Florida Statutes

Fla. Stat. § 440.09 (2025)

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✓ 2025 Florida Statutes — current through the 2025 Regular Session

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440.09 Coverage.—

(1) The employer must pay compensation or furnish benefits required by this chapter if the employee suffers an accidental compensable injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment. The injury, its occupational cause, and any resulting manifestations or disability must be established to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, based on objective relevant medical findings, and the accidental compensable injury must be the major contributing cause of any resulting injuries. For purposes of this section, “major contributing cause” means the cause which is more than 50 percent responsible for the injury as compared to all other causes combined for which treatment or benefits are sought. In cases involving occupational disease or repetitive exposure, both causation and sufficient exposure to support causation must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Pain or other subjective complaints alone, in the absence of objective relevant medical findings, are not compensable. For purposes of this section, “objective relevant medical findings” are those objective findings that correlate to the subjective complaints of the injured employee and are confirmed by physical examination findings or diagnostic testing. Establishment of the causal relationship between a compensable accident and injuries for conditions that are not readily observable must be by medical evidence only, as demonstrated by physical examination findings or diagnostic testing. Major contributing cause must be demonstrated by medical evidence only.

(a) This chapter does not require any compensation or benefits for any subsequent injury the employee suffers as a result of an original injury arising out of and in the course of employment unless the original injury is the major contributing cause of the subsequent injury. Major contributing cause must be demonstrated by medical evidence only.

(b) If an injury arising out of and in the course of employment combines with a preexisting disease or condition to cause or prolong disability or need for treatment, the employer must pay compensation or benefits required by this chapter only to the extent that the injury arising out of and in the course of employment is and remains more than 50 percent responsible for the injury as compared to all other causes combined and thereafter remains the major contributing cause of the disability or need for treatment. Major contributing cause must be demonstrated by medical evidence only.

(c) Death resulting from an operation by a surgeon furnished by the employer for the cure of hernia as required in s. 440.15(6) [F.S. 1981] shall for the purpose of this chapter be considered to be a death resulting from the accident causing the hernia.

(d) If an accident happens while the employee is employed elsewhere than in this state, which would entitle the employee or his or her dependents to compensation if it had happened in this state, the employee or his or her dependents are entitled to compensation if the contract of employment was made in this state, or the employment was principally localized in this state. However, if an employee receives compensation or damages under the laws of any other state, the total compensation for the injury may not be greater than is provided in this chapter.

(2) Benefits are not payable in respect of the disability or death of any employee covered by the Federal Employer’s Liability Act, the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Worker’s Compensation Act, the Defense Base Act, or the Jones Act.

(3) Compensation is not payable if the injury was occasioned primarily by the intoxication of the employee; by the influence of any drugs, barbiturates, or other stimulants not prescribed by a physician; or by the willful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself, herself, or another.

(4)(a) An employee shall not be entitled to compensation or benefits under this chapter if any judge of compensation claims, administrative law judge, court, or jury convened in this state determines that the employee has knowingly or intentionally engaged in any of the acts described in s. 440.105 or any criminal act for the purpose of securing workers’ compensation benefits. For purposes of this section, the term “intentional” shall include, but is not limited to, pleas of guilty or nolo contendere in criminal matters. This section shall apply to accidents, regardless of the date of the accident. For injuries occurring prior to January 1, 1994, this section shall pertain to the acts of the employee described in s. 440.105 or criminal activities occurring subsequent to January 1, 1994.

(b) A judge of compensation claims, administrative law judge, or court of this state shall take judicial notice of a finding of insurance fraud by a court of competent jurisdiction and terminate or otherwise disallow benefits.

(c) Upon the denial of benefits in accordance with this section, a judge of compensation claims shall have the jurisdiction to order any benefits payable to the employee to be paid into the court registry or an escrow account during the pendency of an appeal or until such time as the time in which to file an appeal has expired.

(5) If injury is caused by the knowing refusal of the employee to use a safety appliance or observe a safety rule required by statute or lawfully adopted by the department, and brought prior to the accident to the employee’s knowledge, or if injury is caused by the knowing refusal of the employee to use a safety appliance provided by the employer, the compensation as provided in this chapter shall be reduced 25 percent.

(6) Except as provided in this chapter, a construction design professional who is retained to perform professional services on a construction project, or an employee of a construction design professional in the performance of professional services on the site of the construction project, is not liable for any injuries resulting from the employer’s failure to comply with safety standards on the construction project for which compensation is recoverable under this chapter, unless responsibility for safety practices is specifically assumed by contracts. The immunity provided by this subsection to a construction design professional does not apply to the negligent preparation of design plans or specifications.

(7)(a) To ensure that the workplace is a drug-free environment and to deter the use of drugs and alcohol at the workplace, if the employer has reason to suspect that the injury was occasioned primarily by the intoxication of the employee or by the use of any drug, as defined in this chapter, which affected the employee to the extent that the employee’s normal faculties were impaired, and the employer has not implemented a drug-free workplace pursuant to ss. 440.101 and 440.102, the employer may require the employee to submit to a test for the presence of any or all drugs or alcohol in his or her system.

(b) If the employee has, at the time of the injury, a blood alcohol level equal to or greater than the level specified in s. 316.193, or if the employee has a positive confirmation of a drug as defined in this act, it is presumed that the injury was occasioned primarily by the intoxication of, or by the influence of the drug upon, the employee. If the employer has implemented a drug-free workplace, this presumption may be rebutted only by evidence that there is no reasonable hypothesis that the intoxication or drug influence contributed to the injury. In the absence of a drug-free workplace program, this presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that the intoxication or influence of the drug did not contribute to the injury. Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood must be based upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood. If the results are positive, the testing facility must maintain the specimen for a minimum of 90 days. Blood serum may be used for testing purposes under this chapter; however, if this test is used, the presumptions under this section do not arise unless the blood alcohol level is proved to be medically and scientifically equivalent to or greater than the comparable blood alcohol level that would have been obtained if the test were based on percent by weight of alcohol in the blood. However, if, before the accident, the employer had actual knowledge of and expressly acquiesced in the employee’s presence at the workplace while under the influence of such alcohol or drug, the presumptions specified in this subsection do not apply.

(c) If the injured worker refuses to submit to a drug test, it shall be presumed in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary that the injury was occasioned primarily by the influence of drugs.

(d) The agency shall provide by rule for the authorization and regulation of drug-testing policies, procedures, and methods. Testing of injured employees shall not commence until such rules are adopted.

(e) As a part of rebutting any presumptions under paragraph (b), the injured worker must prove the actual quantitative amounts of the drug or its metabolites as measured on the initial and confirmation post-accident drug tests of the injured worker’s urine sample and provide additional evidence regarding the absence of drug influence other than the worker’s denial of being under the influence of a drug. No drug test conducted on a urine sample shall be rejected as to its results or the presumption imposed under paragraph (b) on the basis of the urine being bodily fluid tested.

(8) If, by operation of s. 440.04, benefits become payable to a professional athlete under this chapter, such benefits shall be reduced or setoff in the total amount of injury benefits or wages payable during the period of disability by the employer under a collective bargaining agreement or contract for hire.

History.—s. 9, ch. 17481, 1935; CGL 1936 Supp. 5966(9); s. 3, ch. 18413, 1937; s. 1, ch. 28236, 1953; s. 1, ch. 57-293; s. 2, ch. 73-127; s. 5, ch. 74-197; s. 3, ch. 75-209; s. 2, ch. 77-290; s. 23, ch. 78-300; s. 124, ch. 79-40; s. 21, ch. 79-312; s. 7, ch. 86-171; ss. 4, 5, 6, 43, ch. 89-289; ss. 11, 56, ch. 90-201; ss. 9, 52, ch. 91-1; ss. 5, 55, ch. 93-415; s. 101, ch. 97-103; s. 1, ch. 98-161; s. 3, ch. 98-174; s. 8, ch. 2001-91; s. 14, ch. 2002-194; s. 469, ch. 2003-261; s. 6, ch. 2003-412.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 404 cases (13 in the last 5 years), 1943–2026 · leading case: Closet Maid v. Sykes, 763 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).

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Closet Maid v. Sykes, 763 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). · cites it 44× “1994), states that "[t]he injury, its occupational cause, and any resulting manifestations or disability shall be established to a reasonable degree of medical certainty and by objective medical findings.”

Pearson v. Paradise Ford, 951 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). · cites it 28× “It is apparent that the amendments to subsection (1)(b) of section 440.09 were intended to overrule our decision in Closet Maid v.”

City of Miami v. Jones, 593 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). · cites it 17× “The City contends that section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes, in effect at the time of claimant's accident, permitted the offsets.”

Marvin Castellanos v. Next Door Co., 192 So. 3d 431 (Fla. 2016). · cites it 4× “; (4) a heightened standard of “major contributing cause” that applies in a majority of cases rather than the less stringent “proximate cause” standard in civil cases, § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat.; (5) a heightened burden of proof of “clear and convincing evidence” in some types of…”

A. Duda & Sons, Inc. v. Kelley, 900 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). · cites it 17× “The JCC erred in finding the ulcer condition compensable and in awarding any TPD benefits when Claimant refused suitable employment.”

Travelers Indem. Co. v. PCR INC., 889 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 2004). · cites it 4× “2d at 686 (quoting § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (1997)) (emphasis added).”

Medina v. Gulf Coast Linen Servs., 825 So. 2d 1018 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). · cites it 8× “In this appeal appellant raises several constitutional claims against the order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) below determining under section 440.09, Florida Statutes, that as a result of appellant's commission of a fraudulent act she is no longer entitled to…”

Hazealeferiou v. Labor Ready, 947 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). · cites it 12× “In the order, the JCC ruled that, based upon findings that the employment accident occurred in Alabama, the subject employment agreement was made in Alabama, and no record evidence established that claimant's employment was principally located in Florida, under section…”

Isaac v. Green Iguana, Inc., 871 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). · cites it 9× “, d/b/a Medical Billing Group, and Associated Industries Insurance Company, the employer and carrier respectively (employer/carrier), pursuant to section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (1999).”

McKenzie Tank Lines, Inc. v. McCauley, 418 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). · cites it 14× “McKenzie and its servicing agent appeal from an order of the deputy commissioner which refused to exact the 25% penalty required by Section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (1979), to be placed upon compensation benefits awarded to injured claimants who willfully refuse to use safety…”

Barragan v. City of Miami, 545 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1989). · cites it 6× “The Court based its holding on section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (1957), which provided that any workers' compensation benefits payable to injured public employees should be reduced by the amount of pension benefits which were also payable.”

Mangold v. Rainforest Golf Sports Ctr., 675 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). · cites it 9× “Carol Mangold, the Appellant, seeks review of a workers' compensation order finding that her husband's heart attack following his work-related injury was not compensable under section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.”

Show all 404 citing cases →

— 440.09(1) — 157 cases

Closet Maid v. Sykes, 763 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000). “1994), states that "[t]he injury, its occupational cause, and any resulting manifestations or disability shall be established to a reasonable degree of medical certainty and by objective medical findings.”

Marvin Castellanos v. Next Door Co., 192 So. 3d 431 (Fla. 2016). “; (4) a heightened standard of “major contributing cause” that applies in a majority of cases rather than the less stringent “proximate cause” standard in civil cases, § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat.; (5) a heightened burden of proof of “clear and convincing evidence” in some types of…”

Travelers Indem. Co. v. PCR INC., 889 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 2004). “2d at 686 (quoting § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (1997)) (emphasis added).”

Mangold v. Rainforest Golf Sports Ctr., 675 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996). “Carol Mangold, the Appellant, seeks review of a workers' compensation order finding that her husband's heart attack following his work-related injury was not compensable under section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (Supp.”

Turner v. PCR, INC., 754 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2000).

— 440.09(1)(a) — 6 cases

A. Duda & Sons, Inc. v. Kelley, 900 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005). “The JCC erred in finding the ulcer condition compensable and in awarding any TPD benefits when Claimant refused suitable employment.”

Cespedes v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 130 So. 3d 243 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).

Hensley v. Punta Gorda, 686 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).

Claims Mgmt., Inc. v. Drewno, 727 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999).

— 440.09(1)(b) — 25 cases

Pearson v. Paradise Ford, 951 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). “It is apparent that the amendments to subsection (1)(b) of section 440.09 were intended to overrule our decision in Closet Maid v.”

Louisiana Pac. Corp. v. Harcus, 774 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).

Staffmark v. Merrell, 43 So. 3d 792 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

— 440.09(1)(d) — 4 cases

Hazealeferiou v. Labor Ready, 947 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007). “In the order, the JCC ruled that, based upon findings that the employment accident occurred in Alabama, the subject employment agreement was made in Alabama, and no record evidence established that claimant's employment was principally located in Florida, under section…”

DL Peoples Grp., Inc. v. Hawley, 804 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

Mcdade v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sch. Dist., 898 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).

Trifecta Servs. Co. v. Najar (Fla. 1st DCA 2024).

— 440.09(2) — 17 cases

Univ. of Fla., Inst. of Agr. v. Karch, 393 So. 2d 621 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).

City of Plantation v. Roberts, 342 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 1976).

FCCI Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cayce's Excavation, Inc., 675 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

Lugo v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 487 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).

Iley v. Linzey, 531 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).

— 440.09(3) — 42 cases

Hall v. Recchi Am. Inc., 671 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

Domino's Pizza v. Gibson, 668 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1996).

US Sugar Corp. v. Henson, 823 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 2002).

Jones v. Leon Cnty. Health Dep't, 335 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1976).

Recchi Am. Inc. v. Hall, 692 So. 2d 153 (Fla. 1997).

— 440.09(4) — 71 cases

City of Miami v. Jones, 593 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). “The City contends that section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes, in effect at the time of claimant's accident, permitted the offsets.”

Isaac v. Green Iguana, Inc., 871 So. 2d 1004 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004). “, d/b/a Medical Billing Group, and Associated Industries Insurance Company, the employer and carrier respectively (employer/carrier), pursuant to section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (1999).”

McKenzie Tank Lines, Inc. v. McCauley, 418 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). “McKenzie and its servicing agent appeal from an order of the deputy commissioner which refused to exact the 25% penalty required by Section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (1979), to be placed upon compensation benefits awarded to injured claimants who willfully refuse to use safety…”

Barragan v. City of Miami, 545 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1989). “The Court based its holding on section 440.09(4), Florida Statutes (1957), which provided that any workers' compensation benefits payable to injured public employees should be reduced by the amount of pension benefits which were also payable.”

Vill. Apts. v. Hernandez, 856 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003).

— 440.09(4)(a) — 18 cases

Matrix Emp. Leasing v. Hernandez, 975 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008).

Steel Dynamics Inc.-New Millennium v. Markham, 46 So. 3d 641 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

Pavilion Apts. v. Wetherington, 943 So. 2d 226 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).

Mcarthur v. Mental Health Care, Inc., 35 So. 3d 105 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

Carroso v. State, 129 So. 3d 374 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).

— 440.09(4)(c) — 1 case

Carroso v. State, 129 So. 3d 374 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013).

— 440.09(5) — 4 cases

Mcdade v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sch. Dist., 898 So. 2d 126 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005).

Agner v. APAC-Florida, Inc., 821 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

Wallace v. Post, Buckley, Schuh & Jernigan, Inc., 579 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).

Dep't of Agric. & Consum. Servs. v. Anderson, 132 So. 3d 900 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).

— 440.09(6) — 3 cases

Agner v. APAC-Florida, Inc., 821 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

Williams, Hatfield & Stoner v. Malcolm, 687 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997).

Est. OF REYES EX REL. REYES v. Parsons Brinckerhoff Constr. Servs., Inc., 784 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).

— 440.09(7) — 4 cases

Temp. Labor Source v. EH, 765 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).

Lias v. Anderson & Shah Roofing, Inc., 867 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).

Bonita Brinson v. Hosp. Housekeeping Servs., LLC, 263 So. 3d 106 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018).

Scanlan v. Martinez, 44 Fla. Supp. 2d 170 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1990).

— 440.09(7)(a) — 2 cases

Lias v. Anderson & Shah Roofing, Inc., 831 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

Bonita Brinson v. Hosp. Housekeeping Servs., LLC, 263 So. 3d 106 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018).

— 440.09(7)(b) — 9 cases

Eur. Marble Co. v. Robinson, 885 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).

Temp. Labor Source v. EH, 765 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).

Wright v. Dsk Grp., 821 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).

Domino's Pizza v. Gibson, 668 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1996).

Thomas v. Bircheat, 16 So. 3d 198 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).

— 440.09(7)(c) — 1 case

Teresita De Jesus Abreu v. Riverland Elementary Sch. & Broward Cnty. etc. (Fla. 4th DCA 2019).

— 440.09(7)(d) — 2 cases

Eur. Marble Co. v. Robinson, 885 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).

Temp. Labor Source v. EH, 765 So. 2d 757 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).

— 440.09(8) — 1 case

Tampa Bay Nfl v. Jarvis, 668 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996).

— 440.09(a) — 3 cases

City of Ocoee v. Trimble, 929 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).

Steel Dynamics Inc.-New Millennium v. Markham, 46 So. 3d 641 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

Carrillo v. Case Eng'g, Inc., 53 So. 3d 1214 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

— 440.09(b) — 1 case

City of Ocoee v. Trimble, 929 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006).

— 440.09(l)(a) — 3 cases

Cespedes v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 130 So. 3d 243 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).

Myers v. Williams, 770 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000).

Levy Cnty. Sheriff's Off. v. Allen, 140 So. 3d 1150 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).

— 440.09(l)(b) — 22 cases

Schroeder v. Peoplease Corp., 18 So. 3d 1165 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009).

Osceola Cnty. Sch. Bd. & Florida, etc. v. Ivonne Pabellon-Nieves, 152 So. 3d 733 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014).

Westphal v. City of St. Petersburg/City of St. Petersburg Risk Mgmt., 122 So. 3d 440 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).

BYSCZYNSKI v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., 53 So. 3d 328 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).

Cespedes v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 130 So. 3d 243 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013).

— 440.09(l)(d) — 2 cases

Owens v. CCJ Auto Transp., 59 So. 3d 179 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011).

Zurich Am. Ins. v. Lawhorn, 789 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001).

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