The 2022 Florida Statutes (including 2022 Special Session A and 2023 Special Session B)
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Similarly, Florida's worker's compensation scheme provides that an “employer must pay compensation or furnish benefits required by this chapter if the employee suffers an accidental compensable injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment.” Fla. Stat. § 440.09. Florida law provides that an employer that fails to secure worker's compensation “may not plead as a defense that the injury was caused by negligence of a fellow employee, that the employee assumed the risk of the employment, or that the injury was due to the comparative negligence of the employee.” Fla. Stat. § 440.11(1)(a).
To the extent that Wyatt's claim for medical benefits and indemnity relies on her PTSD being an occupational disease as provided by sections 112.1815(5) and 440.151, she correctly identifies [the date she took a leave of absence] as the accident date. Notwithstanding any other provision in chapter 440, "the disablement . . . of an employee resulting from an occupational disease . . . shall be treated as the happening of an injury by accident." § 440.151(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (emphasis supplied); cf. § 440.09( 1), Fla. Stat. (requiring an employer to pay compensation and furnish benefits for an "accidental compensable injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment"). Neither the employee's exposure to a cause of the disease nor her suffering of symptoms counts toward the accident date; her disablement (read: her "disability") does, if it occurs at all. § 440.151(1)(a), (3), Fla. Stat. (2018); cf. City of Port Orange v. Sedacca, 953 So.2d 727, 732 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) ("Realistically, it is possible that a permanent disease may never result in disability."). At least with respect to wage indemnity, then, an employee, does not suffer a…
We start with the date of the accident. To the extent that Wyatt's claim for medical benefits and indemnity relies on her PTSD being an occupational disease as provided by sections 112.1815(5) and 440.151, she correctly identifies November 27, 2018, as the accident date. Notwithstanding any other provision in chapter 440, "the disablement . . . of an employee resulting from an occupational disease . . . shall be treated as the happening of an injury by accident." § 440.151(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (emphasis supplied); cf. § 440.09( 1), Fla. Stat. (requiring an employer to pay compensation and furnish benefits for an "accidental compensable injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment"). Neither the employee's exposure to a cause of the disease nor her suffering of symptoms counts toward the accident date; her disablement (read: her "disability") does, if it occurs at all. § 440.151(1)(a), (3), Fla. Stat. (2018); cf. City of Port Orange v. Sedacca, 953 So.2d 727, 732 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) ("Realistically, it is possible that a permanent disease may never result in disability."). At least with respect to wage indemnity, then, an employee…
Prior to the enactment of section 112.1816, a firefighter who was diagnosed with cancer and believed the disease was caused by his or her employment as a firefighter could only seek benefits from their employer by filing a workers' compensation claim. See § 112.1816(2), Fla. Stat. (2019) (stating the statute is an "alternative to pursuing workers' compensation benefits under chapter 440"). To be eligible to receive benefits under chapter 440, the firefighter had to make several showings, including a showing that the cancer was caused by their work. § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (2019). If causation was established, the firefighter would receive, among other things, a percentage of their average weekly wages while they remained disabled. See generally § 440.15, Fla. Stat. (2019).
This Court reviews statutory interpretation questions de novo. Generally, Florida's workers’ compensation system compensates employees for injuries resulting from their work. That is, injuries "arising out of and in the course of employment." § 440.02(19), Fla. Stat.; see also § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. The going-and-coming provision statutorily defines out of workers’ compensation coverage injuries that occur while an employee is traveling to and from work:
It should also be recognized that Valcourt-Williams cited with approval Sentry Insurance Company v. Hamlin , 69 So. 3d 1065 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011). Valcourt-Williams , 271 So. 3d at 1134. In Hamlin we stated, "Work connection determines coverage under chapter 440, not fault." Id. at 1069 ; see also Taylor v. Sch. Bd. of Brevard Cnty. , 888 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 2004). So the majority here correctly holds that the Employer/Carrier's attempt to inject fault must fail. See § 440.10(2), Fla. Stat. Fault should be a consideration only in limited cases when a claimant was injured while under the influence of drugs or alcohol or when a claimant was injured while engaging in a willful act with the intent to injure or kill. See § 440.09(3), Fla. Stat. To hold otherwise would violate the statutory system created by the Legislature and impair "the quick and efficient delivery of disability and medical benefits to an injured worker" as well as delaying "the worker's return to gainful reemployment at a reasonable cost to the employer." § 440.015, Fla. Stat.
An employee's injury is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act if it stems from an accident that "aris[es] out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment." § 440.09( 1), Fla. Stat.; see also § 440.02(19), Fla. Stat. (defining "injury" in terms of an accident "arising out of and in the course of employment"); § 440.02(1), Fla. Stat. (defining an "accident" in the context of chapter 440 as "only an unexpected or unusual event or result that happens suddenly"). "The phrases ‘arising out of’ and ‘in the course of employment’ are used conjunctively. The words ‘arising out of’ refer to the origin of the cause of the accident, while the words ‘in the course of employment’ refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which the accident occurs." Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Richardson , 148 Fla. 323, 4 So. 2d 378, 379 (1941) (citing reference omitted). For decades the supreme court has been telling us that this means an employee must "show that the accident or injury happened not only in the course of [his] employment but arose out of it. There must have been a causal connection between the employment and the injury." Gen. Properties Co. v. Greening …
The parties don't dispute the underlying facts here. Cabrera was working to install a residential cable line for Kablelink in 2016, when he fell from a ladder and was severely injured. He filed a petition seeking workers' compensation benefits from Kablelink. But Kablelink disputed that Cabrera was eligible under its plan because he was an independent contractor. See § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (2016) (making benefits available only to "employees"). A prior agreement between Cabrera and Kablelink recognized him to be "an independent contractor and not an employee." Notwithstanding the agreement, Cabrera asserted that he is considered a Kablelink employee under Florida law because independent contractors are "employees" if they are working and engaged "in the construction industry." § 440.02(15)(c) 3., (d)1., Fla. Stat. Cabrera believes that the law's "construction industry" definition includes the cable-laying work he was doing for Kablelink. See § 440.02(8), Fla. Stat.
Under section 440.09(1), the "accidental compensable injury must be the major contributing cause [MCC] of any resulting injuries." Paragraph (b) of this section further provides that when a work-related injury combines with a preexisting disease or condition to cause or prolong disability or the need for treatment, the E/C must pay benefits "only to the extent that the injury arising out of and in the course of employment is and remains more than 50 percent responsible for the injury as compared to all other causes combined and thereafter remains the [MCC] of the disability or need for treatment." § 440.09(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2016). This court has previously recognized that section 440.09(1)(b) applies when the need for treatment or benefits is caused by the combination of an employment accident with a preexisting injury or condition that is unrelated to the accident. E.g., Pizza Hut v. Proctor , 955 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007).
See generally § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (2018) (defining MCC as "the cause which is more than 50 percent responsible for the injury as compared to all other causes combined for which treatment or benefits are sought").
. . . ." § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (2016). . . . Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2016), states in part, "The employer must pay compensation or furnish . . . However, to satisfy the "arising out of work" requirement of section 440.09(1), the personal comfort . . .
. . . We would note that the E/C neither pled nor pursued a fraud defense pursuant to sections 440.09(4) and . . .
. . . Phillips , 656 So.2d 1386, 1387 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (holding that term "compensation" as used in § 440.09 . . . The fraud defense under section 440.09(4) is not available for accidents that occurred before the statute's . . .
. . . the workplace injury is the major contributing cause of the need for surgery as required by section 440.09 . . .
. . . Powers's testimony stem from the evidentiary requirements set forth in sections 90.704 and 440.09(1). . . . Section 440.09(1) requires that "[t]he injury, its occupational cause, and any resulting manifestations . . .
. . . See § 440.09(3), Fla. Stat. (2017). Ms. Brinson challenged the denial of benefits. . . . to rebut the statutory presumption attributing her injury primarily to the influence of drugs, see § 440.09 . . . And it does not compensate for the injury. § 440.09(3), Fla. Stat. . . . ." § 440.09(7)(b), Fla. Stat. Ms. . . . Test results have long been used in workers' compensation cases (and § 440.09(7)(b)'s presumption has . . . . § 440.09(7)(b), Fla. Stat. (2018). . . . to the extent that the employee's normal faculties were impaired" as to the accident in question. § 440.09 . . . on the statutory presumption of intoxication in section 440.09(7)(b) (discussed further below). . . . An employer without a program, of course, may conduct drug testing under state law, as section 440.09 . . . Hall , 692 So.2d 153 (Fla. 1997) (section 440.09(3)'s then-existing conclusive presumption that injury . . .
. . . In the order, the JCC found that no benefits were payable in accordance with subsection 440.09(3), Florida . . . Under subsection 440.09(3), compensation is not payable if the injury was occasioned primarily by the . . . Although section 440.09(7)(b) also provides that evidence of a certain blood alcohol level creates a . . . comply with the Florida Administrative Code to establish the intoxication presumption under section 440.09 . . . "When the presumption in section 440.09(7)(b) does not apply, employer/carriers must 'establish, by the . . .
. . . In the notice of denial, the E/C asserted that, by operation of subsection 440.09(3), Florida Statutes . . .
. . . Section 440.09(1) does not enumerate “all other causes” for MCC analysis, but subsections (a) and (b) . . . As this Court summarized in Cespedes, “under the text of section 440.09(1)(a)-(b), MCC analysis cannot . . . The JCC assumed that, for purposes of 440.09(l)(b), a preexisting condition “must have produced the need . . . Claimant’s preexisting osteoarthritis is a qualifying preexisting condition under section 440.09(l)(b . . . Code R. 60Q-6.113(2)(h) requires, ”[a]ny defense raised pursuant to Sections 440.09(4)(a) and 440.105 . . .
. . . Sectioris 440.09(4) and 440.105, Florida Statutes, are often referred to as the mechanisms that created . . . Accordingly, per section 440.09(4), the commission of “any” act of an employee prohibited by section . . . However, this formal dismissal of claims does not shield the Claimant from the reach of section 440.09 . . . The JCC erroneously required that for benefit denial under section 440.09(4), the E/C had to link the . . . Pursuant to section 440.09(4)(a), and having violated section 440.105, the Claimant is not entitled to . . .
. . . partial disability benefits and rejecting the affirmative defense of misrepresentation under paragraphs 440.09 . . . Under subsection 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2014), an employer/carrier is responsible for providing . . . the injury, when compared to all other causes combined for which treatment or benefits are sought. § 440.09 . . .
. . . .” § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. . . . Section 440.09(1) must be read in conjunction with section 440.02(1), which provides as follows: ... . . . Following qualification for the presumption, the claimant’s burden of proving MCC under section 440.09 . . . MCC is not revived as a required standard of proof for the claimant under sections 440.09(1) and 440.161 . . .
. . . of Compensation Claims (JCC) rejecting their affirmative defense of misrepresentation under sections 440.09 . . . intentionally engaged in” such acts “for the purpose of securing workers’ compensation benefits.” § 440.09 . . .
. . . See §§ 440.09(1); 440.11, Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . The medical causation defense appears in section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes: [T]he accidental compensable . . .
. . . See §§ 440.09, .10. . . .
. . . subsequently described in the joint pretrial stipulation as: “ ‘Misrepresentation,’ in violation of §§ 440.09 . . . And section 440.09(4)(a), Florida Statutes, bars benefits for an employee found to have “knowingly dr . . . misrepresentation defense under • rule 60Q-6.113(2)(h), which provides: Any defense 'raised pursuant to Sections 440.09 . . . with instructions to the JCC to determine whether Cláimant made “any” statements afoul of subsection 440.09 . . .
. . . See §§ 440.09(1), 440.13(14)(c), Fla. Stat. (2009). . . .
. . . The E/C filed a response to the petition, denying the claim based on sections 440.09(4) (intentional . . . in a majority of cases rather than the less stringent "proximate cause” standard in civil cases, § 440.09 . . . heightened burden of proof of “clear and convincing evidence” in some types of cases, §§ 440.02(1), 440.09 . . .
. . . Subsection 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2010), provides: The employer must pay compensation or furnish . . . Claimant’s subjective complaints, standing alone, however, will not meet the requirements of subsection 440.09 . . .
. . . . § 440.09(1)). . . .
. . . See § 440.09(1)(b), Fla. . . . Proctor, 955 So.2d 637, 638 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (“[Section 440.09(l)(b) applies when a claimant’s need . . .
. . . Compare § 440.09(1), Fla. . . . performed in the course and scope of employment is the major contributing cause of the injury”), with § 440.09 . . .
. . . between the original work accident of 4/1/12 and claimant’s current need for psychiatric treatment, per § 440.09 . . . the burden to show that the April 1, 2012, Compensable workplace accident is the MCC for his PTSD. §§ 440.09 . . . See §§ 440.09, 440.13, Fla. Stat. (2011). . . .
. . . including new allegations and an additional (fourth) count seeking a declaratory judgment that sections 440.09 . . . Section 440.09 addresses the scope of coverage for on-job injuries. . . . .
. . . TTD) benefits on the grounds that Claimant made misrepresentations forfeiting benefits under sections 440.09 . . . Section 440.09(4) bars benefits for an em ployee found to have “knowingly or intentionally engaged in . . . Notwithstanding these facts, Claimant argues that in every instance where section 440.09(4) is applied . . . But the plain text of section 440.09(4) suggests something different: “An employee shall not be entitled . . . At the time of Lessard, section 440.09(4) did not allow JCCs to make determinations of fraud (instead . . .
. . . Jones’s 1981 workplace injury, rather than the standard in section 440.09, Florida Statutes (2013), was . . . We reject the E/C’s argument that a selected portion of current version of section 440.09, relating to . . . Here, we conclude that the amendment to section 440.09 in 1994 affected Mr. . . . The JCC, therefore, properly declined to apply the current version of section 440.09 as to the causation . . .
. . . Claimant had not produced evidence of “objective relevant medical findings” as required by section 440.09 . . . this test at the insistence of the Employer/Servicing Agent (E/SA), based on the wording of section 440.09 . . . But Claimant argues the JCC used the wrong legal standard, because section 440.09 governs compensability . . . standard of causation in 1994, see chapter 93-415, section 5, at 76, Laws of Florida (amending section 440.09 . . . of the injured employee and are confirmed by physical examination findings or diagnostic testing.” § 440.09 . . .
. . . appeals a final order denying his claims for medical and indemnity benefits as barred under section 440.09 . . . Section 440.09(4)(a) provides that an employee who knowingly or intentionally violates subsections 440.105 . . . Accordingly, I concur that the JCC’s order denying Claimant’s claims as barred under section 440.09(4 . . . require the following in the parties' pretrial stipulation: Any defense raised pursuant to Sections 440.09 . . .
. . . We write, however, to clarify application of section 440.09(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2009). . . . Section 440.09(l)(b) provides: If an injury arising out of and in the course of employment combines with . . . See § 440.09(l)(b), Fla. . . . (amending section 440.09(l)(b) as of October 1, 2003, to require that major contributing cause be proven . . .
. . . order of the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) that concludes Claimant is disqualified, under section 440.09 . . . has, therefore, forfeited his entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits as directed by section 440.09 . . .
. . . employer had no agreement providing for workers’ compensation coverage for that private employment^] § 440.09 . . .
. . . .” § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (2010). . . .
. . . District analyzed section 440.105(4)(b)9 only as it applied to the denial of coverage under section 440.09 . . .
. . . Legislature’s adoption of the “major contributing cause” standard effective January 1, 1994, see sections 440.09 . . .
. . . See § 440.09, Fla. Stat. (2007). . . . physical injury, the mental or ner vous injury would be compensable because it would meet the section 440.09 . . .
. . . wherein the Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) rejected its partial affirmative defense under section 440.09 . . .
. . . .” § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (2011). . . . established to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, based on objective relevant medical findings [.] ” § 440.09 . . .
. . . Section 440.09(l)(a)-(b) sets forth the textual basis for coverage of injuries under chapter 440. . . . . § 440.09(1), Fla: Stat. (2005). . . . See § 440.09(l)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. (2005). . . . In short, under the text of section 440.09(1)(a)-(b), MCC analysis cannot be performed in a vacuum or . . . Under the dictates of section 440.09(l)(b), Florida Statutes (2005), and this court’s relevant case law . . .
. . . . § 440.09(1). . . .
. . . Under section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes, as amended in 1994, pain is com-pensable only with objective . . .
. . . Paradise Ford, 951 So.2d 12, 16 (Fla, 1st DCA 2007) (recognizing that the 2003 amendments to section 440.09 . . .
. . . offense with the monetary amount of the noncriminal, administrative sanction available under section 440.09 . . . Section 440.09(4)(a) provides for a noncriminal, administrative sanction in the event that a claimant . . . Section 440.09(4)(a) states: An employee shall not be entitled to compensation or benefits under this . . . Escobar, 729 So.2d 1014, 1015 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (“[S]ection 440.09(4) ... does not limit a claimant . . . The First District has interpreted the sanction in section 440.09(4)(a) to result in the cessation of . . .
. . . . § 440.09 (2003). Thus, there is a need for a determination as to the injured party's status. . . . .
. . . Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2007), provides: “The employer must pay compensation or furnish . . .
. . . to that EMA, and by doing so had forfeited all workers’ compensation benefits, as stated in sections 440.09 . . .
. . . . § 440.09(1). . . .
. . . .” § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (2010). See also Orange County MIS Dep’t v. . . .
. . . receives remuneration under employment contract, whether express or implied, oral or written); see also § 440.09 . . .
. . . Claimant’s accidental injuries, Claimant satisfied the major contributing cause requirement of sections 440.09 . . .
. . . /C or its attorney for violating section 440.105, it could have easily done so as it did in section 440.09 . . .
. . . . § 440.09(1) (“An employer must pay compensation or furnish benefits required by this chapter if the . . .
. . . Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2009), requires that causation be established by clear and convincing . . . established to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, based on objective relevant medical findings.” § 440.09 . . . Accordingly, because claimant met her burden, as required by section 440.09(1), to prove that “[t]he . . .
. . . On appeal, the claimant argued that section 440.09(1)(b) did not apply because his injuries were caused . . . We determined that section 440.09(l)(b) was intended to apply only when a claimant’s need for treatment . . . Proctor, 955 So.2d 637, 638 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (holding that the E/C could not rely upon section 440.09 . . . See § 440.09(1), Fla. . . . Section 440.09(1 )(b) provides in part that "[i]f an injury arising out of and in the course of employment . . .
. . . treatment, I find that the major contributing cause standard and the criteria for compensability under F.S. 440.09 . . . resulting aggravation of the pre-exist-ing condition was the MCC of his need for treatment under section 440.09 . . . of employment is and remains the major contributing cause of the disability or need for treatment. § 440.09 . . . Farthing, 905 So.2d 925, 928 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (holding the MCC requirement of section 440.09(1)(b) . . . Oweis, 733 So.2d 1149, 1150 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999) (holding the MCC requirement in section 440.09(l)(b) . . .
. . . . § 440.09(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2006). . . .
. . . on the first part of the coverage formula, “arising out of work performed,” as set forth in section 440.09 . . . doing an activity implicitly permitted by the Employer, the “arising out of’ requirement of section 440.09 . . . COURSE AND SCOPE INSUFFICIENT The coverage formula found in section 440.09(1) reads: “The employer must . . .
. . . . § 440.09(4)(a), Fla. Stat. (2006). . . . this court found could not serve as the predicate for disqualification from benefits under sections 440.09 . . .
. . . grounds Claimant violated section 440.105(4)(b), Florida Statutes (2006), and thus, pursuant to section 440.09 . . . Stat. 440.09(4) whether the Employee/Claimant had knowingly made false, fraudulent or misleading oral . . .
. . . See § 440.09(1), Fla. . . .
. . . a sufficient causal relationship between his accident and his injury, findings relevant to section 440.09 . . .
. . . provider, an IME, or an expert medical advisor is admissible in proceedings before the JCC); see also § 440.09 . . . See § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (2005); see generally Castillo v. E.I. . . .
. . . . § 440.09(1) (providing employer must pay compensation where employee suffers injury “arising out of . . .
. . . Section 440.09(l)(d), Florida Statutes (2007), provides that the Florida Workers’ Compensation Law covers . . . See § 440.09(l)(d), Fla. Stat. (2007). . . .
. . . Stat. 440.09(l)(b)), rev. denied, 980 So.2d 490 (Fla.2008). . . .
. . . of claimant’s attorney’s fees because, in defeating the affirmative defense contemplated by sections 440.09 . . . benefits are still payable because he prevailed in resisting the affirmative defense based on sections 440.09 . . . Section 440.09(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2009), located within the “coverage” provisions of chapter 440 . . . Stat.; and § 440.09(a), Fla. . . . Setting up the fraud defense under sections 440.09 and 440.105 put com-pensability at issue — and did . . .
. . . See §§ 440.09, 440.10(2), Fla. Stat. (2008). . . .
. . . occupational injuries and, thus, the JCC erred in applying the major contributing cause standard in section 440.09 . . . Here, the JCC, by application of the major contributing cause standard in section 440.09(l)(b) denied . . . Ford, 951 So.2d 12, 17 (Fla. 1st DCA 2007) (stating “it seems evident that the legislature intended [440.09 . . .
. . . . § 440.09. . . .
. . . The Judge of Compensation Claims initially denied the claim on the ground that section 440.09(1), Florida . . . provide an evaluation on the ground that there were no objective relevant medical findings under section 440.09 . . . Statutes (2007), and its test of whether the requested benefit is medically necessary, and not section 440.09 . . .
. . . concluding Claimant is not disqualified from receiving all compensation under the provisions of section 440.09 . . . The E/C fails to appreciate that the applicability of section 440.09(4)(a) (the provision of the Workers . . . established that claimant made criminal misrepresentation for purpose of securing employment, section 440.09 . . . , 929 So.2d 563 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006) (reversing for lack of CSE JCC’s disqualification under section 440.09 . . . Conclusion In essence, the E/C has interpreted section 440.09(4)(a) as a means of disqualifying a claimant . . .
. . . Analysis Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2007), provides in relevant part: The injury, its occupational . . . See §§ 440.09(1) & 440.13(5)(e), Fla. Stat. (2007). . . .
. . . defined, however, and later applied in the context of the “major contributing cause” provision of section 440.09 . . . In Pearson, this court defined “preexisting condition,” for purposes of section 440.09(1)(b), to mean . . . This definition was subsequently adopted and applied in Proctor, wherein the court held that “section 440.09 . . .
. . . See § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (2007). . . .
. . . See § 440.09, Fla. Stat. (2007). . . . physical injury, the mental or nervous injury would be compensable because it would meet the section 440.09 . . .
. . . Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2004), provides that “[t]he employer shall pay compensation or furnish . . .
. . . final order denying all of her claims for benefits pursuant to the so-called “fraud defense” in section 440.09 . . . See § 440.09(4)(a), 440.105(4)®, 440.106, Fla. Stat. . . . process by which an employee may be sanctioned for violating section 440.105 is set forth in section 440.09 . . . See § 440.09(4)(a), Fla. Stat. . . . Thus, not only does section 440.09(4) specifically authorize the JCC to determine whether an employee . . .
. . . The Pawtucket Police Manual of Procedures 440.09 provides that a supervisor is to be sent in addition . . .
. . . Claimant’s injuries to be a compensable aggravation of a preexisting condition pursuant to section 440.09 . . . Pursuant to section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2001), Claimant was required to prove the existence . . . Thus, pursuant to section 440.09(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2001), Claimant was further required to prove . . .
. . . 440.105(4)(b), and thus required a forfeiture of all workers’ compensation benefits pursuant to section 440.09 . . .
. . . Analysis Section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (2008), requires: The injury, its occupational cause, and . . .
. . . . § 440.09(1). . . .
. . . . § 440.09(1). . . .
. . . found to have committed fraud with respect to those (different) benefits, in violation of sections 440.09 . . .
. . . condition, which is a recognized defense to a claim for workers’ compensation benefits under section 440.09 . . . compensable injury or death arising out of work performed in the course and the scope of employment.” § 440.09 . . .
. . . Judge of Compensation Claims (JCC) accepted the E/C’s position and denied all claims under section 440.09 . . . prohibited acts is not entitled to compensation or benefits under the workers’ compensation statute. § 440.09 . . .
. . . by the influence of any drugs, barbiturates, or other stimulants not prescribed by a physician-” § 440.09 . . . See § 440.09(7)(b), Fla. . . . When the presumption under section 440.09(7)(b), Florida Statutes, does not apply, employer/carriers . . . DSK Group, 821 So.2d 455, 456 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (quoting section 440.09(3)); see also Sterling, 580 . . .
. . . there were no objective relevant medical findings justifying the evaluation as required by section 440.09 . . . Section 440.09 is entitled “Coverage.” . . .
. . . includ-ing the allegation that Claimant is no longer entitled to benefits because he violated sections 440.09 . . .
. . . Section 440.09(3), Florida Statutes (2007), provides that “[c]ompensation is not payable if the injux-y . . .
. . . See §§ 440.09(4), 440.105(4)(b)l-3, Fla. Stat. (2005). . . . See §§ 440.09(4), 440.105(4)(b)l-3, Fla. Stat. . . .
. . . injury occurred in the course and scope of employment, as required for compensability under section 440.09 . . .
. . . The JCC concluded that the objective medical evidence requirement found in section 440.09(1), Florida . . .
. . . .” § 440.09(2), Fla. Stat. (1986). See also Escambia County Transit v. . . .
. . . See § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (2006). . . . See § 440.09(1), Fla. Stat. (2006); Mitchell v. . . . In pertinent part, this provision states: 440.09 Coverage.— (1) The employer must pay compensation or . . .
. . . State, Dep’t of Corr., 890 So.2d 1238, 1238 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); see also § 440.09(1), Fla. . . .
. . . argued that this section did not apply to his claim, but, rather, the JCC should have applied section 440.09 . . . Section 440.09(1) requires a claimant establish a workplace accident was more than 50% responsible for . . . ” dictated Claimant had in fact suffered a mental or nervous injury, can substitute for the section 440.09 . . .
. . . for Indus., 772 So.2d 560, 561 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (rejecting an excessive fines challenge to section 440.09 . . .
. . . State, Dep’t of Corr., 890 So.2d 1238, 1238 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005); see also § 440.09(1), Fla. . . .
. . . The E/C argues that the JCC erred in its application of sections 440.105(4)(b)(9) and 440.09(4)(a), Florida . . . by claimant pursuant to section 440'.105(4)(b)(9) is sufficient to trigger the provisions of section 440.09 . . . Section 440.09(4)(a), Florida Statutes (2005), provides: An employee shall not be entitled to compensation . . . The E/C, on one hand, asserts that section 440.09(4)(a) should be read to mean that an employee shall . . . Claimant, on the other hand, interprets section 440.09(4)(a) differently. . . .