant part of section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2001), provides: "The employer shall pay compensation or furnish benefits required by this chapter if the employee suffers an accidental injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and scope of employment....

...DISCUSSION 9 In the earlier case before the Florida Supreme Court, PCR claimed it owed no liability to Turner and Creighton because "workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for `accidental injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and scope of employment.'" Turner, 754 So.2d at 686 (quoting Fla. Stat. § 440.09 (1) (1997))....

...an occupational disease pursuant to section 440.151, Florida Statutes. Coverage Under the Workers' Compensation Act The Workers' Compensation Act, Chapter 440, Florida Statutes, provides coverage only "if the employee suffers an accidental injury." § 440.09(1), Fla....

...The flaw is illustrated by examining the Manatee claimant's status. Specifically, the Manatee claimant was not seeking coverage, he was seeking benefits. The Manatee "claimant was injured on July 3, 1995." Id. at 877. Thus, he suffered an injury by accident under section 440.09, and his medical condition was covered under the Act....

...They argued that they were not estopped from asserting workers' compensation immunity because the notice of denial denied the workers' compensation claim on the grounds of a preexisting condition, which is a recognized defense to a claim for workers' compensation benefits under section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2005), and the notice did not assert that no employment relationship existed or that the incident occurred outside the scope of the employment relationship....

...Turning to the workers' compensation statutes, an employer is only required to pay compensation or furnish benefits "if the employee suffers an accidental compensable injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment." § 440.09(1), Fla....

...investigation within the 120-day period permitted under section 440.20(4), appellees waived the right to deny compensability of appellant's injury. The standard for a determination of causal relationship between employment and injury is set forth in section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1995), which provides: (1) The employer shall pay compensation or furnish benefits required by this chapter if the employee suffers an accidental injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment....

...[4] The third issue concerns the JCC's denial of appellant's claim for psychiatric evaluation and care. Pursuant to the 1994 revisions to the Workers' Compensation Act, a claimant must present clear and convincing evidence that mental or nervous injuries occurred as a manifestation of a compensable injury. See § 440.09(1), Fla.Stat....

...(1995); McKesson Drug Co. v. Williams, 706 So.2d 352, 353 *974 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). See also Claims Management, Inc. v. Drewno, 727 So.2d at 397. The clear and convincing standard is to be determined on the totality of the evidence, "since nothing in section 440.09(1) requires the clear-and-convincing standard to be met by medical evidence alone." See id....

...A highway patrolman who investigated the accident, Pittman, put in his report that the accident was a direct result of Laramie's intoxication. The pathologist who did the autopsy, Dr. Clemmons, said with .22% blood alcohol, even with a greater than average tolerance, driving ability would be impaired. Section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes, provides, in part: No compensation shall be payable if the injury was occasioned primarily by the intoxication of the employee......

...Laramie's *135 car left the road and he overcompensated when returning. The most likely explanation was found to be that his reflexes were dulled due to the amount of alcohol in his blood stream. Laramie's widow failed to overcome the presumption of intoxication of Section 440.09(3) Florida Statutes....

...They recognized intoxication while on duty as a hazard of the trade. When seen last, Laramie was not obviously drunk. Employer cannot be allowed to encourage a course of conduct, then refuse to face the consequences. The deputy commissioner concluded that an estoppel exception should be recognized. Under § 440.09(4), the benefits were reduced 25% for willful refusal to observe safety rules required by statute....

...ages salesmen to have a social drink with customers, since the employer does not encourage or condone salesmen becoming intoxicated. E/C further argue that to allow this estoppel would alter employee-employer relationships and obviate the purpose of Section 440.09(3), to discourage employees from drinking on the job....

...the major contributing cause of his disability. We cannot agree for two reasons. First, in our judgment, there was, under the circumstances, no burden on claimant to prove that the stenosis was the major contributing cause of the disability, because section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1997), does not apply under the facts of this case. The stenosis is not a preexisting condition within the meaning of section 440.09(1)(b), and there was only one cause, rather than multiple causes, of claimant's disability and need for treatment....

...Our second reason for rejecting the E/C's argument arises from the CSE review standard. We find that a combination of the evidence, both lay and medical, supports the JCC's determination that the employment caused claimant's disability and need for treatment. The first error in the E/C's argument is its reliance on section 440.09(1)(b), which provides as follows: If an injury arising out of and in the course of employment combines with a preexisting disease or condition to cause or prolong disability or need for treatment, the employer must pay compensation or...

...dition to cause or prolong a disability." Id. While it is clear from Dr. Beranek's testimony that claimant's spinal stenosis preexisted his disability, this does not mean that it was a preexisting condition, as the term is used by the legislature in section 440.09(1)(b)....

...Comm'n, 196 So.2d 748, 752-53 (Fla.1967). In the instant case, it simply cannot be concluded from the evidence that the stenosis, which is itself the compensable injury, "combine[d] with a preexisting condition to cause or prolong disability or need for treatment," as required under section 440.09(1)(b)....

...It's a job that requires manual labor, doing a lot of repetitive bending and lifting. Q. Would it be consistent and reasonable to you to conclude that somebody who performed that type of work over the course of twenty-four years may have this condition you call lateral stenosis? * * * A. Absolutely. We also find section 440.09(1)(b) to be inapplicable, because the evidence in this case shows that there was only one cause, rather than multiple causes, for claimant's disability....

...rniation was not a cause of the disability arising in March 1998. We next turn to the question of whether CSE supports the JCC's causation determination. In answering this question, it is necessary to identify the appropriate causation test. Because section 440.09(1)(b) is inapplicable, compensability must be determined solely under section 440.09(1). See Claims Management, Inc. v. Drewno, 727 So.2d 395 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (on reh'g). As explained in Drewno, to establish compensability pursuant to section 440.09(1), a claimant must demonstrate he or she suffered "`an accidental injury ... arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment.'" Drewno, 727 So.2d at 397 (quoting section 440.09(1))....

...1st DCA 1994). Alternatively, the claimant must show a series of occurrences, the cumulative effect of which is injury. See Festa, 382 So.2d at 124. Causation can be established through lay and medical testimony. Id. And see Closet Maid, 763 So.2d at 383 (section 440.09(1) does not alter the long-recognized principle that the cause of a workplace injury may be established by either medical or lay evidence, or both)....

...Closet Maid v. Sykes, 763 So.2d 377 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (en banc), as overruling these and other similar decisions of this court. Closet Maid did no such thing. On the contrary, it cited such decisions with approval, saying: We further conclude that section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), does not invariably require medical evidence to show that a workplace accident is the major contributing cause of a disability or need for treatment....

...work-related. Therefore, it is further my opinion that the claimant failed to carry his burden of proof, and that the determination of compensability must be reversed. The employer and servicing agent also argue that reversal is required pursuant to section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1997), because the claimant failed to establish that the spinal stenosis was "the major contributing cause of [his] disability or need for treatment." In fact, as I read Dr....

...ion contributed to the claimant's disability and need for treatment, the latter was "at least fifty-one percent" responsible for and, therefore, was "the major cause" of, the disability and need for treatment. However, I agree with the majority that section 440.09(1)(b) is not applicable because, as presently written, it applies only when a work-related injury "combines with a preexisting disease or condition." Here, there was competent, substantial evidence to support the finding that the stenosis existed before the disk herniation. Therefore, had there been competent, substantial evidence to support the finding that the stenosis was work-related, section 440.09(1)(b) would, by its language, not apply because the work-related injury would have preceded the non-work-related....

...ade as to whether jurisdiction herein was within the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq. On October 8, 1979, the Deputy entered his Order, finding inter alia that he had subject matter jurisdiction herein. Section 440.09(2), Fla....

...Sicking, P.A., Miami, for appellee. BARFIELD, Judge. The issue presented in this appeal is the retroactive application of Barragan v. City of Miami, 545 So.2d 252 (Fla. 1989), to the claim of an employee injured after June 30, 1973, the last effective date of section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (1957), repealed by chapter 73-127, Laws of Florida, effective July 1, 1973....

...The appellants argue that the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) erred in finding that Corea's false and misleading statements regarding his current physical health and post-accident employment did not preclude payment of workers' compensation benefits pursuant to section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (1999)....

...This section precludes all benefits to an employee who knowingly or intentionally provides any false, fraudulent, or misleading oral or written statements for the purpose of obtaining benefits under Chapter 440. See also § 440.105(4)(b)1, Florida Statutes (1999). Because the JCC misapplied section 440.09(4), we reverse and remand the case for further proceedings....

...ing in full-time gainful employment. The JCC concluded, however, Corea's conduct did not "rise to the level of fraud as contemplated by Florida Statutes, § 440.105(4)(b)" and, thus, his actions were not sanctionable under sections 440.105(4)(b) and 440.09(4)....

...accident and the date of maximum medical improvement, in addition to continued palliative medical care, costs and attorney's fees. In so doing, the JCC erred. As we have explained in a decision issued after the JCC entered the order on appeal, under section 440.09(4), knowingly false, incomplete, or misleading statements of material fact made by a claimant during workers' compensation proceedings regarding his current state of health or post-accident employment are deemed to be made in support of the claimant's claim for benefits....

...ading. If Corea knew at the time he made the material statements in advancement of his claim for workers' compensation benefits that the statements were false, incomplete or misleading, then Corea would forfeit his right to all benefits, pursuant to section 440.09(4)....

...of cocaine and its metabolites in the claimant's urine sample was confirmed and quantified. The employer and carrier (E/C) presented these drug test results as evidence that the accident was caused primarily by the influence of drugs, as provided by section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes, [1] and to raise the presumption set out in section 440.09(7)(b), Florida Statutes. [2] The JCC construed section 440.09(3) in pari materia with section 440.09(7) and ruled that, while a drug test of a sample which was taken for medical purposes may be used to support an intoxication defense under section 440.09(3), the presumption in section 440.09(7)(b), which is based upon a positive confirmation drug test, may not be based upon a drug test of a medically-drawn sample unless the Florida Administrative Code requirements alluded to under section 440.09(7)(d) are followed....

...[3] The JCC's final order did not recite his ruling on the applicability of the intoxification presumption, but instead denied the claim in its entirety on the ground that the claimant had violated section 440.105, Florida Statutes, and was therefore barred by section 440.09(4) from entitlement to compensation. On appeal, this court reversed the order, finding that a JCC is not authorized under section 440.09(4) to make a *759 section 440.105 determination, and the case was remanded for further proceedings....

..."law of the case" doctrine, and also reaffirmed his prior ruling on the applicability of the presumption, irrespective of "law of the case." The JCC's final order ruled that the accident and injuries were compensable, finding that the presumption of section 440.09(7)(b) does not apply to the facts of this case, that the claimant ingested cocaine within hours of the accident, but the accident was caused primarily by "fatigue brought on by seven hours of work, or simple inadvertence," and that the E/C failed to prove, by the greater weight of the evidence, that "the accident was occasioned primarily by Claimant's intoxication or the influence of a drug or alcohol on Claimant." The JCC found that the evidence would not have overcome the section 440.09(7)(b) presumption if it had been applicable, and rejected the claimant's contention that the employer had actual knowledge of his condition and expressly acquiesced in his presence in the workplace, which would have made the presumptio...

...he would not alter his ruling on the intoxication presumption, the issue need not be reconsidered on remand. We affirm the JCC's ruling that, while a drug test performed for medical purposes may be admissible to support an intoxication defense under section 440.09(3), the presumption set out in section 440.09(7)(b) does not arise as the result of a positive confirmation drug test using a medically-drawn sample unless the Florida Administrative Code rules required by section 440.09(7)(d) are followed....

...The case is REMANDED to the JCC for correction of the order consistent with this opinion, and for determination of the claimant's entitlement to PTD benefits under the "catastrophic injury" provisions of section 440.15, Florida Statutes. WEBSTER and BENTON, JJ., CONCUR. NOTES [1] Section 440.09(3) provides: Compensation is not payable if the injury was occasioned primarily by the intoxication of the employee; by the influence of any drugs, barbiturates, or other stimulants not prescribed by a physician; or by the willful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself, herself, or another. [2] Section 440.09(7)(b) provides: If the employee has, at the time of the injury, a blood alcohol level equal to or greater than the level specified in s. 316.193, or if the employee has a positive confirmation of a drug as defined in this act, it is presumed that the injury was occasioned primarily by the intoxification of, or by the influence of the drug upon, the employee. [3] Section 440.09(7)(d) provides: The division shall provide by rule for the authorization and regulation of drug testing policies, procedures, and methods. Testing of injured employees shall not commence until such rules are adopted. Chapter 38F-9, Florida Administrative Code ("Drug Testing Rule"), was created in 1991 to implement the mandate of section 440.09(7)(d), and remained unchanged at the time of the 1994 accident....

...ration of principles of estoppel, we reverse. At the hearing at which Riker's claim for benefits was ultimately heard, FCCI's defense was that the judge lacked jurisdiction over the claim because it fell under the aegis of the LHWCA. By operation of section 440.09(2), Florida Statutes (1991), [1] a judge of compensation claims does not have subject matter jurisdiction of a dispute that is covered by the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act....

...1st DCA 1987) ("estoppel does not operate to confer authority or power"). While section 440.04, Florida Statutes (1991), does allow for waiver of chapter 440 exclusions and exemptions when coverage specifically has been secured for work contemplated by the act, section 440.09(2) works to expressly exclude coverage when the nature of the work is covered by the LHWCA....

...Because the judge did not make any *1030 findings on the issue of whether Riker's exclusive remedy is under the LHWCA, we remand this case for further proceedings. Our holding today obviates the need to address FCCI's other points raised on appeal. REVERSED and REMANDED. BARFIELD, C.J., and KAHN, J., concur. NOTES [1] Subsection 440.09(2) specifically provides as follows: (2) No compensation shall be payable in respect of the disability or death of any employee covered by the Federal Employer's Liability Act, the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, o...

...The 1970 Legislature which enacted chapter 121 deliberately selected a definition for "disability in line of duty" which closely resembles the "deceptively simple and litigiously prolific" [4] test for workmen's compensation coverage: "arising out of and in the course of employment," § 440.09(1), F.S....

...of a workmen's compensation test is indicated also by the existence of another statute, when the Retirement System Act was enacted, preventing duplication of workmen's compensation and retirement disability benefits payable to public employees. Sec. 440.09(4), F.S....

...Retirement Commission rather than a hearing officer. See § 120.57(1) (a) 1, (b)3, § 121.23(2), F.S. 1975. [3] An industrial claims judge found Bolinger's injury and disability arose out of and in the course of her employment, within the meaning of § 440.09(1), F.S....

...In the order, the JCC ruled that, based upon findings that the employment accident occurred in Alabama, the subject employment agreement was made in Alabama, and no record evidence established that claimant's employment was principally located in Florida, under section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2005), claimant had not established jurisdiction under chapter 440....

...Labor Ready was made in Alabama, and there was no evidence establishing that claimant's employment was principally located in Florida. Based upon these findings, the JCC dismissed the claim, ruling the claim did not satisfy the *602 requirements of section 440.09(1)(d), Florida Statutes (2005), and that proper jurisdiction was in Alabama....

...nd all documentation provided by Labor Ready to P & H was sent to P & H's Florida business address. Based on these facts showing contracts with the State of Florida, claimant argues that the JCC erred in denying jurisdiction to his claim pursuant to section 440.09(1)(d). We cannot agree. Section 440.09(1)(d), in pertinent part, provides: If an accident happens while the employee is employed elsewhere than in this state, which would entitle the employee or his or her dependents to compensation if it had happened in this state, the employee or his or her dependents are entitled to compensation if the contract of employment was made in this state, or the employment was principally localized in this state. . . . § 440.09(1)(d) (2005), Fla. Stat. (2005). Thus, under section 440.09(1)(d) a claimant injured in an employment accident outside of Florida is entitled to compensation under chapter 440 only if one of the following two factors are established: (1) the contract of employment was made in Florida or (2) the claimant's employment was principally localized in Florida....

...1st DCA 2004). Where, however, the employee leasing company fails to provide coverage, workers' compensation liability attaches to the special employer. See Tu-Lane Invs., Inc. v. Orr, 889 So.2d 961, 963 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Under the first factor of section 440.09(1), a claimant is entitled to compensation under chapter 440 "if the contract of employment was made in this state." "Where an employment contract was made is determined through a consideration of (1) the hiring authority of the person...

...Most compelling, however, in the pretrial stipulation, the parties stipulated that claimant's injury occurred at a time during which an employer/employee relationship existed between appellant and Labor Ready in Alabama. We agree with the JCC that for the purposes of section 440.09(1)(d) the relevant employment agreement here is the contract between claimant and Labor Ready, not the employee leasing agreement between P & H and Labor Ready....

...f claimant's proposed employment under the agreement was in Alabama. Because we conclude that competent *605 substantial evidence supports the finding that the contract at issue was made in Alabama, claimant has failed to satisfy the first factor of section 440.09(1)(d)....

...ant's employment. Principal Localization of Claimant's Employment We agree with the JCC that there is insufficient evidence in the record to establish that claimant's employment was principally localized in Florida. In determining jurisdiction under section 440.09(1)(d), the principal location of the claimant's employment, not of the employer's business, is the relevant consideration....

...to the 1999 accident and 20% was related to the 2004 accident. The JCC ruled, however, that, since the 2004 accident was not greater than 50% responsible for claimant's condition, that accident was not compensable pursuant to the 2003 amendments to section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2003), see Chapter 2003-412 § 6 at 3876, Laws of Florida, and that, therefore, the employer/carrier at risk for the 2004 accident, appellees Paradise Ford and Comp Options Insurance (Paradise Ford/Comp Options...

...A ClaimPlus (Budget Group/CNA), were required to pay claimant 80% of the benefits due for the period May 3, 2004, through November 12, 2004. We affirm the JCC's allocation of responsibility between the two employer/carriers. Because we conclude that section 440.09(1)(b) does not apply here, we reverse the JCC's ruling that section 440.09(1)(b) absolves Paradise Ford/Comp *14 Options of any responsibility for claimant's workers' compensation benefits....

...The JCC accepted Dr. Munson's opinion and, based on this opinion, found that 80% of claimant's condition was related to the 1999 accident and 20% was related to the 2004 accident. Based on this finding, he ruled that under the post-October 1, 2003 revisions to section 440.09(1)(b), [1] Paradise Ford/Comp Options was not liable for any TTD benefits for the 2004 accident because the 2004 accident was not more than 50% responsible for the claimant's need for treatment and benefits....

...The JCC found that Budget Group/CNA was liable to pay claimant 80% of the TTD benefits for the period May 3, 2004 through November 12, 2004, and 80% of the claimant's medical treatment until claimant returned to his pre-April 26, 2004 condition. The JCC ruled that, since the 2004 accident was not compensable under section 440.09(1)(b), neither employer/carrier was responsible for 20% of the incurred TTD benefits or medical expenses....

..., the level of liability did not rise to a level required by the statute in order for [Paradise Ford/Comp Options] to be responsible for their "contributed effect." On appeal, the claimant and Budget Group/CNA assert that the JCC's interpretation of section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2003), is erroneous. They contend that section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2003), should be read as applying only when a claimant's preexisting condition did not arise in the course of employment. Thus, since the claimant's injuries here were caused solely by multiple employment accidents, section 440.09(1)(b) should not be determinative. [2] Paradise Ford/Comp Options argues that section 440.09(1)(b) applies to any preexisting condition or injury no matter the source....

...Thus, where a claimant's condition is caused by the effects of a combination of two or more industrial accidents, only the employer/carrier responsible for the accident which constitutes the major contributing cause of the claimant's injuries is required to provide compensation or benefits. We agree that section 440.09(1)(b) does not apply here. Section *16 440.42(4), Florida Statutes (2003), [3] not section 440.09(1)(b), controls the case under review....

...See Custom Architectural Metals v. Bradshaw, 623 So.2d 804, 806 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). Thus, here, the JCC erred in not dividing liability 80% to Budget Group/CNA and 20% to Paradise Ford/Comp Options in accordance with his findings of responsibility. Our holding that section 440.09(1)(b) is not applicable to the instant case is supported by the manner in which the statute was amended in 2003. It is apparent that the amendments to subsection (1)(b) of section 440.09 were intended to overrule our decision in Closet Maid v. Sykes, 763 So.2d 377 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000)(en banc). In Closet Maid, we defined the term "the major contributing cause" in section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), in the context of a case in which the claimant suffered an employment accident which combined with his preexisting condition of spinal stenosis to cause a need for lumbar laminectomy surgery and other compensation benefits. We held that under section 440.09(1)(b) "coverage is available if the workplace accident contributes more to the disability or need for treatment than any other single cause." Id. at 381. We also held that major contributing cause could be established by either medical or lay evidence. Id. at 382. In the 2003 amendments to section 440.09(1)(b), the legislature rejected both the Closet Maid definition of major contributing cause and the use of lay evidence to establish causation....

...the claimant's need for treatment or benefits is caused by the impact of an employment accident combining with a preexisting injury or condition that is unrelated to an employment accident. Further, we believe that the interpretation of the amended section 440.09(1)(b) argued by Paradise Ford/Comp Options would produce absurd results in cases involving a claimant with injuries caused solely by multiple employment injuries with different employers....

...15, and that the 1999 "injury arising out of and in the course of employment is and remains" more than fifty per cent responsible for the injury as compared to all other causes combined "and [still] remains the major contributing cause of the disability." § 440.09(1)(b), Fla....

...and its insurance carrier are not responsible for compensation benefits on account of a condition only "20% . . . related to the 2004 accident." Ante p. 13. With respect, I believe this is what the Legislature intended in enacting, then in amending, section 440.09(1)(b)....

...The statute draws no distinction between a "preexisting disease or condition" attributable to work in the same or another industry and a "preexisting disease or condition" with a nonindustrial etiology. The majority opinion's discussion of this point is not, moreover, necessary to today's decision. NOTES [1] Section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2003) was amended by the 2003 Legislature in the following manner: (b) If any injury arising out of and in the course of employment combines with a preexisting disease or condition to cause or prolong disabilit...

...ereafter remains the major contributing cause of the disability or need for treatment. Major contributing cause must be demonstrated by medical evidence only. Ch. 2003-412 § 6 at 3876, Laws of Fla. [2] The claimant also argues that, notwithstanding section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2003), under sections 440.02(1) and 440.15(5)(a), Florida Statutes (2003), where a claimant has a preexisting condition, whether from a prior compensable accident or an idiopathic condition, the claimant has susta...

...lity of both the neck and back conditions," based upon the expert opinions of several physicians, including an expert medical advisor appointed by the Division of Workers' Compensation to resolve the differences of opinion among the medical experts. Section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), provides: If an injury arising out of and in the course of employment combines with a preexisting disease or condition to cause or prolong disability or need for treatment, the employer must pay com...

...e compensable injuries to his back and neck, see sections 440.13(1)(m) and 440.13(2)(a). Contrary to the E/C's contention, the 1994 amendments to chapter 440 do not change the E/C's obligation in this respect. As to the E/C's assertion that sections 440.09(4) and 440.105 preclude the claimant from entitlement to worker's compensation benefits, the JCC properly ruled that he did not have jurisdiction to determine, as a prerequisite to application of section 440.09(4), that the claimant knowingly or intentionally made false or misleading statements for the purpose of obtaining workers' compensation benefits....

...not been shown to be sufficiently reliable to justify its admission into evidence. This determination was a matter within the deputy's discretion. In attempting to introduce the blood alcohol test results into evidence, the employer sought to invoke § 440.09(3), Florida Statutes, which provides that "no compensation shall be payable if the injury was occasioned primarily by the intoxication of the employee......

...pensation law in contravention of Section 440.21(2), Florida Statutes, which provides: "(2) No agreement by an employee to waive his right to compensation under this chapter shall be valid." The trial court reasoned that if the former state statute (Section 440.09(4) Laws of Florida 1953, repealed effective July 1, 1973) was valid before repeal (see City of Miami v....

...Paragraph 10 of the Complaint herein states that the Defendants permitted an offset of Plaintiff's pension by Plaintiff's Workmen's Compensation benefits under Municipal Ordinance § 41-406(15). The Court finds that said Municipal Ordinance expresses the same intent as former Florida Statute § 440.09(4). Further, § 440.09(4), now repealed was valid and legal under Purdy v....

...Clark, Fla.App. (3rd) 1969, 223 So.2d 387, and City of Miami v. Graham, Fla. 1962, 138 So.2d 751. Although said statute has now been repealed, no new legislation has prohibited the action that was allowed thereunder. Thus the action allowed under F.S. § 440.09(4) is still permissible under Municipal Ordinance....

...ided that claimant had made a false, fraudulent or misleading statement for the purpose of obtaining benefits, in violation of section 440.105(4)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), the JCC erred in refusing to dismiss the entire claim, as required by section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998)....

...ment of an EMA. In its cross-appeal, the E/C asserts that the JCC erred in awarding claimant impairment benefits for her carpal tunnel syndrome, because once the JCC found that claimant had misrepresented her psychiatric condition, the provisions of section 440.09(4) [1] required her to dismiss the entire claim....

...When she decided this case, the JCC did not have the benefit of our opinion construing the statute in CDL v. Corea, 867 So.2d 639 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (observing that if claimant's false and misleading statements were made knowingly, he would forfeit his right to all benefits pursuant to section 440.09(4))....

...aining benefits. If so, consistent with this court's decision in CDL, "the JCC should rule that the statements fall within the scope of section 440.105(4)(b)1." Id. at 640. REVERSED and REMANDED. BOOTH, J., and SMITH, Senior Judge, concur. NOTES [1] Section 440.09(4) provides in part: An employee shall not be entitled to compensation or benefits under this chapter if any judge of compensation claims ......

...Section 440.02(32), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), provides: "Arising out of" pertains to occupational causation. An accidental death or injury arises out of employment if work performed in the course and scope of employment is the major contributing cause of the injury or death. (Emphasis added). Similarly, section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), provides: *999 If an injury arising out of and the course of employment combines with a preexisting disease or condition to cause or prolong disability or need for treatment, the employer must pay compensation or benefits......

...the risk of injury and to which the claimant would not normally be exposed during his nonemployment life. Id. (citations omitted); see also Mangold v. Rainforest Golf Sports Center, 675 So.2d 639, 641-642 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). Significantly, sections 440.09(1) and 440.02(32) use the definite article "the," and not "a," before the term "major contributing cause." By such usage, the legislature is recognizing that there may be numerous contributing causes leading to an injury or disability, but tha...

...District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District. April 16, 1999. Mary Ann Stiles and Rayford H. Taylor of Stiles, Taylor and Grace, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellants. William P. Levens, Tampa, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. We affirm the order of the judge of compensation claims (JCC), holding that section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), which bars the recovery of compensation benefits upon proof that a claimant engaged in certain prohibited activities, is substantive legislation and thus cannot be retroactively applied....

...rand theft, whereupon the circuit court withheld adjudication of guilt and sentenced him to 18 months' probation and 50 hours of community service. Escobar filed petitions for medical benefits in 1996 and 1997. The E/C denied each, *1015 pursuant to section 440.09(4), which took effect January 1, 1994, and provides: An employee shall not be entitled to compensation or benefits under this chapter if any administrative hearing officer, court, or jury convened in this state determines that the employee has knowingly or intentionally engaged in any of the acts described in s....

...recover compensatory damages, plus all reasonable investigation and litigation expenses, including attorney's fees at the trial and appellate courts. Contrary to the E/C's argument, section 440.37(2)(c) differed substantially and substantively from section 440.09(4). Under the former provision, an E/C was required to file a civil action, in which claimant could raise any pertinent defenses, to recover those benefits paid pursuant to the claimant's misrepresentations or fraudulent activity. In contrast, section 440.09(4) requires no civil proceeding, and mandates that a claimant forfeit all compensation or benefits once there has been a finding of knowing or intentional fraud, and does not limit a claimant's forfeiture to those benefits that may have been obtained by virtue of the claimant's unlawful conduct....

...Remedial statutes simply confer or change a remedy in furtherance of existing rights and do not deny a claimant his or her vested rights. St. John's Village I, Ltd. v. Department of State, Division of Corps., 497 So.2d 990 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). If the JCC had applied section 440.09(4), Escobar might have lost his vested right to medical benefits for treatment necessitated by his industrial injury, even in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation relating to his 1996 and 1997 medical-benefit claims....

...The City's first point contends that the order errs in applying the supreme court's Barragan decision retroactively. The City argues that Barragan overruled numerous decisions of Florida intermediate appellate *1185 courts upholding the offset under the Miami ordinance after the repeal of section 440.09(4) in 1973, and that the City had detrimentally relied on these decisions during the years it had taken the offsets pursuant to the ordinance invalidated by the supreme court's "surprise" decision holding that the ordinance "flies in t...

...1st DCA 1992). In that case we followed our decision in City of Daytona Beach v. Amsel, 585 So.2d 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), which held that Barragan is to be retroactively applied to compensable injuries occurring after the July 1, 1973, repeal of section 440.09(4). [4] II. The City's second point contends that it was error to rule that Bell's claim for the offset was not barred as being mature when the earlier claim for medical benefits was filed in 1988. The City points out that section 440.09(4), which had authorized the offset, was repealed in 1973, so that Bell's claim for past monies withheld pursuant to the City's offset was mature at the time of the 1988 proceeding on Bell's claim for medical benefits and thus should h...

...g that course of action. As noted by the supreme court in Barragan, under the case law existing at the time this claim was filed, several appellate opinions had upheld the City's right to take the offset under the Miami pension ordinance even though section 440.09(4) had been repealed in 1973....

...In this case, the penalty is calculated on amounts offset prior to Barragan 's holding that the ordinance was invalid. The offset was made pursuant to city ordinance 40-207(J). Several appellate decisions held that ordinance valid, even after the repeal in 1973 of section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes....

...After a hearing, an order was entered May 25, 1988, pursuant to a joint stipulation of the parties, requiring the City to pay the disputed medical expenses. [4] This case is to be distinguished from those cases involving compensable injuries that occurred prior to the repeal of section 440.09(4) in 1973....

...The statute applies to workers' compensation cases and provides for a presumption of compensability. See S. Trail Fire Control Dist. v. Johnson, 449 So.2d 947, 947 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Martin v. State, Dep't of Corr., 890 So.2d 1238, 1238 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); see also § 440.09(1), Fla....

...1st DCA), review denied, 388 So.2d 1119 (Fla. 1980). [6] With regard to Judge Ervin's concurring opinion, we continue to adhere to the views expressed in Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1973). [7] The statute requires: "an injury arising out of and in the course of employment." § 440.09(1), Fla....

...Cristal and Dixie T. Switzer of the Cristal Law Group, Tampa, for Appellees. WETHERELL, J. In this workers' compensation appeal, Claimant seeks review of a final order denying all of her claims for benefits pursuant to the so-called "fraud defense" in section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (2007)....

...[t]o knowingly make, or cause to be made, any false, fraudulent, or misleading oral or written statement for the purpose of obtaining or denying any benefit or payment under this chapter." A person who violates this statute is subject to criminal, civil, and administrative penalties. See § 440.09(4)(a), 440.105(4)(f), 440.106, Fla. Stat. The process by which an employee may be sanctioned for violating section 440.105 is set forth in section 440.09(4)....

...is not entitled to any compensation or *107 benefits under chapter 440 if the JCC (or an administrative law judge, court, or jury) determines that the employee knowingly and intentionally engaged in any of the acts prohibited by section 440.105. See § 440.09(4)(a), Fla. Stat. Thus, not only does section 440.09(4) specifically authorize the JCC to determine whether an employee has violated section 440.105, but it also sets forth the sanction that the JCC is required to impose upon finding that a violation occurred....

...y conferred by chapter 440."). And as the JCC recognized at the final hearing, [1] had the Legislature intended to give the JCC the authority to sanction an E/C or its attorney for violating section 440.105, it could have easily done so as it did in section 440.09(4) for fraud by employees....

...rady was an employee covered by chapter 440, Florida Statutes, at the time of his injury, and that chapter provides his exclusive remedy. The circuit court granted the motion for summary judgment in an order which explained the basis for its ruling. Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1981), provides workers' compensation coverage "in respect of disability or death of an employee if the disability or death results from an injury arising out of and in the course of employment." Section 440.11(1)...

...Although the JCC did not credit her version of events, the employer and carrier waived the right to deny compensability by failing "to deny compensability within 120 days after the initial provision of benefits...." § 440.20(4), Fla. Stat. (2002). We nevertheless affirm on the authority of section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...[t]he evidence in its totality establishes that .... [c]laimant *291 knowingly made false or misleading oral and written statements for the purpose of obtaining benefits [in violation of section 440.105, Florida Statutes, (2002) ].... Therefore, claimant is not entitled to benefits per section 440.09(4), Fla....

...where it differs. Claimant could not remember any workplace injury until she was encouraged to report a work injury by her friend and employer, Anna Marie Yoder, which is supported by all of the other evidence, including her history to Dr. Swanson. Section 440.09(4) precludes "compensation or benefits ......

...Apartments v. Hernandez, 856 So.2d 1140 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). Affirmed. BENTON and LEWIS, JJ., concur; BOOTH, J., dissents with opinion. BOOTH J., dissenting. A review of the record does not reveal any evidence to support the JCC's ruling that Claimant violated section 440.09(4) and is, therefore, precluded from receipt of benefits....

...The E/C further contends that the JCC erroneously relied on both medical and lay evidence to establish a causal relationship; therefore, the award should be reversed. On rehearing, the E/C has now clarified its position that its arguments arise under section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), and the new statutory definition of "arising out of," which includes the term "major contributing cause," and not under section 440.09(1)(a), pertaining to subsequent injuries, or 440.09(1)(b), involving preexisting conditions....

...As so framed, we cannot agree with the E/C's contentions seeking reversal of the PTD award. In an effort to reduce costs, the Florida Legislature made extensive revisions to the Workers' Compensation Law that became effective on January 1, 1994, which included section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes, providing as follows: (1) The employer shall pay compensation or furnish benefits required by this chapter if the employee suffers an accidental injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment....

...asonable degree of medical certainty and by objective medical findings. Mental or nervous injuries occurring as a manifestation of an injury compensable under this section shall be demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence. The first sentence of section 440.09(1) sets forth the test for causation....

...1st DCA 1998) (claimants are now bound to demonstrate mental injuries by clear and convincing evidence, i.e., evidence of a quality and character designed to produce in the mind of a JCC a firm belief or conviction, without hesitation, as to the truth of the allegations). In considering causation under section 440.09(1), we must also examine section 440.02(32), Florida Statutes, which, too, was added with the 1994 amendments....

...tion). Although the legislature did not define the term "major contributing cause," this court has defined it as "the most preponderant cause." Orange County MIS Dep't v. Hak, 710 So.2d 998, 999 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). We interpret the above portion of section 440.09(1) and the statutory definition of "arising out of" as focusing on the original injury or accident....

...linked to the initial injury. Thus, we reject the E/C's argument that claimant was required to prove that his work was the major contributing cause of his resulting psychiatric conditions. Our interpretation is supported by the statutory language in section 440.09(1), which provides that compensation is payable "if the employee suffers an accidental injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and scope of employment." (Emphasis added.) It does not explicitly require the claimant...

...se. It does not require a claimant to establish separately that they also arise out of work. It is apparent that the legislature understood the difference between an injury and a resulting manifestation by the language used in the second sentence of section 440.09(1), which provides that the "injury, its occupational cause, and any resulting manifestations or disability " be established within a reasonable degree of medical certainty and objective medical findings....

...The parties stipulated that the original groin injury claimant suffered was compensable. Thus, they necessarily agreed that the accident and injury occurred while claimant was performing his work duties, and that his employment was the major contributing cause of the injury. [1] Based on our interpretation of section *399 440.09(1), it was unnecessary for claimant to prove as well a work connection or major contributing cause as to his resultant psychiatric conditions. Turning next to the quantum and quality of the evidence, section 440.09(1) requires a claimant to prove the industrial injury, its cause and its manifestations, such as psychiatric conditions, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty and with objective findings....

...ns CSE to support such a finding). In so saying, we agree with the JCC that the determination of "clear and convincing evidence" is a judicial one that may be made from the totality of all the evidence, medical and lay, particularly since nothing in section 440.09(1) requires the clear-and-convincing standard to be met by medical evidence alone....

...AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED. PADOVANO, J., CONCURS. BOOTH, J. SPECIALLY CONCURS WITH OPINION. BOOTH, J., SPECIALLY CONCURRING. I specially concur in light of Employer/Carrier's motion for rehearing limiting the issue to interpretation of section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), which does not apply to claimants who have a history of preexisting psychiatric conditions....

...nsation system. See City of Pensacola; Housknecht v. City of Dania, IRC Order 2-3276 (November 15, 1977), cert. denied, 368 So.2d 1368 (Fla. 1979). The judge's consideration was therefore not limited to the offset which might otherwise pertain under section 440.09(8), Florida Statutes (Supp.1990), as the parties' rights and obligations were also properly assessed in light of the collective bargaining agreement and player contract....

...any award of workers' compensation indemnity benefits for the specified period of time during which the claimant was still under contract and receiving his salary. In accordance with the parties' contractual agreement, and without regard to whether section 440.09(8) would otherwise permit a greater offset, the judge properly allowed the employer to credit the post-injury salary payments against only those workers' compensation benefits accruing during the term of the contract....

...REVERSED and REMANDED in part with instructions to proceed consistent with this opinion. ERVIN and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] G. Inc. also questioned the deputy's jurisdiction over G. Inc., arguing that the employment contract was not principally localized in Florida as required by § 440.09(1), Fla....

...cation of statute governing transfer of franchise, automobile franchisor that contracted in New Jersey to have New Jersey substantive law apply to it could not be heard to complain about extraterritorial application of the statute). Florida Statutes Section 440.09(1) provides in pertinent part: Where an accident happens while an employee is employed elsewhere than in this state, which would entitle him or his dependents to compensation if it happened in this state, the employee or his dependents...

...Nevertheless, because the administrative paperwork had to be completed at the job site in Alabama before claimant commenced work, the judge found the contract of hire was finalized in Alabama and that Florida had no jurisdiction over the claim. The applicable statute, section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1989), provides in part: ......

...In such circumstances, we decline to disturb the judge's factual determination that the sexual intercourse took place without the claimant's permission. Benefits are available under the Workers' Compensation Act for "injuries arising out of and in the course of employment." § 440.09(1), Fla....

...disability benefits law, or any similar law . . . .” Because Morales’s death occurred during the course and scope of his employment, his employer Lawns was required to pay workers’ compensation benefits to Morales’s family. See Fla. Stat. § 440.09(1)....

...Alternatively, the E/C argues any error in the admission of Dr. Harbisons testimony was harmless because competent, substantial evidence (CSE) otherwise supports the JCCs finding as to the cause of Claimants collapse. We agree with Claimant and reverse. Analysis Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2007), provides in relevant part: The injury, its occupational cause, and any resulting manifestations or disability must be established to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, based on objective relevant med...

...n as to the medical cause of Claimant's April 12 incident and injuries specifically was not. Because Dr. Harbison is not a medical doctor, he was not qualified to testify as to the medical cause of Claimant's condition in this particular case. See §§ 440.09(1) & *109 440.13(5)(e), Fla....

...He suffered a disabling heart attack while working for the used car lot and sought workers' compensation benefits. The deputy commissioner calculated Talley's average weekly wage by combining the earnings from both jobs, and the full commission affirmed. Section 440.09(2), Fla....

...74-197, § 5, Laws of Fla., to provide: No compensation shall be payable in respect of the disability or death of any employee covered by the Federal Employer's Liability Act, the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, or the Jones Act. Section 440.09(2), Fla. Stat. (1987). [5] It is doubtful that the same result would be reached today in view of the change in language of section 440.09(2), as now that language excludes payment of compensation benefits only if the claimant's disability or death is covered by one of the enumerated federal compensation acts....

...Wetherington had instituted to obtain authorization for an intrathecal, morphine pump: Two authorized physicians had prescribed such a pump for relief of pain, but Pavilion Apartments and Claims Center had refused to furnish one. On appeal, as below, Pavilion Apartments and Claims Center invoke section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (2004), [2] *228 which renders an employee ineligible for workers' compensation benefits if it is "determine[d] that the employee has knowingly or intentionally engaged in any of the acts described in s. 440.105 . . . for the purpose of securing workers' compensation benefits." § 440.09(4)(a), Fla....

...oral statement as part of, or in support of, a claim for payment or other benefit . . . knowing that such statement contains any false, incomplete, or misleading information concerning any fact or thing material to such claim. § 440.105(4)(b)(2.), Fla. Stat. (2004). Where a section 440.09 defense is raised, the "JCC is ....

...1st DCA 2005), and those raising the defense have the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. The Workers' Compensation Act contains no authority for the suspension of benefits based on a payor's unilateral determination that a claimant has violated sections 440.09 and 440.105, Florida Statutes (2004). As we said in Isaac v. Green Iguana, Inc., 871 So.2d 1004, 1007 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004): Section 440.09(4) contemplates that, before benefits may be denied pursuant to the statute, there must be a showing [and an official determination] that the claimant made "oral or written statements concerning facts material to his claim that he knew...

...hearing." Village Apartments, 856 So.2d at 1141. "[I]f, at the time he made any of the[ ] statements, [a claimant] knew they were false, incomplete or misleading, then the statements fall within the scope of section 440.105(4)(b)2., and, pursuant to section 440.09(4), result in the loss of workers' compensation benefits." Id....

...Wetherington's compensable work injuries occurred on December 20, 1993, prior to the enactment of section 440.105, which took effect on January 1, 1994, see Ch. 93-415, § 12, at 93-94, Laws of Fla., and on April 20, 1994. As amended by ch.2003-412, § 6, at 3877, Laws of Fla., section 440.09(4)(a) provides: An employee shall not be entitled to compensation or benefits under this chapter if any judge of compensation claims ....

...This section shall apply to accidents, regardless of the date of the accident. For injuries occurring prior to January 1, 1994, this section shall pertain to the acts of the employee described in s. 440.105 . . . occurring subsequent to January 1, 1994. § 440.09(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004); see Ch. 93-415, § 5, at 77, Laws of Fla. (creating section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes)....

...at any time. Additionally, the judge found that just prior to the accident, claimant took evasive action to avoid the accident, and that such evasive action was in furtherance of his sworn duty to protect life and property within Palm Beach County. Section 440.09, Florida Statutes, provides, in pertinent part, that "[c]ompensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee if the disability or death results from an injury arising out of and in the course of employment." Section 440.091, Florida Statutes, specifically delineates the circumstances under which law enforcement officers act within the course of their employment for purposes of coverage by the workers' compensation law. That section provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 440.091 Law enforcement officer; when acting within the course of employment....

...(Emphasis added.) The fact that a law enforcement officer is on call for duty and has a police radio and other indicia of his authority in his possession is not dispositive in determining whether an off-duty officer is acting within the course of his employment. Rather, the issue, pursuant to the provisions of Section 440.091, is whether the officer is carrying out his primary responsibility, which is the "prevention or detection of crime or the enforcement of the penal, criminal, traffic, or highway laws of the state." Accordingly, in City of Ft....

...igation kit and police radio in her car. Since it was undisputed that the police officer was not discharging a "primary responsibility" at the time of the accident, we held that the accident had not occurred within the course of her employment under Section 440.091....

...n duty, but was not actually on duty when the accident occurred. Further, the claimant here, like the claimant in Abrams, but unlike the claimant in Hanstein, was not then in the process of carrying out any "primary responsibility," as delineated by Section 440.091, Florida Statutes....

...Acebal is not admissible evidence under the “self-help” provisions contained in chapter 440. But, we nevertheless conclude that under the facts and procedural history of this case, the JCC employed incorrect legal standards in conducting the major contributing cause analysis required by section 440.09(l)(a)-(b), Florida Statutes (2005)....

...e injuries at issue.”); § 440.13(1)(e), Fla. Stat. (2005) (defining “compensable” as “a determination by a carrier or [JCC] that a condition suffered by an employee results from an injury arising out of and in the course of employment.”); § 440.09(1)(a)-(b), Fla....

...an aggrieved party in derogation of the appealed order.”). Based on the foregoing, and in light of the legal errors raised by Claimant in this appeal, we conclude that the JCC misapplied the MCC standard in denying the medical treatment at issue. Section 440.09(l)(a)-(b) sets forth the textual basis for coverage of injuries under chapter 440. This section provides that “the accidental compensable injury must be the major contributing cause of any resulting injuries” for which treatment or benefits are sought. § 440.09(1), Fla: Stat....

...the two subsections that follow — both of which specifically explain how MCC analysis is to be performed — distinctly limit the “other causes” that may be considered to (1) preexisting injuries and conditions, or (2) subsequent injuries. See § 440.09(l)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. (2005). In short, under the text of section 440.09(1)(a)-(b), MCC analysis cannot be performed in a vacuum or, particular^ in the absence of competing causes, as this court has previously concluded....

...the E/C’s assertion that the workplace accident was no longer the MCC of Claimant’s need for medical treatment. Given these findings, the JCC’s conclusions on the issue of the MCC of the need for surgery are inconsistent. Under the dictates of section 440.09(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2005), and this court’s relevant case law, the JCC should have weighed the relative contributing forces of the two established contributing causes of Claimant’s lower back injury that required medical treatment....

...The E/C argue that, because Brown's exposure to asbestos has not resulted in a work place "injury" as that term is defined by Florida law, the JCC erred by awarding benefits. We agree and reverse. An employer is required to pay compensation or furnish benefits only if an employee suffers an injury by accident. See § 440.09(1), Fla....

...ries include complete retrograde amnesia. Claimant subsequently filed a claim for medical benefits, temporary total and permanent total disability benefits, and attendant care benefits. The employer and carrier defended the claim on the grounds that section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes (1985), "the intoxication statute," precluded claimant from receiving workers' compensation benefits for these injuries....

...n of causation by intoxication. The judge found the accident was compensable, and awarded claimant temporary total disability benefits, permanent total disability benefits, medical benefits, and 24-hour-a-day attendant care services. The judge found section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes (1985), inapplicable to this case because, among other reasons, the statute requires a test for alcohol in the employee's whole blood, not in his blood serum. Section 440.09(3) provides: No compensation shall be payable if the injury was occasioned primarily by the intoxication of the employee; by the influence of any narcotic drugs, barbiturates, or other stimulants not prescribed by a physician, which af...

...picking up the boxes of tile on August 13, 2003, not in March. Because Dr. Hynes testified that Claimant had an underlying degenerative disk, it was necessary for the JCC to determine the major contributing cause of Claimant's neck condition. Under section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2002), [i]f an injury arising out of and in the course of employment combines with a preexisting disease or condition to cause....

...1st DCA 2000); Broward Indus. Plating, Inc. v. Weiby, 394 So.2d 1117 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Cast Crete Corp. v. Duncan, 383 So.2d 245 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980). When an injury combines with a preexisting condition to cause disability or need for treatment, section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes *928 (2000), requires the claimant to show that the workplace injury contributed more than the preexisting disease to the disability or need for treatment. This court has held that this major-contributing-cause requirement of section 440.09(1)(b) is satisfied by proof that workplace exposure aggravated a preexisting disease....

...Sanctions in this context would provide negative incentives for a self-executing system. Second, a blurring of the distinction between the concepts of compensability and entitlement to benefits renders other important statutory provisions meaningless. For example, section 440.09(a), Florida Statutes, concerning subsequent injuries or conditions, and section 440.09(b), Florida Statutes, concerning preexisting conditions, both require the workplace injury remain the major contributing cause of the need for treatment before the E/C is obligated to provide the treatment....

...The trial court granted Publix's motion for summary judgment, holding that workers' compensation was Perez's exclusive remedy. We affirm. Prior to the 1993 amendments, which became effective January 1, 1994, Perez's injury would have been compensable under the "premises rule" exception to the "coming and going rule." Section 440.09 of the Florida Statutes provided that compensation shall be payable to an employee for disability or death arising out of and in the course of employment....

...r that date. Accordingly, the judge concluded that the appellant's condition was not the direct and proximate result of an injury arising out of and in the course of her employment, and was therefore not covered by the workers' compensation law. See Section 440.09, Florida Statutes....

...[Emphasis supplied.] The employee's most telling argument to the contrary is that the statute, being in derogation of the common law, can only apply to specific subjects which it seeks to *873 address. Thus, he reasons, since the statute only covers "injury arising out of and in the course of employment" (section 440.09) and further defines "injury" as an accident (section 440.02), intentional torts are excluded because such are never accidental....

...As a result of injuries sustained in the fight, Fitzpatrick submitted a worker's compensation claim. The state withheld a letter from the bar's compensation insurance provider detailing that Fitzpatrick had received $20,956.47 for medical bills and $2,946.84 for lost wages. Section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes (2007), provides that "[c]ompensation is not payable if the injury was occasioned primarily ......

...1st DCA 1996), which addressed whether the claimant's exclusive remedy for benefits was under the Longshore and Harbor *438 Workers' Compensation Act, rather than under chapter 440. The court in FCCI stated that the JCC had jurisdiction to determine whether the claimant was required by section 440.09(2) to seek benefits under federal, rather than state law....

...The stress, fright, or excitement exclusion now before us, is but one of several. *728 See, e.g., § 440.02(32), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1994) (injury or death compensable only if "work performed in the course and scope of employment is the major contributing cause."); § 440.09(1)(a), Fla.Stat....

...Such a claim, quite simply, is not cognizable under the ADA." McDonald v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 901 F.Supp. 471, 479 (D.Mass.1995) AFFIRMED. ERVIN and DAVIS, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] In her issue on appeal, claimant Hensley also argues that section 440.09, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), violates Title I of the ADA. Nowhere in the brief, however, has Hensley identified which portion of section 440.09 runs afoul of the ADA. The only portion of section 440.09 that expressly treats mental or nervous injuries appears in section 440.09(1), and provides that mental or nervous injuries "occurring as a manifestation of an injury compensable under this section" must be demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence....

...The "customer" lured Bush to the rear of the store and suddenly began beating her about the head. The "customer" then dragged her into the store's back office and raped her. We hold that these undisputed facts establish the necessary causal connection between Bush's injuries and her employment. See § 440.09(1) Fla....

...Celeste and Randy D. Ellison, West Palm Beach, for Appellee. PER CURIAM. In this case of first impression, the employer and its insurance carrier (E/C) complain that the judge of compensation claims (JCC) erroneously failed to apply the defense set forth in section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), based on false statements claimant made contrary to section 440.105(4)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994). We conclude that the provisions of section 440.09(4) are inapplicable to the case at bar, because the E/C did not show that an administrative hearing officer, court or jury had determined that claimant had knowingly or intentionally made false statements. Section 440.09(4) provides: (4) An employee shall not be entitled to compensation or benefits under this chapter if any administrative hearing officer, court, or jury convened in this state determines that the employee has knowingly or intentionally engaged in any of the acts described in s....

...The E/C did not, however, provide any evidence that "any administrative hearing officer, court, or jury" had determined that claimant knowingly or intentionally made any "false, fraudulent, or misleading oral or written statement for the purpose of obtaining... any benefit or payment." Section 440.09(4), by virtue of its plain language, contemplates the existence of a determination in a proceeding collateral to the workers' compensation matter, by either an administrative agency or a court, that false or fraudulent statements were knowingly made, before its provisions can impact a claim for benefits....

...Thus, we agree that the JCC correctly found that the statute was inapplicable. [1] In so concluding, we are not saying, of course, that the JCC does not retain his or her traditional role as fact-finder in resolving credibility issues of any claim for benefits. We hold only that before benefits can be denied under section 440.09(4) based on false or fraudulent statements, a determination to that effect must first be made in one of the forums delineated in the statute, and evidence of same must properly be submitted in the pending workers' compensation proceeding. Finding no error in the JCC's conclusion that section 440.09(4) was inapplicable in this case, we affirm the order determining that a compensable accident occurred and awarding benefits to claimant. [2] AFFIRMED. BARFIELD, C.J., and ERVIN and KAHN, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Although the E/C has stated the issue as jurisdictional, asserting that the JCC has jurisdiction to deny workers' compensation benefits under section 440.09(4) based on misrepresentations made by the claimant, the issue is not one of jurisdiction, but rather is whether the prerequisites were satisfied for operation of the statute....

...Wiitala of Wiitala & Contole, P.A., North Palm Beach, for Appellant. Kimberly A. Hill of Conroy, Simberg & Ganon, P.A., Hollywood, for Appellees. ERVIN, Judge. Claimant, E.H., appeals the order by the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) denying coverage pursuant to sections 440.09(4) and 440.105(4)(b), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...The JCC concluded that the toxicology evidence, supported by expert testimony, proved that E.H. made false statements during his deposition and compensation hearing when he denied ingesting cocaine for two weeks preceding the industrial accident. Characterizing himself as an administrative hearing officer or court under section 440.09(4), the JCC determined that E.H. made these false statements for the purpose of obtaining benefits, thus violating section 440.105(4)(b), and concluded therefrom that E.H. was not entitled to compensation or benefits. This was error. Section 440.09(4) bars compensation or benefits when an "administrative hearing officer, court, or jury convened in this state" determines that a claimant has violated section 440.105....

...This, of course, does not affect the JCC's obligation to evaluate E.H.'s credibility when considering the merits of his claim for benefits or the E/C's intoxication defense. We direct the JCC on remand to determine whether E.H. is entitled to compensation, without reference to either section 440.105 or 440.09(4)....

...made in exchange for each other by each of the two contracting parties). Here, Hawley and Appellant clearly made mutual promises. Thus, the agreement is a bilateral contract, and Chapter 440 must be examined to determine the resulting consequences. Section 440.09(1)(d), Florida Statutes (1999), provides in pertinent part, that: [I]f an accident happens while the employee is employed elsewhere than in this state, which would entitle the employee or his or her dependents to compensation if it had happened in this state, the employee or his or her dependents are entitled to compensation if the contract of employment was made in this state, or the employment was principally localized in this state. § 440.09(1)(d), Fla....

...receiving partial total disability benefits, was a procedural change because the benefits remained the same even though they may be paid by a different entity); Russell Corp. v. Jacobs, 782 So.2d 404 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001) (holding that an amendment to section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes, which granted the JCC jurisdiction to determine whether fraud occurred in workers' compensation cases, was a procedural change and should apply retroactively); Fla....

...We reverse and remand for entry of an order authorizing the surgery because all of the medical evidence established that the need for the surgery was brought about solely by occupational injuries and, thus, the JCC erred in applying the major contributing cause standard in section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2006), to deny the surgery....

...medical issues which accompany even the most fundamental decisions regarding an injured worker's entitlement to, and a carrier's liability for, medical treatment. Here, the JCC, by application of the major contributing cause standard in section *331 440.09(1)(b) denied a surgery (which was indisputably medically necessary) simply because the EMA opined that Claimant, who was fifty-six years old, had age-appropriate degeneration in his spine which preexisted both dates of accident....

...applying the major contributing cause standard to deny the surgery. See Pizza Hut v. Proctor, 955 So.2d 637 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007); Pearson v. Paradise Ford, 951 So.2d 12, 17 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (stating "it seems evident that the legislature intended [440.09](1)(b) to apply only when the claimant's need for treatment or benefits is caused by the impact of an employment accident combining with a preexisting injury or condition that is unrelated to an employment accident")....

...His claim was met with a motion to dismiss on the ground that the judge of industrial claims lacked jurisdiction. The theory of the motion was that unspecified federal law created a remedy for an injury of this kind, and also, even before the enactment of Section 440.09(2), Florida Statutes (1975), ousted state tribunals of jurisdiction over accidents occurring on navigable waters....

...y independent of the Jones Act. For cases arising after October 1, 1974, however, the legislature has made the question whether the Jones Act applies determinative of whether workmen's compensation benefits are available. Ch. 74-197 § 3 has created Section 440.09(2), Florida Statutes (1975), to provide: No compensation shall be payable in respect of the disability or death of any employee covered by the Federal Employer's Liability Act, the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's [sic] Compensation Act, or the Jones Act....

...[5] To deny workmen's compensation benefits, on the ground that a claimant could sue under the Jones Act, would be to take the Sikes decision one step further, albeit in a direction indicated by obiter dicta in that case. The fact that the legislature did take this additional step, by enacting Section 440.09(2) after the injury with which we are concerned was inflicted, is of ambiguous significance....

...884, 79 L.Ed. 1631 (1935). [5] The 1974 Legislature has now barred coverage under the act for employees covered by the Federal Employers' Liability Act, the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, or the Jones Act, effective October 1, 1974. Section 440.09(2), Fla....

...authorized medical therapy related to the compensable injury. The question before us is whether the subsequent accident is compensable, i.e., did it arise out of and in the course of claimant's employment within the meaning of sections 440.02(6) and 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1979)? We treat the case as governed by the statutes in effect on the date of the original injury....

...Section 440.02(6), Florida Statutes (1979), provides: The term `injury' means personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment, and such diseases or infection as naturally or unavoidably result from such injury.... Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1979), states, in part: Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee if the disability or death results from an injury arising out of and in the course of employment......

...cians and a second medical opinion. In challenging this award the employer/carrier present several issues on appeal, each of which we find to be without merit. In addition, while the employer/carrier refer to the major contributing cause standard in section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes, that statutory provision does not apply here as this case involves two industrial accidents and injuries without any preexisting injury or condition attributable to a nonindustrial cause. As explained in Pearson v. Paradise Ford, 951 So.2d 12, (Fla. 1st DCA 2007), section 440.09(1)(b) applies when a claimant's need for treatment or benefits is caused by the impact of an industrial accident combining with a preexisting injury or condition which is unrelated to an industrial accident....

...The judge of compensation claims accepted the testimony of Claimant and the union business manager, rejected that of the supervisor, and ruled that the contract was made in Florida. This ruling was erroneous for the following reasons. Jurisdiction of this claim is dependent upon the provision in section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1985), that "[w]here an accident happens while the employee is employed elsewhere than in this state, which would entitle him or his dependents to compensation if it had happened in this state, the employee or his...

...against the claim for psychiatric treatment by asserting that Claimant’s two non-work-related MVAs “served to break the chain of causation between the original work accident of 4/1/12 and claimant’s current need for psychiatric treatment, per § 440.09.” In support of its defense, the E/C submitted deposition testimony from its independent medical examiner (IME), Dr....

...ng subsection 440.20(4), but did not make any relevant findings. Instead, the JCC concluded that Dr. Segal’s somewhat equivocal causation testimony was not clear and convincing evidence to support a claim of a compensa-ble psychiatric injury under section 440.093, Florida Statutes (2011). In the alternative, the JCC also found' that even assuming Claimant met the burden of persuasion under section 440.093, the defénse based on MCC was supported by Dr....

...ia the parties’ mediation agreement. Application of Subsection 440.20(4) To prove entitlement to the requested psychiatric treatment, Claimant had the burden to show that the April 1, 2012, Compensable workplace accident is the MCC for his PTSD. §§ 440.09, 440.093, Fla....

...4), may be determined. And meaningful analysis' can be made as to both whether that compen-sable psychiatric injury is .the MCC for the need for the specific treatment requested by Claimant,' and whether such treatment ⅛ medically necessary. See §§ 440.09, 440.13, Fla....

...WORKERS' COMPENSATION RECORDS This record series consists of the first report of injury and the employer's supplemental reports including, if used, OSHA Form No. 200 as well as its predecessor forms No. 100 and 102 and OSHA Form No. 101. These records are created pursuant to Florida Statutes Section 440.09 and OSHA standards 1904.2, 1904.4, and 1904.5....

...jurisdiction in this case. They rely primarily on the absence of statutory language in the Florida act explicitly providing for dual jurisdiction in these circumstances, contrasting this absence of statutory provision with the explicit provisions in section 440.09(1) covering claimants employed in Florida and injured out of state....

...nt... ." While the statute does not specify where the employment must be carried on, obviously it includes carrying on employment within the state of Florida. It also contemplates employment being carried on outside of Florida in some instances. See section 440.09(1), discussed below....

...of Florida, or that the person must be principally working out of the state. Rather, the significant provision in this definition is that a person must be "engaged in any employment," i.e., performing a service covered by the act, to be an employee. Section 440.09(1) defines coverage under the act in broad, general language: "Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee if the disability or death results from an injury arising out of and in th...

...section 440.02(16) as "personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment... ." Again, it is obvious that the act covers accidents and injuries arising out of and in the course of employment in the state of Florida. Section 440.09(1) also extends coverage under the Florida act in certain circumstances to injuries occurring outside the state of Florida: Where an accident happens while the employee is employed elsewhere than in this state, which would entitle him...

...age to exist under the Florida act. We deem it significant that the only provision in chapter 440 imposing specific restrictions or qualifications on the entitlement to benefits are those relating to injuries that occur outside the state pursuant to section 440.09(1)....

...esolving the various material conflicts in the evidence including the question as to which worker was the aggressor in the altercation. [1] The order appealed is accordingly reversed and the cause remanded. NIMMONS and ZEHMER, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] Section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes, provides that no compensation shall be payable "if the injury was occasioned primarily ......

...that the employer's IME made the claimant's statements immaterial." The JCC also determined that "[t]he claimant may have deliberately made false statements of fact, believing them to be material, but they turn out not to be." This appeal followed. Section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (2002), provides: An employee shall not be entitled to compensation or benefits under this chapter if any judge of compensation claims, administrative law judge, court, or jury convened in this state determines tha...

...If, at the time a claimant makes any of the foregoing types of statements, he or she knew that they were false, incomplete, or misleading, the statements fall within the scope of section 440.105(4)(b)2. and result in the loss of workers' compensation benefits pursuant to section 440.09(4)....

...t of the claimant's claim for benefits). In the instant case, the JCC expressly found that claimant intended to mislead by making false or misleading statements about his symptoms that were designed to advance his claims. Once this finding was made, section 440.09(4) precluded claimant from receiving workers' compensation benefits....

...The hospital contends that it has not taken inconsistent positions. The hospital claims that its notice of denial did not deny that the injury occurred in the scope of.the decedent’-s employment. Rather, the notice of denial asserted the “medical causation” defense. The medical causation defense appears in section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes: [T]he accidental compensable injury must be the major contributing cause of any resulting injuries....

...ride he received was not transportation provided by the employer." We find that the Commission erred in reversing the JIC and in finding that Wert's injuries did not arise out of and in the course of employment, as required for compensation by F.S. Section 440.09, F.S.A....

...The statute applies to workers' compensation cases and provides for a presumption of compensability. See S. Trail Fire Control Dist. v. Johnson, 449 So.2d 947, 947 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Martin v. State, Dep't of Corr., 890 So.2d 1238, 1238 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); see also § 440.09(1), Fla....

...Grice, 692 So.2d 896 (Fla.1997); Brown v. S.S. Kresge Co., Inc., 305 So.2d 191 (Fla. 1974). The paramount consideration in the instant case is the statutory requirement that workers' compensation benefits are payable for an injury which occurs in the course and scope of employment. Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1987), provides that compensation shall be paid, except for the situations enumerated in that section, none of which are applicable here....

...eave, to cover the difference in the amount between the workers' compensation benefits and the employee's full compensation. Our holding here is not a barrier to such a policy. See, e.g., Fla. Admin. Code R. 60K-5.031. Amount of Benefits While under section 440.09(1) an employer may not avoid paying workers' compensation benefits by offering alternative benefits, pursuant to section 440.20(15), Florida Statutes (1987): an injured worker, except where expressly given such a right by contract, may...

...Sterling became angry and shoved Murphy in the chest a few times, provoking Murphy to hit him once with a closed fist to his face. Sterling fell backwards, hit his head upon the concrete floor and tragically sustained severe and permanent injuries. Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes, provides that compensation benefits will be payable "if the [claimant's] disability or death results from an injury arising out of and in the course of employment." In Brockman v....

...Even if the injuries Sterling received at the Christmas party had arisen out of and in the course of his employment at Mike Brown, Inc., he would nevertheless be barred from recovering compensation benefits by virtue of the judge's finding that his injury was occasioned primarily by his intoxication. Section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes. We need not reach Sterling's argument that the evidence was insufficient to trigger the presumption set out in Section 440.09(3) that his injuries were occasioned primarily by his intoxication, because we observe that the judge found that even absent the presumption, Sterling was intoxicated and his injuries were caused by his intoxication....

...ernative conclusions: 1) that the appellant's injury was not caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment; 2) that even if the injury were employment-related, he was barred from receiving compensation due to the provisions of Section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes, in that he willfully intended to injure another person; 3) that, in any event, the claimant's injury was occasioned primarily by his own intoxication, and was therefore noncompensable; and 4) the employer/carrier...

...njury was occasioned primarily by his intoxication, hence he was barred from compensation, I think it important to consider first what is required by the statutory phrase, "if the injury was occasioned primarily by the intoxication of the employee." § 440.09(3), Fla....

...ion to willfully injure another, is not an issue. [5] I think it unfortunate that this court in Tucker Taxi used the term "aggressor" in that it implies that one who initiates a conflict, regardless of the circumstances, cannot recover compensation. Section 440.09(3) denies compensation to an employee who willfully intends to injure or kill himself or another person....

...ee's preexisting condition was a mental and physical inability to cope with stress. The Division argues that Bolinger requires that the "arising out of" language in Section 121.021(13) should be construed the same as the "arising out of" language in Section 440.09(1) of the Workers' Compensation Law and that Richard E....

...In this workers’ compensation case, Claimant appeals the portion of an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) that denies temporary total disability (TTD) benefits on the finding that Claimant had not produced evidence of “objective relevant medical findings” as required by section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2013). The JCC employed this test at the insistence of the Employer/Servicing Agent (E/SA), based on the wording of section 440.09(1): “[t]he injury, its occupational cause, and any resulting manifestations or disability must be established to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, based on objective relevant medical findings.” But Claimant argues the JCC used the wrong legal standard, because section 440.09 governs compensability and here the E/SA had stipulated to compensability of the injury....

...Merit Electric, 37 So.3d 381, 383 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). Although Jackson addresses the law as it stood before imposition of the “major contributing cause” standard of causation in 1994, see chapter 93-415, section 5, at 76, Laws of Florida (amending section 440.09(1)), its holding translates to the current causation standard if a “break” is understood to occur when the work-related cause drops to 50% or less of the total cause of the need for the requested benefit....

...By the stipulation of compensability, Claimant was absolved of the need to reestablish objective relevant medical findings, defined as “those objective findings that correlate to the subjective complaints of the injured employee and are confirmed by physical examination findings or diagnostic testing.” § 440.09(1), Fla....

...Stenholm, 577 So.2d 977 (Fla. 1st DCA), dismissed, 584 So.2d 997 (Fla.1991). The appellants also contest the determination that the claimant's injury is the major contributing cause of her disability and need for treatment. However, this requirement in section 440.09(1)(b), Fla.Stat., as well as the major contributing cause provision in section 440.02(32), Fla....

...Armstrong World Inds. Inc., 513 So.2d 1265, 1268 (Fla.1987). The plaintiff's complaint should not have been dismissed with prejudice on a theory of sovereign immunity. Also, in support of dismissal, AIM claims entitlement to workers' compensation immunity under section 440.09(6), Florida Statutes (1999). Section 440.09(6) provides: Except as provided in this chapter, a construction design professional who is retained to perform professional services on a construction project, or an employee of a construction design professional in the performance of...

...See, e.g., Wallace v. Post, Buckley, Schuh, & Jernigan, Inc., 579 So.2d 397, 397 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) ("[Defendant's] contractual obligations under its Standard Consulting Agreement with the Florida Department of Transportation qualify for the immunity of subsection 440.09(5), Florida Statutes (1989) [now section 440.09(6), Florida Statutes (1999) ].")....

...Relying on the nurse's written statements that claimant's pain complaints were subjective, the employer and carrier refused to authorize the orthopedic referral, contending there were no objective relevant *764 medical findings justifying the evaluation as required by section 440.09, Florida Statutes (2007). The judge agreed with that argument and denied claimant's request for the evaluation. Section 440.09 is entitled "Coverage." Subsection (1) provides, in pertinent part: The employer must ......

case is governed by that portion of Fla.Stat. § 440.09(1), F.S.A., which provides: “Where an accident

HAWKES, C.J. In this workers’ compensation appeal, we are required to interpret section 440.093, Florida Statutes, enacted by the Florida Legislature as part of the 2003 Chapter 440 reforms. Section 440.093 discusses the four situations when mental or nervous injuries arise....

...In addition to the claims based on her physical injuries, the Claimant claimed psychiatric injuries and requested treatment with a psychiatrist. The employer/carrier denied the psychological claims, alleging the psychiatric injuries were not compensable. At a hearing before a JCC, both parties’ arguments focused on section 440.093(2), Florida Statutes, which authorizes coverage for psychiatric injuries that manifest themselves as a result of a physical injury otherwise compensable under Chapter 440....

...that Claimant’s laryngeal contusion and vocal cord hematoma alone constitute at least 50% of the cause of her PTSD [Post Traumatic Stress Disorder], dysthymic disorder, anxiety disorder or personality disorder.” Claimant now challenges the JCC’s ruling, arguing the JCC erred in its application of section 440.093(2). Because this issue requires us to interpret and apply section 440.093, our review is de novo. See Socolow v. Flanigans *769 Enters., 877 So.2d 742, 743 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Section 440.093 The Workers’ Compensation Law is designed to provide defined benefits for certain injuries caused by workplace accidents. See Chapter 440, Fla. Stat. (2007). Although recovery for psychiatric injuries is limited and restricted under the law, certain psychiatric injuries, which the statute refers to as “mental or nervous injuries,” are compensable. Id. Section 440.093 was added to the chapter as part of the 2003 reforms. This section addresses “mental or nervous injuries” and clarifies when these injuries are either compensable, or when they affect compensability. Id. Section 440.093(1) contains three sentences, with each sentence addressing different situations when mental or nervous injuries may arise in the workplace. Section 440.093(2) defines a fourth situation involving mental or nervous injuries. The following discussion addresses the extent of coverage for these four situations. The first sentence in section 440.093(1) provides: “A mental or nervous injury due to stress, fright, or excitement only is not an injury by accident arising out of the employment.” This first provision precludes coverage for mental or nervous injuries caused only by mental trauma....

...a mental or nervous injury as a consequence of witnessing some horrific event at the workplace. Although the legislature recognizes that such mental or nervous injuries exist, they are not com-pensable pursuant to Chapter 440. The second sentence in section 440.093(1) provides: “Nothing in this section shall be construed to allow for the payment of benefits under this chapter for mental or nervous injuries without an accompanying physical injury requiring medical treatment.” This second prov...

...ury will also be compensable. For example, if an employee, in the course and scope of employment, is sexually assaulted at the workplace and suffers a physical injury that requires medical treatment, the physical injury is certainly compensable. See § 440.09, Fla. Stat. (2007). If the employee also suffers a mental or nervous injury separate and apart from the physical injury, the mental or nervous injury would be compensable because it would meet the section 440.09 requirements and also comply with section 440.093(1). In this hypothetical situation, the employee would have simultaneously suffered two compensable workplace injuries: one physical and one mental. The third sentence in section 440.093(1) provides: “A physical injury resulting from mental or nervous injuries unaccompanied by physical trauma requiring medical treatment shall not be com-pensable under this chapter.” This third *770 provision precludes coverage whe...

...the employee to suffer a heart attack or other internal failure. In this hypothetical, the physical injury (the heart attack) was caused by the mental or nervous injury (stress, fright, excitement) and would not be compensable under Chapter 440. Subsection 440.093(2) defines a fourth situation involving mental or nervous injury....

...Under the Workers’ Compensation Law, a “manifestation” is a disease or infection that “naturally or unavoidably” results from an initial, compensable workplace injury, not a synonym for the initial compen-sable injury. § 440.02(19), Fla. Stat. (2007); Subsection 440.093(2) provides: Mental or nervous injuries occurring as a manifestation of an injury compensa-ble under this chapter shall be demonstrated by clear and convincing medical evidence by a licensed psychiatrist ......

...If the chronic pain eventually results in the employee suffering a mental or nervous injury requiring treatment, the mental or nervous injury would be compensable as the manifestation of the physical injury. The Injury at Issue Here, the parties seem to have conflated the provision enumerated in the second sentence of section 440.093(1) (mental or nervous injury accompanying a physical injury) with that in section 440.093(2) (mental or nervous injury manifesting as a result of an earlier physical injury). The Claimant argues that the JCC erred in finding her mental injuries were not covered under section 440.093(2). As noted, section 440.093(2) addresses only those mental injuries that manifest as a result of a physical injury requiring medical treatment. Thus, in order to support her claim for coverage under section 440.093(2), the Claimant would have had to prove her mental injury was the manifestation of the bruising and temporary loss of voice that she suffered during the attack....

...ury to the Claimant’s neck. Because these mental or nervous injuries may have occurred at the same time as the physical injuries that required medical treatment, the mental or nervous injuries could only be compensable under the second sentence in section 440.093(1). Therefore, the JCC was correct in finding they could not, without further evidence, be compensable under section 440.093(2). In sum, the Claimant presented evidence relating directly to the type of mental or nervous injury defined in the second provision of section 440.093(1), but made an argument based on the type of injury defined in section 440.093(2)....

...Accordingly, the JCC was correct in finding there was insufficient evidence to support the Claimant’s argument that she was entitled to compensation pursuant to the later. However, because it appears that both the Claimant and the employer/carrier were uncertain as to the nuances of section 440.093, we REVERSE and REMAND this matter for further proceedings, including the taking of additional evidence if necessary....

...The judge found that claimant had "smoked marijuana on the day of his injury." There is evidence, in the form of testimony from witnesses, to support such a finding. However, the judge incorrectly concluded that, because of the presumption authorized in certain cases by section 440.09(7)(b), Florida Statutes (1999), claimant was required to establish "by clear and convincing evidence that the intoxication or influence of the drug did not contribute to the injury." Before the presumption authorized by section 440.09(7)(b) can come into play, the employer must establish that "the employee ha[d], at the time of the injury, a blood alcohol level equal to or greater than the level specified in s....

...a positive confirmation of a drug." (Emphasis added.) It is clear that the employer did not meet this burden because it did not require claimant to submit to drug testing until nine days after the work-related injury had occurred. Therefore, the employer was not entitled to the benefit of the presumption authorized by section 440.09(7)(b)....

...Instead, it was obliged to establish, by the greater weight of the evidence, that the work-related injury "was occasioned primarily by the intoxication of the employee; [or] by the influence of any drugs, barbiturates, or other stimulants not prescribed by a physician." § 440.09(3), Fla. Stat. (1999). See generally Temporary Labor Source v. E.H., 765 So.2d 757 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (affirming a ruling that the presumption authorized by section 440.09(7)(b) does not arise when confirmation testing did not conform with applicable rules and that, as a result, the employer was required to establish that the injury was caused primarily by the influence of drugs), review denied, 786 So.2d 1189 (Fla.2001)....

...was compensable under the Florida Workers' Compensation Law. In order for a suicide to be compensable under the Florida Workers' Compensation Statute, the claimant's estate would need to prove that the claimant's suicide was not willful. Pursuant to § 440.09(3) Florida Statute (1990), no compensation shall be payable to an employee if the injury was caused by the willful intention to injure or kill himself ... There are exceptions to § 440.09(3) that would allow for a suicide to be found compensable. An intent to injure or to kill oneself is not "willful" for purposes of § 440.09(3) where the initial work related injury and its consequences cause the employee "to become devoid of normal judgment and dominated by a disturbance of mind so as to dethrone his reason and destroy his will." (Citation omitted). The JCC's order quotes language from the opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida in Whitehead v. Keene Roofing Co., 43 So.2d 464 (Fla. 1949), interpreting when an employee has "the willful intention ... to injure or kill himself ..." under section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes....

...The lower court denied compensability on the grounds that the decedent was aware of what he was doing at the time he took the poison and of the consequences of his act and that his mental condition was such that he had the willful intention to take his own life, and therefore compensability was precluded under section 440.09(3)....

...Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 36.30 (1993). The Florida Supreme Court revisited this issue in Jones v. Leon County Health Department, 335 So.2d 269 (Fla. 1976), and found a suicide death claim compensable and outside the proscription of section 440.09(3)....

...istress that he became devoid of normal judgment prior to committing suicide," and concluded that because of Scott's "neurosis, which was aggravated by his back injury, Scott did not form a willful intent to take his own life," within the meaning of section 440.09(3)....

...ve that the JCC erred as a result of a misapprehension of the applicable law. It is immediately apparent from his order and the examination of the expert witnesses [2] that the JCC was mistaken about *162 the applicable test for compensability under section 440.09(3)....

...nt injury causes a mental disturbance, such as serious depression, involving a loss of normal judgment, which mental disturbance in turn is the cause of the employee's suicide. Under such circumstances, a suicide is not willful within the meaning of section 440.09(3)....

...ly *163 ruled in Whitehead, 43 So.2d at 465, however, that the fact that the employee knew the fatal consequences of his suicide act is not determinative of the issue of an employee's "willful intention ... to ... kill himself" within the meaning of section 440.09(3)....

...For those who fall within the statute’s purview, “workers’ compensation is the exclusive remedy for the ‘accidental injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of the employment.”' Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So.2d 683, 686 (Fla.2000) (quoting Fla. Stat. § 440.09 (1))....

...Valdes retained Mark Zientz, Esq., to represent him in the workers' compensation proceedings, and Stuart Markus, Esq. to represent him in the criminal proceedings. In the criminal case, Mr. Valdes refused to admit guilt or accept any plea agreement that would render him ineligible for workers' compensation benefits. See § 440.09(4), Fla....

...inal hearing revealed that Claimant had not reported all of his 2008 taxable income to the IRS, which, the E/C argued, constituted a violation of section 440.105(4)(b), and thus required a forfeiture of all workers' compensation benefits pursuant to section 440.09(4)(a)....

...he accident and resulting injury arose out of and in the course of her employment, and she would be entitled to an award of compensation. This would follow from the language of the statute itself, without citing any further authorities. See Séction 440.09 F.S....

...Rod Cameron of Lozier, Thames & Frazier, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellants. Millard L. Fretland of Shell, Fleming, Davis & Menge, Pensacola, for Appellee. BROWNING, J. Appellants appeal the Judge of Compensation Claims' holding that he lacked jurisdiction to apply the 1998 amendment to section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes, to the Appellee's Petition for Benefits, because the Petition for Benefits was filed before the effective date of the amendment. The 1998 amendment to section 440.09(4) Florida Statutes, expressly grants jurisdiction to the Judge of Compensation Claims to decide issues of fraud in the workers' compensation context....

...plies retroactively." Id. "Remedial statutes simply confer or change a remedy in furtherance of existing rights and do not deny a claimant his or her vested rights." Rustic Lodge v. Escobar, 729 So.2d 1014, 1015 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). The amendment to section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (Supp.1998), became effective on January 1, 1999, and provides: An employee shall not be entitled to compensation or benefits under this chapter if any judge of compensation claims, administrative hearing officer,...

...y engaged in any of the acts described in s. 440.105 for the purpose of securing workers' compensation benefits. Id. (emphasis added). The underlined text constitutes the only amendment to the 1994 version of the statute. Thus, the 1998 amendment to section 440.09(4) changes only one factor in the workers' compensation process: it adds the Judge of Compensation Claims as an entity authorized to determine whether a claimant "knowingly or intentionally engaged in any of the acts described in section 440.105, for the purpose of securing workers' compensation benefits." Id....

...See Ace Disposal, 668 So.2d at 646. Because the amendment is procedural, the Judge of Compensation Claims erred by declining to apply the amendment to the Appellee's Petition for Benefits. Thus, we REVERSE and REMAND for the Judge of Compensation Claims to apply section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (Supp....

...The City appeals an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) determining that it must reimburse claimant for offsets, in the amount of claimant's weekly compensation benefits, which were taken from claimant's monthly pension benefits for the period July 1, 1973 through August 1, 1989. The City contends that section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes, in effect at the time of claimant's accident, permitted the offsets....

...The City continued to take this offset through August 1, 1989, when the City stopped taking the offset following the supreme court's decision in Barragan v. City of Miami, 545 So.2d 252 (Fla. 1989). At the time of claimant's injury and the subsequent commencement of benefits, section 440.09(4) provided: (4) When any employee of the state or of any political subdivision thereof or of any public or quasi-public corporation therein, or any person entitled thereto on account of dependency upon such employee, receives compensa...

...nly the amount of compensation awarded the employee. City of Miami v. Graham, 138 So.2d 751, 754 (Fla. 1962). In addition to the statute, the City had an ordinance, in effect since 1940, which also permitted the offset. When the legislature repealed section 440.09(4) effective July 1, 1973, the City relied upon its ordinance to continue taking the offsets for accidents occurring subsequent to July 1, 1973....

...the City from deducting workers' compensation benefits. In so holding, the court stated that Hoffkins v. City of Miami, 339 So.2d 1145 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), which had permitted the City to take the offset pursuant to its ordinance, after the repeal of section 440.09(4), was wrongly decided....

...Claimant filed a claim for benefits on October 27, 1989 seeking reimbursement for the pension offset which the City had taken for the period July 1, 1973 through August 1, 1989, amounting to approximately $48,000, as well as penalties, interests, costs and attorney's fees. With regard to the City's contention that section 440.09(4), in effect at the time of claimant's injury, gave the City the substantive right to take the offset, the JCC ruled that section 440.09(4) was a remedial statute which merely governed the manner in which monies are distributed and was procedural, so that when the statute was repealed in 1973, the City's right to take the offset ceased, pursuant to the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Barragan....

...statute remedial, and that the right of the parties would thus be governed by the law as it existed following the statute's repeal. We do not agree. In our view, the language of past Florida Supreme Court decisions makes it clear that the effect of section 440.09(4) was to require a reduction in compensation benefits. Accordingly, the statute is necessarily substantive in nature. In City of Miami v. Graham, 138 So.2d at 754, the Florida Supreme Court explained the import of section 440.09(4) thusly: Considering § 440.09(4), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., in its entirety, the legislative intent seems clear: That an employee shall not receive both a pension and workmen's compensation from his employer when the employer is the state or any political subdivision thereof or a quasi-public corporation therein. Again in Barragan, 545 So.2d at 254 the supreme court summarized § 440.09(4): The Court [in Graham ] based its holding on section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (1957), which provided that any workers' compensation benefits payable to injured public employees should be reduced by the amount of pension benefits which were also payable. These decisions recognize that section 440.09(4) provided for a reduction in compensation benefits....

...iously taken. The law changed the source from which the claimants received benefits — from predominantly state-generated payments to federally-generated payments — not the amounts received. Unlike the situation in the social security offset cases, section 440.09(4) directly impacted the amount of benefits placed in claimant's hands, and the substantive nature of this statute cannot be escaped. If the converse were true in this case — if section 440.09(4) permitted a claimant to collect both pension and workers' compensation benefits, but then in 1973, the statute was amended to permit the offset — it is without question that the amendment would be deemed substantive and not applicable to pre-1973 accidents....

...REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. BOOTH and BARFIELD, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] On appeal, the City contends that the JCC erred in applying Barragan retroactively. Because the decision in this case turns on the substantive nature of section 440.09(4), we do not reach the issue of the retroactivity of Barragan to the facts of this case.

...States he became ineligible to receive further benefits under the Puerto Rico Workmen’s Compensation act. (2) The claimant’s injury was covered by the Florida Workmen’s Compensation Law despite the apparent preclusion of such coverage by F.S. § 440.09(1), F.S.A....

...til termination of his class of disability. He further found Petitioner entitled to further medical treatment as the nature of his condition requires. The full Commission reversed the order of the Deputy Commissioner; it was of the opinion that F.S. § 440.09(1), F.S.A. precluded any recovery by the Petitioner under Florida Workmen’s Compensation Law. F.S. Section 440.09(1), F.S.A., provides in part: “ * * * Wher'e an accident happens while the employee is employed elsewhere than in this state, which would entitle him * * * to compensation if it had happened in this state, the employee * * * shall be...

...ion * * * provided, his contract of employment was not expressly for service exclusively outside of the state * * ” There is no dispute that the Petitioner’s employment was for service exclusively outside the State of Florida and that in view of § 440.09(1), F.S., he would ordinarily be barred from recovering under our Workmen’s Compensation Law....

...is estopped from raising the defense that the contract of employment was expressly for services exclusively outside the State of Florida.” It has been decided in Butler v. Allied Dairy Products, Inc. (Fla.), 151 So. 2d 279 , that the provisions in § 440.09(1) which preclude an employee injured outside the State of Florida from recovering benefits under the Florida Workmen’s Compensation Law where his employment contract was for service exclusively outside the State', can be waived....

...olation. Deren alleges that the letter conveys Fitzpatrick's financial motive to testify that Stewart was the aggressor in the *387 initial fight, since, as a matter of law, Fitzpatrick would not be entitled to any money if he was the aggressor. See § 440.09(3), Fla....

...2004, appeals an order of the judge of compensation claims which denied her claim for benefits on the ground that she knowingly and intentionally made a false or misleading statement for the purpose of securing workers' compensation benefits. See §§ 440.09(4) and 440.105(4)(b)1, Florida Statutes (2003)....

...Lessard, 688 So.2d 941 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), nor our decision in Pavilion Apartments v. Wetherington, 943 So.2d 226 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), require an award by the judge of compensation claims for a period preceding the determination of a violation of section 440.09(4)....

...aches on the legislative domain. First, Chapter 440 provides coverage only for employees. [1] See Section 440.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1985) ("[T]he employer shall furnish to the employee such medically necessary treatment... ." (e.s.)); see also Section 440.09(1)....

...To be compensable under Florida's Worker's Compensation Law, an injury must "arise out of employment in the sense of causation and be in the course of employment in the sense of continuity of time, space, and circumstances." Strother v. Morrison Cafeteria, 383 So.2d 623, 628 (Fla.1980); Fla. Stat. § 440.09(1) (providing employer must pay compensation where employee suffers injury "arising out of work performed in the course and scope of employment.")....

...Kilgore's answers were given within a reasonable degree of medical certainty. Given this testimony of Dr. Kilgore, E/C convincingly argue that no medical competent, substantial evidence supports the JCC's conclusion that the industrial accident is the MCC of Mathis' neck condition. See § 440.09(1), Fla....

...He opined that "this is an attritional type of rotator cuff possibly super imposed with an injury." Although the JCC did not have to accept Dr. Rogozinski's medical opinions on causation, Mathis had the burden to prove "by medical evidence only" that the industrial accident is the MCC of her neck condition. See § 440.09(1), Fla....

...e) and inserts to hold the shoulder or the arm to the shoulder socket. The supraspinatus muscle is one of those muscles. Mathis' shoulder tear injury involved the tendon insertion of that muscle to bone. [3] In pertinent part, this provision states: 440.09 Coverage.— (1) The employer must pay compensation or furnish benefits required by this chapter if the employee suffers an accidental compensable injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment....

...on in violation of section 440.105(4)(b), Florida Statutes (1997), is supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record. Accordingly, the judge correctly held that appellant was precluded from receiving any workers' compensation benefits by section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (1997)....

...The language of section 440.15(1)(e) did not change between March 8, 1988, and April 14, 1992. Nor are we concerned in the present case with subsequent statutory changes requiring proof of major contributing cause. See Ch. 93-415, § 5, at 76, Laws of Fla. (1994) (codified at § 440.09(1), Fla....

...§ 440.19(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1986). However, the statute of limitations is not jurisdictional and is waived unless asserted "at the first hearing of such claim in which all parties in interest are given reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard." § 440.09(2), Fla....

...1st DCA 1996) (setting forth a two-part test for determining compensability: (1) the claimant must have been performing work in the course and scope of his employment, and (2) the work performed by the claimant must be the major contributing cause of the claimant's injury); see also § 440.09(1), Fla....

...employment-related injury; and (3) he was not entitled to additional permanent impairment (PI) benefits. We affirm as to the first two issues, and reverse and remand with directions as to the third. I. The Denial of the Psychiatric Care Claim Under section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1999), an injured worker must establish any injury "to a reasonable degree of medical certainty and by objective medical findings....

...ngs by the deputy. It cannot do so on inferences or findings of its own. This brings us to the question of whether or not Olsen came to his death by suicide. The deputy commissioner found that Olsen did not come to his death by suicide. The statute, § 440.09(3), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides that no compensation shall be paid to one who intentionally takes his own life....

...he injury. He found that, as in Jones v. Leon County Health Department, 335 So.2d 269 (Fla. 1976), the evidence shows that, at the time of the suicide, Scott was so devoid of normal judgment as to negate a willful intent to kill himself, thus making Section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes, inapplicable to this case....

...He concluded: *1222 Based upon the evidence available, I find the employee's death resulted equally from the pre-existing condition and the injury of February 28, 1978. He thereupon found employer liable for one-half of the awardable benefits. Appellant asserts that Section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes, precludes recovery when a decedent intentionally kills himself....

...him so much distress that he became devoid of normal judgment prior to committing suicide. Compare Whitehead v. Keene Roofing Co., 43 So.2d 464 (Fla. 1949), and Jones v. Leon County Health Department, supra. Appellant contends that the exception to § 440.09(3) does not apply in this case since the injury is not severe enough to have caused Scott to become so devoid of normal judgment that he would commit suicide....

...the suicide, was the triggering factor. There is competent substantial evidence that because of his neurosis, which was aggravated by his back injury, Scott did not form a willful intent to take his own life. Therefore, under the facts of this case, Section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes, does not preclude recovery....

...was formed while Claimant was residing in Florida — albeit for work to be performed mostly outside of Florida — and Claimant’s acceptance of the Employer’s offer (the last act necessary to form the contract) occurred in Florida, we reverse. Section 440.09(l)(d), Florida Statutes (2007), provides that the Florida Workers’ Compensation Law covers accidents occurring under a contract of employment formed in Florida. See § 440.09(l)(d), Fla....

...d the petitioner was ordered to pay the respondent’s attorney a fee of $2,000. By order dated May 9, 1961, the full commission affirmed the latter order of the deputy commissioner. The full commission’s order contains the following rationale: “Section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes [F.S.A.], provides essentially that a claimant who is receiving workmen’s compensation benefits has his pension reduced by the amount of the compensation benefits paid. In the instant cause the City of Miami has ignored the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Law and is apparently attempting to operate autonomously in this field. While Section 440.09(4), *753 Florida Statutes [F.S.A.], provides that the pension payment shall be reduced by the amount of the compensation payment, the City of Miami has done the opposite, and it now contends that it should be given the same credit as if it had followed the provisions of Section 440.09(4).” We are confronted with an appeal by cer-tiorari to review the compensation order of the full commission entered May 9, 1961....

...The single issue presented for our determination is whether or not the petitioner complied with the compensation order entered June 25, 1958. Petitioner contends that it has fully complied with the aforesaid compensation order of Deputy Commissioner Cohen dated June 25, 1958, by application of § 440.09(4), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., which section petitioner avers is the applicable and controlling law....

...5, 1958, because the petitioner in making payments to the respondent, has deducted from the amount of compensation due the respondent, the amount of the pension the employee is entitled to receive. That such a procedure is specifically prohibited by § 440.09(4), Florida Statutes, F.S.A. Section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., reads as follows: “When any employee of the state or of any political subdivision thereof or of any public or quasi-public corporation therein, or any person entitled thereto on account of dependency upo...

...Mathematically, respondent was due to receive compensation from the peti *754 tioner aggregating $1,820 annually. In paying respondent $140.50 per month plus $5.35 every two' weeks, petitioner actually paid respondent $1,825.10 per year, or $5.10 more than the required amount. Considering § 440.09(4), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., in its entirety, the legislative intent seems clear: That an employee shall not receive both a pension and workmen’s compensation from his employer when the employer is the state or any political subdivision thereof or a quasi-public corporation therein....

...However, the employer did not verify whether the social *1218 security number was valid. The E/C's witness claimed that the E/C did not find out the card was invalid until the day of the accident. The E/C argues that the JCC erred in its application of sections 440.105(4)(b)(9) and 440.09(4)(a), Florida Statutes. It argues that, pursuant to the plain and unambiguous language of those statutes, the fraudulent obtaining of employment by claimant pursuant to section 440.105(4)(b)(9) is sufficient to trigger the provisions of section 440.09(4)(a), thus mandating that claimant not be entitled to workers' compensation benefits. Whether the JCC erred in finding that claimant was entitled to workers' compensation benefits even though he was unlawfully employed depends on whether the JCC erred in its interpretation of sections 440.105(4)(b)(9) and 440.09(4)(a), Florida Statutes, which is a question of law. The standard of review, therefore, is de novo. Mylock v. Champion Int'l, 906 So.2d 363, 365 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). Section 440.09(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2005), provides: An employee shall not be entitled to compensation or benefits under this chapter if any judge of compensation claims, administrative law judge, court, or jury convened in this state determines...

...claim for workers' compensation benefits. It is undisputed that claimant violated section 440.105(4)(b)(9), Florida Statutes (2005). What is disputed by the E/C is whether this violation was cause for forfeiture of compensation benefits pursuant to section 440.09(4)(a), Florida Statutes....

..."The statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning." Id. (citing McLaughlin v. State, 721 So.2d 1170, 1172 (Fla.1998)). Although both parties argue the statute in question is clear and unambiguous, their interpretations are contradictory. The E/C, on one hand, asserts that section 440.09(4)(a) should be read to mean that an employee shall not be entitled to compensation or benefits under this chapter if a JCC determines that the employee has knowingly or intentionally engaged in any of the acts described in section 440.105....

...Thus, according to the E/C, because it is clear that claimant violated section 440.105(4)(b)(9) by procuring work with a false social security card, claimant should not be entitled to workers' compensation benefits. Claimant, on the other hand, interprets section 440.09(4)(a) differently....

...the evil to be corrected, the language of the act, including its title, the history of its enactment, and the state of the law already in existence on the subject. Stivers v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 777 So.2d 1023, 1025 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). In 2003, section 440.09(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2003), was amended by chapter 2003-412, section 6, Laws of Florida, which added the words "or any criminal act," to read: An employee shall not be entitled to compensation or benefits under this chapter if any...

...Accordingly, prior to the 2003 amendment to this statute, it was clear that "for the purpose of securing workers' compensation benefits" modified any act described in section 440.105. Chapter 2003-412, Laws of Florida, was entitled "An act relating to workers' compensation." It described the amendment to section 440.09(4)(a), Florida Statutes, as "specifying effect of criminal acts." Ch....

...al phrases "for the purpose of securing workers' compensation benefits" to no longer modify section 440.105, Florida Statutes, as they had previously. Instead, the addition of "or any criminal act" appears to have simply broadened the application of section 440.09(4)(a) to cover not only acts described in section 440.105, but also other criminal acts, as long as all of those acts are done for the purpose of securing workers' compensation benefits. Additionally, this interpretation is supported by existing case law. In Pavilion Apartments v. Wetherington, 943 So.2d 226, 227-28 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), this court cited to section 440.09(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2004), and analyzed it as rendering a claimant ineligible for workers' compensation if it was determined "that the employee has knowingly or intentionally engaged in any of the acts described in s....

...wife’s loss of consortium claim. 3  In 2012, Mr. and Mrs. Cortes filed an amended complaint including new allegations and an additional (fourth) count seeking a declaratory judgment that sections 440.092 and 440.11 of the Workers’ Compensation Law are facially unconstitutional or are unconstitutional as applied to Mr....

...suit for their clients instead of the exclusive remedy in Chapter 440, the Workers’ Compensation Act. FWA members assert they have great interest in any action that would improve the rights of injured workers. 2 Section 440.09 addresses the scope of coverage for on-job injuries. 4  In early 2013, Velda Farms voluntarily dismissed its affirmative defense of workers’ compensation immunity as to Mr....

...The petitioner, who was the claimant below, is the mother of the deceased employee of the respondent employer. The accident in which the employee met his death is admittedly compensable. The only issue is whether the award should properly be reduced 25% in accordance with the provisions of Section 440.09(3) which states in pertinent part: “Where injury is caused by the willful refusal of the employee to use a safety appliance or observe a safety rule required by statute or lawfully required or approved by the commission, and brought...

...“On authority of White vs. C. H. Lyne Foundry & Machine Co. [Fla.], 74 So.2d, 538 , I find that the claimant, Mrs. Elizabeth M. Smit, is entitled to the full amount of compensation under the law, and the carrier is not entitled to the 25% reduction provided by Section 440.09(3).” On appeal, the full commission reversed the order of the deputy on this point and stated inter alia: “As it has been stated before, ‘willful’ depends upon the facts in each individual situation....

...f the opinion that the Deputy Commissioner erred as a matter of law and that the claim for workmen’s compensation dependency benefits in excess of the 75 per cent being paid by the employer and carrier should be denied.” The legal effect of F.S. Section 440.09(3), F.S.A....

...JCC utilized an incorrect legal standard. No change in condition need be shown, given claimant’s allegation of subsequent repetitive trauma, because every new exposure to the trauma was a new “accident” for purposes of workers’ compensation. Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2009), requires that causation be established by clear and convincing evidence in cases of repetitive exposure....

...The proper legal standard is a showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that an “accident” occurred; that is, that “[t]he injury, [and] its occupational cause ... be established to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, based on objective relevant medical findings.” § 440.09(1), Fla....

...years. Dr. Fiore opined that the described typing was the major contributing cause of the condition he diagnosed— bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. The JCC did not reject this evidence. Accordingly, because claimant met her burden, as required by section 440.09(1), to prove that “[t]he injury, [and] its occupational cause ......

...intoxication. The judge did not find the testimony of either claimant or Javier to be credible and concluded that the injuries occurred merely from a "drunken brawl." The troublesome aspect of this case was claimant's own intoxication. The effect of Section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes (1987), was to shift the burden of proof below to the claimant to show in this case, where his blood alcohol content was .10 percent or greater, that the injury was not occasioned primarily by his intoxication....

...The E/C never defended either of those claims on grounds that Claimant committed any of the acts prohibited in section 440.105(4)(b), Florida Statutes. However, the E/C denied the third accident actually occurred and, consequently, argued Claimant did not suffer any injury within the course and scope of employment. See § 440.09(1), Florida Statutes....

...ility benefits. Although competent, substantial evidence supports the JCC's conclusion that Claimant committed one of the prohibited acts of section 440.105(4)(b) in a different workers' compensation claim, the JCC erred in applying the exclusion of 440.09(4) to the instant workers' compensation claim....

...This court has interpreted section 440.105(4)(b) to include false, fraudulent, incomplete or misleading statements that are immaterial to the claim if the statements were made for the purpose of obtaining benefits. See Village of N. Palm Beach v. McKale, 911 So.2d 1282 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). However, we have never applied the section 440.09(4) exclusion from coverage to a claim for workers' compensation benefits in a different workers' compensation case than the case in which the 440.105(4)(b) acts were committed. Each case excluding coverage pursuant to section 440.09(4) involved the same case in which the false, fraudulent, incomplete or misleading statements were made, and that claim was currently before the JCC. See id.; Citrus Pest Control & Claims Control, Inc. v. Brown, 913 So.2d 754 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); Nelson v. Labor Finders, 897 So.2d 501 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). This result is mandated by the plain language of section 440.09, which defines when coverage is available. Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes, in part, mandates coverage when an employee suffers "an accidental injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment." This provision applies to a specific accident. Pursuant to the statute, coverage may be limited or denied even when the requirements of subsection (1) have been met, if any of the exclusions or limitations of coverage found in subsections (2) through (8) apply. Section 440.09(4), at issue here, excludes coverage if the employee engaged in any of the acts described in section 440.105(4)(b)....

...ection 440.105. To require coverage be forever barred simply because the employee had, at one time, committed one of the 440.105 proscribed acts would be unduly harsh. Consequently, to be barred from receiving workers' compensation benefits based on section 440.09(4), any false, fraudulent, incomplete or misleading statements must have been made in the case for which workers' compensation benefits are currently being sought....

...1st DCA 2005) (requiring proof of major contributing cause and noting that "[t]he E/C in [ Claims Mgmt., Inc. v. ] Drewno [, 727 So.2d 395 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999), unlike the appellees here] conceded the psychiatric injury at issue was a `manifestation' contested *361 under section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes")....

...and dispensed with oral argument. ANALYSIS At issue in the present case is whether Gilbert's accident is compensable under our Workers' Compensation Law. To be compensable, the accident must arise out of or in the course and scope of employment. See § 440.09(1), Fla.Stat. (Supp. 1994). The "going and coming" rule, as codified in section 440.092(2), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), provides that injuries sustained while going to or coming from work do not arise out of or in the course and scope of employment....

...SHAW, HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, and LEWIS, JJ., concur. WELLS, C.J., concurs with an opinion. *1061 WELLS, C.J., concurring. I concur in the result in this case. I dissented in Swartz v. McDonald's Corp., 788 So.2d 937 (Fla.2001), which should have had the same result as this case. NOTES [1] Section 440.092(2) provides: An injury suffered while going to or coming from work is not an injury arising out of and in the course of employment whether or not the employer provided transportation if such means of transportation was available for the exclusive personal use by the employee, unless the employee was engaged in a special errand or mission for the employer. § 440.092(2), Fla....

...g with the Florida Industrial Commission. The claim for *156 benefits was denied by the Judge of Industrial Claims and this order was affirmed by the Full Commission. To be entitled to Florida compensation for an injury without the state, Fla.Stat., § 440.09(1) F.S.A....

...* * (Emphasis supplied.) Admittedly, the accident involved would not come within the provisions of the Florida Workmen’s Compensation Act in the absence of a showing that respondents have waived or are estopped to use the provisions of Fla.Stat., § 440.09(1), F.S.A....

...tter had paid to date. Because the first accident is the major contributing cause of the disability and need for treatment, the JCC awarded future orthopedic care by Dr. Keller to be provided by E/C # 1. E/C # 1's claim for apportionment pursuant to section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1997), was denied based on the JCC's finding that the second accident is not the major contributing cause of the disability and need for treatment....

...As occurred in B & L Services, "[t]he JCC appears to have confused the standard for determining compensability with the standard for determining responsibility." 791 So.2d at 1142. In that opinion, we stated that "the first step is determining whether the injury is compensable under the major contributing cause standard in section 440.09(1)....

...wrist. [2] The JCC found Anderson's four or five visits to a therapist during that time to have been insignificant. [3] We emphasize that we are evaluating Anderson's psychological condition under the law as it stood prior to the 1993 amendments to section 440.09, Florida Statutes (Supp....

...Primarily two issues were raised: (1) whether the firm specifically assumed responsibility for safety standards in its contract; and (2) whether by its subsequent conduct, the firm assumed a duty to monitor safety. The trial court denied the motion. Section 440.09(6), Florida Statutes (1993), provides for immunity for construction design professionals in connection with safety standards unless the construction design professional specifically assumes such responsibility in its contract....

...yer, Case Engineering, Inc., and to The Claims Center. We reverse the costs award as statutorily unauthorized; and reverse the order denying all of claimant’s attorney’s fees because, in defeating the affirmative defense contemplated by sections 440.09 and 440.105, the claimant prevailed on an issue of compensability....

...medical benefits that were still being provided when he filed the petition for additional benefits that began the present proceeding. The medical benefits are still payable because he prevailed in resisting the affirmative defense based on sections 440.09 and 440.105, “frequently referred to as the ‘fraud defense.’ ” Arreola v....

...The parties’ prehearing stipulation specified section “440.34(3)(b)(c),” as the basis for the attorney’s fees claim, a stated basis that did not change when Case Engineering, Inc., and The Claims Center were granted leave to amend the prehearing stipulation to raise the defense under sections 440.09 and 440.105 that the claimant eventually defeated....

...The rehearing motion again urged entitlement on the basis of section 440.34(3)(c). Asserting entitlement to attorney’s fees on the basis of section 440.34(3)(e) adequately preserved for appeal denial of the attorney’s fees claimant sought for successfully defending against the fraud defense predicated on sections 440.09 and 440.105....

...r a reasonable attorney’s fee from a carrier or employer ... [i]n a proceeding in which a carrier or employer denies that an injury occurred for which compensation benefits are payable, and the claimant prevails on the issue of compensa-bility.” Section 440.09(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2009), located within the “coverage” provisions of chapter 440, provides that “[a]n employee shall not be entitled to compensation or benefits under this chapter if any judge of compensation claims ......

...440.105 or any criminal act for the purpose of securing workers’ compensation benefits.” By order entered September 2, 2009, the judge of compensation claims granted a motion for leave to amend the pretrial stipulation to include the affirmative “defense of fraud per § 440.09(4), Fla. Stat.; § 440.105, Fla. Stat.; and § 440.09(a), Fla. Stat.” based on “discovery received after the filing of the pretrial stipulation.” When Case Engineering, Inc., and The Claims Center raised the defense based on sections 440.09 and 440.105, they placed coverage of the accident and resulting injuries — and thus compensability — at issue....

...perly preserves the issue and successfully defends against a misrepresentation allegation, and all other requisite factors are present, the claimant would be entitled to payment of an appropriate fee.”). Setting up the fraud defense under sections 440.09 and 440.105 put com-pensability at issue — and did so at a time that the claimant was actually receiving palliative medical treatment not otherwise at issue....

...Larson, Larson's Workers' Compensation § 65.10 (Desk ed.1999). For employees within the statute's reach, workers' compensation *153 is the exclusive remedy for "accidental injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment." § 440.09(1), Fla....

...LeVine of Gluckman, Newman & LeVine, P.A., Tampa, for Appellees. KAHN, Judge. We affirm the order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC), and briefly comment on two points raised by the employee/claimant. Claimant first argues that the JCC erred by denying compensability in reliance upon section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994), for this accident which occurred on May 1, 1994. Claimant reasons that section 440.09(1) establishes an affirmative defense and urges that such defense was not articulated by the employer/carrier, prior to the commencement of the hearing in this case....

...Section 440.15(7), Florida Statutes (Supp.1994). Here, the JCC found that claimant refused work offered by the employer within claimant's restrictions. AFFIRMED. *352 ERVIN and DAVIS, JJ., concur. [**] NOTES [*] Because the question is not before us, we express no opinion as to whether sections 440.09(1)(a) and (b) establish affirmative defenses....

...or during testimony given at depositions or the merits hearing." Village Apartments v. Hernandez, 856 So.2d 1140, 1141 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). If such statements are knowingly false, fraudulent, incomplete, or misleading, benefits must be denied. See §§ 440.09(4)(a), 440.105(4)(b)(1)-(2) & (5), Fla....

...ocedurally barred. Even if considered on the merits, Claimant had adequate notice of the issues and does not allege how his substantive due process rights were violated. Finally, to the extent that Claimant contests the constitutionality of sections 440.09(4) and 440.105(b), this court has determined section 440.09(4), in relation to section 440.105, does not violate due process....

...l. Just after 6:00 a.m., as he was getting coffee, Claimant was robbed and shot in the left cheek. LAW The premises rule is a means of determining whether an injury occurred in the course and scope of employment, as required for compensability under section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2006)....

...was barred due to claimant's intoxication). "Compensation is not payable if the injury was occasioned primarily by the intoxication of the employee; by the influence of any drugs, barbiturates, or other stimulants not prescribed by a physician...." § 440.09(3), Fla. Stat. (2006). Claimant correctly argues the Employer/Carrier was not entitled to the application of a presumption of intoxication. See § 440.09(7)(b), Fla. Stat. (2006) (providing injury is presumed to have been occasioned primarily by intoxication of employee where test confirms presence of a drug after an accident). When the presumption under section 440.09(7)(b), Florida Statutes, does not apply, employer/carriers must "establish, by the greater weight of the evidence, that the work-related injury `was occasioned primarily by the intoxication of the employee.'" Wright v. DSK Group, 821 So.2d 455, 456 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (quoting section 440.09(3)); see also Sterling, 580 So.2d at 835 (affirming JCC's conclusion that, even absent presumption of intoxication, evidence supported finding employee's injury was primarily caused by his intoxication)....

...ment. Unlike a criminal forfeiture statute, section 112.3173(3) merely relieves the State of its duty to pay retirement benefits. See also Wright v. Unifs. for Indus., 772 So.2d 560, 561 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (rejecting an excessive fines challenge to section 440.09, Florida Statutes, which denies workers' compensation benefits to employees that engage in a criminal act for the purpose of securing workers' compensation benefits.)....

...t. The employer/carrier (E/C) argued that Claimant's actions were knowingly and intentionally committed in order to obtain workers' compensation benefits. The Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) accepted the E/C's position and denied all claims under section 440.09, Florida Statutes, on the ground Claimant violated section 440.105, Florida Statutes....

...kers' compensation benefits. § 440.105(4)(b)1., Fla. Stat. (2006). An employee found to have knowingly or *794 intentionally committed one of these prohibited acts is not entitled to compensation or benefits under the workers' compensation statute. § 440.09(4)(a), Fla....

...JCC’s application of law to those facts. Aills v. Boemi, 29 So. 3d 1105, 1108 (Fla. 2010). Employers must provide workers’ compensation benefits when employees sustain injuries from accidents “arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment.” § 440.09(1), Fla....

...The en banc majority’s opinion discusses this argument but in its ultimate holding goes well beyond what the E/C argued. Because the relevant facts are undisputed, the issue is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo. See Airey v. Wal- Mart/Sedgwick, 24 So. 3d 1264 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2016), states in part, “The employer must pay compensation or furnish benefits required by this chapter if the employee suffers an accidental compensable injury or death arising out of work performed in the cour...

...Krider, 473 So. 2d 829, 830 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)). A worker remains in the course and scope of employment while attending to matters covered by the personal comfort doctrine. Harding, 653 So. 2d at 1141-42. However, to satisfy the “arising out of work” requirement of section 440.09(1), the personal comfort doctrine applies only when there is a work-related or neutral risk....

...o liability to Turner and Creighton because “workers’ compensation is the exclusive remedy for ‘accidental injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and scope of employment.’ ” Turner, 754 So.2d at 686 (quoting Fla. Stat. § 440.09 (1) (1997))....

...In that case, the parties did not dispute the supposed violation but did argue whether this violation was cause for forfeiture of compensation benefits. The First District analyzed section 440.105(4)(b)9 only as it applied to the denial of coverage under section 440.09(4)(a)....

...The JCC further found that Dr. Abraham causally related the PTSD to the events occurring on October 19, 2010, not to any physical injury suffered on that date. The JCC also found Dr. Kolin, another psychiatrist authorized by the E/C, shared these opinions. Section 440.093(1), Florida Statutes (2010), the statutory provision applicable here, provides: A mental or nervous injury due to stress, fright, or excitement only is not an injury by accident arising out of the employment....

...rvous injuries without an accompanying physical injury requiring medical treatment. A physical injury resulting from mental or nervous injuries unaccompanied by physical trauma requiring medical treatment shall not be compensable under this chapter. Section 440.093(2), Florida Statutes (2010), is not applicable here because the relevant mental or nervous injury did not “occur[ ] as a manifestation of an injury compensa-ble under this chapter.” Section 440.093 was addressed at length by this Court in McKenzie v. Mental Health Care, Inc., 43 So.3d 767 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010). The McKenzie court determined that, with the addition of section 440.093 in 2003, the Legislature described four situations in which mental or nervous injuries may arise in the workplace. Id. at 769 . The situation presented under the facts as found here by the JCC most closely parallels the second sentence in section 440.093(1)....

...ry will also be compensable. For example, if an employee, in the course and scope of employment, is sexually assaulted at the workplace and suffers a physical injury that requires medical treatment, the physical injury is certainly compen-sable. See § 440.09, Fla. Stat. (2007). If the employee also suffers a mental or nervous injury separate and apart from the physical injury, the mental or ner *1159 vous injury would be compensable because it would meet the section 440.09 requirements and also comply with section 440.093(1)....

...and recommended that all containers of TDI be clearly marked with appropriate warning labels. Workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy available to an employee injured by his employer's negligence. Eller v. Shova, 630 So.2d 537, 539 (Fla.1993). Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1995), provides for the payment of compensation benefits whenever disability or death results from an injury arising out of and in the course of employment....

...E/C’s rebuttal threshold to include satisfaction of the MCC standard. MCC is defined as, “the cause which is more than 50 percent responsible for the injury as compared to all other causes combined for which treatment or benefits are sought.” § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. Section 440.09(1) must be read in conjunction with section 440.02(1), which provides as follows: ......

...This Court did not declare that MCC is a component of the E/C’s rebuttal threshold, but only that the specific evidence required to satisfy the shifting burdens of proof must be medically based. Following qualification for the presumption, the claimant’s burden of proving MCC under section 440.09(1), is satisfied. MCC is not revived as a required standard of proof for the claimant under sections 440.09(1) and 440.161, Florida Statutes, unless and until the E/C successfully satisfies its rebuttal threshold....

...The same reasoning applies to the collective bargaining agreement in this case. As we stated in Nolan: [I]t is our view that the paramount consideration in the instant case is the requirement that workers' compensation benefits are payable for an injury which occurs in the course and scope of employment. Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1987), provides that compensation shall be paid, except for the situations enumerated in that section, none of which are applicable here....

Historic Woodfield Inn, a North Carolina property. Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes, extends jurisdiction

421 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961); Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.510(e); § 440.09(1), Fla.Stat. (1989).

...loyee. However, that is not the date upon which the right of immunity must be determined. The liability of the employer under the worker’s compensation action is for injuries which arise out of and in the course of the employee’s employment. See § 440.09(1), Fla.Stat....

under the Florida Workers’ Compensation Law, section 440.09(1)(d), Florida Statutes, with respect to an

PER CURIAM. The first issue presented in this appeal is the retroactive application of Barragan v. City of Miami, 545 So.2d 252 (Fla.1989), to the claim of an employee injured after June 30, 1973, the last effective date of section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (1957), repealed by chapter 73-127, Laws of Florida, effective July 1, 1973....

him from recovery in contemplation of F.S. Section 440.09(3), F.S.A., the pertinent part of which provides

...So.3d at 106-07 . We concluded that “as the JCC recognized at the final hearing, had the Legislature intended to give the JCC the authority to sanction an E/C or its attorney for violating section 440.105, it could have easily done so as it did in section 440.09(4) for fraud by employees.” Id....

2007) (recognizing that the 2003 amendments to section 440.09(l)(b) were intended to "overrule” this court's

PER CURIAM. The first issue presented in this appeal is the retroactive application of Barragan v. City of Miami, 545 So.2d 252 (Fla.1989), to the claim of an employee injured after June 30, 1973, the last effective date of section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (1957), repealed by chapter 73-127, Laws of Florida, effective July 1, 1973....

and in the course and scope of employment. See § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (2003). But the accidental compensable

...Appellants, the employer and carrier (E/C) in this workers’ compensation matter, challenge an award of benefits made by the judge of compensation claims (JCC). In the order, the JCC found the doctrine of res judicata prevented the E/C from raising the defense of section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (2004)....

...Specifically, the parties agreed “to resolve the outstanding claims that were to be heard on the final hearing on November 28, 2000.” Lott then filed the first of the present series of petitions for benefits on October 15, 2001. In response to the new petitions, the E/C again asserted a violation of section 440.09(4), which the JCC disallowed under the doctrine of res judicata....

...ent. If that were the sole argument, res judicata would indeed bar the defense. The E/C argue, however, that Lott, after the 2000 settlement, made subsequent misrepresentations to treating physicians after seeking additional benefits. As the E/C’s section 440.09 defense is based upon facts that allegedly arose after the 2000 settlement and concerns new petitions for benefits, the defense will not be barred by the earlier settlement....

...new trial. In this case of first impression, the State and the trial court erroneously equated the “monetary value” that is an element of this criminal offense with the monetary amount of the noncriminal, administrative sanction available under section 440.09(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2005)....

...We merely hold that the trial court’s reliance on the noncriminal, administrative sanction as a measure of “monetary value” was incorrect. III. THE NONCRIMINAL, ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTION Before describing the two preserved issues on appeal, it is helpful to examine the statute that led the trial court astray. Section 440.09(4)(a) provides for a noncriminal, administrative sanction in the event that a claimant knowingly makes any false, fraudulent, or misleading statement for the purpose of obtaining any benefit under the workers’ compensation laws. Section 440.09(4)(a) states: An employee shall not be entitled to compensation or benefits under this chapter if any judge of compensation claims, administrative law judge, court, or jury convened in this state determines that the employee has knowingly or intentionally engaged in any of the acts described in s....

...1st DCA 2011); Pavilion Apartments v. Wetherington, 943 So.2d 226 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). 4 The First District, which has jurisdiction over appeals from workers’ compensation proceedings, has held that the administrative forfeiture of benefits under section 440.09(4)(a) does not require any nexus between the false statement and the benefits forfeited. See Rustic Lodge v. Escobar, 729 So.2d 1014, 1015 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (“[S]ection 440.09(4) ... does not limit a claimant’s forfeiture to those benefits that may have been obtained by virtue of the claimant’s unlawful conduct.”). The First District has interpreted the sanction in section 440.09(4)(a) to result in the cessation of an injured employee’s entitlement to any unpaid workers’ compensation benefits, but it has not required a return of or restitution for benefits already lawfully paid prior to the claimant’s misrepresentation. Thus, the sanction under section 440.09(4)(a) turns off the tap from which workers’ compensation benefits flow. 5 See Alvarez v. Unicco, 958 So.2d 951, 952 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (holding judge of compensation claims is not required to order payment of benefits for “a period preceding the determination of a violation of section 440.09(4)”). IY. THE ERRORS ARISING FROM THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 440.09(4)(A) IN THIS CRIMINAL TRIAL The attorney who represented First Commercial in the workers’ compensation case testified at this criminal trial....

...ents made before and payments made after the deposition — not merely payments that otherwise would be payable after an order of cessation of benefits. This, of course, is not even consistent with the law established by the First District regarding section 440.09(4)(a), much less with the conclusion we reach today that section 440.09(4)(a) has no bearing on the measure of “monetary value” in section 440.105(4)....

...Although we make no attempt to provide any comprehensive definition of “monetary value” for purposes of this statute, “monetary value” simply cannot be measured by other sanctions against the defendant; it cannot be measured by the administrative forfeiture in section 440.09(4)....

...d that he had sustained work-related injuries that entitled him to significant benefits. Mr. Car-roso’s misrepresentations might have justified a noncriminal, administrative sanction under the First District’s nearly strict liability approach to section 440.09(4)(a), but in this criminal case the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr....

...a Claimant from receiving benefits. Id. Steel Dynamics Inc.-New Millennium v. Markham, 46 So.3d 641, 645 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (emphasis in original). . It appears the tap does not close until such a ruling becomes final, in light of the provision in section 440.09(4)(c), that if the employee appeals the section 440.09(4)(a) ruling, a JCC "shall have the jurisdiction” to order that the flow of benefits be paid into the court registry or an escrow account during the pen-dency of the appeal....

therefor. Appellants contend . that, pursuant to section 440.09(4)1, Florida Statutes, the claimant is not

...fall. In denying the claim for psychiatric care, the judge of compensation claims expressly “reject[ed] the testimony of Dr. Weller,” and concluded that the claimant had not met her burden to prove causation by clear and convincing evidence. See § 440.09(1), Fla....

...ising out of and in the course of his employment with appellants in Saudi Arabia. Appellants disputed compensability on the grounds the employment was localized in Saudi Arabia and the employment contract was made in New York rather than in Florida. Section 440.09(1), F.S....

proof for workers’ compensation claimants. Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes establishes this new standard

in the Commission’s interpretation of Fla.Stat. § 440.09(1), F.S.A., the pertinent part of which is as

...to enter a SSN and a statement that the “claim could be denied if you do not provide the information.” Claimant admitted that she entered an invalid SSN on the form because she believed she needed to do so to obtain authorized medical care. Section 440.09(4)(a), Florida Statutes, prohibits an employee from receiving workers’ compensation benefits if he or she commits any act described in section 440.105, Florida Statutes, “for the purpose of securing workers’ compensation benefits...

...In this workers' compensation case, the claimant sought an orthopedic evaluation based on undisputed medical testimony that the evaluation was necessary to determine whether there were objective findings to support her claim of knee pain. The Judge of Compensation Claims initially denied the claim on the ground that section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2007), precluded an award because there were no objective relevant medical findings of an injury....

...objective basis for the claimant's subjective complaints, the doctor recommended an evaluation to find such a basis, the employer and carrier refused to provide an evaluation on the ground that there were no objective relevant medical findings under section 440.09(1), and the judge erroneously accepted this position. The error is the same in both cases. The judge should have relied on section 440.13(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2007), and its test of whether the requested benefit is medically necessary, and not section 440.09(1), and its test of whether objective relevant medical findings exist to support an award....

...benefits — over and above a fireman’s disability retirement pension' — on account of an accident that occurred on July 12, 1969, in the course and scope of Alexander Adamides’s employment with the City of Miami, we affirm on the authority of section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (1969). We also affirm on the City’s cross-appeal. Although long since repealed, see ch. 73-127, § 2, Laws of Fla., section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (1969), controls because the statute was in effect on the date of the accident....

...fit payment allocable to such week shall be affected and the amount of the difference between the compensation and the pension or benefit payment allocable to one week shall not reduce the pension or benefit payment allocable to any subsequent week. § 440.09(4), Fla. Stat. (1969). Initial judicial interpretation 1 of the statute made “it clear that the effect of section 440.09(4) was to require [or at least to allow] a reduction in compensation benefits,” City of Miami v....

...he period during which the City paid no permanent total disability workers’ compensation payments. He contends that the decision in City of Hollywood v. Lombardi, 770 So.2d 1196 (Fla.2000), has, by implication, modified the initial construction of section 440.09(4). 4 But Lombardi was concerned with the so-called Grice 5 and Barragan 6 *957 offsets, and the Lombardi opinion is silent concerning section 440.09(4), which, after all, had been repealed some thirty years earlier....

...�� focusing instead on whether the “pension plan is funded at least in part with employees’ contributions.” 770 So.2d at 1205 (citation omitted). Nothing suggests that the Lombardi court had any purpose to alter the established construction of section 440.09(4) or modify the rule laid down in Graham....

...7 . Accordingly, we affirm on the cross-appeal, too. Affirmed. PADOVANO and HAWKES, JJ., concur. . As has previously been pointed out: In City of Miami v. Graham, 138 So.2d [751,] 754 [ (Fla.1962) ], the Florida Supreme Court explained the import of section 440.09(4) thusly: Considering § 440.09(4), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., in its entirety, the legislative intent seems clear: That an employee shall not receive both a pension and workmen’s compensation from his employer when the employer is the state or any political subdivision thereof or a quasi-public corporation therein. Again in Barragan [v. City of Miami ], 545 So.2d [252,] 254 [ (Fla.1989),] the supreme court summarized § 440.09(4): The Court [in Graham] based its holding on section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (1957), which provided that any workers’ compensation benefits payable to injured public employees should be reduced by the amount of pension benefits which were also payable. These decisions recognize that section 440.09(4) provided for a reduction in compensation benefits....

...iguous statute.” Lombardi, 770 So.2d at 1204 (quoting Dixon v. GAB Bus. Servs., Inc., 161 So.2d 443, 445 (Fla.2000)). . Barragan v. City of Miami, 545 So.2d 252 (Fla.1989). The Barragan decision was “based upon the legislature’s 1973 repeal of section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (1971).” City of Miami v....

...ing Claimant did not intentionally or knowingly make misrepresentations for the purpose of securing workers’ compensation benefits, and consequently by concluding Claimant is not disqualified from receiving all compensation under the provisions of section 440.09(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2007)....

...ers’ compensation claim, he should have been disqualified from all benefits available under chapter 440. Similarly, the E/C argues because Claimant’s employment with Savage was more physical than characterized by Claimant, disqualification under section 440.09(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2007), is required as a matter of law....

...Here, the JCC believed Claimant’s testimony that he failed to tell the Employer of the true reasons for his resignation to protect his employment opportunities in the future, not to enhance or advance his compensation claim. The E/C fails to appreciate that the applicability of section 440.09(4)(a) (the provision of the Workers’ Compensation Law which allows for the forfeiture of benefits by the JCC) is predicated on a specific intent to deceive for the specific purpose of securing compensation benefits and, if no such in...

...ect to criminal prosecution for the same offense. See Matrix Employee Leasing v. Hernandez, 975 So.2d 1217 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (explaining even where it is established that claimant made criminal misrepresentation for purpose of securing employment, section 440.09(4)(a) does not allow for disqualification from workers’ compensation benefits, where criminal misrepresentation was not made for specific purpose of securing compensation benefits); see also Quiroz v. Health Cent. Hosp., 929 So.2d 563 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (reversing for lack of CSE JCC’s disqualification under section 440.09(4), where claimant’s misrepresentation related to his attempts to retain employment, and bore no relationship to attempt to secure benefits)....

...(Claimant was capable of working hard) and, in accordance with this premise, argues that Claimant’s testimony as to why he left the Employer (because the work was too difficult) must therefore be false, and is thus, a disqualifying statement under section 440.09(4)(a)....

...Nevertheless, here, it is unnecessary to delve into a parsing of opinion from fact, because the JCC found Claimant’s statements as to the “physical” nature of his job were not objectively false and were accurate. Because disqualification from benefits under section 440.09(4)(a) is, for relevant purposes here, predicated on the intentional or knowing commission of a criminal offense found in section 440.105, Florida Statutes, and further, because the criminal offenses contained in section 440.105 are pre...

...lent, or misleading. Accordingly, we affirm the JCC’s rejection of the E/C’s misrepresentation defense as it pertains to Claimant’s statements regarding the physical nature of his job with Savage. Conclusion In essence, the E/C has interpreted section 440.09(4)(a) as a means of disqualifying a claimant from benefits whenever a statement is made during the pendency of a workers’ compensation case that is subject to question, cross-examination, or impeachment — it is not....

...and later relay, objective events. It is only where a sufficient showing of a knowing or intentional misrepresentation for the specific purpose of deceiving and securing compensation benefits is demonstrated to the satisfaction *647 of the JCC, that section 440.09(a) operates to divest a claimant of entitlement to compensation benefits. Based on the foregoing, the order on appeal is AFFIRMED in all respects. WOLF, DAVIS, and WETHERELL, JJ., concur. . We specifically do not reach the issue of whether opinion testimony can ever qualify as á disqualifying misrepresentation under section 440.09(4)(a).

...buting cause of the injuries for which the claimant sought treatment, the claimant was not entitled to any benefits, even if the two work-related accidents played some role in her need for continued treatment. This was an incorrect interpretation of section 440.09, Florida Statutes (1995). Section 440.09, Florida Statutes (1995), requires that the claimant establish that the work-related accident is the major contributing cause of injuries or the need for treatment in only two situations. The first is when the employee sustains a subsequent injury “as a result of an original injury arising out of and in the course of employment.” § 440.09(l)(a), Fla. Stat. (1995). The second is when “an injury arising out of and in the course of employment combines with a preexisting disease or condition to cause or prolong disability or need for treatment.” § 440.09(l)(b), Fla. Stat. (1995). Neither situation is present in this case. Accordingly, coverage is determined by reference to section 440.09(1), which provides that “[t]he employer shall pay compensation or furnish benefits required by this chapter if the employee suffers an accidental injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment.” In this case, it is undisputed that the claimant “suffered] ......

...affected by the choice made. * * * ” The hazards of the highway were inherent in claimant’s contract and his work exposed him to these dangers but his contributory negligence is not a bar to recovery, *516 except as provided in subsection (3) of § 440.09, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., and there is no showing here that any of the grounds named therein are available to the employer....

injury, except as provided in subsection (3) of § 440.09.” Fla.Stat., Sec. 440.11, F.S.A., states, in part

...(2019) (stating the statute is an “alternative to pursuing workers’ compensation benefits under chapter 440”). To be eligible to receive benefits under chapter 440, the firefighter had to make several showings, including a showing that the cancer was caused by their work. § 440.09(1), Fla....

...rent stages of a determination of entitlement to benefits: work must be the MCC of a compensable injury, and also – where (as here) there is a preexisting condition – the compensable injury must be the MCC of the need for treatment. 1 Compare § 440.09(1), Fla....

...employment”), and § 440.02(36), Fla. Stat. (2013) (defining “arising out of” by stating that injury “arises out of employment if work performed in the course and scope of employment is the major contributing cause of the injury”), with § 440.09(1)(b), Fla....

...any false, fraudulent, or misleading oral or written statement for the purpose of obtaining or denying any benefit or payment under this chapter.” § 440.105(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2006). An employee found to have knowingly or intentionally done so is not entitled to benefits. § 440.09(4)(a), Fla....

...The JCC had the right to reject the E/C’s vocational expert’s opinion on this basis. As noted by the E/C, however, it was also improper for both the Claimant’s vocational expert and the JCC to consider personal observations of Claimant’s physical limitation related to pain as a vocational factor. Under section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes, as amended in 1994, pain is com-pensable only with objective relevant medical findings and any disability resulting from a compensable injury also must be established, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, based on objective relevant medical findings....

...We so held most recently in evaluating a waterfront employer's claim of immunity to suit in tort in Babin v. North Florida Shipyards, Inc., 705 So.2d 66, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D125, D126 (Fla. 1st DCA Dec.31, 1997), modified on other grounds, 709 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998): In fact, section 440.09(2), Florida Statutes, expressly precludes receipt of Florida workers' compensation benefits when circumstances dictate that LHWCA benefits apply....

...1st DCA 1983) (reversing deputy commissioner's finding that the LHWCA precluded recovery under the Workers' Compensation Law on grounds the LHWCA did not apply on the facts presented). Earlier, in Hernandez v. Mike Cruz Machine Shop, 389 So.2d 1251, 1252-53 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980), we read section 440.09(2) as ousting state workers' compensation jurisdiction whenever coverage was available under the LHWCA: In the case at bar, the injury occurred upon navigable waters.......

...medy was also available under a state compensation law deemed applicable under the maritime but local exception to the Jensen rule. [4] See id. at 126-27, 82 S.Ct. 1196. *783 But for injuries that occur on the land, federal and so—in Florida, under section 440.09(2)—state subject matter jurisdiction now depend on highly fact-intensive determinations....

...mpensation Law or the LHWCA. [6] VI To recapitulate, Florida's Workers' Compensation Law provides: "Benefits are not payable in respect of the disability ... of any employee covered by ... the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act...." § 440.09(2), Fla....

...at 476, 42 S.Ct. 157. [5] This may be viewed as the dark side of the "twilight zone" the Court discussed in Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249, 256, 63 S.Ct. 225, 87 L.Ed. 246 (1942). [6] The Legislature could avoid this result by amending section 440.09(2), Florida Statutes (1997), to allow concurrent jurisdiction under the Workers' Compensation Law of claims cognizable under the LHWCA, and to allow an offset under the former for any payments made under the federal act....

...On January 18, 1991, however, the appellees ceased providing benefits to Kitschke because their investigation determined that Kitschke was traveling from home to a work site when he was involved in the automobile accident. They claimed, therefore, that based on section 440.092 Kitschke’s injuries were not suffered during the course of his employment and thus he was not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits....

...In that case, we restated the fundamental proposition embodied in section 440.11 that. “[w]here an injury is suffered in the course and scope of employment, workers’ compensation is the *1088 exclusive remedy for recovery against the employer.” Id. at 184 . We held, however, in reliance on section 440.09(1), that “[tjhat remedy is not available where an injury is suffered outside the course of employment.” Id....

...he applicable provisions of the 1990 version of the workers' compensation law, see chapter 440, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1990), and the 1989 version of the contribution act, see section 768.31, Florida Statutes (1989), as the bases for our opinion. . Section 440.092(2), styled "Going or Coming,” provides that "[a]n injury suffered while going to or coming from work is not an injury arising out of and in the course of employment whether or not the employer provided transportation if such means o...

...ibility of compromises and offers to compromise, as well as relevant case law interpreting that section. See, e.g., Ritter v. Ritter, 690 So.2d 1372, 1376 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Rease v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 644 So.2d 1383, 1388 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). . Section 440.09(1) styled "Coverage” provides in part that "[c]ompensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee if the disability or death results from an injury arising out of and in the course of employment.” (Emphasis added.) ....

...The JCC denied the motion, concluding that the reasons for the request did not arise from circumstances beyond Appellants’ control. The JCC then held the final hearing as scheduled, after which he accepted the uncontroverted opinion of Dr. Levi that the work accident was the 3 See § 440.09(1), Fla....

...In affirming the JCC’s finding that the work-related injury arose out of and in the course and scope of Mr. Robinson’s employment, we also approve her ruling that the E/C was not entitled to a presumption that Mr. Robinson’s “injury was occasioned primarily by [his] intoxication,” § 440.09(7)(b), Fla....

...She also did not know whether the hospital laboratory was licensed and approved by the Agency for Healthcare Administration (AHCA). The E/C denied compensability and defended on the ground that Mr. Robinson’s *505 injury was occasioned primarily by the influence of alcohol. See § 440.09(3), Fla....

...affirm that conclusion because “this record demonstrates a lack of compliance with” the procedures for testing and maintaining blood alcohol samples set forth in the Florida Administrative Code. Id. at 759; see Fla. Admin. Code ch. 59A-24. Under section 440.09(7)(b), Florida Statutes (2002), a “presum[ption] that the injury was occasioned primarily by the intoxication of, or by the influence of the drug upon, the employee” arises “[i]f the employee has, at the time of the injury, a blo...

...oned primarily by the influence of cocaine upon the claimant. See 765 So.2d at 759 . In affirming, we agreed with the “JCC’s ruling that, while a drug test performed for medical purposes may be admissible to support an intoxication defense under section 440.09(3), the presumption set out in section 440.09(7)(b) does not arise as the result of a positive confirmation drug test using a medically-drawn sample unless the Florida Administrative Code rules required by section 440.09(7)(d) are followed.” Id. Section 440.09(7)(d), Florida Statutes (2002) requires AHCA to “provide by rule for the authorization and regulation of drug-testing policies, procedures, and methods.” On appeal, the E/C argue that compliance with the Florida Administrative Code...

...quirements.... [If] Claimant’s blood-alcohol level [at the time of the accident] was at least a .08[] then the statutory presumption exists.” We disagree with the E/C’s contention and hold that the Florida Administrative Code rules required by section 440.09(7)(d) also apply to blood-alcohol tests.- In Temporary Labor Source , we explained the history of AHCA’s implementation of the mandate in section 440.09(7)(d): Chapter 38F-9, Florida Administrative Code (“Drug Testing Rule”), was created in 1991 to implement the mandate of section 440.09(7)(d).......

...Chapter 59A-24 of the Florida Administrative Code treats alcohol as a drug. 1 Since chapter 440 of the Florida Statutes and chapter 59A-24 of the Florida Administrative Code treat alcohol as a drug, we conclude that chapter 59A-24 of the Florida Administrative Code applies to the blood-alcohol tests discussed in section 440.09(7)(b), which provides: “If the employee has, at the time of the injury, a blood alcohol level equal to or greater than [0.08 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood], or if the employee has a positive confirmation of a drug as defined in this act, it is presumed that the injury was occasioned primarily by the intoxication of, or by the influence of the drug upon, the employee.” § 440.09(7)(b), Fla....

...the evidence that claimant’s injury was caused primarily by the use of drugs or alcohol.” See Wright v. DSK Group, 821 So.2d 455, 456 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (holding that where “employer *507 was not entitled to the ... presumption authorized by section 440.09(7)(b) .......

...able only to tests for alcohol. . Section 440.102(l)(c) is appropriately looked to even if "this act” refers to chapter 90-201, Laws of Florida, and not to chapter 440 of the Florida Statutes, because chapter 90-201 added the following language to section 440.09: "[0]r if the employee has a positive confirmation of a drug as defined in this act.” Ch....

...Morgan, 533 So.2d 783, 784 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). Once the claimant established a claim for repeated trauma under Festa, she then had to prove that the resulting aggravation of her preexisting carpal tunnel syndrome was the major contributing cause of her need for treatment under section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...and injury, no presumption of causal connection arising therefrom. The respondent states the question in another way as to whether the Full Commission erred in reversing the Deputy Commissioner in the said cause. Workmen’s Compensation Law, F.S.A. § 440.09, provides that the employee is entitled to the benefits thereunder “* * * if the disability or death results from an injury arising out of and in the course of employment.” The respondent had been employed by the petitioner as a boilerm...

...Supreme Court in rejecting this contention said: *42 “The petitioner urges that the evidence narrated above establishes two of the three elements necessary for compensation, namely, the (1) injury (death), (2) during the course of employment, sec. 440.09(1), Florida Statutes 1953, F.S.A., and hy applying the presumption of sec....

...The Department’s Final Order concluded that appellants did not have workers’ compensation coverage, which appellants admitted, and that their jurisdictional claim was without merit. Appellants were ordered to comply with the Amended Stop Work and Penalty Order. Section 440.09, Florida Statutes (2001), provides: (1) The employer shall pay compensation or furnish benefits required by this chapter if the employee suffers an accidental injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and scope of employment ......

took place prior to the July 1, 1973 repeal of Section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes, this case is controlled

...The JCC reasoned Claimant was entitled to the evaluations because Dr. Hershman recommended them to determine whether there was a causal relationship between Claimant's *1222 complaints and the compensable accident. The JCC concluded that the objective medical evidence requirement found in section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2005), did not prohibit these evaluations, even though Claimant's complaints were purely subjective....

...the claimant as to subject matter jurisdiction in the settlement proceeding, because of the claimant’s filing of a “Jones Act” suit after the settlement hearing and before the entry of the order approving settlement based on the same accident. Section 440.09(2) provides that “no compensation shall be payable ......

...the deceased employee. The deputy commissioner (deputy) found: (1) that despite a blood alcohol level of .149%, intoxication was not the primary cause of the accident which resulted in the employee’s death, and (2) that the presumption created by § 440.09(3), Fla.Stat....

...A blood alcohol toxicology study performed as part of the autopsy showed Meadows’ blood alcohol level to be .149% at the time of his death. The E/C controverted the claim* filed on behalf of Meadows’ widow and child on the ground that the blood alcohol level of the decedent should vitiate the claim. Section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes (1979), provides in part: If there was at the time of the injury 0.10 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the employee’s blood, it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, that the injury was occasioned primarily by the intoxication of the employee....

...testify under the Workers’ Compensation Law. See § 440.13(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (2007) (stating no medical opinion other than an authorized treating provider, an IME, or an expert medical advisor is admissible in proceedings before the JCC); see also § 440.09(1), Fla....

...gly concluded by the JCC; rather, she had the obligation of proving this was so within a reasonable degree of medical certainty — not absolute certainty, or the reasonable degree of certainty exacted by some other unspecified field of science. See § 440.09(1), Fla....

affirm. In Florida Tile, this court construed section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes, saying: This statute

...There is no doubt that over-exertion has killed people who have had heart attacks. On the other hand some of them do amazing things and get by with them. Here’s a man whom we know had a bad heart and he had been repeatedly told to avoid over-exertion.” Section 440.09, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides, in part, as follows: “Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee if the disability or death results from an injury arising out of and in the...

reverse and remand. Pursuant to the provisions of section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1991), an employee injured

Appellee benefits for psychiatric treatment under section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes. Appellee concedes that

...rent stages of a determination of entitlement to benefits: Work must be the MCC of a compensable injury, and also – where (as here) there is a preexisting condition – the compensable injury must be the MCC of the need for treatment. 2 Compare § 440.09(1), Fla....

...employment”), and § 440.02(36), Fla. Stat. (2013) (defining “arising out of” by stating that injury “arises out of employment if work performed in the course and scope of employment is the major contributing cause of the injury”), with § 440.09(1)(b), Fla....

PER CURIAM. The Judge of Compensation Claims applied the 120-day pay and investigate provision of section 440.20(4), Florida Statutes, to the claimant’s entitlement to further benefits under section 440.09(l)(b), Florida Statutes....

...Indeed, the JCC found that *469 claimant has reached maximum medical improvement with no permanent impairment rating, and that the industrial injuries are no longer the MCC of any continuing need for treatment or surgery. ... Therefore, the claimant is no longer entitled to medical benefits. See § 440.09(l)(b), Fla....

...nnection between the injury and wage loss. Instead, in the subsequent three paragraphs, the JCC set forth detailed findings that Claimant did *2 not establish a sufficient causal relationship between his accident and his injury, findings relevant to section 440.09, Florida Statutes, which concerns whether an accident or injury is covered by workers' compensation—that is, its compensability....

...96-2212, we reverse and remand for consideration of the proffered evidence at a new hearing. We also reverse the award of attorney’s fees' appealed separately in No. 96-2291. On appeal, the cases have been consolidated. 1 Recently clarifying the scope of section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (1995), we left undiminished the JCC’s responsibility to decide — if necessary to determine entitlement to benefits — whether a claimant is malingering....

...1st DCA 1997)(holding that, while collateral determinations of fraud must be made in another forum, the judge of compensation claims retains the fact-finder’s traditional role in resolving credibility issues); E.H. v. Temporary Labor Source, Inc., 687 So.2d 884 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997)(holding inability to make a section 440.09(4) determination does not affect the ability of the judge of compensation claims to decide a claimant’s credibility)....

... II. A. The first issue is whether the JCC’s decision to apply the causation standard in effect at the time of Mr. Jones’s 1981 workplace injury, rather than the standard in section 440.09, Florida Statutes (2013), was error. It was not. We reject the E/C’s argument that a selected portion of current version of section 440.09, relating to the “burden of proof” for causation, applies as a procedural change to which Mr....

...altered parties’ substantive rights). And the substantive rights of the parties generally are fixed at the time of the accident and injury. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Mayo, 121 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 1960). Here, we conclude that the amendment to section 440.09 in 1994 affected Mr. Jones’s substantive rights by changing an element of his claim with the additional requirement that he prove that his compensable injury is the “major contributing cause” of any other resulting injury; thus, under the current standard, if applied to his 1981 accident, Mr....

...Jones would be potentially precluded from establishing 3 causation for what was previously a compensable condition under the law in effect at the time of his workplace injury. The JCC, therefore, properly declined to apply the current version of section 440.09 as to the causation of Mr....

...The deputy commissioner determined otherwise and the E/C appeals. We reverse. In June, 1987, claimant was hired to work at the construction site of the Perdido Hilton in Gulf Shores, Alabama. The claimant, who resided in Milton, Florida, was injured at the job site a few weeks later. ⅛ Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1987), provides in pertinent part: (1) * * * Where an accident happens while the employee is employed elsewhere than in this state, which would entitle him or his dependents to compensation if it had happened in t...

...ion. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART and REMANDED. BENTON and PADOVANO, JJ., concur. . Blight’s injuries predate the 1994 statutory revisions, which require that the industrial accident be the major contributing cause of the need for treatment. § 440.09, Fla....

...Analysis The Workers’ Compensation Law defines “injury” as “personal injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment.” § 440.02(19), Fla. Stat. (2010). The Law also requires that an injury, to be compensable, “aris[e] out of work performed in the course and scope of employment.” § 440.09(1), Fla....

...McClane’s testimony as being unsupported by, and contradictory to, the weight of the other medical and non-medical evidence. The causal connection between the industrial accident and claimant’s injury or disability must be established by a “reasonable degree of medical certainty.” § 440.09(1), Fla....

...City of Tampa Parks Dep’t, 625 So.2d 868, 873 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)(en banc). Further, although expert medical testimony has an important role in establishing whether the industrial accident was “the major contributing cause” of the claimant’s disability, see section 440.09(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1995); Closet Maid v....

...n applied so as to remove the immunity from tort liability enjoyed by statutory employers. On appeal, appellants argue that the trial court erred in finding that the intentional tort and the unrelated works exceptions were inapplicable. We disagree. Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2004), provides that "[t]he employer shall pay compensation or furnish benefits ......

...olicy. The written policy was the best evidence of the scope of Spirco’s coverage. The order under review is therefore reversed, and this cause is remanded for proceedings consistent herewith. SHIVERS, C.J., and BOOTH and ALLEN, JJ., concur. . See § 440.09(1), Fla.Stat....

...SMITH, Jr., Judge. The workers’ compensation insurance carrier for appellee Griffith Ranch, Inc. appeals a deputy commissioner’s order finding that Robert Barrett’s death was compensa-ble under Chapter 440 and that coverage was not excluded by Section 440.09(2), Florida Statutes (1977), as amended by Chapter 74-197, § 5, Fla....

...But the question is whether state law now avoids overlapping coverage by sacrificing State benefits even if federal law does not require that sacrifice. Dicta in both the majority and the minority opinions in Plantation characterize the 1974 amendment to § 440.09(2) as an “additional step” in that direction, 6 or as an unambiguous bar of overlapping coverage....

...ERVIN and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur. . In Jones , this court held that the City of Miami was entitled to offset from pension benefits the amount its employee was receiving in compensation benefits because the employee’s accident occurred prior to July 1, 1973, the date section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes, was repealed.

“arising out of and in the course of employment.” Section 440.09 (1), Florida Statutes 1955, F.S.A. The test

...administrative rules.” Lias v. Anderson & Shah Roofing, Inc., 831 So.2d 1236, 1236 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). Notwithstanding this failure of proof, workers’ compensation benefits were denied because the JCC applied the presumption available under section 440.09(7), Florida Statutes, that the injury was primarily caused by the use of a metabolite of cocaine....

...Because the JCC deviated from this court’s mandate in Lias , the final order is reversed and the case remanded. On remand, the JCC, without the taking of further testimony, shall determine whether the work-related injury was occasioned primarily by the influence of drugs pursuant to § 440.09(3), solely, and, if not, the JCC shall enter an order determining com-pensability and award medical bills, if any, that are compensable....

primarily by claimant’s intoxication, pursuant to Section 440.-09(3), Florida Statutes, is supported by competent

...Aparicio failed to state his opinion as to the cause of Claimant's injuries and, although he was deposed, Dr. Aparicio was not questioned regarding his opinion on occupational causation. The JCC found Claimant's injuries to be a compensable aggravation of a preexisting condition pursuant to section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2001), and awarded disability and medical benefits attributable thereto....

...Although the record, which comprises three thousand pages, clearly establishes that Claimant is of the good-faith opinion that her injuries were the cumulative result of her work activities, no admissible medical opinion establishes the requisite causal relationship required by the Workers' Compensation Law. Pursuant to section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2001), Claimant was required to prove the existence of her injuries and occupational causation of those injuries, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty....

...Moreover, here the JCC concluded that Claimant's compensable injuries combined with a preexisting condition to cause or prolong disability or the need for medical treatment. This conclusion is not challenged by way of cross-appeal. Thus, pursuant to section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2001), Claimant was further required to prove that the workplace injuries were the major contributing (the most preponderant) cause of the disability or need for treatment....

...h injuries. By the time of Claimant’s third PFB, the E/C began denying entitlement to benefits “based on misrepresentation,” which it subsequently described in the joint pretrial stipulation as: “‘Misrepresentation,’ in violation of §§ 440.09 and .105, F.S....

..., makes it illegal for any person to “knowingly make, or cause to be made, any false, fraudulent, or misleading oral or written statement for the purpose of obtaining or denying any benefit or payment under this chapter” (emphasis added). And section 440.09(4)(a), Florida Statutes, bars benefits for an employee found to have “knowingly or intentionally engaged in any of the acts described in s....

...Specificity of the E/C’s Misrepresentation Defense The second error below relates to the requirement for pleading a misrepresentation defense under rule 60Q-6.113(2)(h), which provides: Any defense raised pursuant to Sections 440.09(4)(a) and 440.105, F.S., and any affirmative defense, must be raised with specificity, detailing the conduct giving rise to the defense, with leave to amend within 10 days....

...Claimant an opportunity to object/respond to the affirmative defense with specificity, as required by the rule. If the E/C satisfies the rule’s specificity requirement, then the JCC should determine whether Claimant made “any” statements afoul of subsection 440.09(4)(a), Florida Statutes, irrespective of whether the statements relate to the specific injuries for which Claimant is seeking benefits. 5  Lack of Job Sear...

...In paragraph forty-one of the JCC’s order, the JCC set forth that it is well settled that recovery for a mental or emotional injury is only available where the alleged mental injury is the “direct and immediate result” of a physical injury. The JCC also set forth in paragraph forty-one that section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes, provides that “mental and nervous injuries occurring as a manifestation of an injury compensable under this section shall be demonstrated by clear and convincing *374 evidence.” In paragraph forty-two, the JCC...

...his claim for attorney’s fees and costs. This appeal followed. Because the JCC’s application of an incorrect legal standard would preclude us from reaching the merits of her denial of the claim for psychiatric care, we address this issue first. Section 440.09, Florida Statutes (1997), provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (1) The employer shall pay compensation or furnish benefits required by this chapter if the employee suffers an accidental injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment....

...orkers’ Compensation Law. See Drewno, 727 So.2d at 397 . Prior to such revisions, the Legislature made no reference to “clear and convincing evidence” or “major contributing cause” with regard to workers’ compensation coverage. See e.g., § 440.09, Fla. Stat. (1993). In Drewno , we rejected the E/C’s argument that pursuant to section 440.09(1), an industrial accident must constitute the major contributing cause of any alleged psychiatric injuries....

of major contributing cause as embodied in section 440.09(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1997). In the decision

...Accordingly, our analysis will focus on the statutory predicate for a finding of compensability. Compensation is payable under chapter 440 to an employee if “disability or death results from an injury arising out of and in the course of employment.” § 440.09, Fla....

...Appellee’s partner on the grating opined the accident occurred because the grating was lying off-balance when ap-pellee stepped on it, and his weight tipped it, causing him to fall with it. We affirm the judge’s order finding ap-pellee’s accident was compensable. According to § 440.09(3), Fla.Stat....

...In that case, the burden remained with the employer to show that the employee’s intoxication was the primary cause of accident. The employer in that case failed to meet this burden, with the result that the accident was found com-pensable. In the instant case, the statutory language in § 440.09(3) reversed the eviden-tiary burden, so that it fell on appellee, as a legally intoxicated employee, to overcome the presumption his accident had occurred primarily because of his intoxication....

...n 1970. In urging this court to reverse, the City relies on this court’s recent decision in City of Miami v. Jones, 593 So.2d 544 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), which held that if the injury occurred prior to July 1,1973, the effective date of the repeal of section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes, then the City was entitled to take the offset because section 440.09(4), which authorized the offset, was still in effect at the time of the injury....

commissioner was whether recovery was barred (by section 440.09 Fla. Stat., F.S.A.) because the injuries were

...He decided to take steps to protect other motorists from the hazard, but ran into the tractor-trailer before he could do so. The question we address is whether Deputy Allen’s injuries are compensable because he was “acting within the course of employment” under section 440.091(1), Florida Statutes, or non-compensable because he was “going to or coming from” work under 440.092(2), Florida Statutes....

...ourse of employment whether or not the employer provided transportation if such means of transportation was available for the exclusive personal use by the employee, unless the employee was engaged in a special errand or mission for the employer.” § 440.092(2), Fla. Stat. Noting that the section’s two exceptions did not apply (the injury did not occur “during the officer’s work period or while going to or coming from work in an official law enforcement vehicle”), the JCC turned to the provisions of section 440.091(1), which provides that an “employee is considered to have been acting within the course of employment” if the employee: (a) Is elected, appointed, or employed full time by a municipality, the state, or any political subdivision a...

...ary responsibility; and (c) Was not engaged in services for which he or she was paid by a private employer, and the employee and his or her public employer had no agreement providing for workers’ compensation coverage for that private employment^] § 440.09(l)(a)-(c), Fla....

...ests,” the JCC analyzed whether an off-duty police officer who is “suddenly thrust” into the “performance of an official duty” meets the statutory test. In reviewing the statute’s language and caselaw on the topic, the JCC concluded that section 440.091(1) applies where an “officer’s duty status” changes due to intervening events that require the performance of the “employee’s primary responsibility,” which statutorily must be “the prevention or de *1152 tection of crime or the enforcement of the penal, criminal, traffic, or highway laws of the state[.]” Id. § 440.091(l)(a)....

...guard the drivers on the road and resolve the hazard as required by the Levy County Sheriffs Office standards of conduct.” For these reasons, the JCC concluded that Deputy Allen established he was “acting within the course of employment” under section 440.091(1) because he was discharging his primary responsibility at the time of the accident. The employer/carrier argued that that section 440.092(2) applies because it is an exception to and more specific than 440.091(1), but the JCC determined that both sections contain “exceptions to the going and coming rule as it relates to law enforcement officers, and each provides criteria that must be met before an accident is deemed to have occurred in the cours...

...ployment.” The JCC thereby concluded that Deputy Allen’s accident was compensable, which the employer/carrier now appeals. II. The employer-carrier raises three issues, two of which are inter-related and involve the scope and purpose of sections 440.091(1) and 440.092(2); the third involves a claim that Deputy Allen was not a “full time” employee, but competent substantial evidence supports that he was. On the main issues, the employer-carrier asserts that because Deputy Allen was off-duty and on his way to work, section 440.092(2) applies to the exclusion of section 440.091(1). Stated differently, it views section 440.092(2) as precluding a finding of compensability if an officer suffers an injury while going to or coming from work, the only two exceptions being those in 440.092(2) itself, which create a presumption of compensability: if an injury occurs (a) “during the officer’s work period” (i.e., normal working hours) or (b) “while going to or coming from work in an official law enforcement vehicle,” neither of which apply in this case. Because neither of the exceptions apply, the employer-carrier’s view is that no accident can ever be compensable — even if the requirements of section 440.091(1) are otherwise met — if an officer is in the process of going to/coming from work, even if interrupted by an event that requires the officer to engage in action required of the officer as part of his official responsibilities. But section 440.092(2) cannot be read to extinguish the intended scope of section 440.091(1), which provides that officers (who otherwise fulfill the other statutory requirements) engaging in their “primary responsibility” are considered acting within the course of employment regardless of whether they happen to be going to/coming from work....

...for the official acts of an officer. Here, because Deputy Alen was driving his personal vehicle to work, an accident ordinarily would not be compensable. But extraordinary intervening events made the *1153 fact he was going to work irrelevant under section 440.091(1)....

...He was a full-time deputy with the “authority to bear arms and make arrests” who happened upon a situation that his employer deemed by written policy to require Deputy Allen to intervene. At that moment, Deputy Allen was no longer “going to work” but instead was — for purposes of section 440.091(1)— engaged in his “primary responsibility” which was “the prevention or detection of crime or the enforcement of the penal, criminal, traffic, or highway laws of the state” as the Levy County policy required....

...hat his employment required him to' intervene in the dangerous situation that confronted him and other motorists — a factual finding that is not contested — his status changed from a mere commuter to one falling squarely within the parameters of section 440.091(1), thereby supporting the JCC’s legal conclusion that he was acting within the course of his employment and his accident compensable. That Deputy Allen falls within the criteria for compensability in section 440.091(1) is not inconsistent with the history and purpose of section 440.092(2), • which was adopted in 1990 and stated: Going or coming....

...s the employee was engaged in a special errand or mission for the employer. Ch. 90-201, § 14, Laws of Florida. This “going and coming” provision applied to employment generally and was not limited solely to law enforcement officers. In applying section 440.092(2) in the law enforcement context, however, this Court has consistently construed it as precluding compensability in the generic situation where an officer is involved in an accident in her private vehicle, but argues she was on-call...

...This Court found that the officer was discharging his “primary responsibility while traveling to the police station, and it was not necessary to actually issue a citation or take any affirmative action in this regard for the officer to be within the course of his employment as delineated in section 440.091.” Id. at 494 . As the JCC below noted, the caselaw *1154 both from 1990 (pre-section 440.092(2)) and thereafter in the context of law enforcement officers has been to determine whether the status of an off-duty officer, even if in her private vehicle going to/coming from work, can change when the officer observes an event requiring her to carry out her primary responsibility under the statute....

...on that compensability is permissible only under the “going or coming” context when an officer is injured during her “work period” or while “in an official law enforcement vehicle,” an argument that no appellate court has addressed since section 440.092(2) was amended in 2001. But as mentioned earlier, we view the current, post-2001 version of section 440.092(2), as not inconsistent with a finding of compensability in this case under section 440.091(1). The 2001 amendment to section 440.092(2) at issue merely established two situations in which a presumption of compensability arises as exceptions to its general “going or coming” provisions. We divine no legislative intent that the addition of these two exceptions in 2001 were intended to alter the long-standing principle under section 440.091(1) that the status of an off-duty law enforcement officer can change to on-duty when a situation arises requiring the officer’s exercise of her primary responsibility....

...In this workers’ compensation case, Claimant, Tony Leggett, appeals an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) denying contested temporary total disability (TTD) benefits on the grounds that Claimant made misrepresentations forfeiting benefits under sections 440.09 and 440.105, Florida Statutes (2012)....

...over a three-day period in October 2013, he performed physical tasks consistent with the construction of a dock. The E/C stopped paying TTD benefits as of December 2, 2013, and denied the entire claim (including the orthopedic evaluation), asserting a fraud defense under sections 440.09 and 440.105, Florida Statutes....

...Section 440.105(4)(b)(1) states it is illegal for any person to “knowingly make, or cause to be made, any false, fraudulent, or misleading oral or written statement for the purpose of obtaining or denying any benefit or payment under this chapter.” Section 440.09(4) bars benefits for an employee found to have “knowingly or intentionally engaged in” such acts “for the purpose of securing workers’ compensation benefits.” Notably, Claimant in this appeal does not challenge the finding...

...and medical benefits that the E/C was contesting. Instead, the JCC denied entitlement to these benefits, which were the very benefits at issue when Claimant made misrepresentations in deposition. Notwithstanding these facts, Claimant argues that in every instance where section 440.09(4) is applied, entitlement to benefits ends on a date certain—the date of the misrepresentation. But the plain text of section 440.09(4) suggests something different: “An employee shall not be entitled to compensation or benefits under this chapter if any judge of compensation claims, administrative law judge, court, or jury convened in this state determines that...

...ion. The cases cited in Alvarez – Horizons Painting v. Lessard, 688 So. 2d 941 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), and Pavilion Apartments v. Wetherington, 943 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) – are also distinguishable on their facts. At the time of Lessard, section 440.09(4) did not allow JCCs to make determinations of fraud (instead limiting such determinations to “any administrative hearing officer, court, or jury convened in this state”), so we held there is no forfeiture where the E/C failed to show that “an administrative hearing officer, court or jury had determined that claimant had knowingly or intentionally made false statements.” Subsequent to Lessard, the Legislature amended section 440.09(4) to permit JCCs to make factual determinations that fraud had occurred....

...This cause was pending when this court determined the rights of similarly situated parties in City of Miami v. Herndon, Fla. App.1968, 209 So.2d 487 . The circuit judge entered his judgment in accordance with the following quotation from that case: “The plain meaning of the language of § 440.09(4), Fla.Stat., F.S.A....

...d. These advance payments are permitted under the practice in workmen’s compensation courts as an aid and courtesy to the claimant who may have outstanding bills or pressing needs. The basis for our decision in City of Miami v. Herndon, above, was § 440.09(4), Fla.Stat., F.S.A....

...circumstances, as doing so would reward Claimant. To be certain, workers’ compensation is not designed as a reward of any sort; rather, it is a limited form of compensation for actual physical injury, both medically demonstrated and verified. See § 440.09(1), Fla....

...nt *1231 would have had to satisfy a more stringent burden of proof, i.e., she would have had to show that her original work-related injury, the exacerbation of her asthma condition, constituted the major contributing cause of her hip condition. See § 440.09(1)(a), Fla....

was the aggressor in a fight. In either case, Section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes (1983) precludes compensation

...OSTERHAUS, J., Bonita Brinson failed two illegal-drug tests after falling and injuring her shoulder on the job at the hospital. She later sought workers’ compensation benefits, but was denied by her employer- carrier because of the failed tests. See § 440.09(3), Fla. Stat. (2017). Ms. Brinson challenged the denial of benefits. But because she failed to rebut the statutory presumption attributing her injury primarily to the influence of drugs, see § 440.09(7)(b), we affirm the Judge of Compensation Claims’ decision to deny benefits. I.  Ms....

...When an injured employee tests positive for drugs after an accident, like Ms. Brinson did, Florida’s workers’ compensation law “presume[s] that the injury was occasioned primarily . . . by the influence of the drug upon the employee.” § 440.09(7)(b), Fla. Stat. And it does not compensate for the injury. § 440.09(3), Fla. Stat. The law allows the injured employee, however, to rebut the statutory presumption denying compensation by presenting clear and convincing evidence that the “influence of the drug did not contribute to the injury.” § 440.09(7)(b), Fla....

...Brinson’s witnesses left open the question of whether she was under the influence when the accident occurred. They didn’t know whether the drugs in her system contributed to her injury, and so failed to testify effectively for purposes of rebutting § 440.09(7)(b)’s presumption. Because their testimony didn’t present clear and convincing evidence that the “influence of the drug did not contribute to the injury,” as required by § 440.09(7)(b), Ms....

...2 2 Regarding exclusion, we see no statutory or case-related basis for applying an exclusionary rule on the basis of requiring visible or other signs of impairment in addition to an accident. Test results have long been used in workers’ compensation cases (and § 440.09(7)(b)’s presumption has been applied) in the absence of additional impairment evidence....

...She challenges the denial of coverage, arguing that the drug test was unauthorized and, alternatively, that she rebutted the statutory presumption—required for positive drug tests—that that her injury “was occasioned primarily . . . by the influence of the drug upon” her. § 440.09(7)(b), Fla....

...from hospital tests conducted for medical purposes after an auto accident); Temp. Labor Source v. E.H., 765 So. 2d 757, 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (acknowledging that an emergency room drug test in the absence of other employer-originated suspicion could underlie an employer’s § 440.09(7)(b)-based defense). 6 of an injured employee only “if the employer has reason to suspect that the injury was occasioned primarily . . . by the use of any drug, as defined in this chapter, which affected the employee to the extent that the employee’s normal faculties were impaired” as to the accident in question. § 440.09(7)(a), Fla....

...for the drug-testing, which resulted in the immediate denial of any medical treatment. 7 justified. 2 A workplace injury—without more—is a legally insufficient basis to impose drug testing on an employee under section 440.09(7) or the employer’s written policy, both of which require reasonable suspicion, which did not exist as to Brinson. The testing of Brinson was thereby unauthorized under section 440.09(7)(a), negating the employer’s reliance on the statutory presumption of intoxication in section 440.09(7)(b) (discussed further below). Had Brinson’s employer adopted a statutorily-defined drug- free workplace program, it would have more latitude to drug test injured employees, perhaps even Brinson....

...Only employers with compliant drug free workplace programs get its benefit. On this point, no statute or case 4 says that employers subject to Chapter 440, but without drug-free workplace programs, have 3 Nor could it rely on the more stringent evidentiary standard that employees must meet under section 440.09(7)(b)) (“If the employer has implemented a drug-free workplace, this presumption may be rebutted only by evidence that there is no reasonable hypothesis that the intoxication or drug influence contributed to the injury.”) (emphasis...

...o drug testing vis-a-vis rights of employers who need to ensure safe workplaces. This case upsets that balance, giving employers carte blanche to do as they want. An employer without a program, of course, may conduct drug testing under state law, as section 440.09(7)(a) makes clear, but it must comply with standards, such as the “reason to suspect” requirement for drug-testing after a workplace injury. Intermixing the drug-free workplace statute, section 440.102, with the general drug-testing statute, section 440.09(7), creates confusion and thwarts the important legislative protections for drug testing of employees....

...with inactive metabolites in their system—couldn’t have done anything more than she did to rebut the statutory presumption “that the injury was occasioned primarily by the intoxication of, or by the influence of the drug upon, the employee.” § 440.09(7)(b), Fla....

...ke the future application of workplace drug tests challenging, to say the least. 12 _____________________________ Paul M. Anderson of Anderson & Hart, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellant/Cross-Appellee. 692 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1997) (section 440.09(3)’s then-existing conclusive presumption that injury in drug-free workplace was caused by claimant’s intoxication due to positive drug test violates due process), affirming, Hall v....

...mant in an automobile accident, with no permanent impairment, the industrial accident was not the major contributing cause of either the claimant’s disability or his need for treatment. Accordingly, it was error to award further medical treatment. § 440.09(l)(b), Fla....

...nel for the Chi-Chi's division at the time of the accident. But he also testified that employee transfer from the Duffs division to the Chi-Chi’s division was possible and that Tip-ton and Guess were interested in seeing the Chi-Chi’s operation. Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1983), provides that compensation shall be payable only if the injury arises out of and in the course of employment....

...restrictions on admissible testimony in workers’ compensation cases. We cannot agree. The EMA presumption is not irrebuttable and is permitted elsewhere in the law (in civil and criminal contexts), as well as throughout Chapter 440, Florida Statutes. See § 440.093(2), Fla. Stat. (requiring mental or nervous injuries to be demonstrated by clear and convincing medical evidence); § 440.09(1) (in occupational disease and repetitive exposure cases both causation and sufficient exposure to support causation must be proven by clear and convincing evidence); § 440.02(1), Fla....

...limitations defense and the carrier demonstrates that it has provided notice to the employee in accordance with s. 440.185 and that the employer has posted notice in accordance with s. 440.055, the employee must demonstrate estoppel by clear and convincing evidence.”); § 440.09(7)(c), Fla....

...All of the contractors working on the subject property were paid by Arbor pro on a daily basis. At all times material, Arbor Pro did not secure workers’ compensation coverage. At all times material, Southern Crane secured workers’ compensation coverage for its employee, Michael Negron. (Emphasis added.) Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2007), provides: “The employer must pay compensation or furnish benefits required by this chapter if the employee suffers an accidental compensable injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and...

...Having examined the germane facts of the instant case, we hereby hold that the trial judge was eminently correct when he applied the principles of Herndon, supra, to the case at bar. In Herndon, we stated that: “The plain meaning of the language of § 440.09(4), Fla.Stat., F.S.A....

B.L. THOMAS, J. In this workers’ compensation case, the Employer/Carrier challenge an order awarding Claimant temporary partial disability benefits and rejecting the affirmative defense of misrepresentation under paragraphs 440.09(4)(a) and 440.105(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2014)....

...The Employer/Carrier defended the claim, in part, on the ground that the workplace injury is not the major contributing cause of Claimant’s neck condition, based on Dr. Trimble’s expert opinion and the expert opinion of Dr. Rumana, the Employer/Carrier’s independent medical examiner. Under subsection 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2014), an employer/carrier is responsible for providing benefits only where the accidental compensable injury is the major contributing cause of any resulting injuries....

...Wiethoff, 925 So.2d 348, 350 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). In accordance with the statute, a major contributing cause is the cause that is more than 50% responsible for the injury, when compared to all other causes combined for which treatment or benefits are sought. § 440.09(1), Fla....

...to the patient’s diagnosis and status of recovery.” § 440.13(1)(k), Fla. Stat. Claimants have the burden of showing that requested medical benefits are medically necessary by use of medical evidence connecting the requested benefits and the compensable accident. § 440.09(1), Fla....

based upon the intoxication presumption in section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes (1991).1 We agree with

...In the light of this finding, we have no occasion to determine, and expressly do not rule upon, the question raised on argument of this cause as to whether or not impairment to the equivalent of intoxication by “Bennies” or other similar stimulants is within the scope of F.S. 440.09(3), F.S.A....

...“In any proceeding for tlie enforcement of a claim for compensation under this chapter it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary (3) That the injury was not occasioned primarily by the intoxication of the injured employee.” . F.S. 440.09(3), F.S.A....

...h injuries. By the time of Claimant’s third PFB, the E/C began denying entitlement to benefits “based on misrepresentation,” which it subsequently described in the joint pretrial stipulation as: “‘Misrepresentation,’ in violation of §§ 440.09 and .105, F.S....

..., makes it illegal for any person to “knowingly make, or cause to be made, any false, fraudulent, or misleading oral or written statement for the purpose of obtaining or denying any benefit or payment under this chapter” (emphasis added). And section 440.09(4)(a), Florida Statutes, bars benefits for an employee found to have “knowingly or intentionally engaged in any of the acts described in s....

...on Defense Claimant challenged the E/C’s misrepresentation defense as failing to satisfy the requirements for pleading a misrepresentation defense under rule 60Q- 6.113(2)(h), which provides: Any defense raised pursuant to Sections 440.09(4)(a) and 440.105, F.S., and any affirmative defense, must be raised with specificity, detailing the conduct giving rise to the defense, with leave to amend within 10 days....

...the specificity objection with a second bite at the apple after hearing and appeal. And so, taking account of both parties’ rights, we remand with instructions to the JCC to determine whether Claimant made “any” statements afoul of subsection 440.09(4)(a), Florida Statutes, irrespective of whether the statements relate to the specific injuries for which Claimant is seeking benefits. Lack of Job Search Finally, we find no merit in the E/...

the employee suffers an accidental injury.” § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (2002). This coverage prerequisite

...l relationship between Claimant's accident and her hearing loss. Rather, Claimant had to introduce medical evidence proving that, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, her hearing loss was causally related to her compensable accident. See § 440.09(1), Fla....

PER CURIAM. In this workers’ compensation appeal, Claimant challenges an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) that concludes Claimant is disqualified, under section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (1998), from all benefits otherwise available to him under the Florida Workers’ Compensation Law....

...pensation fraud under section 440.105, *896 Florida Statutes, in a court of competent jurisdiction, we find no error in the JCC’s conclusion that Claimant has, therefore, forfeited his entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits as directed by section 440.09(4)....

...review is de novo. Palm Beach Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Ferrer, 990 So.2d 13, 14 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); Matrix Emp. Leasing v. Hernandez, 975 So.2d 1217, 1218 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); Mylock v. Champion Int’l, 906 So.2d 363, 365 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). Sectioris 440.09(4) and 440.105, Florida Statutes, are often referred to as the mechanisms that created the “fraud defense.” This “misnomer appears to have narrowed the "application of the sanction beyond that intended by the legislature.” Village Apartments v....

...Not all prohibited acts in section 440.105 entail a “fraud” element. See § 440.105(4)(b)2.-3., Fla. Stat. In interpreting a statute, “full effect must be given to the language' selected by the' legislature.” Hernandez, 856 So.2d at 1141 . Accordingly, per section 440.09(4), the commission of “any” act of an employee prohibited by section 440.105 results in forfeiture of benefits, not just those statutorily designated as “fraudulent.” 2 'This Court has previously emphasized that the 2003 Amendments to section 440.09(4)(a), adding the phrase “or any criminal act,” broadened the subsection to cover not only acts described in section 440.105, but also other criminal acts, as long as “all of those acts are done for the purpose of securing workers’ compensation benefits.” Matrix Emp....

..., regardless of the source. The JCC erred in placing an affirmative duty, not statutorily mandated, on the evaluating physicians to interrogate the -Claimant regarding known misrepresentations. Furthermore, a plain reading of sections-440.105(4) and 440.09(4) provides no basis for the JCC’s exoneration of the misrepresentations....

...Accordingly, Claimant’s misrepresentation to Shands regarding the cause of his sinus condition was not made for the purpose of the obtaining workers’ compensation benefits. This reasoning misconstrues section 440.105(4) and requires an immediate causal nexus not contemplated by the legislature. Section 440.09(4)(a) mandates forfeiture of benefits if the misrepresentations were made for “the purpose of securing workers’ compensation benefits.” Section 440.105(4) details those acts regarded as having been committed for “the purpose of...

...The Claimant, just a few days before the merits hearing, dropped his claims relating to the facial and head injuries and did not seek payment of the Shands’ medical bill. However, this formal dismissal of claims does not shield the Claimant from the reach of section 440.09(4)....

...that effect. It was not until the filing of pre-trial legal memoranda several days before hearing that the Claimant advised he was not seeking benefits related to the facial/sinus injuries. The JCC erroneously required that for benefit denial under section 440.09(4), the E/C had to link the allegedly false or misleading statements directly to the particular injury for which benefits are sought—to the Claimant’s lower back in this instance....

...The parties have a right to expect that all statements, whether written or oral, are truthful and adequately responsive. The Claimant’s argument on appeal that the E/C waived, expressly or impliedly, the misrepresentation defenses during the course of the merits hearing is without merit. Pursuant to section 440.09(4)(a), and having violated section 440.105, the Claimant is not entitled to workers’ compensation benefits....

...o far into the water that it had to be towed out. . Section 440.105, Florida Statutes, lists prohibited activities of employees, employers, insurance entities, licensed medical providers, attorneys, and a broad reference to "any person.” However,' section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes, provides the sanction for employees who violate section 440.105, Florida Statutes.

...Jur.2d Federal Employers’ Liability, etc., § 67 (1967). However, those remedies are usually exclusive by their terms; the election depends on whether federal jurisdiction attaches. Florida does not permit workmen’s compensation when recovery is possible under the Jones Act. Section 440.09(2), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...It is illegal for any person to make "any false, fraudulent, or misleading oral or written statement" for the purpose of obtaining workers' compensation benefits. § 440.105(4)(b), Fla. Stat. (2006). An employee found to have knowingly or intentionally done so is not entitled to benefits. § 440.09(4)(a), Fla....

...Claimant's "posturing and cog wheeling" were not oral or written statements, but behavior identical to behaviors captured on surveillance in Dieujuste v. J. Dodd Plumbing, Inc., 3 So.3d 1275 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009), which this court found could not serve as the predicate for disqualification from benefits under sections 440.09 and 440.105....

...The JCC found that Rinker had complied with the drug-free workplace requirements of section 440.102, and that Stepanek’s blood-alcohol level was over .10 percent, thereby raising the rebuttable presumption-that Step-anek’s intoxication primarily caused his injury, pursuant to section 440.09(7)(b), Florida Statutes (1995)....

...In his second issue, Stepanek claims that Mike Tedesco’s testimony recounting that he smelled alcohol on Stepanek’s breath a few hours before the accident occurred established the employer’s knowledge of his intoxication. Such knowledge, he contends, defeats the presumption established in section 440.09(7)(b), providing that Stepanek’s intoxication primarily occasioned his industrial injury, which was established by proof that his blood-alcohol level was .08 percent or higher....

PER CURIAM. We affirm the JCC’s ruling that Florida has jurisdiction to determine the compens-ability of claimant’s out-of-state industrial injury because the employment contract *537 was made in Florida. See § 440.09(l)(d), Fla....

BARFIELD, Judge. The employer and carrier (E/C) appeal a compensation order which denied disability benefits but awarded medical benefits. The E/C correctly assert that the term “compensation” as used in section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes (1991), includes both medical and disability benefits....

...The E/C defended on the ground that the employer had implemented a drug-free workplace program and all benefits were barred pursuant to section 440.101, Florida Statutes (1991), or, in the alternative, the accident was primarily occasioned by drug use and therefore not compensable pursuant to section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes (1991)....

...l benefits when an employee tests positive for drug use after an injury if the employer has substantially complied with the requirements of section 440.102. Although we reject the E/C’s substantial compliance argument, the presumption appearing in section 440.09(3) affords the E/C the desired relief. Section 440.09 provides, in part: (1) Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee if the disability or death result from an injury arising out of and in the course of employment.......

...employee. In the absence of a drug-free workplace program, this presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that the intoxication or influence of the drug did not contribute to the injury.... Regarding the rebuttable presumption in section 440.09(3), the JCC found there was no clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption that the drug contributed to the injury. This finding is supported by the record. The JCC determined that “compensation” was accordingly denied, but noted that the question of what constitutes “compensation” had to be addressed because unlike section 440.101, section 440.09(3) did not provide that both “medical and indemnity” benefits should be denied....

...ded in this chapter. The JCC noted that the definition of “compensation” in section 440.02(6) did not mention medical benefits. The JCC concluded that if the legislature had intended that both medical and “indemnity” benefits be denied under section 440.09(3), the legislature could have used the same terminology used in section 440.101. Because the legislature used different terms in the two statutory provisions, the JCC denied “indemnity” benefits but awarded medical benefits. To limit the term “compensation” in section 440.09 to disability benefits leads to illogical results. Such a construction of the term would permit an award of medical benefits under section 440.09(2) to an employee covered by the Federal Employer’s Liability Act, the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act, or the Jones Act and under section 440.09(3) to an employee who by willful intention injured himself....

...ion for death when a limited or narrow construction of “compensation” is intended. The JCC’s rebanee on the fact that the legislature referred to “medical and indemnity benefits” in section 440.101, while referring to “compensation” in section 440.09, appears to be unwarranted....

...Within section 440.101, the legislature first refers to forfeiture of “compensation benefits” and subsequently refers to forfeiture of “medical and indemnity benefits.” Additionally, there is no other statutory provision defining or providing “indemnity” benefits. We conclude that section 440.09(3) precludes payment of all benefits and the JCC therefore erred in awarding medical benefits in this case....

...In this workers’ compensation case, the Employer/Carrier (E/C) filed a motion seeking to terminate Claimant’s entitlement to benefits under chapter 440 on grounds Claimant violated section 440.105(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2006), and thus, pursuant to section 440.09(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2006), she was no longer entitled to any benefits....

...). In Polston v. Hurricane Island Outward Bound, 920 So.2d 766 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), this court reversed the JCC’s finding she had jurisdiction to entertain the E/C’s petition for benefits which requested “a determination pursuant to Fla. Stat. 440.09(4) whether the Employee/Claimant had knowingly made false, fraudulent or misleading oral or written statements for the purposes of securing workers’ compensation benefits in violation of Fla....

...1st DCA 1985)). III. Discussion 1. Underlying Action In general, Florida’s Workers’ Compensation Law precludes Eric, an employee, from suing Gulfstream, his employer, for injuries he sustained during the course of his employment. See Fla. Stat. § 440.09 (1) (“An employer must pay compensation or furnish benefits required by this chapter if the employee suffers an accidental compensable injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment.”); see also Fla....

...The work included resealing and restriping tarmacs; sealing and coating roofs on hangers; re *1232 pairing leaks in those roofs, which at times required replacing part of the roof structure; pressure washing hangers; and cleaning up debris. On occasion, Just Overlay’s employees installed ceiling tiles. Under section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2004), “[t]he employer must pay compensation or furnish benefits required by this chapter if the employee suffers an accidental compensable injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and scope o...

claimant had failed to prove, as required by section 440.09, Florida Statutes (1994), that the work-related

...Therefore, the statements *1070 made by the Defendant in July 15, 1997 deposition that he had no off the job injuries were not material to the issue in the claim. The trial court’s analysis and its citation to the Mellon case makes clear that it presumed Calabrese’s workers’ compensation claim was based upon section 440.09(l)(b), which provides: If an injury arising out of and in the course of employment combines with a preexisting disease or condition to cause or prolong disability or need for treatment, the employer must pay compensation or benefits re...

...To the contrary, the facts alleged in Calabrese’s motion to dismiss raise the issue of whether his 1996 symptoms were caused by his 1992 back injury, not whether the 1992 injury “was aggravated by an on-the-job accident.” This type of claim falls under paragraph 440.09(l)(a), Florida Statutes', which provides: This chapter does not require any compensation or benefits for any subsequent injury the employee suffers as a result of an original injury arising out of and in the course of employment unless the original injury is the major contributing cause of the subsequent injury....

...15(5)(b). 43 So.3d at 793. In affirming, we noted that while the term "preexisting condition" was not specifically defined in section 440.15(5)(b), we had defined and later applied the term in the context of the major contributing cause provision in section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes....

...1st DCA 2007), which we relied upon in Staffmark, we explained that the claimant was involved in two employment accidents, each of which resulted in an injury to the claimant's back and both of which combined to cause his then-current need for compensation benefits. On appeal, the claimant argued that section 440.09(1)(b) did not apply because his injuries were caused solely by multiple employment accidents....

...We agreed and determined that section 440.42(4), Florida Statutes, which "governs the division of liability between carriers when two or more compensable accidents combine to cause the claimant's need for benefits," controlled the case. Id. at 16. We determined that section 440.09(1)(b) was intended to apply only when a claimant's need for treatment or benefits was caused by the impact of an employment accident combined with a preexisting injury or condition that was unrelated to an employment accident. Id. at 17; see also Pizza Hut v. Proctor, 955 So.2d 637, 638 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (holding that the E/C could not rely upon section 440.09(1)(b) because the case involved two industrial *110 accidents and injuries without any preexisting injury attributable to a nonindustrial cause)....

...t deemed compensable at the pertinent time because of the actions of Claimant. As the JCC correctly set forth, the law requires industry to bear the burden of paying for only those injuries that were sustained in compensable workplace accidents. See § 440.09(1), Fla....

...Thus, while I concur in the result here, I think this court should reconsider its prior decisions and correctly differentiate between apportionment of costs between an employer and a claimant, and the allocation of benefits between multiple employers and a claimant. NOTES [1] Section 440.09(1)(b) provides in part that "[i]f an injury arising out of and in the course of employment combines with a preexisting disease or condition to cause or prolong disability or need for treatment, the employer must pay compensation or ben...

contributing cause” of claimant’s medical condition. § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat.; Orange County MIS Dept. v. Hak

...Therefore, after due consideration, I find that Raymond O.’ Harris, Jr., and Wilburn Howard Harris were dependent upon the deceased at the time of his death and are entitled to benefit under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. “The carrier under Section 440.09, Florida Statutes 1941, contends that the deceased did not meet his death in the course of his employment and the contract of employment specifically provided for services exclusively outside of the State of Florida....

...Midland Constructors, 152 Fla. 289 , 11 So. (2nd) 895 ; Wheeler Co. v. Pullins, 152 Fla. 96 , 11 So. (2nd) 303 and Sec. 440.02 (13), F.S. ’41, F.S.A. The second question is decided upon Lovejoy Co. v. Ackis, 153 Fla. 876 , 16 So. (2nd) 297 . See also Sec. 440.09 (1), F.S....

therefore the intoxication provision of Florida Statute 440.09(3) does not apply. “Finally, in connection

...nt[’s] right ankle injury is the job duties with the employer. Because the claimant’s employment has aggravated and accelerated the need for treatment, I find that the major contributing cause standard and the criteria for compensability under F.S. 440.09 have been met....

...he MCC of his need for treatment. The JCC was not entitled to reinterpret the EMA’s opinions in this manner. Claimant had the burden to prove that the resulting aggravation of the pre-exist-ing condition was the MCC of his need for treatment under section 440.09(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2002)....

...treatment, the employer must pay compensation or benefits required by this chapter only to the extent that the injury arising out of and in the course of employment is and remains the major contributing cause of the disability or need for treatment. § 440.09(l)(b), Fla....

...ing for further proceedings as to whether aggravation was the MCC of claimant’s need for treatment); City of Cooper City/Fla. Mun. Ins. Trust/Fla. League of Cities v. Farthing, 905 So.2d 925, 928 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (holding the MCC requirement of section 440.09(1)(b) is satisfied by proof that workplace exposure aggravated pre-existing disease); J & J Enters. v. Oweis, 733 So.2d 1149, 1150 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (holding the MCC requirement in section 440.09(l)(b) and the MCC provision in section 440.02(32) were both satisfied by claimant’s proof that workplace activity produced disabling aggravation of pre-existing condition); cf....

...ally connected to the workplace accidents. An employer is to provide benefits “only to the extent that an injury arising out of and in the course of employment is and remains the major contributing cause of the disability or need for treatment.” § 440.09(l)(b), Fla....

...At some point, while leaning for *1190 ward to operate the switch on the machine Claimant fainted and fell to the ground. An employer must provide workers’ compensation benefits if an employee “suffers an accidental compensable injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and scope of employment.” § 440.09(1), Fla....

...(2011). To be com-pensable under chapter 440, “[t]he injury, its occupational cause, and any resulting manifestations or disability must be established to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, based on objective relevant medical findings [.] ” § 440.09(1), Fla....

PER CURIAM. In this workers’ compensation case, the Employer/Carrier (E/C) appeal an order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) rejecting their affirmative defense of misrepresentation under sections 440.09(4) and 440.105(4), Florida Statutes, and awarding benefits to Claimant....

...ation Law. § 440.105(4)(b)l., Fla. Stat. (2013). And workers’ compensation benefits are barred for an employee found to have “knowingly or intentionally engaged in” such acts “for the purpose of securing workers’ compensation benefits.” § 440.09(4), Fla....

...d appellate review of such issue). The workers’ compensation statute provides that “[mjental or nervous injuries occurring as a manifestation of any injury compensable under this section shall be demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence.” § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (1999); McKesson Drug Co. v. Williams, 706 So.2d 352 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). This determination “may be made from the totality of all the evidence, medical and lay, particularly since nothing in section 440.09(1) requires the elear-and-eonvincing standard to be met by medical evidence alone.” Claims Management, Inc....

...offset against, and payable in lieu of, any benefits payable by the City retirement system on account of the same disability or death. § 40-212(N), Miami City Code. This ordinance was mandated by a provision in the workers’ compensation law, see § 440.09(4), Fla.Stat. (1971), beginning with its enactment in 1935. Ch. 17481, § 9, Laws of Fla. In 1973 subsection 440.09(4), Fla.Stat....

...The Miami City Code provision was retained intact and the City continued to make the pension offsets called for thereby. After 1973, the offset provision of the City ordinance was challenged on several occasions. This court concluded that the repeal of subsection 440.09(4) did not invalidate the City’s offset ordinance, and that the offset ordinance should be deemed to be within the scope of the City’s home rule powers....

...The City declined, however, to reimburse pension recipients for offsets taken between 1973 and 1989. Approximately 60 claims have been submitted to the workers’ compensation tribunal, for reimbursement of pension offsets taken after the 1973 repeal of subsection 440.09(4)....

...presented the finding's of fact and conclusions of law upon which it is based. The claimant, who was injured in Alabama, seeks to qualify for compensation under the Florida Workmen’s Compensation Law on the premise that his claim meets the test of Section 440.09, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., which provides in substance that an injury occurring outside the State of Florida is compensable if (a) the contract of employment was made in this state, and (b) the employer’s place of business or the emp...

...This opinion is necessarily confined to a discussion of general principles of law and should not be construed as applicable to or determinative of any particular circumstance or employment. Chapter 440 , Florida Statutes, is the Workers' Compensation Law. 1 Section 440.09 (1), Florida Statutes, provides that the employer must pay compensation or furnish benefits required by Chapter 440 "if the employee suffers an accidental compensable injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the...

...An injured employee is entitled to compensation under the statute only if he or she was an employee of the employer at the time of the injury and the accidental compensable injury or death arose out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment. Section 440.091 , Florida Statutes, addresses when a law enforcement officer is acting within the scope of his or her employment....

...mployee of the hospital. The court found that the off-duty officer was performing a service for which he was paid by the hospital and was not performing a police function at the time he was injured. Under these circumstances the court concluded that section 440.091 , Florida Statutes, provides that the officer should not be deemed to have been acting within the course of his employment with the City of Miami Beach at the time of his injury....

...s do not also constitute a service for which he or she is paid by a private employer, unless the public employer had agreed to provide workers' compensation coverage for the private employment. Accordingly, I am of the opinion that the provisions of section 440.091 , Florida Statutes, govern whether a police officer working off-duty is covered by the city workers' compensation plan....

...f work performed in the course and scope of employment is the major contributing cause of the injury or death." 3 Cf. Klyse v. City of Largo , 765 So.2d 270 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), review denied , 789 So.2d 344 (Fla. 2001), in which the court held that s. 440.091 , Fla....

...Respondent contends that she was carrying the money with her upon the requirement and instructions of her employer and therefore her claim for injuries suffered should be allowed. The related questions here are whether the respondent’s injury arose “out of and in the course of employment”, within the meaning of Section 440.09, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., and whether the case falls within the exceptions to the “going and coming” rule which exempts an employer from liability under workmen’s compensation acts when the employee is going to and from his regular work....

...At no point in the proceedings below did the employer and carrier take the position that claimant was not entitled to medical benefits because his shoulder injury had been “occasioned primarily ... by the willful intention of [claimant] to injure or kill himself....” § 440.09(3), Fla.Stat....

...d resulting disability and depression, and claimant’s suicide attempt. On appeal, the principal point argued by the employer and carrier is that the judge “erred as a matter of law” in directing that claimant’s medical bills be paid, because Section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes (1989), states that “[n]o compensation shall be payable if the injury was occasioned primarily ... by the willful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself-” Case law interpreting Section 440.09(3) holds that an intent to injure or to kill oneself is not “willful” for purposes of that Section where the initial work-related injury and its consequences cause the employee “to become devoid of normal judgment and dominated b...

...stroy his will....” Jones v. Leon County Health Department, 335 So.2d 269, 272 (Fla.1976). Accord, Whitehead v. Keene Roofing Co., 43 So.2d 464 (Fla.1949). Whether or not the intent is sufficiently “willful” to preclude compensation because of Section 440.09(3) is a question of fact to be resolved by the judge of compensation claims, based upon the evidence presented....

...Scott, 397 So.2d 1220 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 411 So.2d 381 (Fla.1981). In this case, the judge made no findings addressing this issue for the obvious reason that nobody suggested to him that it was an issue. We hold that the proscription of compensation pursuant to Section 440.09(3) when “the injury was occasioned primarily ......

...a claim for benefits; and that, as such, it is forever waived if not presented with clarity during the course of the proceedings before the judge of compensation claims. See McKenzie Tank Lines, Inc. v. McCauley, 418 So.2d 1177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) [Section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes, precluding compensation when injury results from “willful refusal of the employee to use a safety appliance or observe a safety rule” is an affirmative defense to a claim for benefits, which is waived if not pleaded]; Sunland Hospital/State of Florida v....

BARFIELD, J. The order denying the employer/cam-er’s motion to dismiss under section 440.105(4)(b), Florida Statutes, on the ground that the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) lacked jurisdiction to apply section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes, to this worker’s compensation claim, is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED to the JCC for further proceedings in accordance with Russell Corp....

out of and in the course of employment.” See Section 440.09, Florida Statutes, F.S.A. The Deputy and the

reasons for his determination, I would affirm. . Section 440.09(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2000), provides: If

...have an immediate right to pursue her claim in a tort suit but is obligated to litigate that defense to a conclusion before the workers' compensation judge. See Tractor Supply Co. v. Kent, 966 So.2d 978, 981-82 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (citing Fla. Stat. 440.09(1)(b)), rev....

...use the operation had not been authorized by it, the deputy reasoned that in view of the emergency and the fact Dr. Beyer could not be found, it would be unreasonable to require specific authorization to see another physician. Under the authority of Section 440.09 (1), F.S.A....

...It is also our opinion that had the employer’s physician, Dr. Beyer, incorrectly diagnosed decedent’s *161 trouble as an incarcerated hernia, the employer would have been liable for the consequences of the resulting operation. This result would be the logical effect of Section 440.09(1), F.S.A., which provides in part: “ * * * Death resulting from an operation by a surgeon furnished by the employer for the cure of hernia as required in subsection (6) of § 440.15 shall for the purpose of this chapter be considered as a death resulting from the accident causing the hernia....

cardiac event and resulting death, as required by section 440.09(l)(b), Florida Statutes (1995). See Mangold

...This cause is before us on appeal from an order requiring appellant, the City of Miami, to reimburse appellee, the claimant below, for offsets taken against his monthly pension benefits from January 10, 1974 through July 31, 1989. Because appellee’s injury took place prior to the July 1, 1973 repeal of Section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes, this case is controlled by City of Miami v....

...This cause is before us on appeal from an order requiring appellant, the City of Miami, to reimburse appellee, the claimant below, for offsets taken against his monthly pension benefits from July 1, 1973 through July 31, 1989. Because appellee’s injury took place prior to the July 1, 1973 repeal of Section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes, this case is controlled by City of Miami v....

PER CURIAM. In this workers’ compensation case, the Employer/Carrier (E/C) appeals that portion of a final merits hearing order wherein the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) rejected its partial affirmative defense under section 440.09(5), Florida Statutes (2009)....

...ation benefits in violation of section 440.105. The JCC determined she had no jurisdiction once Polston voluntarily dismissed the petition for benefits. The E/C then filed a petition for benefits, requesting “a determination pursuant to Fla. Stat. 440.09(4) whether the Employee/Claimant has knowingly made false, fraudulent or misleading oral or written statements for the purposes of securing workers’ compensation benefits in violation *767 of Fla....

...440.105(4)(b).” Polston filed a motion to dismiss the petition, in which she argued the JCC had no jurisdiction. This motion was denied. After a final hearing, the JCC issued an order finding Polston had violated section 440.105(4)(b)(2), and was not entitled to compensation or benefits pursuant to section 440.09(4)....

...a. Although, because Hanson was almost certainly a “seaman” and thus subject to the Jones Act, see Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 , 73 S.Ct. 921 , 97 L.Ed. 1254 (1953), a Florida worker’s compensation claim almost certainly did not lie, see § 440.09(2), Fla. Stat. (1994); Brown v. Glabvo Dredging Contractors, 386 So.2d 53, 54 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980)(“Florida does not permit workmen’s compensation when recovery is possible under the Jones Act. Section 440.09(2), Florida Statutes (1979).”), such a proceeding was indeed commenced and recognized without objection by the employer Gim-rock and its carrier....

this be said to be a part of the sidewalk. Section 440.09, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., is in part: “Compensation

...thout the right of set-off, discount or reimbursement from any other source or fund Mrs. Olson also was entitled to her husband’s pension payable to her on his demise. Appellant City, in spite of the stipulation, took the position that pursuant to § 440.09(4), 2 Fla.Stat....

...o because of injuries sustained in *293 an accident, and as a direct and proximate result thereof, undoubtedly accounts for the diversity of opinion on this question among the courts of this country. And, clearly, in a proper case, the provisions of Section 440.09(3), supra, should be given full force and effect so that industry should not have to carry the burden of compensating for a death for which it was in no wise responsible....

...termination that the claimant made false, fraudulent, or misleading *368 statements and omitted or concealed material information, thereby violating section 440.105(4)(b)3, Florida Statutes, and being disqualified from receiving benefits pursuant to section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes....

...en the time of injury and disability. Applying section 440.14(1)(d) in such cases is not only consistent with the purpose of the Workers' Compensation Law, [2] but it is also consistent with the E/C's statutory duty to provide coverage. As stated in section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1981), "Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee if the disability or death results from an injury arising out of and in the course of employment." (Emphasi...

PER CURIAM. The appellant, Clifford Simpson, challenges a determination that he is not entitled to recover workers’ compensation benefits in the future because he made a misrepresentation of fact, in violation of sections 440.09(4) and 440.105(4)(b)(l), Florida Statutes....

...Therefore, we reverse that part of the order ruling substantively on the misrepresentation defense and concluding that the appellant is not entitled to any future benefits. On remand, the judge shall dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. Reversed and remanded. BOOTH, VAN NORTWICK and PADOVANO, JJ., Concur. . Section 440.09(4) denies workers’ compensation benefits to any worker who knowingly or intentionally engages in any of the acts set forth in 440.105, for the purpose of securing workers' compensation benefits.

...We find no reversible error on the factual and legal argument as to course of employment, 1 but we amend the order in accord with the fourth issue which is stated by appellant as follows: The memoranda of February 23, 1983 and November 8, 1983 were not safety regulations within the meaning of Section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes....

deputy commissioner lacked jurisdiction under section 440.09(2), Florida Statutes (1977)1 because the claimant’s

...Stat. (“Subject to the limitations specified elsewhere in this chapter, the employer shall furnish to the employee such medically necessary remedial treatment, care, and attendance for such period as the nature of the injury or the process of recovery may require . . . .”); see also § 440.09(1), Fla....

...That is the accrual date, and the two-year “time clock” (the metaphor used by the supreme court in Hankey v. Yarian) starts running from there. 1 1 The limitation period, then, is tied to the employee’s injury, which makes sense—the accidental injury being the unit of compensability under chapter 440. Cf. §440.09(1), Fla....

benefits as barred under section 440.09(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2012). Section 440.09(4)(a) provides that

...Reeder (Claimant) full compensation benefits. Claimant cross-appeals the denial of statutory penalties. Finding that Claimant was entitled to an assessment of penalties against Employer, we reverse that portion of the order holding otherwise. In all other respects, we affirm the order. § 440.09(4), Fla.Stat....

...Claimant sought payment of indemnity benefits at the full compensation rate, and Employer stipulated to the compensability of the accident. However, Employer’s claims adjuster determined that under the circumstances of the accident, Claimant’s compensation should be reduced by 25 percent pursuant to section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (1991), because Employer clearly had promulgated a safety rule requiring employees to wear safety belts, the rule had been brought to Claimant’s attention, and Claimant admitted not wearing a seat belt at the time of injury....

...The employer paid temporary disability benefits but affirmatively defended, arguing that McCauley had received instructions to wear safety goggles, as required by a United States Occupational Safety & Health Administration mandate. Specifically, the employer relied on the 1979 version of section 440.09(4), which addressed “injury ......

...to the accident to his ... knowledge,” and which provided for a 25 percent reduction in compensation. A post-accident inspection of McCauley’s vehicle revealed a pair of goggles behind the driver’s seat. The deputy commissioner concluded that section 440.09(4) was inapplicable to McCauley’s case as a matter of law. For reasons not pertinent to the case sub judiee, we reversed the order in McKenzie and remanded for additional factual findings. Id. at 1180-82 . In McKenzie, we noted that section 440.09(4) may afford an employer/carrier a “partial affirmative defense to a claim for benefits.” Id. at 1180 , citing, 1A Larson, Workmen’s Compensation, § 33.10 at 6-48 (1979). McKenzie is instructive for our analysis of section 440.09(4) in that we found that “it is apparent that the statute can only be defensively invoked when there is a causal relationship between a violation of the statute and the injury.” Id....

...ance. Second, the applicable version embraces a second scenario, possibly applicable here, “where injury is caused by the knowing refusal of the employee to use a safety appliance provided by the employer.” We conclude from the plain language of section 440.09(4) and from McKenzie that, irrespective of the ensuing statutory changes, resolution of the matter in the lower tribunal required a determination as to whether “a causal relationship” exists between Claimant’s injury and bis knowing refusal to wear an available safety device provided by Employer....

...Beatty agreed that was true in some people, but, because there was a possibility for improvement, it was necessary to conduct testing in order to have objective data. Until Claimant underwent new testing, the doctor could not give an opinion regarding Claimant's current condition. Analysis Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2008), requires: The injury, its occupational cause, and any resulting manifestation or disability must be established to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, based on objective relevant medical findings, and...

...e reasons below. A claimant is entitled to benefits only so long as the industrial injury remains the major contributing cause of the disability or need for treatment. See Checkers Rest. v. Wiethoff, 925 So.2d 348, 350 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (en banc); § 440.09(1)(b), Fla....

...This order was based on the judge's earlier conclusion that Millerick had been engaged in his primary duty as a police officer at the time of the accident. The City of North Bay Village and its servicing agent then filed a timely notice of appeal. Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes, limits an employee's right to obtain workers' compensation benefits to injuries "arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment." Whether a police officer was acting in the course of employment is an issue governed by a special rule. As provided in section 440.091, Florida Statutes, a police officer who was discharging a primary law enforcement responsibility "shall be deemed to have been acting in the course of employment" regardless of the officer's duty status at the time....

...ugh she had her crime scene investigation kit and police radio with her at the time of her automobile accident. As these cases illustrate, the officer must be engaged in a primary law enforcement duty at the time of the event that caused the injury. Section 440.091 is often applied when an off-duty police officer is suddenly thrust into *1232 a situation that requires the performance of an official duty....

...ot into an argument with a man who happened to be a potential suspect. In short, the encounter in the bar did not occur "under circumstances reasonably consistent" with the manner in which an officer's primary responsibility would be discharged. See § 440.091(2) Fla.Stat....

...Therefore, he was not entitled to recover workers' compensation benefits for the injuries he sustained. Reversed. BOOTH and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur. NOTES [1] This case is governed by the law in effect in 1987, but the applicable statute remains unchanged in the present version of the Workers' Compensation Law. See § 440.091 Fla.Stat....

...under “ordinary standards of humanity.” 556 So.2d at 797 . The court further reasoned that “the claimants’ actions in assisting the two stranded motorists were altogether reasonable and expected behavior under the circumstances.” Id. Under section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1987), workers’ compensation coverage is provided for injuries “arising out of and in the course of employment.” “[T]o be com-pensable, an injury must arise out of employment in the sense of causation and...

...Recognizing as compen-sable injuries incurred under such circumstances supports the sound public policy of encouraging employees to undertake humanitarian acts designed to prevent imminent harm to the public. Such policy was recently furthered by the enactment of chapter 90-201, section 14, Laws of Florida (to be codified at section 440.092(3), Florida Statutes (Supp.1990)), which provides that an employee has not deviated from the course of his employment if such deviation is “in response to an emergency and designed to save life or property.” Accordingly, we approv...

...Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) erred in awarding continuing medical treatment for Claimant’s work-related neck injury. Finding no error in the JCC’s award of the continuing care, we affirm the order. We write, however, to clarify application of section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2009). Section 440.09(1)(b) provides: If an injury arising out of and in the course of employment combines with a preexisting disease or condition to cause or prolong disability or need for treatment, the employer must pay compensation or...

...Closer review of Bysczynski reveals that it does not matter whether a preexisting condition is “age- appropriate;” what matters is whether there is medical evidence that it is the major contributing cause of the need for the requested treatment. See § 440.09(1)(b), Fla. Stat....

...(2012) (providing that if compensable work injury combines with preexisting condition to cause or prolong need for treatment, employers need provide benefits only to extent work injury is and remains major contributing cause of need for benefits); Ch. 03-412, § 6, Laws of Fla. (amending section 440.09(1)(b) as of October 1, 2003, to require that major contributing cause be proven “by medical evidence only”). Here, the JCC found Claimant had a pre-existing condition—one based on degenerative changes to her cervical spine and not based on any prior accident....

...incidental to the employment but is directly *191 connected, in the language of the Deputy’s •order, with the “employee’s deliberate act of aggression.” (Emphasis supplied.) On the basis stated, the Deputy Commissioner dismissed the claim. Section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., provides: “No compensation shall be payable if the injury was occasioned primarily by the intoxication of the employee or by the willful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself or another or...

...the burden of showing a break in causation, which they failed to do. In the alternative, Claimant argued the arthritis could not be considered a contributing cause in any MCC analysis because the condition did not qualify as a “preexisting condition” under section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes. In response, the E/C asserted that Claimant failed to satisfy his burden regarding MCC with respect to ongoing medical care....

...nt that the injury arising out of and in the course of employment is and remains more than 50 percent responsible for the injury as compared to all other causes combined and thereafter remains the [MCC] of the disability or need for treatment.” § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (emphasis added). 8  Section 440.09(1) does not enumerate “all other causes” for MCC analysis, but subsections (a) and (b) provide some distinct limitations – to qualify the causes must be (1) subsequent injuries, or (2) preexisting injuries and conditions. See Cespedes v. Yellow Transp., Inc, 130 So. 3d 243 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). As this Court summarized in Cespedes, “under the text of section 440.09(1)(a)-(b), MCC analysis cannot be performed in a vacuum or, particularly, in the absence of competing causes.” Id....

...Here, no evidence was presented regarding subsequent injury. Accordingly, as the JCC correctly noted, the question remaining was whether evidence existed of a qualifying “preexisting injury or condition.” 2 The JCC assumed that, for purposes of 440.09(1)(b), a preexisting condition “must have produced the need for medical care before the accident or caused claimant to have some disability or impairment.” The JCC further concluded Claimant’s preexisting knee arthritis, while symptom...

...not a qualifying preexisting condition, because it required no medical treatment or caused disability or impairment before the 2013 workplace injury. 2 If the preexisting condition is due to an industrial accident, it does not qualify under section 440.09(1)(b)....

...Morse’s treatment on April 9, 2015, was “necessitated solely by Claimant’s osteoarthritis and [was] not necessary because of Claimant’s accident.” As a result, the osteoarthritis qualifies as a preexisting condition for purposes of an MCC analysis under paragraph 440.09(1)(b), and per the EMA, independently required the medical treatment at issue. For the above reasons, we find that Claimant’s osteoarthritis qualified as a preexisting condition under section 440.09(1)(b), and its consideration in the MCC analysis appropriate. “The 120-Day Rule” Section 440.20(4), commonly referred to as the “120-Day Rule,” allows a carrier the option of paying and investigating a claim for up to 120 days....

...pinions established Claimant’s preexisting arthritic condition as the primary — if not the sole — cause of the need for the left knee surgery. Accordingly, Claimant was unable to satisfy his burden of proof regarding the MCC requirements of section 440.09(1)....

...Any claims that are ripe, due, and owing, and all available defenses not raised in the pretrial stipulation are waived unless thereafter amended by the judge for good cause shown... Fla. Admin. Code R. 60Q-6.113(2)(h) requires, “[a]ny defense raised pursuant to Sections 440.09(4)(a) and 440.105, F.S., and any affirmative defense, must be raised with specificity, detailing the conduct giving rise to the defense, with leave to amend within 10 days....

...n We reverse the JCC’s determination that the E/C was barred, as a matter of law, from asserting a MCC defense regarding the left total knee replacement. Claimant’s preexisting osteoarthritis is a qualifying preexisting condition under section 440.09(1)(b)....

express or implied, oral or written); see also § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (2010) (providing that employer

...The Workers’ Compensation Law, chapter 440, Florida Statutes (2004), requires employers to maintain coverage for employees who suffer accidental, compensable injuries or death arising out of work performed in the course and scope of them employment. § 440.09....

...icted 'to sexual harassment which is by public policy the direct responsibility of the employer. However, allowing the affirmative defense to stand should not be construed to *611 eliminate the possibility of a successful claim against the employer. Section 440.09, Florida Statutes (1991), states that to come under the workers’ compensation act there must be “an injury arising out of and in the course of employment.” Byrd , citing Strother v....

...Scope of Section 440.28. We review the JCC’s interpretation of the statute de novo. Lombardi v. S. Wine & Spirits, 890 So. 2d 1128, 1129 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). Claimant argues that section 440.28 provides no 1 The fraud defense under section 440.09(4) is not available for accidents that occurred before the statute’s 1994 effective date....

...We accepted without question the E/C’s petitioning to reduce or eliminate attendant care benefits under section 440.28. See also Gustafson’s Dairy v. Phillips, 656 So. 2d 1386, 1387 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (holding that term “compensation” as used in § 440.09(3) includes both medical and disability benefits); § 440.25(4)(e), Fla....

...rkplace” but it was unable to ascertain whether Claimant’s drug test was administered by a facility utilizing procedure which complies with the statute and administrative rules. The JCC therefore erroneously applied the rebuttable presumption in section 440.09(7)(b), requiring Claimant to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the influence of drugs did not contribute to his injuries. § 440.09(7)(a) & (b)....

...Armstrong, 118 So.3d 865, 866 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). When a claimant has a pre-existing condition not related to an earlier workplace injury, it is appropriate to consider whether the workplace injury at issue is the MCC of the need for the treatment. See § 440.09(1)(b), Fla....

...ry as compared to-all other'causes combined and thereafter remains the [MCC] of the disability or need for treatment. [MCC] must be demonstrated by medical evidence only”). See also Pizza Hut v. Proctor, 955 So.2d 637, 638 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (“[Section 440.09(l)(b) applies when a claimant’s need for treatment or benefits is caused by the impact of an industrial accident combining with a preexisting' injury or condition which is unrelated to an industrial accident.”)....

...In first determining that the E/C here wrongfully denied surgery, the JCC rejected the E/C’s causation defense and found that Claimant satisfied his burden of showing 2 that the workplace injury is the major contributing cause of the need for surgery as required by section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2015)....

...s because 3 it was based on improper bolstering and lacked a sufficient factual foundation. The problems with Dr. Powers’s testimony stem from the evidentiary requirements set forth in sections 90.704 and 440.09(1)....

...ent arising out of employment unless there is clear and convincing evidence establishing that exposure to the specific substance involved, at the levels to which the employee was exposed, can cause the injury or disease sustained by the employee.” Section 440.09(1) requires that “[t]he injury, its occupational cause, and any resulting manifestations or disability must be established to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, based on objective relevant medical findings, and the accidental...

...wful evidence that Billy Lee McFalls, the deceased employee, had a blood alcohol level of .10% or greater, and that had there been evidence of blood alcohol level in excess of .10%, there was sufficient competent evidence to rebut the presumption of section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes....

...No beer cans, liquor bottles or receipts were present in the vehicle. Following the accident, death benefits were timely paid to McFalls’s widow, until May 10, 1982 when Meyer and Travelers controverted the claim based upon excessive blood alcohol content under section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes (1979)....

...The deputy commissioner, therefore, found there was no lawful evidence of intoxication. The deputy commissioner further found that even if there were evidence of blood alcohol in excess of .10%, sufficient competent evidence rebutted the presumption of section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes....

...The results of a blood alcohol test are not privileged, regardless of whether the taking of the test was directed by an investigating officer who prepared an accident report. Brackin , at 542. Having found the blood alcohol test results admissible, the presumption of section 440.09 would preclude the award of benefits absent substantial evidence to the contrary. We cannot agree that there was substantial evidence to rebut the presumption of section 440.09(3)....

standard in effect prior to the 1994 amendments to section 440.09(1). Having thoroughly reviewed the record,

...The Defense Base Act provides that the provisions of the LHWCA shall apply to the injury or death of any employee covered under the act, except as modified in the act. 42 U.S.C. § 1651 (a). As an extension of the LHWCA, the Defense Base Act is subject to the Section 440.09(2) exclusion....

...Our finding of injury here is consistent with the statute delineating an employer's responsibility to furnish workers' compensation benefits. Under that statute, the injury "must be established to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, based on objective relevant medical findings." § 440.09(1), Fla....

...Further, under the statute, such objective findings are those "confirmed by physical examination findings or diagnostic testing." Id. As detailed above, diagnostic testing has confirmed physiological changes determinative of beryllium sensitivity. Accordingly, the injury in this case falls within the contemplation of section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2005)....

...laimant’s work brings him or her into close proximity with the aggressive co-worker; and (3) the object causing injury was an “implement of the employment.” See Spleen v. Rogers Group, Inc., 548 So.2d 740 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989). However, sections 440.09(1) and (3), Florida Statutes (2002), do not authorize workers’ compensation benefits where an employee suffers an accidental injury arising out of his or her employment which was caused through the employee’s willful intent to injure himself or another....

...nanimate object of the employer in anger, an object which obviously presented a danger of injury. Id. at 1202 . However, we also provided: Even were we to find that claimant’s injuries resulted from an impulsive act, we would reject benefits under section 440.09, Florida Statutes.......

...George Kagan and Celine Abramschmitt of Miller, Kagan, Rodriguez & Silver, P.L., West Palm Beach, for Appellees. PER CURIAM. In this workers' compensation appeal Claimant contests the JCC's finding that his heart attack was not a compensable injury pursuant to section 440.093(1), Florida Statutes (2003). Claimant argued that this section did not apply to his claim, but, rather, the JCC should have applied section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2003)....

...nt. The employer/carrier (E/C) denied the claim, asserting that Claimant's heart attack was a physical injury caused by a mental or nervous injury unaccompanied by physical trauma requiring medical treatment, and thus was not compensable pursuant to section 440.093(1)....

...Claimant contends that this statute is inapplicable here because he did not suffer a mental or nervous injury that caused his heart attack, and therefore he was only required to prove that the elevator incident was the major contributing cause of his injury. Section 440.093(1), Florida Statutes (2003), provides: A mental or nervous injury due to stress, fright, or excitement only is not an injury by accident arising out of the employment....

...However, based on Claimant's description of experiencing a panic attack, as well as his continued emotional response to the incident, the JCC found Claimant did suffer from a mental or nervous injury. The JCC also concluded that Claimant did not suffer any physical trauma requiring medical treatment, and thus, section 440.093(1) precluded compensability of the heart attack. Section 440.09(1) requires a claimant establish a workplace accident was more than 50% responsible for a claimed injury....

...major contributing cause of his heart attack. Neither Claimant's self-diagnosis of experiencing a panic attack, nor the JCC's determination that "common sense" dictated Claimant had in fact suffered a mental or nervous injury, can substitute for the section 440.09(1) evidentiary requirement. Significantly, the first sentence of section 440.093(1) differentiates between mental or nervous injuries caused by "stress, fright, or excitement," and physical injury caused by "mental or nervous injuries." Thus, stress, fright, or excitement does not necessarily equate to a mental or nervous injury....

...Here, there was no CSE that Claimant incurred a mental or nervous injury, or, if he did, that this caused his heart attack. However, even if there had been evidence that Claimant had suffered a mental or nervous injury, his heart attack would have been compensable under section 440.093(1), *713 Florida Statutes, because Claimant's heart attack constituted a physical trauma that required medical treatment....

...on to hear the claim. Workers’ compensation benefits generally constitute the exclusive remedy available to an injured employee for “an accidental compensable injury ... arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment.” § 440.09(1), Fla....

...gaging in doing something incidental to it.” The Commission distinguished Tucker Taxi, Inc. v. Schofield, 107 So.2d 188 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958), in which the Judge of Industrial Claims found the claimant to be the aggressor and denied benefits, citing section 440.09(3)....

Florida Workers’ Compensation Act, relying on section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1985). Appellant, Advanced

...quired to perform beyond the range of what he was accustomed to performing on one of his peak days. REVERSED and REMANDED for additional proceedings. THOMAS, J., concurs; VAN NORTWICK, J., dissents with written opinion. . Under the 2003 amendment to section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes, the major contributing cause standard requires claimants to prove the industrial accident caused more than 50% of the injury and the resulting need for treatment....

...eceived $80,928 during the same period of disability, for a difference of $10,115.97. The E/C therefore sought an offset as to that amount for the asserted overpayment. I. As to the first issue, we conclude that the JCC correctly awarded the offset. Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1983), provides that an employee is entitled to compensation for a compensable accident which occurs while the worker is employed outside the state of Florida....

...her separate interval of disability. . We disagree. We find nothing limiting the statute’s application to payments made in two or more states for coinciding terms of disability. In so concluding, we consider it helpful to recite a short history of section 440.09(1) and applicable case law. The above quoted language from section 440.09(1), which was adopted in 1937, 2 appears to be generally in accord -with the law then existing in all states permitting credit for amounts previously paid in another state....

...r state, a successive award in another state for the same injury is permissible, if credit is given for any overpayment of benefits in the successive award. See cases collected under 4 Larson § 85.40. The Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of section 440.09(1) in de Cancino v....

...ant below, for offsets taken against his monthly pension benefits from July 1, 1973 through June 2, 1988. The parties stipulated that appellee was injured on August 10, 1970. Because appellee’s injury took place prior to the July 1, 1973 repeal of Section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes, this case is controlled by City of Miami v....

...JCC’s application of law to those facts. Aills v. Boemi, 29 So. 3d 1105, 1108 (Fla. 2010). Employers must provide workers’ compensation benefits when employees sustain injuries from accidents “arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment.” § 440.09(1), Fla....

...The en banc majority’s opinion discusses this argument but in its ultimate holding goes well beyond what the E/C argued. Because the relevant facts are undisputed, the issue is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo. See Airey v. Wal- Mart/Sedgwick, 24 So. 3d 1264 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009). Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2016), states in part, “The employer must pay compensation or furnish benefits required by this chapter if the employee suffers an accidental compensable injury or death arising out of work performed in the cour...

...Krider, 473 So. 2d 829, 830 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985)). A worker remains in the course and scope of employment while attending to matters covered by the personal comfort doctrine. Harding, 653 So. 2d at 1141-42. However, to satisfy the “arising out of work” requirement of section 440.09(1), the personal comfort doctrine applies only when there is a work-related or neutral risk....

...It was Claimant’s burden to prove that the treatment was necessitated by the injury which “arose as a result of a work-related accident.” § 440.13(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2010). The causal relationship “for conditions that are not readily observable must be by medical evidence only....” § 440.09(1), Fla....

...Moreover, Florida has a significant interest in maintaining compliance with its worker’s compensation laws. Florida intended its worker’s compensation system to strike a balance between compensating injured workers and limiting the liability of employers for accidents. Section 440.09 of the Florida Statutes provides in pertinent part that: Where an accident happens while the employee is employed elsewhere than in this state, which would entitle him or his dependents to compensation if it had happened in this state, the employee or his dependents shall be entitled to compensation....

...... However, if an employee shall receive compensation or damages under the laws of any other state, nothing herein contained shall be construed so as to permit a total compensation for the same injury greater than is provided herein. Fla.Stat.Ann. § 440.09 (West 1981)....

...As the district court noted, “[Garcia] is barred from seeking a tort recovery when he has already availed himself of the benefits obtainable under Spanish worker’s compensation law. The fact that Spanish law would permit such a double recovery is of no significance_” See Fla.Stat.Ann. §§ 440.09 and 440.11 (West 1981); Urda, 211 F.2d at 715 ....

...hat the workplace accident was not the major contributing cause of Richards’ need for treatment. A claimant is entitled to benefits only so long as the industrial injury remains the major contributing cause of the disability or need for treatment. § 440.09(l)(b), Fla....

Road Department, 171 So.2d 523 (Fla. 1965). Section 440.09(1), F.S., provides, in pertinent part, that

...sequently filed a petition for benefits, seeking a compensability determination for temporary total or partial disability benefits, along with costs and attorney’s fees. The E/C filed a response to the petition, denying the claim based on sections 440.09(4) (intentional acts) and 440.105(4)(b)9....

...a. Stat.; (3) an extensive fraud and penally provision, § 440,105, Fla. Stat.; (4) a heightened standard of "major contributing cause” that applies in a majority of cases rather than the less stringent "proximate cause” standard in civil cases, § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat.; (5) a heightened burden of proof of “clear and convincing evidence” in some types of cases, §§ 440.02(1), 440.09(1), Fla, Stat,; (6) the elimination of the “opt- out” provision, §§ 440.015, 440.03, Fla....

...However, assuming the absence of an election or an estoppel, in order for the jury to decide whether the plaintiff was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits, the question which should have been asked was whether his injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment. § 440.09(1), Fla.Stat....

...HERNDON’S retirement allowance by the amount of Workmen’s Compensation benefits previously paid to MARTIN C. HERNDON while in the employment of the City of Miami for accidental injury prior to his award of retirement under § 2-91(1) of the Miami City Code, is illegal, void, and conflicts with Florida Statute 440.09(4).” The City of Miami as appellant urges that the procedure it wishes to follow is authorized by the provisions of § 2-91(15) City of Miami Code. A review of the provisions of the code establishes that it expresses the same intent as the statute. The plain meaning of the language of § 440.09(4), Fla.Stat., F.S.A....

...pment to be used by his employer at New Providence Island. The Judge of Industrial Claims found that a portion of the work was performed in the State of Florida and that the Florida Workmen’s Compensation Law was applicable, under Florida Statutes § 440.09(1), F.S.A.: “Where an accident happens while the employee is employed elsewhere than in this state, which would entitle him or his dependents to compensation if it had happened in this state, the employee or his dependents shall be entitl...

...pany issued the policy for the specific purpose of granting coverage to the employer for possible liability arising out of the employment in the Bahama Islands and because the factual situation here met the requirements contained in Florida Statutes § 440.09 for coverage under Florida law....

...Following a hearing on the matter, the JCC found, inter alia, that claimant had broken the glass while upset and angry over his firing. However, the JCC also found that claimant had “no willful intention ... to injure himself’ and, therefore, was not precluded from compensation. This appeal followed. Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1993), states in part that “fclompensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee if the disability or death results from an injury arising out of and in the course...

...Tucker Taxi, Inc. v. Schofield, 107 So.2d 188, 191 (Fla. 1st DCA 1958) (benefits denied where employee’s death was occasioned primarily by his willful intention to injure his superior in a fight). In Tucker Taxi, 107 So.2d at 191 , we interpreted then current section 440.09(3), stating: It is generally held, apart from the express statutory defenses provided by our statute, that the aggressor in an admittedly work-connected fight cannot recover compensation....

...who is injured by willfully striking an inanimate object of the employer in anger, an object which obviously presented a danger of injury. Even were we to find that claimant’s injuries resulted from an impulsive act, we would reject benefits under section 440.09, Florida Statutes....

...Employee’s spouse) appeals the judge of compensation claims’ (JCC’s) final order denying her claim for death benefits and funeral expenses under section 440.16, Florida Statutes (2014). In the order, the JCC found that no benefits were payable in accordance with subsection 440.09(3), Florida Statutes (2014), because the Employee’s death was primarily occasioned by his intoxication....

...ces of this case. Nevertheless, we reverse the denial of benefits because competent, substantial evidence (CSE) does not support the JCC’s ultimate conclusion that the Employee’s death was primarily occasioned by his intoxication. Under subsection 440.09(3), compensation is not payable if the injury was occasioned primarily by the intoxication of the employee. Although section 440.09(7)(b) also provides that evidence of a certain blood alcohol level creates a presumption that injury or death was occasioned primarily by the intoxication of the employee, the Employer/Carrier (E/C) here were not entitled to the presum...

...administrative rules on blood-alcohol testing precludes presumption that injury primarily occasioned by alcohol). Although the JCC found the blood alcohol testing did not sufficiently comply with the Florida Administrative Code to establish the intoxication presumption under section 440.09(7)(b), the results were admissible on other grounds as chain of custody and authentication were properly established. “When the presumption in section 440.09(7)(b) does not apply, employer/carriers must ‘establish, by the greater weight of the evidence, that the work-related injury was occasioned primarily by the intoxication of the employee.’” See Thomas v....

...Plaintiff-appellant Florencia Reyes is the personal representative of the estate. She brought suit against Parsons, which was responsible for construction engineering and inspection on the flyover project. The trial court ruled that Parsons was entitled to worker's compensation immunity by virtue of subsection 440.09(6), Florida Statute (1993)....

...The reference is to the safety of the public, not workers at the job site. In order for Parsons to lose its statutory immunity, there would have to be a provision in the contract by which Parsons specifically assumed responsibility for safety practices of the employer, i.e., Odebrecht. See § 440.09(6), Fla.Stat....

...ponsibility for employee safety within the meaning of the statute. We disagree. The statute provides that the construction design professional is immune from liability "unless responsibility for safety practices is specifically assumed by contract." § 440.09(6), Fla.Stat....

...responsibilities in considerable detail. Nowhere in the contract did Parsons specifically assume responsibility for employer safety practices. The summary judgment entered by Judge Shapiro is entirely correct. Affirmed. NOTES [1] The full text of subsection 440.09(6) is: Except as provided in this chapter, no construction design professional who is retained to perform professional services on a construction project, nor any employee of a construction design professional in the performance of pro...

...disability benefits law, or any similar law . . . .” Because Morales’s death occurred during the course and scope of his employment, his employer Lawns was required to pay workers’ compensation benefits to Morales’s family. See Fla. Stat. § 440.09(1)....

...from.” Anderson v. Wales Indus., 688 So.2d 379, 380-81 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), citing Ackley v. General Parcel Serv., 646 So.2d 242 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994). As we said in Anderson , [a] claimant was not required to show [pri- or to the 1993 amendments to section 440.09, Florida Statutes (Supp.1994) ] that the industrial accident was the sole cause of the mental injury or condition, but simply that it was a precipitating or accelerating cause....

PTSD was a manifestation of his shoulder injury. § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (1997). REVERSED and REMANDED for

...Appellants raise the following two issues for our review: (1) whether the deputy commissioner erred as a matter of law and of fact in finding that the claimant had *920 entered into an employment contract with the employer in the State of Florida, therefore meeting the requirements of section 440.09, Florida Statutes, and entitling the claimant to compensation under the Florida Workers’ Compensation Law; and (2) whether the order of the deputy commissioner is supported by competent substantial evidence in determining that carrier No....

...or the claimant’s injury in Utah. The deputy commissioner based his results upon a determination that the contract for employment between the employer and the claimant was made in the State of Florida and therefore met the requirement set forth in section 440.09(1) Florida Statutes....

...lta, Utah, could not be extended to cover Ramos’s claim in Florida given these circumstances. Therefore, the deputy’s order is affirmed and this cause is remanded for a determination of benefits due claimant. SHIVERS and THOMPSON, JJ., concur. . Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1985) provides in pertinent part: 440.09 Coverage.— (1) Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee if the disability or death results from an injury arising out of and in the course of employment.......

...I find that the Claimant obtained a doctor's note from an unauthorized physician, Dr. Gustavo Bustamonte, in an attempt to justify his false statements of March 1, 2004 and March 2, 2004. *565 The JCC denied all pending petitions with prejudice. ANALYSIS Section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (2002), provides that an employee is not entitled to workers' compensation benefits under chapter 440 if the JCC "determines that the employee has knowingly or intentionally engaged in any of the acts described in s....

...Gustavo Bustamonte." However, the JCC made no finding that claimant, through his testimony at the hearing, knowingly or intentionally engaged in any acts described in section 440.105 for the purpose of securing workers' compensation benefits pursuant to section 440.09(4)....

...This is an appeal of an order requiring the appellant, the City of Miami, to reimburse the appellee, the claimant below, for offsets taken against his monthly pension benefits. Because appellee's injury took place prior to the July 1, 1973 repeal of section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes, this case is controlled by City of Miami v....

...d have resulted from the injury alone. Approximately a month after the plaintiff received the lump sum payment, the pension board of the defendant, City of West Palm Beach, ostensibly under the provisions of art. I, § 16(14) of the City Charter and Section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes 1967, F.S.A., reduced the amount of plaintiff’s pension by the sum of $182 per month until such time as the pension board should receive credit for the entire amount of the lump sum settlement. Plaintiff thereafter sought declaratory relief alleging that the defendant-city had no legal right to reduce plaintiff’s pension under the provisions of art. I, ch. 16 § 14 of the City Charter 1 and Section 440.09(4)', Florida Statutes....

...Palm Beach, through its pension board, had no legal authority to decrease the longevity retirement pension check of the plaintiff. This appeal followed. The defendant contends on appeal that pursuant to art. I, ch. 16, § 14 of the City Charter, and Section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes, F.S.A., it may reduce service retirement benefits to an employee by de *26 ducting therefrom workmen’s compensation paid to the employee in a lump sum awarded subsequent to the employee’s retirement....

...ent which is hazardous or low-paying and to make such employment a career rather than a passing interlude on the basis that a secure future will be provided via a pension plan. We turn now for a determination as to whether the defendant, pursuant to Section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes, is entitled to reduce age and service pension benefits to an employee by deducting therefrom workmen’s compensation which is paid to the employee in a lump sum awarded subsequent to the employee’s retirement. We are of the conviction that F.S. Section 440.09(4), F.S.A., was promulgated by the Florida Legislature to prevent double recovery for a single injury....

...his own contributions and becomes entitled to upon retirement. He has, and rightly so, a vested interest as a beneficiary for the benefits for which he had paid. It is our conclusion that the defendant-city is not entitled to reduce pursuant to F.S. Section 440.09(4), F.S.A., the plaintiff’s service retirement benefits by deducting workmen’s compensation paid to the plaintiff in a lump sum and awarded subsequent to his retirement....

...Any workmen’s compensation which may be paid or payable to a' member, retirant or beneficiary on account of the disability or death of a member shall be deducted from pension payable and to be payable on account of such member, any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding. . F.S. 440.09 Coverage.— (4) When any employee of the state or of any political subdivision thereof or of any public or quasi-public corporation therein, or any person entitled thereto on account of dependency upon such employee, receives compensation...